INDEX.

3.

the B. and the N. each alleged that 1. W., the voluntary general assignee

2.

the States of Rhode Island and New
York had lawfully deprived L. of
his property without "due process
of law;'

(5.) The plaintiff is entitled to re-
Lavin v. Emigrant Indus-

cover.

trial Savings Bank,

1

Whether the Rhode Island letters
were letters on the estate of a de-
ceased person, so as to authorize at
all, under the statute of New York,
the issuing of ancillary letters in
New York, quere.

See EAST RIVER Bridge, 1, 2.
EJECTMENT, 1.
WHARFAGE, 3.

id.

were granted to B., in Rhode Island,
in 1877. In 1877, B. obtained from
a Surrogate, in New York, ancillary
letters of administration on the estate
of L, based on the Rhode Island let-
ters, an affidavit by B., and a sworn
petition by B. The Rhode Island
letters set forth that L. was "absent
from the State without due proof of
his being alive." The affidavit stat-
ed, "that, to the best of deponent's
information and belief," L. was dead.
The petition spoke of L. as "de-
ceased." The New York letters de-
clared that L. "lately departed this
life." On those letters the savings
bank paid to B. the money deposited
by L In 1879, L. returned to
Rhode Island and brought this suit
against the bank, to recover the
money. He had no actual notice of CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
any of said proceedings, and no other
constructive notice of them. The
Court of Appeals of New York had
decided, four judges to three, in
Roderigas v. East River Savings In-
stitution, (63 N. Y., 460,) that, under
the statutes of New York, a Surro-
gate was authorized to issue letters
of administration when he judicially
determined that a party was dead,
although such party was alive, and
that a payment by a debtor of the
supposed deceased, made in good
faith, to the administrator, was valid:
Held,

(1.) There was prima facie evi-
dence that the Surrogate judicially
determined that L. was dead, and
nothing was shown to impeach such
evidence;

(2.) This Court is bound to follow
said decision of said Court of Ap-
peals, in construing the statutes of
New York;

(3.) Said decision does not control
this Court on the question whether
L. was deprived of his property with
out "due process of law," within the
meaning of the 14th Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States,
which declares, that no State shall
deprive any person of property
without due process of law;

(4.) The effect of holding valid the
Rhode Island letters, and the pro-
ceedings before said Surrogate, and
the issuing of the New York letters,
to protect the defendant in its pay-
ment to B., would be to hold that

STATES.

Article 1, § 9,
Article 3, § 1,
Article 3, § 2,
7th Amendment,

CONTEMPT.

207

349

247

247, 349

1. The plaintiff, after obtaining an in-
terlocutory decree against M. and L.,
for an account of profits of infringe-
ment of a patent, applied to the Court
by petition, setting forth that the de-
fendants were about to dispose of
their property, and that, unless he
could,"by writ of sequestration, fix
a lien thereon," the litigation would
be fruitless, and praying for a writ of
sequestration "for the purpose afore-
said." The writ was issued, com-
manding the marshal to take, attach
and sequester the goods, chattels
and estate of the defendants to the
value of $40,000, and detain and keep
the same under sequestration, accord-
ing to law, to respond to the final
decree in the cause. The marshal
served the writ by attaching real es-
tate and machinery in the manner
prescribed by the laws of Vermont,
by lodging copies in the office of the
town clerk. He took no other pos-
session of the property. A final de-
cree was rendered for a large amount,
and a special execution w s issued.
The personal property could not be
found, and the real estate had been

(4.) That there must be deducted
from the amount of the plaintiff's re
covery, as a fine against the plaintiff,
the expenses to the defendants of 5.
the suit in Iowa, including reason-
able counsel fees, to be taxed by the
clerk, and that execution in the suit

3. A person indicted under that section
cannot be allowed to show that the
person to whom the Pension Office.
has allowed the pension as due was
not entitled to it.
id.

4. W., a witness for the defendant, de-
nied, on enquiry by the prosecution,
that he had used to B., in the pres-
ence of the pensioner, language urg-
ing B. to persuade the pensioner not
to press the prosecution for a reason
assigned. Afterwards, notwithstand-
ing the objection of the defendant, B.
was allowed to testify that W. had
used such language to B. in the pres-
ence of the pensioner: He'd, that the
evidence was competent, and was
not the contradiction of a collateral
fact, but, if believed, tended to show
bias on the part of W. and a desire to
save the defendant from prosecution,
and would have been admissible even
in the absence of any prior inquiry
of W.
id.

5. In charging the jury the Court
called their attention to the fact that
the defendant had failed to call S. as
a witness, and left it to them to say
whether such failure was consistent
with the testimony given by the de-
fendant as a witness, in view of facts
proved in the case. The defendant
excepted to such charge but did not
offer S. as a witness nor suggest that
S. was not a competent witness, he
being indicted jointly with the de-
fendant. After conviction, a new
trial was moved for on the ground of
error in the charge, because S. was
not a competent witness, being in-
dicted jointly with the defendant:
Held, no ground for a new trial. id.

6.

2278. On a writ of error under the Act of