mont, and the defendant was a New
York corporation, lessee of a rail-
road in Vermont, and in possession
of the road and running it there,
under the lease. Under a statute of
Vermont, it had appointed a person
in Vermont upon whom service of
every kind of process known to the
laws of the State might at any time
be made, such service on such person
to be a legal service on the lessee.
The writ in this suit was served on
such agent, in Vermont, in the man-
ner provided by the laws of Ver-
mont. The defendant moved to dis-
miss the suit on the ground that
jurisdiction of the defendant was not
obtained by service: Held, that the
motion must be denied. Brownell v.
Troy & Boston R. R. Co.,
242
The defendant did not become a citi-
zen of Vermont, and the service of
the process in Vermont was good
under said law of the State. id.
5. An action against a town in Ver-
mont, given by a statute of Vermont,
for special damage from the insuffi-
ciency of a highway or bridge in the
town, which the town was bound to
keep in repair, is an action at com-
mon law, of which the Circuit Court
of the United States has jurisdic-
tion, under § 629 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, and § 1
of the Act of March 3d, 1875, (18 U.
S. Stat. at Large, 470.) Keith v. Town
of Rockingham,
246
1. This suit was brought by the plaint-
iff against a postmaster, for the in-
fringement of a patent. On a sug-
gestion by the latter, one E. was 6.
made a defendant, as owning an in-
terest in the patent, and afterwards
others were made defendants as hav-
ing an interest in it: Held, that the
questions as to such interest were
questions arising under the patent
law, and within the jurisdiction of
the Court, whether the conveyances
were made pendente lite or not. Camp
bell v. James,
Under the Act of the Legislature
of the State of New York, passed
May 8th, 1869, (Laws of New York,
of 1869, chap. 738, p. 1,785,) H.
brought a suit in the Supreme Court
of New York against T. and W., to
foreclose a possessory lien for re-
pairs on a vessel owned by T. to
which H. had made repairs, on the
delivery of her to him by T. for that
purpose. W. held a mortgage on the
vessel. The vessel was sold under a
decree of foreclosure in the suit and
was bought by H. Afterwards, a suit
in Admiralty, in rem, for wages, was
brought against the vessel, in the
District Court. T. filed a claim to
the vessel as owner, and so did H.:
Held, that the State Court had no
jurisdiction to enforce the lien, be-
cause the contract was a maritime
contract, and the remedy was not a
common law remedy or one which
the common law was competent to
give, and the jurisdiction was exclu-
sive in the District Courts of the
United States, under § 563 of the Re-
vised Statutes of the United States,
and that the claim of H., as owner of
the vessel, must be stricken out. The
B. F. Woolsey,
344
7. The nature of a lien arising out of a
locatio operis faciendi, considered. id.
See BANKRUPTCY, 3, 4.
REMOVAL OF CAUSE.
See INJUNCTION.
PATENT, 73.
See CONTEMPT, 1 to 3.
JURISDICTION, 6, 7.
WHARFAGE, 1, 2.
1. Unsealed coupons, originally attached
to sealed bonds, and sold after being
detached, are subject to the statute
of limitations applicable to sealed
instruments. Kershaw v. Town of
Hancock,
383
after the woman had returned to New
York, that any definite plan as to the
time or place of the marriage was en-
tertained, and then it was contem-
plated that the parties should be mar-
ried in New York, at some convenient
future time. There was no intent to
marry in New York for the purpose
of evading the laws of Alabama. By
the statute of Alabama, a marriage
between a man and the sister of his
mother is void, and, if they marry,
they are punishable by imprison-
ment. No statute of New York ex-
pressly forbids such a marriage. In
a suit, in New York, by the woman
against the man for damages for the
breach of such contract: Held,
(1.) The contract was void, because
void by the law of Alabama, where
it was made;
(2.) The fact that the marriage was
to be solemnized in New York did
not make the contract valid, because
the place of performance of the con-
tract was not where the marriage
was to be solemnized, but was Ala-
bama, where the parties were to re-
side and discharge their marital re-
lations;
(3.) A contract of marriage be-
tween a man and the half-sister of his
mother will not be enforced by the
law of New York. Campbell v.
