very different form, so that the subject was one well deserving of careful attention. (Hear, hear.) The noble and learned lord in the next place touched on the promised measure of the Government with respect to the transfer of land, observing that abroad our system of uses and trusts was unknown, and that, instead of them, recourse was had to simple contract and agreement, which he said was much more effectual and infinitely less cumbrous. Dismissing that subject, the noble and learned lord adverted to the relations between husband and wife, especially with reference to the rights of the latter with respect to property, observing that there was no doubt great room for improvement in such matters. In this country we adhered entirely to the proposition that marriage was a legal transfer to the husband of the wife's personal property as well as of the income derived from her real property. That was, however, accompanied with the condition that the gift was made in order that the husband might maintain the wife. Was that a trust in the proper sense of the word or was it an obligation that ought to be made the condition of the gift, so that when the trust was not performed the gift might be resumed and placed under regulations ? In justice he thought it was so, and probably to that extent most of those whom he had the honour to address would be willing to accept an alteration of the law. He would, however, suggest to the members of the society that they should examine the different Bills which might from time to time be introduced into Parliament on the subject, and see how it was proposed to meet the difficulty as to how far the wife was to be made to contribute to the necessities of the family. He next came to the measure which the Government had introduced on the subject of naturalisation and neutrality. He had striven for years during the Government of Lord Palmerston to procure the sanction of the principles that aliens might be permitted to hold land in this country. Lord Palmerston, however, held peculiar views on the subject, and he was unable to carry out his object. The principle was now being acted upon, and the issue would be, he hoped, the production of the best results. He begged, in conclusion, earnestly to direct the attention of the society to the various questions to which he had alluded, because the expression of the opinions of such a body upon them was the best way to secure that they should be understood, and thus a great benefit would by its means (Cheers.) be conferred upon the community. On the motion of Sir P. Colquhoun, seconded by Mr. Napier Higgins, a vote of thanks was unanimously passed to the noble and learned lord at the close of his address, and the proceedings terminated. ARTICLED CLERKS' SOCIETY. At a meeting of this society, held in the hall of the Hon. Society of Clement's-inn, Clement's-inn, Strand, at seven p.m. on Wednesday last, Mr. J. C. Barnard in the chair, Mr. Plant moved: "That a national system of compulsory secular education would not at present be in accordance with the requirements of society." The motion provoked much discussion, and was ultimately lost by a majority of six. The meeting was particularly well attended, and adjourned at 9.45 p.m. LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY. At a meeting of this society, held on Tuesday last, Mr. Hargreaves in the chair, the following question was discussed: "Should the Bill introduced by the Government, relative to the tenure of land in Ireland, become law?" The debate was opened by Mr. Warmington, in the affirmative; and, after an animated discussion, was decided by the society in the same view by a majority of 12 to 1. Mr. W. Appleton was elected to the vacant The number of post of honorary secretary. members present was 23. LEGAL OBITUARY. W. PAGAN, ESQ. The late William Pagan, Esq., of Curriestanes, Kirkcudbrightshire, and Clayton, Fifeshire, solicitor, who died at Clayton, on the 21st Dec. last, was the eldest son of the late William Pagan, Esq., of Curriestanes, by Mary, sister of Allan Cunningham, the poet. He was born at Kelwood, near Dumfries, in the year 1803; was educated at Dumfries Academy and Edinburgh University, and admitted a member of the Sheriffs' Court of Fife in 1826. He was a banker at Cupar-Fife, and some time provost of that town. Among the works written by him, one on road reform, a plan for abolishing tolls and maintaining our highways by assessment, is the earliest and best known. His name will be associated with this scheme which has been taken up by successive Lord Advocates, and is likely ere long to be passed into law. Mr. Pagan married in 1826, Janet, eldest daughter of the late George Hair, Esq., and by her, who died in 1866, he has left, with other issue, an only son, George Hair, now of Curriestanes and Clayton, who was born in 1828, and has been twice married, first in 1851, and again in 1862. J. G. N. DARBY, ESQ. The late Jonathan George Norton Darby, Esq. Barrister-at-Law, who died at 29, Westbourne Park-road, W., on the 17th inst., in the 41st year of his year, was the eldest son of George Darby, Esq., of Markly, Sussex (who was formerly M.P. for East Sussex), by Maria, daughter of the late Samuel Homfray, Esq., of Coworth-house, Berks. He was born in 1829, and was educated at Christ Church, Oxford, where he graduated B.A. in 1851, and proceeded M.A. in 1854. Having chosen the law as a profession, Mr. Darby became a student at Lincoln's-Inn, where he was called to the Bar in Trinity Term 1854; he practised as an equity draughtsman and conveyancer, and went the Home Circuit, and also practised at the Sussex Sessions. The deceased gentleman married in 1869 Susan Margaret, eldest daughter of Nathan Wetherell, Esq., of Pashley, Sussex. F. PRUJEAN, ESQ. LOVETT, PHILIP COSBY, jun, no occupation, Park-place, To surrender in the Country. CALVERT, HENRY, jun., and WALKLAND, JAMES, electro GOTT, WILLIAM, printer, Leeds. Pet. March 19. Reg. Marshall. HALSTEAD, DAVID, dyer, Manchester. Pet. March 28. Reg. Kay. Sur. April 14 HURST, THOMAS, bootmaker, Pilkington. Pet. March 24. Beg. Holden. Sur. April 13 MAUNDER, ROBERT, draper, Exeter. Pet. March 24. Reg. Daw Sur. April 11 NICHOL, JACOB, publican, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Pet. March 23. Reg. Mortimer. Sur. April 8 TERRY, DAVID, builder, Whitwood. Pet. March 26. Reg. Mason. Sur. April 13 TODD, WILLIAM HURFORD, surgeon, Beaufort Iron Works. Pet March 24. Reg. Shepard. Sur. April 14 WILSON, WILLIAM SHIRLEY, travelling draper, Sheffield. Pet. March 24. Reg. Rodgers. Sur. April 8 WINKLEY, JAMES, innkeeper, Whaplode Drove. Pet. March 24. Reg. Partridge. Sur. April 14 Dibidends. BANKRUPTS' ESTATES. The Official Assignees are given, to whom apply for the Dividends. Azulay, I. merchant, first and second on new proofs, 28. Dief, (and third on total proofs, 44.) McNeill, Manchester.