CONVEYANCER

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
WILL-CONSTRUCTION.-A testator gave to his

wife the rents and interest of all property for her
life, but still giving her liberty to sell and dis-
pose of the whole or any part of the said pro-
perty if she should think proper to do so; and
he directed that all his property remaining at
her death should be divided into two equal parts,
one moiety among six persons, and the other
moiety among three, but that if any of the nine
legatees should die before receiving their share,
having no child, such legatee's share should be
equally divided between the other legatees:
Held, that the testator's widow took only a life
interest in the property: Held, further, that
none of the legatees to whom one moiety of the
property was bequeathed were entitled to share
in the other moiety: (Rose v. Rowe, 21 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 349. V.C. S.)

REAL PROPERTY LAWYER AND gagor], of the second part, E. F., of, &c. [pur- residue of the said term of years, created by chaser], of the third part, and the Mayor, Aldermen, the hereinbefore recited indenture of lease of and Burgesses of the Borough of of the the day of 18, may be merged and fourth part. Whereas by an indenture of lease extinguished in the reversion in fee simple and dated, &c., and expressed to be made between the inheritance of the said piece of land, dwelling said Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the one house, and premises hereby surrendered. And to part, and W. X. and Y. Z., both of, &c. [lessees], the further intent that the said Mayor, Aldermen, of the other part, for the considerations therein and Burgesses, or their successors, do and shall mentioned, the piece of land hereinafter described, forthwith make and grant a good and valid lease and intended to be hereby surrendered, was, with to the said E. F., his executors, administrators, or other hereditaments, demised unto the said W. X. assigns, of the said piece of land, dwelling house, and Y. Z., their executors, administrators, and and premises, for the term of years, subject assigns, for and during and unto the full end and to a peppercorn rent, and to such covenants, conterm of years thence next ensuing, at a pep- ditions, and agreements as are already agreed percorn rent if demanded, and subject to the upon, and in like cases usually contained, in and covenants, conditions, and agreements in the said with all the rights and privileges granted by the the lessees, their executors, administrators, and And each of them the said A. B. and E. F. doth indenture of lease contained, and on the part of leases of the said Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses. assigns, to be observed and performed. And hereby for himself, his heirs, executors, and whereas, after divers mesne assignments and acts administrators, covenant with the said Mayor, in the law, the said piece of land, with a dwelling- Aldermen, and Burgesses, their successors and house erected and built thereon, became and was assigns, that the said A. B. and E. F. respecvested in the said C. D., his executors, adminis- tively have not at any time heretofore made, trators, and assigns, for all the residue unexpired done, committed, or executed, or knowingly of the said term of years. And whereas by or willingly permitted or suffered, or been the said C. D. of the one part, and the said thing whereby or by reason whereof the premises an indenture, dated, &c., and made between party or privy to any act, deed, matter, or A. B. of the other part, in consideration of £ hereinbefore expressed to be hereby surrendered, to the said C. D. paid by the said A. B., the or any part thereof, are, is, can, shall, or may be said C. D. did assign unto the said A. B., his impeached, charged, affected, or encumbered, in executors, administrators, and assigns, the piece title, estate or otherwise howsoever, or whereby or of land, dwelling-house, and premises herein- by reason whereof the said A. B. and E. F. after described and intended to be hereby respectively are in anywise prevented from sursurrendered. To hold the same unto the said rendering the same premises, or any part thereof, A. B., his executors, administrators, and assigns, in manner aforesaid. And the said C. D. doth thenceforth for the residue of the said term of hereby for himself, his heirs, executors, and years, subject to a proviso in the now re-administrators, covenant with the said Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses, their successors and assigns, that notwithstanding any act by the said C. D. done or suffered to the contrary, the said A.B., C. D., and E. F., or some or one of them, now have or hath, in themselves or himself, good right to surrender the said premises in manner hereby done. And that the said C. D., his executors and administrators, and all persons lawfully claiming through, under, or in trust for him or them, shall and will at all times hereafter, at the request and gesses, their successors and assigns, execute and expense of the said Mayor, Aldermen, and Burdo all further acts, deeds, and assurances for better and more perfectly surrendering and assuring the said piece of land, dwelling-house, and premises unto the said Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses, their successors and assigns, as by them or their counsel in the law may be reasonably required. In witness, &c.

CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF LANDS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-A valid contract for the sale of lands may be made by telegraphic message. B. held himself out to C. as having authority to sell an estate for the owner. C. offered a price for it by letter. B. signed written instructions to a telegraph office for a message to C. accepting the offer. This message was transmitted and duly delivered to C., who signed an acknowledgment of the receipt. This was held to be a sufficient contract within the Statute of Frauds:

(Godwin v. Francis, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 361. C. P.)

