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Texas Central Railroad, Houston, East and West Texas Railway, Illinois Central Railroad, International and Great Northern Railroad, Iowa Central Railway, Jacksonville, Tampa and Key West Railway, Kansas City, Fort Scott and Memphis Railroad, Kansas City, Memphis and Birmingham Railroad, Kansas City, St. Joe and Council Bluffs Railroad, Kansas City, Clinton and Springfield Railway, Kentucky Central Railway, Lake Erie and Western Railroad, Lake Erie Alliance and Southern Railway, Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway, Lehigh Valley Railroad, Little Rock and Fort Smith Railway, Little Rock and Memphis Railroad, Louisville and Nashville Railroad, Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Consolidated Railroad, Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway, Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railway, Louisville Southern Railroad. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway, Missouri Pacific Railway, Mobile and Ohio Railway, Montgomery and Eufaula Railway, Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway, Newport News and Mississippi Valley Railroad, New York Central and Hudson River Railroad, New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad, New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad, New York, Ontario and Western Railroad, New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio Railroad, Norfolk and Western Railroad, North Eastern Railway, South Carolina, Northern Pacific Railroad, Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, Ohio and Northwestern Railroad, Ohio, Indiana and Western Railway, Ohio River Railroad. Ohio Southern Railroad, Ohio Valley Railway, Oregon and California Railroad, Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, Pennsylvania Railroad, Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad, Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railway, Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway, Peoria, Decatur and Evansville Railway, Petersburg Railroad, Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, Piedmont Air Line, Pittsburg and Lake Erie Railroad, Pittsburg and Western Railroad, Pittsburg, Marion and Chicago Railway, Potomac, Fredericksburg and Piedmont Railroad, Raleigh and Gaston Railroad, Richmond and Danville Railroad, Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, Plant Steamship Line, St. Joe and Grand Island Railroad, St. Joe, St. Louis and Santa Fe Railway, St. Louis and Chicago Railway, St. Louis and San Francisco Railway, St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Railroad, St. Louis, Arkansas and Texas Railway, St. Louis Bridge and Tunnel Company, St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railroad, St. Louis, Keokuk and Northwestern Railway, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway, Savannah, Florida and Western Railroad, Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad, Shenandoah Valley Railroad, Sioux City and Pacific Railroad. Southern Railway Company, Southern Pacific Company, St. Louis, Alton and Springfield Railroad, Terre Haute and Springfield Railroad, Texas and Pacific Railway, Toledo and Ohio Central Railway, Toledo, Columbus and Cincinnati Railway, Toledo, Peoria and Western

Railroad, Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad, Union Pacific Railway, Union Pacific, Denver and Gulf Railway, Virginia Midland Railway, Wabash Railroad, Wabash Western Railway, Western and Atlantic Railroad, Western North Carolina Railroad, Western Railway of Alabama, Western New York and Pennsylvania Railroad, West Shore Railroad, Wheeling and Lake Erie Railway, Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, Wilmington, Columbia and Augusta Railroad, Wisconsin Central Railroad, and such other railroads or water routes as may be hereafter specially authorized and designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, provided that in all cases where other railroads or water routes are so authorized and designated, the written consent thereto of the sureties on the bond shall first be filed with said Secretary. In all cases where other cars or vessels than those owned by said company are used they shall be distinctly marked: "South Carolina and Georgia Railroad Company."

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TREASURY DEPARTMENT, February 19, 1895.

SIR: An appeal having been taken under the provisions of section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, from the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers at New York on the protest of F. H. Shallus (G. A. 2854), which involves the question of the proper rate of duty on sugar from Holland (export bounty), you are hereby directed to take no official action under and by virtue of said decision until the question shall be judicially determined.

You will be duly advised when a final decision is reached.

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Sufficiency of Protest-Importers failed to Make Claim under Proper Paragraph of the Tariff.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, February 19, 1895.

SIR: I have to inform you that the Department is in receipt of a letter dated the 15th instant from the United States attorney for the southern district of New York, in which he reports the trial of the case

of the United States v. Thurber, Whyland & Co., which resulted in a judgment of reversal of the decision of your Board, and in favor of the United States. It appears that the importation consisted of sweetened chocolate which had been assessed for duty by the collector at the rate of 50 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 239 of the act of October 1, 1890; the importers protested, and claimed that it was properly dutiable at 2 cents per pound under paragraph 318 of said act. The only question presented to the court related to the sufficiency of the protest, as the importers failed to make a claim under paragraph 319, under which your Board decided that the goods ought to be classified. Respectfully, yours, CHARLES S. HAMLIN, (7431 g.)

Acting Secretary.

The PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS,

(15639.)

125 Bleecker street, New York.

Classification of Muriate of Cocaine under Act of 1890.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, February 19, 1895.

SIR: I have to inform you that the Department is in receipt of a letter dated the 13th instant from the United States attorney for the southern district of New York, in which he reports the trial on the 1st instant of the so-called appraisers' case, Lehn & Fink v. The United States, involving the dutiable classification of muriate of cocaine, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the Government, thus sustaining the classification made by the collector.