-Bates, E. builder, first, 2s. 4d. McNeill, Manchester.-Bowen, 8. giaas Acraman, Bristol-Brit-life, W. cabinet maker, first, 15. McNeill, Manchester-Chorley, R. coal merchant, first, 2s. 6d. McNeill, Manchester.-Clough, P. brewer, first, 2s. 6d. McNeill, Manchester.-Collins, R. D. grocer, first, 98. 7d. Acraman, Bristol.-Cooke, R. market gardener, 3. 44. Harris, Nottingham. - Cooper, J. coachbuilder, first, 74 8d. McNeill, Manchester.-Cripps, W. commission agent, first, Is. 114. McNeill, Manchester. Fielding, J. cotton manufacturer, first 85. 1d. McNeill, Manchester.-Gray, A. G. alkali manufacturer, The late Francis Prujean, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, who died at 27, Clifton-road, Brighton, on the 5th inst., in the 60th year of his age, was the youngest son of the late John Prujean, Esq., conveyancer, of Gray's-inn, by Ann, daughter of William Sanders, Esq,, and grandson of Francis Prujean, manufacturer, first, 18. 2. Esq., of Sutton-gate and Daggenham's-park, Essex. He was born at London in the year 1810, educated at St. Edmund's College, Herts, and was called to the Bar at the Middle Temple in 1848, and, like his father, he acted for many years as a conveyancer in Gray's-inn. The deceased gentleman, who lived and died unmarried, was a descendant of Sir Francis Prujean, M.D., of Sutton-gate and Daggenham's-park, who, according to tradition, attended Charles I. to the scaffold, the family having a painting of the above Sir Francis Prujean, by Vandyke, said to have been taken after attending the king to the scaffold. It is further an historical fact that he attended Catherine of Braganza, wife of Charles II. He was also president of, and gave the library to, the College of Physicians. PROMOTIONS & APPOINTMENTS Mr. Henry Stanley Whalley, of Blackburn, Lancashire has been appointed by the Lord Chief Justice a Commissioner for taking Affidavits in the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh, K.G., has conferred upon Frederick J. Fegen, Esq., R.N. Barrister-at-Law, Lincoln's-inn, the appointment of Naval Counsel to His Royal Highness. Whitehall, March 12.-The Queen has been pleased to direct Letters Patent to be passed under the Great Seal granting the dignity of a Knight of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland unto Michael Roberts Westropp, Esq., Chief Justice of Her Majesty's High Court of Judicature at Bombay. THE GAZETTES. Bankrupts. Gazette, March 25. To surrender at the Bankrupts' Court, Basinghall-street. HORLEY, THOMAS REGINALD, stock broker, Finch-la. Pet. PIPE, HENRY, bootmaker, Pickering-ter, Westbourne-pk. Pet. RHODES, JAMES, gentleman, Addison-rd, Kensington. To surrender in the Country. COLES, WILLIAM, farmer, Harburg. Pet. March 21. Reg. Campbell. Sur. April 6 CRABTREE, DANIEL PEARCY, tea dealer, Exeter. Pet. March 22. Reg. Daw. Sur. April 6 FREEMAN, GEORGE PHILIP, auctioneer, Frostenden. Pet. IRVING, BENJAMIN, lace manufacturer, Balsall-heath, near Bir. Sur. April 5 SCOTT, HENRY SHIPPEY, innkeeper, Bury St. Edmunds. Pet. March 21. Reg. Collins. Sur. April 7 To surrender at the Bankrupt's Court, Basinghall-street. Pet. BEGBIE, FRANCIS EDMUND, captain in the marine artillery on half-pay, St. Heliers. Pet. March 25. Reg. Brougham. Sur. April 22 FAUCHEUX, TOUSSAINT, marble mason, Charles-st, Cavendish-sq. Pet. March 23. Reg. Roche. Sur. April 25 FICKLER, JULIUS, and FICKLER, EDWARD, velvet manufacturers, Wood-st. Pet. March 24. Reg. Spring-Rice. Sur. April 11 third, o. 5-16ths (in addition to is. 54d. previously declared. Laidman, Newcastle-Halton, W. farmer, first, 9s. 4. McNeill, Manchester.-Headland, W. farmer, 1. Harris, Nottingham.Herbert, J. paper box manufacturer, new proofs, 20. Harris, (and second on total proofs, d.) McNeill, Manchester.-Jaksana, 8. cotton dealer, first, 5d. Turner, Liverpool.-Jones, G. W. wine merchant, first, Is. 6d. Turner, Liverpool.-Kent, G. baker, first, 5d. Acraman, Bristol.-Knocles, J. machinist, first, 114. McNeill, Manchester.-Mawby, T. warehouseman, 1d. Harris, Nottingham. -Murray, D. block maker, &c., first, 3s. 7d. Laidman, Newcastle. -Napper, R. wheelwright, first and final, 4s. 2d. Messiter, Wincanton-Pilling, J. jun. cotton spinner, first, 3s. 24, McNeill, Manchester.-Politt, J. cotton spinner, first on new proofs, 3a. (and second on total proofs, 3d.) McNeill, Manchester-Suebotham, J. and N. machinists, first 11s. McNeill, Manchester.Smith, S. and J. T. cotton spinners, first, 1s. 7d. McNeill, Manchester.-Spencer, J. jun., Liverpool, first, 34. Turner, Liverpool. -Wilkinson, D. commission agent, first, 2d. McNeill, Kanchester.-Williams, W. leather seller, first, 6d. Peter, Beirath. -Williams, W. saddler, &c., first, Is. 4d. Turner, LiverpoolWinterbottom, J. K. banker, further, 2d. McNeill, Manchester. Nottingham-Horsley, J. iron merchant, first on new proofs, 11. Assignment, Composition, Inspectorship, and Trust Deeds. Gazette, March 25. GORRINGE, JOSEPH FRANCIS, farmer, Brayton, near Aspatria. March 2. 68. on April 24. Trusts. J. Carruthers, farmer, Aspatria, and J. Tinkler, joiner, Penrith BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. BIRTHS. BARDSWELL-On the 26th ult., at Highfield, Surbiton, the wife of C. W. Bardswell, Esq., barrister-at-law, of a daughter. BLACKBURNE.