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION-STAMP DUTY -PROPERTY TO BE DISTRIBUTED ABROAD.In 1819 S., a widow, died intestate, and the Solicitor of the Treasury took out administration to her estate, and received under it 23,8217. In 1823 I. C., the wife of E. C., applied to the Crown, claiming to be next of kin of S., but died in 1825 without establishing her claim. In 1830 E. C. died intestate without having taken steps to recover the money, and without having administered to his wife. In 1855 administration, by two several grants, was granted to P. in respect of the estates of I. C. and E. C., on behalf of their children. P. instituted a suit in equity to administer to the estate of S., when it was found that J. C. (the son of I.C. and E. C.) was the sole next of kin of S., and it was ordered that the Solicitor to the Treasury should pay to P., as the representative of J. C., the money in his hands, with interest at 4 per cent. I. C., E. C., and J. C. were all resident and domiciled in the United States of America: Held (affirming the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber), first, that stamp duty was chargeable on the accretions of interest; for the interest, as an accretion, merged into and became a part of the sum which had to be paid, and the whole amount taken together became the estate in respect of which the administration was granted; and secondly (Lord Westbury dissentiente), that letters of administration having, in fact, been granted to both I. C. and E. C., the stamp duty must be paid on each administration. Fiscal statutes must be construed strictly. Per Lord Westbury dissentientem, the double duty was payable only on the assumption that the estate was twice distributed in this country; an assumption incorrect, because, regard being had to the domicile of the parties, the distribution of the estate was governed exclusively by American law; and, the administration to E. C. being unnecessary, the Stamp Office ought not to take advantage of a mistaken form of proceeding: (Partintgon v. The Attorney-General, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 370. H. of L.)

ELEMENTARY PRECEDENTS IN CON-
VEYANCING. (a)

A Collection of practical Forms designed for pro-
fessional Use, and suited to the Emergencies of

actual Practice, with Notes.

(Continued from page 402, Vol. xlviii.)
SURRENDERS. (b)

170. Surrender of a lease from mortgagor, mort-
gagee, and purchaser to a corporation.
This indenture, made, &c., between A. B., of, &c.
[mortgagee], of the first part, C. D., of, &c. [mort.

(a) By THOMAS WILKINSON, Esq., Liverpool.
(b) See 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 3, and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3;
and the cases of Doe dem. Courtail v. Thomas, 9 B. & C.
288; and Lord Ward v. Lumley, 5 H. & N. 87.

recited indenture of the

sum of £

18

on or before the execution hereof,

JOURNAL.

NOTES ON NEW DECISIONS. LIABILITIES OF RAILWAYS ACCIDENT MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-In an action for injury by negligence, the jury, in assessing damages, are to consider, first, the pecuniary loss caused by the accident; secondly, the injury sustained in the physical capacity to enjoy life. In estimating the fact, it may take into account not only the present loss, but incapacity to gain a future income: (Fair v. The London and North-Western Railway Company, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 326, Q. B.)

