mont, and the defendant was a New York corporation, lessee of a rail- road in Vermont, and in possession of the road and running it there, under the lease. Under a statute of Vermont, it had appointed a person in Vermont upon whom service of every kind of process known to the laws of the State might at any time be made, such service on such person to be a legal service on the lessee. The writ in this suit was served on such agent, in Vermont, in the man- ner provided by the laws of Ver- mont. The defendant moved to dis- miss the suit on the ground that jurisdiction of the defendant was not obtained by service: Held, that the motion must be denied. Brownell v. Troy & Boston R. R. Co., 242
The defendant did not become a citi- zen of Vermont, and the service of the process in Vermont was good under said law of the State. id.
5. An action against a town in Ver- mont, given by a statute of Vermont, for special damage from the insuffi- ciency of a highway or bridge in the town, which the town was bound to keep in repair, is an action at com- mon law, of which the Circuit Court of the United States has jurisdic- tion, under § 629 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and § 1 of the Act of March 3d, 1875, (18 U. S. Stat. at Large, 470.) Keith v. Town of Rockingham, 246
1. This suit was brought by the plaint- iff against a postmaster, for the in- fringement of a patent. On a sug- gestion by the latter, one E. was 6. made a defendant, as owning an in- terest in the patent, and afterwards others were made defendants as hav- ing an interest in it: Held, that the questions as to such interest were questions arising under the patent law, and within the jurisdiction of the Court, whether the conveyances were made pendente lite or not. Camp bell v. James,
Under the Act of the Legislature of the State of New York, passed May 8th, 1869, (Laws of New York, of 1869, chap. 738, p. 1,785,) H. brought a suit in the Supreme Court of New York against T. and W., to foreclose a possessory lien for re- pairs on a vessel owned by T. to which H. had made repairs, on the delivery of her to him by T. for that purpose. W. held a mortgage on the vessel. The vessel was sold under a decree of foreclosure in the suit and was bought by H. Afterwards, a suit in Admiralty, in rem, for wages, was brought against the vessel, in the District Court. T. filed a claim to the vessel as owner, and so did H.: Held, that the State Court had no jurisdiction to enforce the lien, be-
cause the contract was a maritime contract, and the remedy was not a common law remedy or one which the common law was competent to give, and the jurisdiction was exclu- sive in the District Courts of the United States, under § 563 of the Re- vised Statutes of the United States, and that the claim of H., as owner of the vessel, must be stricken out. The B. F. Woolsey, 344
7. The nature of a lien arising out of a locatio operis faciendi, considered. id.
See BANKRUPTCY, 3, 4. REMOVAL OF CAUSE.
See INJUNCTION. PATENT, 73.
See CONTEMPT, 1 to 3. JURISDICTION, 6, 7. WHARFAGE, 1, 2.
1. Unsealed coupons, originally attached to sealed bonds, and sold after being detached, are subject to the statute of limitations applicable to sealed instruments. Kershaw v. Town of Hancock, 383
after the woman had returned to New York, that any definite plan as to the time or place of the marriage was en- tertained, and then it was contem- plated that the parties should be mar- ried in New York, at some convenient future time. There was no intent to marry in New York for the purpose of evading the laws of Alabama. By the statute of Alabama, a marriage between a man and the sister of his mother is void, and, if they marry, they are punishable by imprison- ment. No statute of New York ex- pressly forbids such a marriage. In a suit, in New York, by the woman against the man for damages for the breach of such contract: Held,
(1.) The contract was void, because void by the law of Alabama, where it was made;
(2.) The fact that the marriage was to be solemnized in New York did not make the contract valid, because the place of performance of the con- tract was not where the marriage was to be solemnized, but was Ala- bama, where the parties were to re- side and discharge their marital re- lations;
(3.) A contract of marriage be- tween a man and the half-sister of his mother will not be enforced by the law of New York. Campbell v. Crampton,
any non-resident lands, taxed as such," and should not include "those taxed for dogs or highway tax only," and that the pe ition, verified by one of the petitioners, should set forth that the petitioners were a majority of "the tax payers," the petition and the verification together constituted the petition, and the petition, so verified, was to be regarded as verified by all the petitioners, and the petition and the adjudication were sufficient;
(3.) That, as against the plaintiff, as a bona fide holder, for value, of the coupons, the town was estopped from questioning their validity, after it had accepted and retained the stock for which the bonds and coupons were issued, and had paid the interest on the bonds for so long a time. ing v. Town of Potter,
2. The decision in Phelps v. The Town of Lewiston, (15 Blatchf. C. C. R., 131,) confirmed and applied. Irwin v. Town of Ontario,