-On the 23rd ult., at Stone Cottage, Oldham, the wife of Charles Edward Blackburne, solicitor, prematurely, ot twin daughters. CHITTY. On the 24th ult., at 34, Queensborough-terrace, Kensington-gardens, the wife of Joseph W. Chitty, Esq., barristerat-law, of a daughter. CLARENCE. On the 25th ult., at No. 37, Alexandra- road, St. John's-wood, London, the wife of L. B. Clarence, barrister-atlaw, Lincoln's-inn, of a son. son. HOLMES. On the 2nd ult., at 36, Eccles-street, Dublin, the wife of Hugh Holmes, Esq., barrister-at-law, of a daughter. KINGDON. On the 24th ult., at 29, Marlborough hill, St. John's wood, the wife of Paul A. Kingdon, Esq., barrister-at-law, of a MAJOR.-On the 26th ult., at Reigate-hill House, Reigate, the wife of Pryce A. Major, Esq., barrister-at-law, of a daughter. MOORE. On the 26th ult., at Frankville Bebington, the wife of R. B. Moore, Esq., solicitor, Birkenhead, of a son. MARRIAGE. WATSON-GREEN.-On the 23rd ult., at Rawdon, Yorkshire, Samuel Watson, of Bouverie street, London, solicitor, to Martha Louisa, daughter of the Rev. S. G. Green, B.A., President of Rawdon College. DEATHS. COTHER. On the 20th ult., at Dinau, France, aged 57, William Cother, Esq., barrister-at law. EVANS. On the 23rd ult., at The Parade, Monmouth, aged 38, Alfred Evans, Esq., solicitor. PAYNE. On the 29th ult., at Highgate, aged 72, Joseph Payne, Esq., Deputy-Assistant Judge of the Middlesex Sessions, the brother of Mr. Serjt. Payne. HE COUNTY COURTS Tand GAZETTE of BANKRUPTCY (MONICLE 18. 6d.), greatly improved and enlarged, in accordance with the extension of the Jurisdiction of the County Courts under 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142. To enable it to treat more completely of the many matters on which the Judges, Officers, and Practitioners will require to be kept regularly informed, and to give to it the import ance which, as the Journal of the County Courts, and their long-established official organ, it is entitled to assume, it is enlarged to twenty-four pages, of the size and shape of the LAW TIMES, the Reports of Cases relating to County Court Law decided by the Superior Courts being continued in their present octavo form, as more convenient for citation in Court. Communications are specially invited to the department o Queries," which is designed to do for the County Courts what the Justice of the Peace does for the Magistrates Courts. The COUNTY COURTS CHRONICLE will be published monthly as hitherto; but should the growth of business in the County Courts require more space or more frequent issue hereafter t will then be published at shorter intervals. N. B.-The COUNTY COURTS CHRONICLE was commenced with the County Courts. It is recognised as the official organ of the Courts, the Treasury having made an order that it shall be supplied to all the Judges. London: 10, Wellington-street, Strand,W.C. Manchester County Court-Liability of bleachers Manchester County Court-Conversion by carriers Peterborough County Court-Legacy-Right of husband.. BANKRUPTCY LAW: Notes of New Decisions............ CORRESPONDENCE OF THE PROFESSION NOTES AND QUERIES ON POINTS OF PRACTICE................. Law Union Fire and Life Insurance Company Law Students' Debating Society. The Solicitors' Benevolent Association 460 461 462 462 462 within the mischief of the 2nd and 32nd sections of the Act of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, and that, irrespective of any illegality, the practice is strongly to be deprecated." We heartily concur. taxed more heavily for medical attendance upon a claimant for compensation than a private individual; and we hope that solicitors will do all in their power, and they may do much, to dissipate the mistaken ideas on this subject which are entertained by many members of the medical profession. THE complaints which have so largely prevailed against the Bribery Commissioners have had more effect than is generally supposed upon the prosecutions for bribery which have so conspicuously failed. At Taunton the leading counsel for one of the Bridgewater defendants proclaimed the fact that the weight of public reprobation had fallen more heavily upon the Commissioners than upon the individuals whom they had scheduled. This was a very strong observation from a member of the Profession to which the Commissioners belong, and it may have been in bad taste. But the fact remains that public indignation has been much excited by the mode in which the inquiries were conducted; and there can be no doubt that if the laws for the prevention of electoral corruption are to be worked efficiently, the conaltered. If that is not done, a great deal stitution of these tribunals must be radically more care must be exercised in the selection of commissioners. This is clear from the petitions which have been sent up from Norwich, in which the complaint is made that "many abusive and insulting observations were made by the commissioners to witnesses," and that the commissioners unnecessarily prolonged the inquiry. Therefore, looking at each of the commissions, we find the Bridgewater commission pre-eminent for the most extraordinary piece of browbeating on record in any modern judicial proceeding; the Beverley commission raising points of law by its irregularities, and extending its sittings to great length, and the Norwich commission charged by that city with abuse and insult. These facts cast serious reflections upon the legal profession; and it is with considerable pain that we come to the conclusion that some at least of the Commissioners were wholly unfitted for the offices to which they were appointed. And we repeat that a new principle of selection 'must be adopted on future occasions if the bribery laws are to be carried into active operation. LAND TENURE. LAST week we sought to show why all attempts to lessen the cost of land transfer had failed fo egregiously. The reformers had not traced the evil to its source, and their remedies were therefore wrongly directed. The true cause was not the