citing indenture contained for redemption of the
same premises on payment by the said C. D. on
the
day of
then next of the said sum of
£ and interest after the rate of £ per
centum per annum. And whereas the said E. F.
has agreed with the said C. D. for the purchase of
the said piece of land, and the dwelling-house
erected thereon, for the sum of £ And
whereas the said sum of £ is still due and
owing to the said A. B. on the security of the said
day of
but all interest for the same has been paid up to
the day of the date of these presents, and upon
the treaty for the said purchase it was agreed
that the said sum of £ should be paid to the
said A. B. out of the said purchase-money, or sum
of £ And whereas the said E. F. has
applied to the said Mayor, Aldermen, and Bur-
gesses to grant to him a new lease of the said
piece of land, dwelling-house, hereditaments, and
premises for the term of years in the usual
manner of granting such leases by them, and the JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES' LAW
said Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses on such
application have agreed to grant such new lease
accordingly, and in pursuance of such contract for
sale as aforesaid the said A. B. and C. D. have
agreed to surrender the said premises to the
said Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses in manner
hereinafter mentioned, to the intent that the
said new lease may be granted to the said
E. F. Now this indenture witnesseth that, in
consideration of the said agreements, and of the
paid to the said A. B. by the said E. F. at the
request and by the direction of the said C. D., the
receipt whereof the said A. B. doth hereby acknow-
ledge, and doth declare the same to be in full
satisfaction and discharge of all principal moneys
and interest now due and owing to him, on the
security of the said recited indenture of the
ASSIGNMENT of DebenturES-CALLS-RIGHT
day of 18, and of and from the same and
OF SET-OFF.-The defendants' company issued
every part thereof doth hereby release and for to the plaintiff certain debenture bonds, by
ever discharge, as well the said C. D., his heirs,
executors, and administrators, as also the said which they bound themselves to pay to the
E. F., his heirs, executors, and administrators, plaintiff, his executors, administrators, or
and also in consideration of the sum of £
and every of them, for ever, by these presents, assigns, a certain amount upon a future day,
together with interest thereon in the mean time.
to the said C. D. at the same time paid by the By the articles of association of the company
said E. F., the payment and receipt in manner the defendants were to have a lien upon the
aforesaid of which several sums of £ and shares or debentures of members indebted to the
£ (making together the said purchase-money company, and be entitled to sell and transfer
the said C. D. doth hereby them, and apply the proceeds in discharge of
acknowledge, and of and from the same and every such debt. Subsequently the plaintiff trans-
part thereof doth acquit, release, and discharge
the said E. F. for ever by these presents, and also ferred certain of these debenture bonds to A. B.
in consideration of s. by the said Mayor, The defendants registered the transfer, and issued
said A. B., C. D., and E. F., the receipt whereof is registered as proprietor of the debenture bonds.
Aldermen, and Burgess, paid to each of them the a certificate to A. B., stating that he had been
hereby acknowledged, the said A. B., at the request Their secretary also, in a letter to A. B., ac-
and by the direction of the said C. D. and E. F. res- knowledged him to be the proprietor of the
pectively, doth by these presents surrender and bonds, and requested time for payment. They
yield up, and the said C. D. doth by these presents likewise accepted one of the bonds in payment
surrender, yield up, and confirm, and the said of calls due from A. B. to them on shares held
E. F. doth hereby ratify and confirm unto the said by him in the company. The plaintiffs previ-
Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses, and their succes ously to the falling due of the debenture bonds
sors. All that, &c. [parcels], together with all the
rights, members, and appurtenances to the said became indebted to the defendants in a certain
piece of land, hereditaments, and premises belong-sum for calls upon shares held by plaintiff in
ing or in anywise appertaining. And all the defendants' company. This sum the defendants
estate, term, and interest of the said A. B., C. D., sought to set-off in an action brought in the
and E. F., and each of them therein or thereto. name of the plaintiff, but really for the benefit
To hold the same premises to the intent that the of A. B., the assignee of the debentures: Held,

or sum of £

on a special case stated in the action raising the question whether the defendants were entitled in equity to set-off the calls, that they were not so entitled: (Higgs v. The Northern Assam Tea Company, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 336. Ex..)

WINDING-UP-PROOF-INTEREST AFTER PAYMENT OF DEBT.-The holder of bills of exchange accepted by one company and indorsed by another company, both of which were being wound-up, proved against both for the amount due for principal and interest up to the date of the winding-up, and received dividends, from both amounting together to 20s. in the pound on the amount of their proof. They were held not to be entitled to interest accruing due after the date of the orders, but they must be excluded from further dividends until all the other creditors had been paid the amount of their proofs in full: (Re The Joint Stock Discount Company, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 345. M. R.)

WINDING-UP-LIABILITY OF HOLDERS OF PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATES FOR SHARES.-Provisional certificates for new shares, provided that if a second instalment of the capital and premium money in respect of the shares were not paid before a day named, the amount paid for the shares and all rights and privileges appurtenant to the certificate would be forfeited. The holder of such certificates who had transferred his shares without paying the second instalments, was held not to be a contributory (Collum's case, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 350. V.C. S.)

MERCANTILE LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PATENT.-A patent for certain improvements had been granted to H. and K., their executors, administrators, and assigns. K. sold his share of the patent, and in the deed of assignment purported to release the purchaser, his heirs, executors, &c., from all actions and suits by himself and H. The deed of assignment was entered verbatim in the register of proprietors at the patent office. On a motion by H. under the 38th section of the Patent Law Amendment Act 1852: Held, that he was entitled to have the whole deed expunged from the register. Order accordingly: (Re Horsley and Knighton's Patent, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 345. M. R.)

BILL OF SALE-OCCUPATION-DESCRIPTION. The "occupation" of the person making or giving a bill of sale within the 1st section of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, means the ordinary business or calling in life of such person, by reference to which he may be identified: Held, therefore. that a woman who, at the time of giving a bill of sale, carried on a farm, which had belonged to her deceased husband, merely as his executrix, and not with a view to taking permanently to it, and had no other occupation, need not be described as a "farmer" in the affidavit filed under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, s. 1, but was sufficiently described as a "widow :" (Luckin v. Hamlyn, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 366. Ex.)

