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The importers claim that the goods are exempt from duty under paragraph 597 of the free list, which reads as follows:

Sunn, and all other textile grasses or fibrous vegetables substances, unmanufactured or undressed, not specially provided for in this Act.

The evidence taken at the hearing shows satisfactorily that the article in question is not hemp, and thus far refutes the report made as to its character by the local appraiser.

One witness who deals in the article testifies that it is sunn, which is an East Indian fiber resembling hemp, obtained from the inner bark or a certain tree, and that it is sometimes called "sunn-hemp." It is used as an adulterant, being mixed with hemp and flax to make ropes, cables, and cordage.

The examiner of such fibers, in the local appraiser's office at the port of New York, testified that, in his opinion, the article was neither hemp nor sunn, but was what is known as "raffia," or, rather, the cuticle or fiber of raffia, which is a species of palm plant, used for various textile purposes. He states that the goods have always been admitted free of duty at this port, being classified under said paragraph 597. We summarize our finding of facts as follows:

(1) The merchandise is correctly represented by the official sample accompanying the report of the local appraiser, and was imported under the tariff act of 1890.

(2) The article is not hemp, or other fiber anywhere enumerated in the dutiable list of said tariff act, but is either sunn or raffia, or other like fibrous vegetable substance.

(3) It is neither in a manufactured nor dressed condition, and is used as raw material for the manufacture of ropes, cables, and other textile purposes to which hemp and other fibrous substances are adapted.

The protest claiming the merchandise to be free of duty under said paragraph 597 is sustained, and the collector's decision is reversed, with instructions to reliquidate the entry accordingly.

(15580-G. A. 2840.)

Silk Edgings.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 20, 1894.

In the matter of the protest, 66994 a, of Lahey & Duncan, against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain silk edgings and silk insertings, imported per Saale, March 5, 1894, and La Gascogne, March 6, 1894.

Opinion by HAM, General Appraiser.

The merchandise in this case consists of silk edgings and insertings assessed for duty as laces at 60 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 413 of the act of October 1, 1890, but claimed to be entitled to entry at 50 per cent ad valorem as manufactures of silk not specially provided

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for under paragraph 414 of said act. The case is submitted on the record, verified samples of the merchandise in controversy, and expert testimony as to the character of silk edgings and their designation in commerce. The evidence shows, and we find as a fact, that samples number 5315 and 5818 represent the silk insertings covered by invoice items described by those numbers; and the protest, so far as it relates to those articles, is sustained, and the decision of the collector to that extent is reversed, with an appropriate order of reliquidation under the authority of G. A. 2723.

It remains to consider the question raised by that part of the protest which relates to the subject of silk edgings.

It is admitted by appellants' counsel in his brief that the edgings in question are a variety of lace, and on this point the evidence is abundant, all to the same effect, and hence conclusive. They were assessed for duty under the following clause of paragraph 413 of said act, to wit: "Laces * * * composed of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value, not specially provided for in this act." Appellants' counsel calls attention to the fact that cotton edgings are provided for, eo nomine, in paragraph 373, side by side and at the same rate as cotton laces, while in said paragraph 413 of the silk schedule, edgings are not enumerated by name; and the conclusion is hence deduced that the case falls within the rule in Arthur v. Lahey (96 U. S., 118) that "when Congress has designated an article by its specific name, and imposed a duty upon it by such name, general terms in a subsequent act, or in a latter part of the same act, although sufficiently broad to comprehend such article, are not applicable to it." This rule of construction, not less sound in principle than clear in statement, plainly applies only to articles of like material, and hence has no relevancy here. The article provided for in paragraph 413 under the name of "laces" is not the same as the article provided for in paragraph 373 under the name of "edgings." There is a difference in material, the former being of silk and the latter of cotton, and there is a kind of edging made of cotton which has no counterpart in edgings made of silk, to wit, edgings known as Hamburg edgings.

The evidence shows that there are at least two kinds of cotton edgings, namely, lace edging, which is a narrow cotton lace, and Hamburg edging, which is not lace, but a narrow strip of cotton cloth embroidered, while there is only one kind of silk edging, namely, lace edging, which is a narrow silk lace. The evidence also shows that the terms "edging" and "lace" are convertible terms, and are used interchangeably in commerce. One of the appellants, who appeared as a witness in his own behalf, testified that a silk edging is a narrow lace; that silk edgings and silk laces are made in like manner and of like materials, and are used for like purposes, namely, as trimmings. Some of the witnesses testified that cotton edging bears precisely the same relation to cotton lace that silk edging does to silk lace; but such statements

were shown to be inaccurate by illustrative samples of Hamburg edgings made part of the record, which, although edgings, are not lace edgings, and hence do not bear the same relation to cotton lace as silk edgings bear to silk lace.

This analysis of the testimony shows that while there are two kinds of cotton edgings there is only one kind of silk edging. The silk edging is a narrow lace; one variety of cotton edging is a narrow lace, while the other variety is a narrow woven fabric, embroidered. Congress must be presumed to have legislated in the light of these facts, so that when it considered the subject of cotton laces and edgings it took into account the distinction, shown by the testimony in this case, between lace edging and the article known as Hamburg edging by providing in paragraph 373 for laces and lace edgings in the enumeration "laces," and for Hamburg or other cotton edgings which are not lace edgings in the enumeration "edgings." Coming then to paragraph 413 in the silk schedule, there appeared to be no such distinction between silk laces and edgings as had been found to exist in regard to cotton laces and edgings, and they were both provided for by the single enumeration "laces."