verbosity of conveyancers or the absence of a register; it was to be found in the extensive power of imposing charges upon land (which was, in fact, to permit the creation of an indefinite number of owners other than the actual possessor) and the latitude of claims permitted by the Statute of Limitations. If we are right in this, and upon that point we should much like to be favoured with the opinions of some of our most experienced solicitors, the reforms required may be thus stated: 1. Registration of all charges upon land not accompanied by actual possession. right to discharge all such registered charges, 2. Power to the party having the possessory by paying the amount or the value thereof into the Court of Chancery for the use of the party 462 THE exorbitancy of all charges where public companies are concerned, is brought promi-entitled to such charges, precisely as is done in 463 465 466 463 nently forward by the nature of the medical 463 charges revealed in an action against a railway 464 Company tried at Kingston. We wish to show no disrespect to the medical profession, but we 464 speak from reliable information when we say that they too frequently back up claims against 466 railway companies, in a way which we do not 466 believe they could reconcile to their consciences 466 under any other circumstances. In the case to 466 which we have referred the plaintiff was seen 466 going about his business shortly after the accident. This piece of folly was undoubtedly set right by his medical attendant ordering him to keep his bed for a decent time. This is an evil which is very widespread and very deplorable, and is really a forcible argument in favour of, in some way, fixing the liability of companies for accidents upon a graduated scale. Everyone must agree with the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE that there is no reason why a company should be £ s. d. 2 13 0 179. 0 1 1 010 017 016 the case of land taken by railway companies and for public improvements. 3. A reduction of limitation of claims from sixty years to thirty years. If these were adopted, the complicated, costly, and inefficient scheme of the Land Tenure Bill might be put aside. 1. Registration of charges and incumbrances. The propriety of this is so manifest, the marvel is that it was not long ago adopted. The law that recognises possession as proof of property should surely have required more public and tangible evidence of any claim adverse to such title. A man who desires to establish a claim upon property to which he has no visible title, cannot justly complain that he is required to notify that claim at a public office, so that whosoever may afterwards deal with the property may have notice that it is not what it appears to be. The objection raised to such a register of charges and incumbrances is, that it would sometimes make inconvenient revelations. But the power to charge without possession is the peculiar privilege of the landowner, and the conditions of it may be fairly imposed by the law that confers it. If the public convenience demands a modification of this privilege, partial inconvenience in the exercise of it cannot be permitted to stand in the way. A registry of charges and incumbrances is the first step to land transfer simplification; registration must be peremp tory and without exception, and any charge not registered must be absolutely void. The registrar must give notice to those who deal with the land of every charge affecting it that does not attach to the actual possession. The possessory title is almost always easy of proof. This and a search of the register for charges and incumbrances will be all the investigation of title then required. 2. But this should be accompanied with a power to the owner in fee entitled to the possession to discharge any of such charges or incumbrances at any time. This is not a new and untried experiment. It has been tried and proved already. The difficulties are few, and no wrong or even inconvenience has been found to result from it. The machinery by which this process of discharge from charges and incumbrances may be effected has been tried by railway companies and by public improvement commissioners, and proved perfectly successful. But what has been effected so easily for some land may be applied to all land, and our proposition is, that the owner in fee entitled to the possession should be empowered at any time, on due notice given to the parties interested, to apply to the court for a valuation of the charges upon his land, and then to pay the value so found to the AccountantGeneral as a "fund in court," to be held for the persons entitled to receive it, when they are enabled to establish their claims. The duty of the landowner will cease when he has thus paid off his charges, his land will be free, and on the register of incumbrances there will be a memorandum against the entry of the charge, that on such a day it was valued at so much, and the amount thereof paid on such a date to the Accountant-General for the use of the parties entitled. This will be a permanent notice to all subsequent inquirers, and enable claimants to trace with ease what is the value of their interest, and where their property is to be found. 