LEGAL TENDER IN AMERICA.-The Supreme

Court of the United States is stated to be now
engaged in deliberating on the constitutionality of
the Legal Tender Acts; and there is some likeli-
hood of the decision being against the Acts. If
such should be the decision, it will certainly be an
American way of getting rid of inconvertible paper
electioneering manoeuvres and currency theories
now that it has served its purpose, and all sorts of
decision at the present moment would certainly be
are interposed to prevent a return to specie. The
popular, though the inconveniences of the change
must be greater than on a plan deliberately laid
down beforehand. People who have contracted to
pay in greenbacks will suddenly find that they
must pay in gold, and the individual hardships
will be great. But the Americans, as we have
often remarked. get on with more jolting than
would be tolerable in an old country. A strange
part of the matter is, that the chief judge of the
Supreme Court is Mr. Chase, who, as Secretary to
the Treasury, devised the very law on the validity
of which he is asked to decide so long after date.

would involve this necessity, unless it is stipulated that a man should not work at all, is hardly conceivable.

MARITIME LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SHIP SUNK IN PORT-EXPENSES OF REMOVING OBSTRUCTION-LIABILITY OF OWNERS OF CARGO.-By the Mersey Dock Acts Consolidation Acts 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. xcii.) s. 59, the defendants are empowered to destroy wrecks or vessels sunk within the port of Liverpool that are obstructions to navigation; and they may also remove any stone, timbers, anchors, or other obstructions or impediments to such navigation that may be found or arise therein; and in case the master or owner of such vessel or other obstruction shall refuse or neglect to pay the charge of removing the same, the board may sell the same, and out of the proceeds of such sale, retain the expenses incurred in raising, destroying, and removing such wrecks or other obstruction, rendering the overplus to the person entitled to the same. Held, that if the cargo in a sunken ship be included in the terms of this section (of which the court expressed some doubt), the power to detain for the expense of removing an obstruction is to be read distributively, and the owners of cargo, the plaintiffs in this case, could be liable only for the cost of raising their goods, and not of destroying the hull of the ship: (Vivian v. The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, 21 L. T Rep. N. S. 362. C. P.)

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.
GENTLEMEN WHO PASSED THE FINAL
EXAMINATION.

MICHAELMAS TERM 1869.
Aspden, Frank-W. Foyster
Allen, Thomas Lewis-Articled to R. Peckham; J. J.

Merriman; T. Eaton; T. Bowker

Atkey, Frederick Walter, B.A.-J. R. Upton
Atkinson, Fenton Granger-E. Atkinson
Barlow, Stephen Babington, B.A.-J. A. McLeod
Beardsley, William Frederick-T. F. A. Burnaby
Blake, Charles-H. J. Davis; G. Blakey; W. J. Lloyd
Boycott, William-Gardner and Landor
Brabant, William Frederick-W. H. Brabant; F. L.

Bent, Frederick-S. Field

PERSONAL LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS-MISREPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY WITHOUT FRAUD -IMPLIED WARRANTY.-The appellants, two directors of a company, wrote a letter to the respondents' bank, stating that they, as directors, had appointed C. to be legal manager, and had authorised him to draw cheques upon the account of the company. The appellants were not empowered to give C. this authority. On the faith of the above letter, advances were made by the respondents' bank on cheques drawn by C., purporting to bind the company. There was no imputation of fraud in the transaction. In an action by the respondents against the appellants to recover the amount so paid on C.'s cheques: Held (affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria), that the law implied a warranty to the bank, on the part of the appellants, that C. had authority to bind the company, so as to make the appellants respon sible to the bank for the advances on the cheques. If a person represents himself as having autho-Economist. rity to do an act when he has not, and the other side is drawn into a contract with him, and the contract becomes void for want of such authority, he is liable for the damage which may result to the party who confided in the representation, whether the party making it acted with a knowledge of its falsity or not. Collen v. Wright, 8 E. & B. 647 followed and approved. The warranty which the law implies in such cases depends on the position of the parties and on the nature and effect of the representation. Europe. The defendant, however, having set up Evett, George Stuart, B A.-H. R. G. Fowkes

but when ascertained, as a matter of fact, the legal effect is the same as if the warranty had been express. The remedy by special action, where there is fraud or deceit, is a distinct matter: (Cherry v. The Colonial Bank of Australasia, 21 L. T. Řep. N. S. 356. Priv. Co.)

WINDING-UP-WHO MAY PETITION. The

Master of the Rolls-Re Spence's Patent Nonconducting Composition and Cement Company (Limited), which was a winding-up application by three shareholders with fully paid-up shares-has decided that such shareholders are only entitled to petition in a peculiar case, as where the assets are in the hands of third parties who refuse to give them up." The petition was supported by statements that the company was "virtually insolvent," that the business was carried on at a loss solely for the benefit of the managing director, and that the independent shareholders might get something through immediately stopping the business, though the overpowering influence of the managing director prevented a voluntarily winding-up. The Master of the Rolls, however, was not satisfied that the company could not go on, and thought it was for the shareholders to decide. Another feature of this case was that an unpaid creditor supported the application, and his Lordship had some doubts whether he ought not to make the order on the present petition and give the carriage of it to the creditor, but he decided "not to turn a shareholders' petition into a creditor's at such short notice to the respondents of the case they would have to meet."Economist.

CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT ON TRADE.-A question as to the law by which contracts are held void on account of being in restraint of trade, was before Vice-Chancellor James this week, in the case of the Leather Cloth Company Limited v. Lorsont. The plaintiffs had purchased from the defendant and others certain patents for the manufacture of leather cloth, and the latter undertook by their agreement not to engage in the manufacture or sale of similar productions in a business and announced that he would supply similar goods, the present suit was brought to restrain him, and he opposed this plea among others that the undertaking he had given was in restraint in trade, and therefore void. The exact stipulation was that the defendants "will not directly or indirectly carry on, nor will they to the best of their power allow to be carried on by others in any part of Europe, any company or manufactory having for its object the manufacture or sale of productions in any way similar to the productions which are the subject of the said letters patent, and now manufactured in the business or manufactory so carried on at West Ham as aforesaid, and will not communicate to any person or persons the means or processes of such manufacture so as in any way to interfere with the exclusive enjoyment of the said intended company of the benefits hereby agreed to be purchased." The Vice-Chancellor decided that this was not illegal. Notwithstanding the general principal that contracts in restraint of trade were bad, the law allowed an exception for such restrictions as were natural and not unreasonable for the protection of the parties in dealing with the subject-matter of the contract; and this case was within the exception. It more resembled the sale of a secret than a mere agreement not to carry on a business; and sales of secrets with stipulations that they should not be communicated to others had been sanctioned. The public policy of the whole law as to contracts in restraint of trade is perhaps very questionable. The notion is that no person should be compelled to deprive himself of the means of earning his living; but in these days, when the variety of employment is so great as it is, a contract which

Capron

Bickers

Brown, Charles Cornish -S. Brown; T. S. Parnell
Browning, Thomas Worledge-T. M. Ellison; T. L.
Byrne, Lovell Widdrington-E. Byrne
Carlyon, Alexander Keith--E. Carlyon
Clarke, John Thomas-H. Palmer

Cooper, Christopher Bird-T. Cooper
Cooper, George Henry-S. B. Dixon, jun.; J. H. Street
Cooper, John Edward-W. Cooper
Cooper, John Rayner-T. Harland
Cowlard, Christopher Lethbridge-Cowlard and Kemp-
Crook, James-J. C. Crook

son

Cruttwell, Percy Wilson Daniel-W. C. Cruttwell

Damant, Francis William Sancroft-H. J. Damant
Davies, Edward-T. M. Llewellin
Davies, Harry Finden-W. J. S. Foster; J. Mead
Derry, William Main-G. Marshall, jun.

Dunu, Hugh James-H. Dunu

Feltham, George-C. Cole
Forster, Heury Langstaffe-J. L. Forster
Foster, William Joseph-W. Fisher
Fowler, John Seymour A. B. Anderson
Fox, John Henry-W. L. Fox; G. O. Lyns
Fretson, Charles William-W. Fretson
Gaches, George Fitzroy Dean-W. D. Gaches
Furley, Charles John-R. Furley
Garland, Robert Devenish-H. T. Johns; W. Sandys
Gatis, Thomas-W. Dent
Gayford, Edward-W. M. Hazard; T. F. Simpson
Greene, William Asbury-A. Rawlinson
Greville, Arthur Edwin J. H. Hearn
Hall, George Astell-W. Jaques
Hague, Temple Layton-H. Cowling; J. J. Leeman
Harris, Robert Hare T. Davis
Hartland, Edwin Sidney-H. O' B. O'Donoghue
Hayden, Frederick William-W. H. Cobb
Hayes, William Steele-W. Hayes
Hextall, William Brown-G. W. Lamb
Hearsey, Richard-A. St. Paul
Hill, Pascoe Greenfell, B.A.-F. Hill; T. Rawle
Hope, John Henry-J. C. Scarisbrick; A. J. Moore,

jun.

