Objection that the general power of taxation would inter-
fere with the State levies considered-- Barrier against this
danger-Federal sovereignty limited-The only exclusive
power of taxation in the federal government is in laying duties
on imports-The power of taxation in all other respects con-
current with that of the States - Proof of this- No repug-
nancy between federal and State power-Concurrent author-
ity the necessary result of a divided sovereignty.

No. XXXIII.-THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

Objections to incidental powers of taxation considered-
These powers necessary- Their express grant an act of caution
The federal authorities and then their constituents the
judges of the propriety of federal measures-Objections that
the taxation laws of the Union are supreme considered, and
the necessity of this supremacy shown -These laws limited
by the Constitution.

No. XXXIV.-THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

Concurrent authority concerning taxation the only alterna-
tive to complete subordination of the States - Absurdity of
denying the practicability of concurrent authority - Examples
from Roman history -- Needs of the federal government for
large powers of taxation.

No. XXXV.-THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

Reasons for not restricting federal government in the mat-
ter of revenue - Restraint would lead to inequality of taxa-
tion and oppression — Objections that the interest of the
revenue would guard against an extreme tariff, and that all
classes of tax-paying citizens cannot be represented, consid-
ered Representation in Congress analyzed in regard to taxa-
tion-Good effects of mixed representation and the need of
extensive information among representatives.

--

No. XXXVI.--THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

Representation further considered with reference to taxa-
tion - The federal government able to exercise the power of in-
ternal taxation-Better than the system of requisitions-No
danger of conflict between State and federal authorities in
regard to taxation-Minor objections to power of taxation
considered.

PAGE

206

211

216

223

230

No. XXXVII.- CONCERNING THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONVEN-

TION IN DEVISING A PROPER FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Difficulty of discussing public measures in the right spirit
- Predetermined friends and enemies-The Federalist ad-
dressed to neither, but to those who wish merely the happi-
ness of the country-Novelty and difficulties of the work
pointed out-The constitution of necessity not perfect, but
the convention worked without party feeling, and all were
finally satisfied.

No. XXXVIII.-THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND THE INCO-
HERENCE OF THE OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW PLAN Ex-

POSED

-

All governments of deliberation and consent hitherto
framed by individuals — Examples -- Errors in the new sys-
tem arise from lack of experience — The present situation of
America Existing evils shown, and the futility of the ob-
jections and remedies of the opposition.

No. XXXIX. THE CONFORMITY OF THE PLAN TO REPUBLICAN
PRINCIPLES

PAGE

. 238

Only a Republican system possible for America — The
principles of republican government shown by examples-
The proposed constitution conforms to the standard - Proofs
of this from the provisions of the Constitution - Neither
wholly national nor wholly federal.

No. XL. THE POWERS OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A Mixed
GOVERNMENT EXAMINED AND SUSTAINED

246

. 256

The authority under which the convention acted examined
- Proper even to have exceeded authority, from considera-
tions of duty-Constitution merely recommended - Necessity
for a radical change-Whether the convention exceeded its
powers does not affect the question of ratification.

No. XLI.- GENERAL VIEW OF THE POWERS CONFERRED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.

-

The quantity of power conferred - Not greater than it
should be-General objections considered — The objects of
the powers conferred - Declaring war and granting letters
of marque-Providing armies and fleets-Regulating and
calling out the militia-Levying taxes and borrowing money.

264

274

No. XLII.-THE POWERS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION FUR-
THER CONSIDered.

Regulation of intercourse with foreign nations - Ambassa-
dors, consuls, and treaties-Punishment of piracy, felonies
on the high seas, and offenses against the laws of nations-
Regulation of foreign commerce-The sanction of the slave
trade- Objection on that point considered - Maintenance of
harmony and proper intercourse among the States-Inter-
State commerce and the Indian trade-Coinage of money-
Punishment of counterfeiters - Standard of weights and meas-
ures-Naturalization — Bankruptcy laws-Rule for proving
public acts- Post roads and post offices.

-

No. XLIII. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

.

Miscellaneous powers - Copyrights and patents- The Fed-
eral city Punishment of treason-Admission of new States
-Government of territories and control of public property —
Guarantee to every State of a republican form of govern-
ment - Protection of States against invasion and against
domestic violence - Assumption of payment of outstanding
debts-Amendments to the Constitution -The establishment
of this government on the adherence of nine States - Objec-
tion that this is a violation of the Confederation - Relations
between ratifying States and those which refuse to ratify.