3. Reduction of the period for limitation of claims to thirty years. Descriptions in bills of sale have been, on for the general benefit we will here give a sumseveral occasions, the origin of litigation, and mary of them. First, however, should be borne in mind the object of the statute, which is to afford to creditors and parties interested a true idea of the position in life of the vendor, and to give such a description of the residence and occupation of the vendor and witnesses as will enable persons interested to trace out the person giving the bill of sale, and who the witnesses are, so as to ascertain the bona fides of the transaction (Per Blackburn, J. in Briggs v. Ross, 17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 600.) It is not possible to give all the cases which have been decided on the matter of description. Mr. Beniamin, in his work on the sale of Personal Property, takes the following as fair examples, for which he gives the authorities (p. 371). "It has been held insufficient to describe as 'gentleman' only, a clerk in the Audit Office, or an attorney's clerk, or silk buyer, but such a description was held sufficient where the party had no occupation.... The residence of the witness has been held sufficiently indicated by giving his place of business, without describing the place where he sleeps. A residence described as dlesex,' was held sufficient without adding the New-street, Blackfriars, in the county of MidCity of London.' Where the attesting witness stated, I reside at Hanley, in the county of Stafford, and am an accountant,' it was held sufficient both as to residence and occupation, although it was proved that Hanley was a borough containing 40,000 inhabitants, and although the deponent was a clerk of an accountant residing in Manchester, whose name was over the door of the place of business in Hanley." There, however, it was proved that hundreds of letters reached the deponent addressed Hanley only, and that although a clerk only, he was allowed to do business on his own account. To add Vining's case to these, it establishes that to describe an actor and theatrical manager as "esquire" is insufficient. "If this were the only point in the case," said Chief Judge Bacon, "I should be of opinion, without any hesitation, that the description' he has not been complied with. The gentleman is by adopted is insufficient, and that the statute has profession an actor, and although it is said that he was not at the particular time referred to under any engagement to act, yet he was undoubtedly a manager of actors. He had the conduct of a theatre in which he must of necessity have had abundance of employment in preparing plays for representation, in engaging and directing such performers as were there employed, and in entering into a variety of personal contracts incident to his business and occupation as in favour of this reform. There is, we believe, The Land Transfer Bill now before the House of Lords, and which we printed in full last week, is much too difficult and doubtful a measure to be passed hastily into a law. It ought to be subjected to the most careful scrutiny of the practitioners who have enjoyed the largest experience in real property law. We gather from Mr. GLADSTONE'S statement on the condition of Parliamentary business that it is already placed in the category of Bills of the third class, and to be reserved for a less busy session. In the meanwhile it behoves the lawyers to subject it to their keenest criticism, and, while they are considering the question of land tenure, may we ask them to examine the suggestions we have made, and favour us with an opinion as to their practicability and propriety. BILLS OF SALE. EFFORTS are continually being made to evade the provisions of the Bills of Sale Act, and however successful they may be as a rule, they are summarily disposed of whenever they come We next come to the still more important question of possession. The Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36) by its first section says that any bill of sale shall be null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever, so far as regards the property in, or the right to, the possession of any personal chattels comprised in such bill of sale, as against assignees of all kinds, sheriff's officers, &c.," so far as regards the property in, or right to, the possession of any personal chattels comprised in such bill of sale which," at or after certain times mentioned, "shall be in the possession or apparent possession of the person making such bill of sale, or of any person against whom the process shall have issued under or in the execution of which such bill of sale shall have been made or given, as the case may be. In Vimng's case the bankrupt, being in want ot an advance of money, applied to his father, who agreed to lend and did lend him 4004. upon the security of the chattels assigned by the bill of sale; and there appeared no reason to doubt the perfect good faith of the transaction in this or any other respect. The money not being repaid, the father determined to enforce his security; and on the 25th Oct, last, by his agent, he took possession of the whole of the furniture and effects assigned by the bill of sale, and which then were, and still remained at the time of the bankruptcy, in the house occupied by the bankrupt. The Chief Judge came to the conclusion that as the goods were in the house of the bankrupt, used and possessed by him at the time of the bankruptcy, they were in his apparent ownership within the meaning of the statute. "The plain enactment is," said his Lordship," in substance that if the owner of the bill of sale do not comply with the provisions of the statute his security shall be void as against assignees in bankruptcy with respect to chattels left in the apparent ownership of one who becomes bankrupt. The creditor is at liberty under his bill of sale, whether registered or not, to take possession of that which has been assigned to him, and to remove or deal with it as the owner. If instead of exercising his right he thinks fit to leave the goods which have been assigned to him, and which have thereby become his, in the house of his debtor, the bill of sale not having been duly registered, he leaves them in that debtor's apparent ownership, and he cannot be relieved from the consequences by proving only that it was not a merely formal possession which was taken by him. To decide otherwise would, in my opinion, be not only to impair the Bills of would be to misconstrue its plainly expressed Sale Act in a very mischievous degree, but it enactments." The accuracy of this ruling cannot be doubted, and it should be generally understood, because it was attempted to build up an argument upon the interpretation clause of the Act which says "personal chattels shall be deemed to be in the apparent