Hunt, James Allen-A. Grundy; J. Woodcock

Hutchinson, James John-C. B. Lever
Kitson, Charles William-C. Kitson; T. Hayter
I'Anson, George Green-J. M. I'Anson
Kitson, Robert, B.A.-J. Kitson; F. T. Woolbert
Lee, George Adolphus Irby, B.A.-P. W. Ottoway
Le Riche, Ebenezer C. T. Foster; E. W. Le Riche
Liggins, Henry Joseph-P. A. Hanrott

Lucas, Lionel Richard, jun.-W. Allison
McLeod, Llewellyn Wynn-J. A. McLeod
Lumley, Theodore-R. B. Lumley
Martin, Robert-S. D. Ashby
Meybruch, Frederick William-J. Mortimer
Midgley, James R. L. Rooke
Minett, Henry Wallace H. Minett
Page, William Tomlinson, jun.-T. G. Dale
Morriss, Thomas Myddleton-A. Carr
Paine, Edwin Alfred-J. Newbon
Palmer, Alexander Douglas Greenlaw-W. H. Gwinnett

Pearse, Thomas Henry-T. Pain; W. Holmes

Fease, Charles-H. M. Cotton

Philips, Charles Edward-A. Hawks

Paillips, William-T. Griffiths

Prt, Richard Joseph Williams-W. Rankin

The learned commissioner held that the notice Iwas insufficient, and nonsuited the plaintiff, who appealed.

The court being of opinion that the notice was

Freedy, Henry Styleman Borrodaile-E. Ball; A. R. sufficient, and that there must be a new trial,
Hudson

resswell, George J. McDiarmid

Frideaux, Robert Walter-S. W. Prideaux; W. Earle
Procter, Arthur Crabtree-C. E. Procter

Fullen, Charles Henry-C. A. Pullen
Ramsden, Thomas Henry-T. W. Clough

Bowen asked for the costs of the appeal, relying
on Schroeder v. Ward (13 C. B. N. S. 410), where
the Court of Common Pleas laid down an opposite
rule to that laid down in this court in Gee v. Lan
cashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, 6 H. & N.
Court, the successful appellant was, in all cases,
entitled to costs, although a new trial was directed
on the ground of misdirection.
Kemp, contra.

Hatcliff, Edmund Theodore-W. P. Allcock; C. F. 221, and held that, on appeals from the County

Tagart

Rendell, William Francis-R. Francis

Roberts, Frederick-J. Girdlestone; J. Harward
Ranson, Henry-R. Robinson

Rogers, Thomas Henry Tate-J. F. Fussell

Swell, Henry Summers-J. T. Hoyle

Serpe, William Arthur-W. Sharpe

Sheppard, Frederick James-J. H. Sheppard

Sinson, Higson-J. Wintringham

Smith, Fraser, jun.-J. T. Roumieu; H. W. Purkis
Smith, John Anthony-W. S. Allen

Smith, John Christopher-T. D. Calthrop

Smith, Mark Philip-A. Weston

Shuth, William Henry-W. Murphy; M. R. Sharman
Steavenson, Ernest Cartwright-W. Gribble

Story, Henry Donald-H. Story; W. C. Bousfield
Statheld, Alfred Robert Ogilvie-T. D. Calthrop; G. G.

Fackston

Sedlow, John, jun.-J. Bury; J. Sudlow; N. C. Milne
Sweeting, Thomas Luther-J. H. Lydall'

Tanner, Harry Grenville-G. Masefield; F. Wood; H.
Liversidge

Tatham, Richard Turner-J. Sharp
Tolcher, Robert-J. T. White

Walker, Edward Lake-E. Walker

Walker, Walter-W. Dennis

Waters, Charles William-T. Waters; G. Henderson
Watson, Alfred-H. Brearey

Watson, William James-W. Watson, jun.
Watehead, Joseph-F. Smith

Whitehorn, William Lampet J. Stockton
Wight, Thomas Holyoake-T. Wight; G. Birch;

Robinson

Williams, George Salusbury-J. D. Wadham

Wilmott, Henry George, B.A.-R. Stubbs

COUNTY COURTS.

COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION.

IN ADMIRALTY.

THE COURT (Kelly, C.B., Channell, Pigott, and Cleasby, BB.) gave costs to the appellant, but declined to lay down a general rule; and held that it was a matter of discretion in each case.

STONEHOUSE COUNTY COURT.
(Before M. FORTESQUE, Esq., Judge.)
GILLETT v. SOUTH DEVON RAILWAY COMPANY.
The payment of witnesses-Subsistence.
The jury in this case gave the plaintiff 191.
damages.
R. G. Edmonds said he had presented his costs
(17.) to the registrar, who had refused to pass
them until he had consulted his Honour as to
whether the plaintiff and his wife should be
allowed anything for subsistence. Mr. and Mrs.
Gillett came from Bristol, and they were at Ply-
mouth three days, for which they claimed. The
Superior Courts, in such cases, allowed the costs
B. of subsistence, and he contended the same should
be done there. It would be remembered that the
case lasted until after six o'clock in the evening,
and on the part of the company it was said that
the plaintiff and his wife ought to have gone back
by the mail, and not charged for another day. If
they had left, however, by the 7.40 train they
would have broken into the third day before they
reached Bristol.