Crampton,
any non-resident lands, taxed as such,"
and should not include "those taxed
for dogs or highway tax only," and
that the pe ition, verified by one of
the petitioners, should set forth that
the petitioners were a majority of
"the tax payers," the petition and the
verification together constituted the
petition, and the petition, so verified,
was to be regarded as verified by all
the petitioners, and the petition and
the adjudication were sufficient;
(3.) That, as against the plaintiff,
as a bona fide holder, for value, of
the coupons, the town was estopped
from questioning their validity, after
it had accepted and retained the stock
for which the bonds and coupons were
issued, and had paid the interest on
the bonds for so long a time.
ing v. Town of Potter,
2. The decision in Phelps v. The Town
of Lewiston, (15 Blatchf. C. C. R.,
131,) confirmed and applied. Irwin
v. Town of Ontario,
1. Under the Act of the Legislature of
New York, passed May 18th, 1869,
(Laws, of New York, 1869, chap. 907,)
as amended by the Act of May 12th,
1871, (Laws of New York, 1871, chap.
925,) permitting municipal corpora-
tions to aid in the construction of
railroads, the petition of tax payers
for the bonding of a town, filed with
the county judge August 4th, 1871,
did not set forth that the petitioners
were a majority of the tax payers
who were taxed or assessed for prop-
erty, "not including those taxed for
dogs or highway tax only," and in-
cluding the owners of non-resident
lands taxed as such. It only set
forth that the petitioners were a ma-
jority of the tax payers whose names
appeared upon the tax list or assess-
ment roll. But, the petition was ac-
companied by the affidavit of a tax
payer, who was a petitioner, verifying
the petition and setting forth that the
petitioners were a majority of the
tax payers "not including those tax- 3.
ed for dogs or highway tax only."
The county judge made an adjudica-
tion that the petitioners were a ma:
jority of "the tax payers." The stat-
ute provided for the issuing of the
bonds and their exchange for the
stock of the railroad company named
in the proceedings, and for the pay.
ment of the principal and interest of
the bonds as a town charge. An-
other statute provided that the issu-
ing of bonds might be restrained by
injunction, and another, that the pro-
ceedings for bonding might be re-
viewed by certiorari by a higher
Court. The bonds were issued dated
September 1st, 1872, payable in 30
years, and had coupons payable every
6 months from and including March
1st, 1873. The town paid the cou-
pons which fell due before March 1st,
1879. It had received the stock and
retained it. In a suit brought against
the town, on coupons which fell due
March 1st, 1879, by a person who
was a bona fide holder of the coupons,
for value: Held,
(1.) That the county judge had ju-
risdiction to make the adjudication;
(2.) That, as the statule provided
that the word "tax payer," when used
in it, should include "the owner of
Under the town bonding Act of May
11th, 1868, (Laws of New York, 1868,
chap. 811,) as amended by the Act of
April 19th, 1869, (Laws of New York,
1869, chap. 241,) the application to
the county judge, and his order, and
the affidavit of the assessors, and the
consents, and the proofs of the sig
natures to the consents, being, when
produced in evidence from the coun-
ty clerk's office, attached together,
and marked as filed and recorded, as
one paper, on a specified day, and the
affidavit of the assessors, and each
consent, and each proof of the signa-
tures to the consents, being separate-
ly marked as filed in said office on
said day, they must be regarded as
having been physically attached to-
gether as one whole when they were
filed. Hence, in a suit against a town
on coupons taken from bonds issued
by it under said Acts, brought by a
person who purchased said bonds and
coupons in good faith, before they be-
came due, for a valuable considera-
tion paid by him therefor at the time
of the purchase thereof, it is not com-
petent for the defendant to show that
said affidavit, when it was subscribed
and sworn to by the assessors, was
on a separate sheet of paper, unat-
tached to any of the consents, and
6. The statute makes the affidavit of
the assessors proof that the consent
has been proved or acknowledged in
the manner prescribed by the stat-
ute, as against the plaintiff, as a bona
fide holder, as well as proof of the
other facts stated in the affidavit in
this case, and, therefore, it was not
admissible for the defendant to object
to the sufficiency of the affidavit, or
to the sufficiency of the proof of the
signatures to the consents, or to go
into an arithmetical computation as
to whether the required consents had
in fact been given, as to value or
number.