possession of the person making or house, building works, yard, land, or other pregiving the bill of sale, so long as they shall remain or be in or upon any house, mill, waremises occupied by him, notwithstanding that formal possession thereof may have been taken by or given to any other person," and Baron Bramwell's judgment in Gough v. Everard, in 32 L. J. 210, Ex., was relied upon. The Chief Judge was of opinion that it could not be inferred from the learned Baron's judgment that in all cases where more than merely formal possession is taken, the bill would necessarily be without the statute. We agree in this view, for, upon the facts-and it was of course upon the facts that Baron Bramwell gave his judgmentit appeared that the purchaser under one bill of sale had taken the key of the private wharf of the vendor on which some of the timber sold lay, whilst the rest of the timber sold lay on a public wharf, the key of which remained in the hands of the wharfingers. Under another agreebut the vendor had apartments in it, and the ment, certain furniture was sold. It was lying in a house which was the property of the vendor, vendor ceased to use the apartments which he had been accustomed to occupy on executing the remarked that there was neither actual nor bill of sale. Upon these facts the learned Baron apparent possession in the vendor. "The plaintiff," he said, "had taken possession of it (the timber), as much as he could have taken possession of it, and he did not, I suppose, think it necessary to remove it to any particular premises that he may have exclusively occupied.” And as to the general meaning of the interpretation clause, he said it was "that the goods shall be deemed to be in the apparent possession of the vendor as long as they are on the premises occupied by him, if there has been nothing more done to them than mere format possession taken." That brings the matter to where it is put by the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy. The principle is clear. Transactions of this nature must be bona fide and not delusive. A purchaser for value would naturally do all he could to perfect his title, but if he does not do all he can to perfect his possession as owner, and before registration the vendor becomes bankrupt, the property would go to the assignees. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BY RAILWAY TRAVELLERS. ONE of the American courts has been discussing a rather peculiar question, which, however, may very easily find its parallel in this country. This question was whether railway travellers are entitled to assume that the track along which a train passes is so clear from obstructions, not only on the line but about it, that if an arm or a head is thrust out of the window whilst the train is in motion, it could not be regarded as contributory negligence in the event of an accident happening? The facts of the American case were these. A freight train stood so near to the track of a passenger train that a traveller in the latter who had his elbow out of window sustained a fracture of the limb by contact with the last carriage of the freight train. These being the facts, the court said: "The question then arises whether the arm outside of the car in that manner was negligence, and if so, was there greater negligence in the company in permitting its freight cars to stand so near the track as to have produced the injury in the manner we supposed it occurred. And if both parties were guilty of negligence, was that of appellee relatively slight when compared with that of appellant ?" As far as we are aware there has been no exactly similar case in this country, but there are one or two decisions which go to establish the doctrine that the question of negligence on the one side and on the other is one of degree merely. The broad English principle respecting contributory negligence is, that a passenger is bound to use all ordinary care to avoid the consequences of the company's negligence. This was the principle stated by Lord Ellenborough in the case of Butterfield v. Forester, 11 East, 60. His Lordship there said "A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the right. One person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff." Another case of an analogous kind is that of Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q. B. 439, which laid down that "in an action for damage occasioned by the defendant's negligence, a material question is, whether or not the plaintiff might have escaped the damage by ordinary care on his own part. But the defendant is not excused merely because the plaintiff knew that some danger existed through the defendant's neglect, and voluntarily incurred such danger." A cabman had attempted to lead his horse over a ditch made by commis sioners of sewers in front of a mews. The horse fell and was killed. It was remarked by the judges that in all these cases the question is one of degree. In Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, an ass was left on the highway fettered, so as to prevent its going too far away. The defendant, driving his waggon along the highway at a smart pace, ran over the donkey. There the Judge told the jury that the mere fact of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, in leaving his donkey on the public highway, was no answer to the action, unless the donkey's being there was the immediate cause of the injury; and that, if they were of opinion that it was caused by the fault of the defendant in driving too fast, the mere fact of putting the ass upon the road would not bar the plaintiff of his action. "And that," said Baron Parke, "is perfectly correct; for although the ass may have been wrongfully there, still the defendant was bound to go along the road at such a pace at would be likely to prevent mischief." road suffer obstacles to be so placed as to barely miss the car while passing. And it seems to us almost absurd to hold that in every case and under all circumstances, if the party injured had his arm the smallest fraction of an inch