His HONOUR, referring to the question of sub-
The following matters have been before the sistence, said the rule of one Superior Court might
Court of Admiralty:

THE YOUNG JAMES.

This was a cause of damage. The action was entered in the sum of 10007. The damage actually sustained by the plaintiff's Vessel amounted to 8001. After the institution of the suit the defendants availed themselves of the provisions contained in sect. 54 of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. e. 65), and filed an affidavit, which stated the facts necessary to entitle them to have their liability lunited to 81. per ton. After the affidavit was filed the sum of 252. 2s., which was the value of the defendants' vessel calculated at 81. per ton, was tendered by the plaintiffs, and accepted by the defendants in satisfaction; the question of costs being reserved.

Clarkson, on behalf of the plaintiffs, moved the court to condemn the defendants in costs.

Gibson opposed the application, on the ground that the suit might, without agreement, have been brought in a County Court, and that the plaintiffs had not recovered a sum exceeding 3001.

The COURT held that the suit was not a proceeding which might, without agreement, have been taken in the County Court, and condemned

the defendants in costs.

THE BENGAL. Clarkson applied, in pursuance of the 9th section of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868, for an order to institute a suit in the High Court of Admiralty. The application was made on behalf of the owners of two steam tugs, who claimed to have rendered salvage services to the Bengal, a vessel of 1300 tons burden. The application was supported by an affidavit, from which it appeared that agreements had been made between the masters of the tugs and the master of the Bengal to tow the Bengal into port for a specific sum; that after the making of the agreerent the difficulty of the enterprise had increased; and that a question of law was likely to arise whether, under the circumstances of the case, the towage contract was superseded by the right to salvage.

The COURT made the order.

APPEAL FOR COSTS. CONYBEARE V. FARRIES. The following matter was before the Court of Exchequer on the 8th instant. This was an appeal from the decision of Mr. Commissioner Kerr, upon the question whether a notice to produce "all letters relating to your tenancy of a room" included a letter which, with the plaintiff's reply, constituted the tenancy. One letter was specified in the notice, which was written during the tenancy, and it was contended that this limited the generality of the terms.

not be same as another.

Edmonds said if it were necessary he would get Mr. Bennett, who was there for the company, a dozen such bills of costs out of his bill-book passed by the taxer.

Bennett asked his Honour whether he thought the whole of the plaintiff's witnesses were necessary, and whether there was not cumulative evidence?

His HONOUR could not say that they were not necessary.

Mr. Registrar Pearce was then directed to make inquiries as to what was done in the Superio Courts in reference to subsistence.

Edmonds did not see why he should be put to any trouble in the matter, and said he should charge for his attendance there that day.

FOOT v. STANBURY.
Injunction-Jurisdiction-Value.

Rundle applied on the part of the plaintiff for
an order in the nature of an injuction to restrain
the defendant from committing waste, by break-
ing up for tillage the garden meadow, the Devon-
port field, the north field, and the house meadow,
all situate in the tithing of Weston Peverel, and
which he had threatened to do, contrary to the
terms of his lease. He understood there was a
preliminary objection that the land which the de-
fendant, was going to break was of the value of
more than 500l., which ousted the jurisdiction of
the court. But if the defendant broke the fields,
the question would be as to the amount of damage
the plaintiff sustained by the breaking. Stanbury
threatened to break and take green crops out of
the land, and they asked for an order to restrain
him from so doing. Had it been on any other part
of the estate than that immediately in front of
Captain Foot's residence, it would not have been
so much injury to him.

Shelly, for the defendant, submitted that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the injunction prayed for. The section under which the application was made was "in all proceedings the County Court shall have the power and authority of the High Court of Chancery in the suits or matters hereinafter mentioned.' Seven particular suits were then named, and he contended that his Honour had power to grant an injunction only in those seven matters, under neither of which did the question before the court come.

Rundle said he applied under the eighth paragraph.

Shelly.-That has reference to the paragraph that has gone before.

His HONOUR said he was as certain as he could be without referring that that very matter came under the cognisance of one of the Vice-Chancellors upon an appeal a short time ago, and it was held that the County Court had jurisdiction.

Shelly said, assuming that his Honour did not agree with him in the first objection, he contended that as the value of the property was above 500l., the court had not the power to try it.

His HONOUR said he had sufficient confidence in his memory to be quite certain that that matter had been before the Superior Courts, and they had gone nearly as far as to say that the County Courts had general jurisdiction in matters of injunction. In that particular case he entertained no doubt, because although it might be called an injunction, it was virtually the enforcement of an agreement.

