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generally in trade as fancy hemstitched lawns, nainsooks, or muslins, or as fancy hemstitched cloth, or as fancy hemstitched skirting.

(3) Of bleached and colored cotton cloths which are of like character with those described in our first finding, but in addition to the hemstitched border are ornamented with tucks, varying in number from two to thirty or more, arranged either regularly or in clusters of two or more, and sometimes interspersed with revering or openwork effects. It appears from the testimony that these are often called tucked or fancy tucked lawns, but are generally known in trade as tucked flouncings or as tucked skirts or skirtings; but are not known commercially or familiarly as tuckings, and are not composed in part of articles so known.

The plain and fancy hemstitched goods, and also a portion of those which have tucks, were classified and assessed for duty as partly made wearing apparel at 50 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 349, N. T., and the balance of those which have tucks were assessed for duty at 60 per cent ad valorem under the provision for tuckings, or articles made in part of tuckings, in paragraph 373, N. T. The appellants claim, first, that all these goods are dutiable at 40 per cent ad valorem as unenumerated manufactures of cotton under paragraph 355, N. T., the alternative claim being also made in most cases that they are dutiable under the "countable" paragraphs, 344 to 348, of Schedule I, N. T.

The question of the classification for duty of articles similar to those covered by our first and second findings of fact was considered in G. A. 2708, and it was there held that they were dutiable as manufactures of cotton under paragraph 355 of the act of October 1, 1890.

Adhering to decision of the Board G. A. 2708, and from the evidence taken in these cases, we sustain the claim of the appellants that the merchandise is dutiable at 40 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 355.

(15584-G. A. 2844.)

Incandescent Lamps.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 24, 1894.

In the matter of the protest, 76619 a-15625, of R. H. Klein, Jr., against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain incandescent lamps, imported per Persia, September 11, 1894.

Opinion by SHARRETTS, General Appraiser.

We find that the merchandise in this case is incandescent lamps composed of metal and glass. The Board, In re The National Express Company (G. A. 2553), decided from the evidence that lamps identical with those in question were composed in chief value of glass. We make a corresponding finding of fact in this case, and find further that the merchandise was imported or withdrawn for consumption after August 28, 1894.

We overrule this protest, and affirm the collector's decision in assessing duty on the merchandise at 35 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 102, act of August 28, 1894.

(15585-G. A. 2845.)

Religious Books for Sunday-School Teachers not Free.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 27, 1894.

In the matter of the protest, 23719b-14, of Mr. John Marshall Smedes, against the decision of the collector of customs at Suspension Bridge, N. Y., as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per cars, and entered on August 4, 1894.

Opinion by SOMERVILLE, General Appraiser.

We find the following facts in this case:

(1) The merchandise covered by the protest consists of sixteen books, valued at $12, which were imported from Toronto, Canada, on August 4, 1894.

(2) These books are of a religious character, suitable for use in teaching Sunday school and Bible classes, and other like religious instruction. (3) The importer of these books, who is a resident of Cincinnati, Ohio, is engaged in teaching Sunday school and Bible classes, and purchased the articles during a brief visit to Toronto, for his own personal use and not for sale, and brought them back with him on his return to this country on the day after the purchase.

The collector assessed the goods, under paragraph 423 of the tariff act of 1890, as "Books * * * twenty-five per centum ad valorem." They are claimed to be free of duty

(1) Under paragraph 686 of said act as "professional books * * * and tools of trade, occupation, or employment, in the actual possession at the time of persons arriving in the United States, not * * * imported for any other person or persons, or for sale."

(2) Under paragraph 752, as "Wearing apparal and other personal effects (not merchandise) of persons arriving in the United States" actually in use and necessary and appropriate for the importer's use for the purposes of his journey and his present comfort and convenience, and intended for his own use and not for sale.

In our opinion the vocation of teaching a Sunday school, or Bible class, which is usually confined to a few hours of one day in each week, is not a "profession" within the commonly understood meaning of this word. Hence, books used by such a teacher would scarcely be classed as "professional books," especially where they had never been used abroad a single hour prior to importation so as to impress them with the character of articles devoted to such purposes.

These books can not be regarded as "tools of trade, occupation, or employment," but would seem rather to be in the nature of "house

hold effects," if the holder had been a householder abroad, which is not the fact. Paragraph 516 of said act mentions "Books or libraries * ** and other household effects," etc., thus distinguishing books, not professional, from tools of trade, or occupation. But no claim is made under this paragraph, nor would the evidence sustain any such claim had it been made in the protest.

We are equally clear in the view that these books can not be properly classified as "personal effects" of the kind described in paragraph 752 of said act. The phrase "wearing apparel and other personal effects" was construed by the Board In re Yates, G. A. 86 (November 3, 1890), and again In re Booth (January 12, 1894), unpublished, so as to confine the words "other personal effects" to articles of a kindred nature with wearing apparel, or with passengers' baggage.

The same construction precisely was placed on a like phrase occurring in the tariff act in force in June, 1876, by Attorney-General Taft (15 Opin. Att'y Gen., 113), and this opinion was formally adopted and promulgated by the Treasury Department July 21, 1876, in Synopsis 2901.

It is true that a different view was taken recently by the Department, based on an opinion of the Acting Attorney-General, promulgated September 26, 1893, in Synopsis 14368.