It appears that this merchandise was classified for duty by the col lector as a chemical salt at the rate of 25 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 76 of the act of October 1, 1890. The importers protested, claiming that the said merchandise was properly dutiable as a medicinal preparation in which alcohol is used at the rate of 50 cents per pound under paragraph 74 of said act. In the opinion delivered by Judge Coxe the following language is used:

"I am inclined to think that this case is ruled by the Mallinckrodt case, decided in the St. Louis circuit. That case, as I understand it, involved the precise substance that is in controversy here. Where a court has decided the precise question another court of concurrent jurisdiction should follow it. I understand it to be conceded that both of the paragraphs in question cover this particular importation; that is, that it is a chemical salt and also a medicinal preparation. The circuit court in the Mallinckrodt case held that paragraph 76, which provides for chemical salts, is more specific than paragraph 74, which provides for medicinal preparations. It is not necessary for me to express my views upon the subject, for the reason that in the circumstances this court should follow that decision."

In connection with this your attention is invited to Department's rulings of March 7, 1893 (Synopsis 13826), and March 20, 1893 (Synopsis

13849); also to the decisions of your Board, G. A. 886 and 2642, in the latter of which it is stated that in view of the several judicial decisions in conflict therewith the Board no longer maintains that enumeration under paragraph 74 for medicinal preparations is more specific than enumeration under paragraph 76 for chemical compounds, etc.

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TREASURY DEPARTMENT, February 19, 1895.

SIR: I have to inform you that the Department is in receipt of a letter dated the 13th instant from the United States attorney for the southern district of New York, reporting the trial of the case of C. L. Tiffany v. United States, which resulted in a verdict confirming the decision of the collector and that of your Board in favor of the United States. It appears that the merchandise consisted, among other things, of traveling clocks, which were assessed for duty by the collector at the rate of 45 per cent ad valorem as manufactures of metal under paragraph 215 of the act of October 1, 1890, the importer claiming that the same were dutiable by virtue of the assimilating clause of section 5 of said act under paragraph 211, for "watches, parts of watches, watch cases, watch movements," etc., at the rate of 25 per cent ad valorem. The language of the court is as follows:

"The collector assessed the traveling clocks under paragraph 215 of the act of 1890 as 'manufactures of metal.' The importer protested, insisting that they should have been classified, either directly or by reference to the similitude clause, under paragraph 211 of the same act, which provides for 'watches, parts of watches, watch cases, watch movements,' etc.

"There is no dispute that the articles in question are traveling clocks. They usually consist of a case of brass and plate glass, which contains the watch or clock movement, the whole being surrounded by an outer case of leather. They are intended to be carried by travelers, and when in use are placed upon the table, mantel, etc. They are never carried upon the person and are not suitable for such use. It can not be said, therefore, in any view, that they are watches or parts of watches, nor can it be said that the similitude clause operates, for the reason that, being specifically covered by paragraph 215 as manufactured articles, they can not be said to be nonenumerated."

Respectfully, yours,
(7723 g.)

CHARLES S. HAMLIN,

Acting Secretary.

The PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS,

125 Bleecker street, New York.

(15641.)

Classification of Marble in Blocks under Act of 1890.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, February 19, 1895.

SIR: I have to inform you that the Department is in receipt of a letter from the United States district attorney for the southern district of New York, in which he reports the trial of the case of the Mexican onyx and Trading Company v. The United States, which suit resulted in a verdict in favor of the United States.

It appears that the importation consisted of Mexican onyx, and was classified by the collector as marble in blocks at the rate of 65 cents per cubic foot under paragraph 123 of the act of October 1, 1890, the importers protesting, and claiming that the same was free of duty as a crude mineral under paragraph 651 of said act.

The language of the court is as follows:

"The questions involved, as I understand them, are whether or not the importation in question is a species of the genus marble and was known as a variety of marble commercially and in common parlance. These are questions of fact, and are presented to the court upon the same record that was presented to the Board. I do not think it is necessary to enter into a discussion of these matters at length, for the reason that the question now presented to the court is not whether the court would have reached a different conclusion from the Board had the proof been submitted to the court in the first instance, but whether or not the finding of the Board is so contrary to the weight of evidence that the court is justified in setting it aside; whether or not the court, if this were an appeal from the report of a master or referee, would hold that there was such a lack of evidence to sustain the findings that the decision should be reversed. I think not. There was sufficient proof upon all the questions of fact presented to the Board to sustain their findings. I can not say that upon any of the questions involved there is no evidence to sustain the decision of the Board, or that the evidence so preponderates against their finding as to justify me in setting it aside. It is suggested here that the rule, which I understand is the established rule of this court, is not applicable to this particular case, because the appraisers who heard the evidence did not decide upon the questions of fact. This contention is sought to be sustained by the suggestion that the report is signed by three appraisers who did not hear the evidence. I do not understand, however, that it follows from this fact that the case was not decided by the appraisers who heard the proof. The court should presume in the absence of proof to the contrary that the appraisers who heard the cause decided the cause. The mere fact that the report is signed by other appraisers is not conclusive to my mind as establishing a different proposition. It very frequently happens, even in court cases, that the judge who decides the case does not sign the decree. The decision of the Board of General Appraisers should be affirmed."

Respectfully, yours,
(7974 g.)

CHARLES S. HAMLIN,

Acting Secretary.

The PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS,

125 Bleecker street, New York.

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