Shelly said supposing his Honour took that view, the section under which proceedings must be sustained was the fourth, "All suits for specific performance, or for the delivering up or cancelling any agreement for the sale or purchase of any property where the purchase-money shall not exceed the sum of 500l." By the 9th section of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142-the last County Court Act-it was altered in this way, that the jurisdiction, so far as related to cases coming within the fourth head of the 1st section, " may, from and after the passing of this Act, be exercised in all suits for specific performance, or for the reforming, delivering up, or cancelling of any agreement for the sale, purchase, or lease of any property, where in the case of sale or purchase the purchase-money, or in case 5001." Therefore the test was the value of the proof lease the value of the property, shall not exceed perty, and he was quite sure Mr. Rundle would not say that in that case it was under 500l.

His HONOUR said unless Mr. Rundle could find an authority he would be afraid to venture without hearing of the case. In the Superior Courts the plaintiff would get the injunction immediately.

Ultimately it was agreed that the case should stand over until the next court, the defendant promising that he would not break the land in the mean time. A hope was also expressed that in the interim some arragement would be effected.

SUNDERLAND COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, Nov. 18.

(Before H. STAPYLTON, Esq., Judge.)
BRITAIN'S PRIDE v. JEANETTE.
Admiralty jurisdiction-Collision-Vessel in tow
-Duty of sailing veesel to keep her course.
In this case during thick and foggy weather, the
Britain's Pride, a brig, was proceeding on her
when about a mile from the former port, steering
voyage from Sunderland to Southampton, and
S.E., she perceived at about a quarter of a mile
distant a steam-tug with the Jeannette in tow,
steering N. W. Both vessels had fog signals
sounding, and look-outs stationed. As soon as
the Britain's Pride saw the Jeannette, she ported
her helm to avoid the collision, the steam-tug at
the same time slipping the Jeannette's tow rope
and passing across the bows of the Britain's
Pride. The helm of the Jeannette was put hard
a-port, but too late too avoid a collision, and she
immediately after ran into the Britain's Pride,
doing considerable damage. The captain of the
latter vessel swore that he hailed the tug to take
him in tow, as he thought he was sinking, but the
tug did not do so, but went back to the Jeanette,
but there was no evidence that the hail was
heard.

Sirney, for the defendant, submitted, that if the helm of the Britain's Pride had been starboarded the collision would have been avoided, or at any rate she ought to have kept her course; and that the Britain's Pride having nearly all her sails set, was herself the cause of the collision, she, in fact, running into the defendant's vessel, as she was going with the wind and tide. He also urged that even if the Jeannette were to blame, the weather was thick, and that therefore the collision was an inevitable accident.

Botterell, in reply, contended that the Jeannette's being in tow was to be considered as if she had been a steamer, and was therefore bound to keep out of the way of the sailing ship (rule 15). That by the sailing rules (rule 13), when two sailing ships were approaching each other, and there was danger of collision, each vessel was to port its helm, and the Britain's Pride being a sailing vessel was bound to do so. He also contended that the fact of the defendant leaving the Britain's Pride to sink or swim after he was hailed, by the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act cast the onus of proof that he was not to blame upon the defendant. As to the weather, to relieve the defendant from liability, it must be shown to have been worse than his own witnesses stated. Several cases were quoted to sustain these contentions.

His HONOUR (having taken time to consider his judgment) found that the defendant's vessel ran into the plaintiff's vessel, and that the weather was not sufficiently thick to support the defence on that ground. He held that the Jeannette was in fault, because, being under steam (in tow of a tug) she was bound to keep out of the way of the Britain's Pride. He also held that the Britain's Pride was in fault in not keeping her course, and

On or after the 1st Jan. 1870, no person may action against the defendant to the amount of tences or by other fraud.

payment of a sum of money subject to the 501. or upwards, and that there is probable cause ditors or any of them, made any transfer or

2. Default in payment of any sum recoverable order such defendant to be arrested and im- satisfied judgment or order for payment of

summarily before a justice of the peace. 3. Default by a trustee or person acting in a fiduciary capacity, and ordered to pay by a court of equity any sum in his possession or under claimed in the action, that he will not go out of has been obtained by fraud, will not be released

(a) The provisions of this clause are involved, and
the difficulty is increased by the terms of the marginal
words, "Saving of power of committal for small debts."
The power of committal is not limited to small debts,
i.e., debts not exceeding 501., but cannot be exercised by
an inferior court for judgment debts of a Superior Court
13. Obtaining within fourteen months before
exceeding that amount. The Superior Courts them. the presentation of a bankruptcy petition or
selves, which are excepted from these provisions, may commencement of the liquidation, by any false
commit for nonpayment of debts of any amount. The
proper marginal words would be, "Power of committal
in certain cases; provisoes as to the exercise of this