id.
7. The bonds having been delivered to
the railroad company in payment for
a subscription by the town to its
stock, and the town having received
and retained the stock, and the road
having been built and put in opera-
tion, and the town having paid the
interest on its bonds for three years
after they were issued, it was held,
that, as against the plaintiff, as a bona
fide holder, the town had ratified,
with full knowledge, by the record,
of the alleged defects, the acts of those
who issued the bonds.
See ESTOPPEL.
JURISDICTION, 2.
PLEADING, 2.
See CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE.
1. A married woman, who was the sole
owner of a patent, brought a suit in
this Court for its infringement, in
her own name, as plaintiff, her hus
band not being a party to the suit.
The bill alleged that she belonged to
New York, and was a citizen of the
United States, and that some of the
infringements were committed in
New York. On a hearing on an ob-
jection taken in the answer, that the
husband should be a party to the suit:
Held, that, under $629, 4,919 and
4,921 of the Revised Statutes, and
Rule 90 of the Rules in Equity, in
connection with the law in New York
as to the status of the property of
married women, the husband need
not be a party. Lorillard v. Stand-
ard Oil Co.,
See PATENT, 9.
REMOVAL OF CAUSE, 2.
(5.) Tifft-Gas-stove, (43.)
(6.) Williams
Overshoe; Wil-
liams-Rubber-boot, (44, 45.)
(7.) Spill-Dissolving xyloidine;
Spill-Manufacture of xyloi-
dine, (46 to 50.)
(8.) Sternbergh-Cheese hoop, (51
to 56)
(9.) Eagleton Mfg. Co.-Japanned
furniture-spring, (57 to 61.)
(10.) E. C. Pratt, Bro. & Co.-De-
sign for a card of buttons,
(62, 63.)
(11.) Munson-Bond and coupon
register, (64 to 66.)
(12.) Yale Lock Mfg. Co.-Post-
office box, (67 to 70.)
(13.) Brickill-Feed-water heater,
(71 to 73.)
(14.) Maguire-Hydraulic power-
accumulator, (74.)
(15.) Holly-Water-works, (75 to
81.)
(16.) Deuchfield Cooling and
drying meal, (82 to 84.)
(17.) Matthews Bottle-stopper;
McIntire-Bottle-stopper, (85
See 28, 29, 43, 50, 62, 63, 65.
See 28, 29, 31, 74, 83, 96, 97, 99
to 102, 107, 110, 113, 119.
RES ADJUDICAta, 1.
5. Specification.
See 72, 74, 76, 86 to 93, 106.
See $2, 33, 33, 53 to 56, 67 to 69,
84, 109, 112, 116 to 118, 121,
122.
1. In this suit, the plaintiff, as assignee
of letters patent, was held to be en-
titled to recover for infringement be-
fore the assignment to him as well as
for that after. Campbell v. James, 92
2. There must be some operative words
expressing, at least, an intention to as-
sign, in order to constitute an assign-
ment of a patent.
3. An assignment of a claim for the use
of a patented invention is not an as-
signment of the patent.
id.
A general assignment to a trustee
for the benefit of creditors, excepting
all property exempt by law from levy
and sale on execution, does not carry
an interest in letters patent.
id.
5. An assignee of a patent, who buys
for a valuable consideration, without
notice of an outstanding equitable
claim to the patent, not recorded in
|