beyond the outside surface, he was wanting in ordinary care and prudence." In the case of Laing v. Calder et al, 8 Penn. State R. 479, it was held, that a person travelling on a railroad car who permitted his hand to extend outside of the window and thereby had his arm broken in passing a bridge, could not recover if the agent of the company had given timely notice of the danger which the plaintiff might have avoided. Another case, which, however, has since been overruled, is that of The New Jersey Railway Company v. Kimard, 9 Harris, 203, where the same court say that" A carrier of either goods or passengers is bound to provide a carriage or vehicle, perfect in all its parts, in default of which he becomes liable for any loss or injury that may be suffered, provided it happens with out negligence or misconduct on the part of the party injured. A carrier of passengers is bound to omit no precaution that may conduce to their safety. He is bound to guard against every apparent danger that may beset them. The dangers incident to travelling in railway cars are few in comparison with those incident to other modes of travel, but the most prominent of them is risk of injury to limbs stuck out of windows when the cars are not so constructed as to prevent it. Anyone who has travelled by railway must have observed that even the most careful passengers forget the risk and unconsciously suffer their elbows to slip out beyond the window sill. What can a carrier do to prevent it? No more is required than a few metallic rods set in the windows perpendicularly or horizontally or a netting of wire work, or even wooden slats. None of these would materially impede the circulation of the air or abridge the comfort of the passengers, while it would make their safety sure. A car without any of these appliances is, to coin a phrase, not roadworthy, and a carrier is responsible for any loss that may happen from that cause alone. Risking his passengers in an unsafe car, it behoves him to use every means in his power to guard against danger from it at dangerous places by audibly proclaiming in the car the necessity of keeping arms and heads inside. Should anyone disregard such warning he would incur the charge of wilful neglect of his own safety, and where there is negligence on both sides, neither party is answerable for any injury to it." The court in the principal case express a preference for the ruling reviewed rather than the decision on appeal. We differ in this respect. The Court of Appeal held that it was negligence on the part of the passenger to have his arm out of window, and we conceive that the cautious prudence of Englishmen is the reason of no action of this nature being recorded in our books. A short time since a horrible accident happened to a traveller who put his head out of window when a train was passing under a railway bridge, and he died from the collision which took place. It probably never occurred to his relations to institute proceedings against the company for negligence in not allowing sufficient room for recreations of this order by passengers. This is really the question upon which the American court express what, with deference, we cannot help considering a remarkable opinion. They say: In America, several cases closely analogous to that under notice have occurred, and, indeed, the same point has been discussed. In the case of Spencer v. The Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railroad Company, 17 Wisconsin 487, the court said: "When we consider the manner in which railroad cars are usually constructed, with the windows so that they can be opened, and arranged at a sufficient height from the seat so "But even if it were to be conceded that it was that passengers will almost unconsciously place negligence on the part of appellee to have had their arms upon the sill for support, there being his arm outside of the car window, should he be no bars or slats before the window to prevent precluded from a recovery? Was it negligence their doing so, then to say if a passenger's arm on the part of the railway company to permit extends the slightest degree beyond the outside cars or other heavy or permanent bodies to stand surface, he is wanting in proper care and atten- so near their tracks that cars in motion must tion, and if an injury happens he cannot recover, because his conduct must have necessarily contributed to the result, appears to us to be laying down a very arbitrary and unreasonable rule of law. It is probably the habit of every person while riding in the cars to rest the arm upon the base of the window. If the window is open it is liable to extend slightly outside. This, we suppose, is a common habit. There is always more or less space between the outside of the car and any structure erected by the side of the track, and must necessarily be so to accommodate the motion of the car. Passengers know this and regulate their conduct accordingly; they do not suppose that the agents and managers of the pass within a few inches of such bodies? We suppose it to be a clear and undoubted duty of a railway company to keep its track clear of such obstructions, and a failure to do so is gross negligence. With such objects so nearly in contact with cars running at a high rate of speed, life must necessarily be greatly endangered, and when such negligence as appellee may have been guilty of is compared with the negligence of permitting a freight train to stand so near the track of a passenger train as to have produced the injury which did occur, the former is slight and the latter is gross." This is a judgment dictated by individual opinion rather than by strict legal principle. We cannot perceive that there could be gross negligence in such a case unless there were actual danger of collision between the trains. Railway companies have a right to assume that passengers will use ordinary care and prudence, and we do not believe that any English jury would find negligence in a company which did not provide room for the protrusion of the limbs of passengers, and