1. Under the Act of the Legislature of New York, passed May 18th, 1869, (Laws, of New York, 1869, chap. 907,) as amended by the Act of May 12th, 1871, (Laws of New York, 1871, chap. 925,) permitting municipal corpora- tions to aid in the construction of railroads, the petition of tax payers for the bonding of a town, filed with the county judge August 4th, 1871, did not set forth that the petitioners were a majority of the tax payers who were taxed or assessed for prop- erty, "not including those taxed for dogs or highway tax only," and in- cluding the owners of non-resident lands taxed as such. It only set forth that the petitioners were a ma- jority of the tax payers whose names appeared upon the tax list or assess- ment roll. But, the petition was ac- companied by the affidavit of a tax payer, who was a petitioner, verifying the petition and setting forth that the petitioners were a majority of the tax payers "not including those tax- 3. ed for dogs or highway tax only." The county judge made an adjudica- tion that the petitioners were a ma: jority of "the tax payers." The stat- ute provided for the issuing of the bonds and their exchange for the stock of the railroad company named in the proceedings, and for the pay. ment of the principal and interest of the bonds as a town charge. An- other statute provided that the issu- ing of bonds might be restrained by injunction, and another, that the pro- ceedings for bonding might be re- viewed by certiorari by a higher Court. The bonds were issued dated September 1st, 1872, payable in 30 years, and had coupons payable every 6 months from and including March 1st, 1873. The town paid the cou- pons which fell due before March 1st, 1879. It had received the stock and retained it. In a suit brought against the town, on coupons which fell due March 1st, 1879, by a person who was a bona fide holder of the coupons, for value: Held,
(1.) That the county judge had ju- risdiction to make the adjudication;
(2.) That, as the statule provided that the word "tax payer," when used in it, should include "the owner of
Under the town bonding Act of May 11th, 1868, (Laws of New York, 1868, chap. 811,) as amended by the Act of April 19th, 1869, (Laws of New York, 1869, chap. 241,) the application to the county judge, and his order, and the affidavit of the assessors, and the consents, and the proofs of the sig natures to the consents, being, when produced in evidence from the coun- ty clerk's office, attached together, and marked as filed and recorded, as one paper, on a specified day, and the affidavit of the assessors, and each consent, and each proof of the signa- tures to the consents, being separate- ly marked as filed in said office on said day, they must be regarded as having been physically attached to- gether as one whole when they were filed. Hence, in a suit against a town on coupons taken from bonds issued by it under said Acts, brought by a person who purchased said bonds and coupons in good faith, before they be- came due, for a valuable considera- tion paid by him therefor at the time of the purchase thereof, it is not com- petent for the defendant to show that said affidavit, when it was subscribed and sworn to by the assessors, was on a separate sheet of paper, unat- tached to any of the consents, and
6. The statute makes the affidavit of the assessors proof that the consent has been proved or acknowledged in the manner prescribed by the stat- ute, as against the plaintiff, as a bona fide holder, as well as proof of the other facts stated in the affidavit in this case, and, therefore, it was not admissible for the defendant to object to the sufficiency of the affidavit, or to the sufficiency of the proof of the signatures to the consents, or to go into an arithmetical computation as to whether the required consents had in fact been given, as to value or number. id.
7. The bonds having been delivered to the railroad company in payment for a subscription by the town to its stock, and the town having received and retained the stock, and the road having been built and put in opera- tion, and the town having paid the interest on its bonds for three years after they were issued, it was held, that, as against the plaintiff, as a bona fide holder, the town had ratified, with full knowledge, by the record, of the alleged defects, the acts of those who issued the bonds.
See ESTOPPEL.
JURISDICTION, 2. PLEADING, 2.
See CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
1. A married woman, who was the sole owner of a patent, brought a suit in this Court for its infringement, in her own name, as plaintiff, her hus band not being a party to the suit. The bill alleged that she belonged to New York, and was a citizen of the United States, and that some of the infringements were committed in New York. On a hearing on an ob- jection taken in the answer, that the husband should be a party to the suit: Held, that, under $629, 4,919 and 4,921 of the Revised Statutes, and Rule 90 of the Rules in Equity, in connection with the law in New York as to the status of the property of married women, the husband need not be a party. Lorillard v. Stand- ard Oil Co.,
See PATENT, 9.
REMOVAL OF CAUSE, 2.
(5.) Tifft-Gas-stove, (43.) (6.) Williams
Overshoe; Wil- liams-Rubber-boot, (44, 45.) (7.) Spill-Dissolving xyloidine; Spill-Manufacture of xyloi- dine, (46 to 50.)
(8.) Sternbergh-Cheese hoop, (51 to 56)
(9.) Eagleton Mfg. Co.-Japanned furniture-spring, (57 to 61.) (10.) E. C. Pratt, Bro. & Co.-De- sign for a card of buttons, (62, 63.)
(11.) Munson-Bond and coupon register, (64 to 66.)
(12.) Yale Lock Mfg. Co.-Post- office box, (67 to 70.) (13.) Brickill-Feed-water heater, (71 to 73.)
(14.) Maguire-Hydraulic power- accumulator, (74.)
(15.) Holly-Water-works, (75 to 81.) (16.) Deuchfield Cooling and drying meal, (82 to 84.) (17.) Matthews Bottle-stopper;
McIntire-Bottle-stopper, (85
See 28, 29, 43, 50, 62, 63, 65.
See 28, 29, 31, 74, 83, 96, 97, 99 to 102, 107, 110, 113, 119. RES ADJUDICAta, 1.
5. Specification.
See 72, 74, 76, 86 to 93, 106.
See $2, 33, 33, 53 to 56, 67 to 69, 84, 109, 112, 116 to 118, 121, 122.
1. In this suit, the plaintiff, as assignee of letters patent, was held to be en- titled to recover for infringement be- fore the assignment to him as well as for that after. Campbell v. James, 92
2. There must be some operative words expressing, at least, an intention to as- sign, in order to constitute an assign- ment of a patent.
3. An assignment of a claim for the use of a patented invention is not an as- signment of the patent. id.
A general assignment to a trustee for the benefit of creditors, excepting all property exempt by law from levy and sale on execution, does not carry an interest in letters patent. id.
5. An assignee of a patent, who buys for a valuable consideration, without notice of an outstanding equitable claim to the patent, not recorded in
« AnteriorContinuar » |