The construction adopted by the Board, however, is sustained by the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Arnold v. United States (147 U. S., 494), where Mr. Justice Brewer uses the following language in reference to the phrase under consideration occurring in said paragraph 752, tariff act 1890:

"Obviously the term (wearing apparel) is here used as covering all articles of dress, while 'personal effects' refer to other matters of personal baggage not used as clothing."

If the words "other personal effects" are not restricted to articles of baggage, or otherwise, then they would embrace all kinds of personal property whatever, irrespective of kind or nature. This was clearly not intended, for the language of the paragraph excludes from its purview all articles not necessary and appropriate for the purposes of the passenger's journey and his present comfort and convenience.

Following the view of the Supreme Court, and for other reasons above stated, the Board overrules the protest and affirms the collector's decision.

(15586-G. A. 2846.)

Leaf Tobacco under the Act of 1890 and Act of 1894.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 27, 1894. In the matte of the protest, 25026 b-173, of Messrs. F. Garcia & Co., against the decision of the collector of customs, at Burlington, Vt., as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain tobacco, imported per railway cars and entered September 1, 1894.

Opinion by SHARPE, General Appraiser.

The merchandise consists of 3 bales of Havana tobacco, imported

through the port of Burlington, September 1, 1894, returned and classified under paragraph 184 of the act of August 28, 1894.

It appears in evidence that these bales were part of an original importation of 207 bales; that of these a reexamination was asked for of certain bales, and the examiner reaffirmed his return thereon; and that subsequently after exportation and reentry the number under contention was reduced to 5 bales. On these 5 bales a hearing was had by the Board June 13, 1894, when, after taking the testimony of several experienced witnesses engaged in the tobacco business, 2 bales were found and held to be filler, and 3 wrapper. These 3 are the same

on which the present protest is made. The importer did not claim that the tobacco had changed in condition since the June hearing, excepting such change as would occur in going to and returning from Canada.

We have found from the evidence in this and other cases that under general conditions wrapper tobacco, if properly housed and carefully handled and cased when opened for use, remains wrapper tobacco for a reasonable length of time, and that such period is not necessarily measured by months.

There are also certain grades of tobacco known as working up stock, the trade term meaning such a bale as would furnish sufficient wrappers to work up the bale, using the remainder for filler, and these, although not commercially wrapper bales, if manufactured in their fresh condition would produce a good percentage of wrappers. Where, however, leaves fit for wrapper in size and color are largely composed of quebrado (torn) and resavo (coarse) they must be removed from the wrapper category.

Between the hearing in June and the present reentry the new tariff had gone into effect, wherein paragraph 185 enacts in its first proviso that the term "wrapper" tobacco shall be taken to mean that quality of leaf known commercially as wrapper; and the second proviso determines that the term "filler" shall be taken to mean all leaf tobacco unmanufactured not commercially known as wrapper.

In contemplation of this language it is readily seen that the same merchandise of this description, under trade testimony, might be properly classified differently under the two acts. We are therefore led to review the results of our decision made on the June hearing, and having taken the testimony of skilled witnesses summoned from the trade, other than those summoned in June, and such testimony having been given after an examination of all the merchandise, and the testimony of the witnesses appearing at the June hearing being also considered, we find that bales Nos. 176 and 178 are filler tobacco, not containing that quality of leaf tobacco known commercially as wrapper.

In view, however, of the fourth proviso of said paragraph 185, to which force must be given to render the whole paragraph operative, and

which follows the other proviso named above, and under all the testimony hereinbefore referred to, we find that bale 172 comes within the terms of said last-mentioned proviso, and hold that it is subject to the same duty as wrapper tobacco, notwithstanding the fact that the evidence tended to show that this bale did not contain leaf tobacco known commercially as wrapper tobacco.

(15587-G. A. 2847.)

Specific Designation-"Woolen Shawls" v. "Wearing Apparel."

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 31, 1894.

In the matter of the protest, 66948 a-978, of B. Schiffman, against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain wearing apparel, imported per Rhaetia, and entered on January 3, 1894.

Opinion by SOMERVILLE, General Appraiser.

The local appraiser reported the merchandise to be shawls, composed in part of wool and in part of cotton, and in which cotton is the component material of chief value, valued as above 40 cents per pound. He further states that the articles are commercially known as "woolen shawls."

The goods were assessed for duty under paragraph 392 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, as "woolen or worsted * shawls * * * made * * * in part of wool or worsted * not specially provided for" in said act.

The importer claims that the merchandise is dutiable as cotton wearing apparel under paragraph 349 of said act, on the ground that cotton is the component material of chief value in the articles as reported by the local appraiser.

The importer appeared on the call of the docket at the hearing on June 6, 1894, and continued the case in order to have an opportunity to produce a sample of the goods before the Board. The hearing was set for September 20, 1894, and when the case was called on that day there was no appearance of the protestant in person or by counsel, and no evidence was offered to rebut the report of the local appraiser, as above stated.

We accordingly find as facts in the case:

(1) That the merchandise consists of shawls, made in part of cotton and in part of wool, and that the importation was made January 3, 1894, while the tariff act of 1890 was in force.

(2) The goods are commercially known as "woolen shawls," and are articles of wearing apparel, the component material of chief value in them being cotton.

The question presented resolves itself simply into this: Which is the narrower or more specific designation, (1) that of woolen shawls, made in part of wool, on the one hand; or (2) that of cotton wearing apparel,

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