-

No. XLIV.- RESTRICTIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE SEVERAL

STATES.

Forbidding the establishment of treaties and alliances be-
tween the States, the issue of letters of marque, the coinage
of money, the issue of bills of credit, the establishment of any
legal tender other than gold and silver, the passage of bills of
attainder, the passage of ex-post-facto laws, the passage of
laws impairing contracts, the establishment of titles of nobility,
and the imposition of duties on exports and imports- The
power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry the pre-
ceding powers into execution - Necessity of such a power-
Prohibition of the exercise of any powers not expressly dele-
gated--Positive enumeration of general powers delegated
-Negative enumeration by specification of reserved powers
and by silence-Remedy for an abuse of this general power-
The supremacy of the Constitution, the constitutional laws,
and treaties-Oath of State and federal officers to support
Constitution-No part of the powers delegated unnecessary or
improper.

PAGE

285

294

305

No.

No. XLV.-THE ALLEGED DANGER FROM THE POWERS OF THE
UNION TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS CONSIDERED

The new Constitution not dangerous to the State govern-
ments, because: the tendency in confederacies is to weaken
the central power; the State governments will have more
influence among the people; the State governments are essen-
tial parts of the federal government; the officers of the
United States are less numerous than those of the States;
the reserved powers are relatively greater than those dele-
gated; the proposed change consists less in giving new than
in strengthening old powers.

No. XLVI. THE INFLUENCE OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL GOV-
ERNMENTS COMPARED.

-

PAGE

314

· 321

Federal and State governments only different agents of
the same constituents — The first attachment of the people
will be to the State governments Reasons for this
Popularity will come to the federal government only if it is
better administered - Reasons for this- Objection on score
of federal military power answered - Concluding remarks on
the proposition that the powers of the Union will be dan-
gerous to the State governments.

No. XLVII.- THE PARTICULAR STRUCTURE OF THE NEW Gov-
ERNMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AMONG ITS
DIFFERENT PARTS

-

The maxim that there should be separate and distinct
departments considered This maxim true-The New Con-
stitution does not violate it-The views of Montesquieu —
The provisions of the various State constitutions on this
point examined.

No. XLVIII.-THESE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD NOT BE SO FAR
SEPARATED AS TO HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL
OVER EACH OTHER

Powers of one department, it is conceded, should not be
exercised by another - One department should not have an
overruling influence over another - Security against the in-
vasion of one department by another considered-Insuffi-
ciency of new constitutional restrictions The tendency of
the legislature to absorb the other departments - Reasons
for this- An instance of executive encroachment explained.

329

338

-

.

No. XLIX. — Method of GuarDING AGAINST THE ENCROACHMENTS
OF ANY ONE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT BY APPEAL-
ING TO THE PEOPLE THROUGH A CONVENTION
Propriety of a well-defined mode of appealing to the
people - A sufficient remedy- Very dangerous and useless
if too frequently applied Reasons for this- When such
appeals are useful Remarks on occasional appeals to the

people.

-

-

No. L-PERIODICAL APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE CONSIDERED
The merits and disadvantages of short and long intervals
-Example of Pennsylvania.

No. LI. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT MUST FURNISH
THE PROPER CHECKS AND BALANCES BETWEEN THe Dif-
FERENT DEPARTMENTS

PAGE

344

349

Modes of obtaining these mutual checks and balances—
Advantages of the federal government in securing the rights
of the people- Division of the delegated powers - Different
interests among the people.

-

No. LII. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

-

-

Electors-The qualifications of the members The term
of office- Biennial elections - Value of frequent elections -
Terms of service in other governments - In England, Ire-
land, and in the American colonies- Biennial elections not
dangerous - Reasons for this drawn from the nature and
position of Congress.

No. LIII. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

-

Objection that when annual elections end tyranny begins
answered - Biennial elections necessary and useful- Objec-
tions to unduly short terms - Biennial elections useful and
safe.

· 353

359

365

No. LIV. THE APPORTIONment of MEMBERS AMONG THE STATES. 372

Numbers the proper standard for representation - Slave
representation - Objection that slaves do not enter into local
representation considered- The right of representation of
property as well as persons-Votes in Congress should be
proportioned to the wealth of the States-No inducement for
falsifying the census, as it is the basis of taxation as well as
representation.