We find as facts

(1) That the merchandise in controversy was imported under the provisions of the act of October 1, 1890.

(2) That it consists of silk edgings.

(3) That a silk edging is a narrow lace.

(4) That the terms silk edgings and silk laces are convertible, and are used interchangeably in commerce.

(5) That there is a distinction between certain cotton edgings, to wit, edgings known as Hamburg edgings, and cotton laces, which does not exist with regard to silk edgings and silk laces.

(6) That the samples in the record are true representatives of the merchandise.

On the law and the evidence we hold that the protest, so far as it relates to silk edgings, is not tenable. It is accordingly overruled, and the decision of the collector is sustained.

(15581-G. A. 2841.)

Articles of Collodion.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 20, 1894.

In the matter of the protest, 69119 a, of F. B. Vandegrift & Co., against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain articles of collodion, imported per Elbe, April 13, 1894.

Opinion by HAM, General Appraiser.

The merchandise in this case consists of picture frames made of collodion, paper, and gelatine, assessed for duty as collodion in finished or

partly finished articles under paragraph 21 of the act of October 1, 1890, at 60 cents per pound and 25 per cent ad valorem. Appellants admit in their protest that the articles are dutiable under said paragraph 21, but claim that duty should have been assessed on the weight of the celluloid (collodion) only.

The case is submitted on the record and the testimony of the importer of the merchandise. It is in evidence that celluloid or collodion is the component material of chief value in the articles subject of controversy and that it comprises about two-thirds of the whole value.

The weights respectively of the gelatine and paper, on the one hand, and of the celluloid on the other are stated in the invoice; but no proof of these alleged facts was offered on the hearing.

We find as facts that the merchandise was imported under the act of October 1, 1890, and that it consists of finished articles of which celluloid or collodion is the component material of chief value.

The case here is covered by the decision in G. A. 2509, where the alternative claim of the protest, that certain belts of collodion, silk, and metal-collodion being the component of chief value-were entitled to entry at 60 cents per pound and 25 per cent ad valorem under said paragraph 21, wàs sustained.

The protest in this case is, we think, fatally defective on another ground, namely, in this, that, while admitting the correctness of the collector's classification, it assails the method of liquidation, since it claims that duty should be collected on the net weight of the celluloid only. The effect of the remedy here sought, if it could possibly be granted, would be to admit free of duty the gelatine and paper components of the articles in controversy, but which are made dutiable under other paragraphs of the act of October 1, 1890.

The protest is overruled on the authority of G. A. 2509.

(15582-G. A. 2842.)

Value Appraised-Protests Against, Invalid.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 20, 1894.

In the matter of the protest, 71668 a, of Emden, Gerstle & Co., against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per La Bourgogne, June 25, 1894.

Opinion by SOMERVILLE, General Appraiser.

The goods in question are invoiced as dotted swisses in pieces of 32 aunes, the measurement by which they were sold in the country whence exported.

The local appraiser reported an excess of quantity over that stated in the invoice of 123 aunes in the aggregate, and additions to market value were made in the liquidation of the entry for the quantity reported in excess of that stated in the invoice.

The merchandise, being bleached cotton cloth valued at over 10 cents per square yard and containing between 100 and 150 threads to the square inch, was assessed for duty at 40 per cent ad valorem under the last clause of paragraph 346 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890.

The contention of the importers, as made in their protest and on the hearing, seems to be that the addition made by the appraiser to the invoice value of the merchandise, which was based on the excess of quantity ascertained by actual measurement, was unauthorized, because the goods were bought and paid for by the piece, and at the prices stated in the invoice, irrespective of the actual number of yards or aunes contained in them.

The addition made by the appraiser was clearly one to the market value of the goods and nothing more. The reason for this addition may or may not have justified his action. His ascertainment of market value, if erroneous, could be reviewed only in the mode prescribed by section 13 of the Customs Administrative Act, which is by calling for a reappraisement of the merchandise. It can not be challenged by a protest which at most asserts the illegality of the appraisement on the alleged ground that excess of quantity over the invoice measurement did not justify the additions to market value as made by him. (In re Arenstein & Wolfers, G. A. 1547; Passavant v. U. S., 148 U. S., 214.) The protest is overruled and the collector's decision affirmed.

(15583-G. A. 2843.)

Hemstitched Cloths (Fancy Lawns, Tuckings, Skirtings, etc.).

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 24, 1894.

In the matter of the protest, 7250 a, etc., of Einstein, Wolf & Co., et al., against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain hemstitched cloths, imported per vessels and on dates as per annexed schedule.

Opinion by SHARRETTS, General Appraiser.

We find as facts the goods here subject of protest are dutiable under the act of October 1, 1890, and consist:

(1, and chiefly) Of bleached and colored cotton cloths, varying in width from about 22 to 54 inches and in length from 14 to 30 yards, with from 3 to 6 inches of one edge or border turned over and hemstitched, and are generally designated in the invoices and known in trade either as hemstitched cloth, plain hemstitched cloth, or plain hemstitched lawns, batiste, nainsooks, or muslins, or as plain hemstitched material. In exceptional cases they are described as hemstitched skirts, or as hemstitched skirting, or as cotton cloth skirting.

(2) Of bleached and colored cotton cloths which are of like character as above, but in addition to the hemstitched border are ornamented variously with revered or fancy openwork effects produced by drawn threads or with so-called applique, miter, or diced effects, and are known

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