if they did we doubt much whether any court would uphold the verdict. THE LAWS OF ARBITRATION. THERE has been a great deal of very curious judicial legislation, to use a popular expression, upon the subject of arbitrations. When the utility of this method of trial was recognised by Parliament, it became more common, and the number of matters annually referred to the arbitrament of barristers must be very large. Therefore, it may be well to notice the more recent cases on two points: first, as to the conclusiveness of an arbitrator's award; and, secondly, as to the evidence available for upsetting it. First, we will look at the principles established at common law. In the early case of Chase v. Westmore, in 13 East, Lord ELLENBOROUGH said that he feared it was impossible to lay down any general and certain rule upon the subject in what cases the court will not suffer an award to be opened. In that case both law and fact were referred to a person competent to decide upon both, and under those circumstances his Lordship said, "We will not open the award unless it could be shown to be so notoriously against justice and his duty as an arbitrator that we could infer misconduct on his part." In the course of the argument, the same Judge said: "In ordinary cases, where questions of fact are referred to one who is supposed to be competent to deal with such questions, though not with questions of law, and a question of law happens to arise on which he decides in a manner which disturbs the whole justice of the case; the court would, I think, enter into the inquiry, aand correct what was erroneous in the decision." That case, and Fuller v. Fenwick, 3 C. B. 705, fully established that the Court will not set aside or refer back an award for an objection in point of law not apparent on the face of it. Indeed, Chief Justice WILDE, laid it down very widely, that "where the parties have thought fit to withdraw from the decision of the ordinary tribunals, and have selected their own judge, they must be content to abide by his judgment.' The Court, if it suspects a mistake, cannot act upon the suspicion, for Baron 'ALDERSON said, in Phillips v. Evans 12 M. & W. 309, in which case the mistake did not appear on the face of the award, "We may suspect that a mistake has been committed by the arbitrator, but we cannot be certain that such is the case, and therefore it is safer to abide by the general rule." In Re Marshall, 16 L.J. 330, Q.B., Mr. Justice COLERIDGE said the arbitrator, learned or lay, is judge of the law, and if he makes a mistake in it the parties are bound. In Wilson and Shaw v. King, 2 Cr. & M. 689 it was ruled distinctly that the Court would not inquire into the validity or the decision of an arbitrator in point of law. The best modern authority on the point now is Hodgkinson v. Fernie, 27 L. J. 66, C. P., where Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN said, "The current of modern authorities is to the effect that unless it appears on the face of the award that the arbitrator proceeded on some ground which will not in point of law support his decision, the court will not interfere." A case somewhat at variance with this principle is that of Hutchinson v. Shepperton, 13 Q. B. 955, where it was laid down that it is not an invariable rule that the courts will not set aside an award on the ground that the arbitrator has by mistake adjudicated wrongly on a matter in difference. Lord Chief Justice DENMAN said, "Though fully sensible of the propriety of observing the greatest caution with regard to this subject to avoid inquiries which would unravel bygone transactions, and keep alive litigation which the parties had hoped to terminate by reference, we cannot think the rule universal and subject to no exception." But taking all the cases together we find the general principle established that a mistake appearing on the face of the award will give a court of common law power to interfere; and the important question is, whether it is possible to give any evidence outside the award to prove that it is had in point of law, or whether a court of equity would take a broader view of the question. The farthest limit to which courts of common law have gone in this respect is to admit a paper delivered with an award to show that the decision is erroneous in point of law, and to allow an arbitrator to give evidence to convict his own award of invalidity. In Williams v. Jones, in 5 M. & Ry., Mr. Justice LITTLEDALE, said, "If you refer a matter to a gentleman at the Bar you are bound by his decision, unless it appear on the face of the award, or some paper annexed, that the arbitrator wishes to raise the question." And in Sharv. Bell, 5 M. & S. 504, it was laid down that a paper delivered with an award showing that the decision was erroneous in point of law will be taken as part of the award, and upon it the validity of the award may be impeached. Then, in the case of The Duke of Buccleuch v. The Metropolitan Board of Works, L. Rep. 3 Ex. 306, three judges held that the umpire's evidence was admissible to upset the award. Baron BRAMWELL dissented, and held that his on man evidence was not admissible. Chief Baron KELLY was very distinct on the point. "No doubt," he said, "if the umpire is shown by properly admissible evidence to have included in his award subjects of compensation which he ought not to have included, inasmuch as the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in respect of them, and thus to have exceeded his jurisdiction, his award is bad." Then, as to the admissibility of the umpire's evidence, he said, "The defendants contended that the umpire might be called at the trial to prove how the sum awarded was made up, and they further say that his evidence showed that much was awarded in respect of subjects for which the plaintiff was not entitled to recover." He then, although regarding the question as irrelevant, held that the evidence of the umpire was admissible. "Suppose, for an example," the Chief Baron said, "that an arbitrator were empowered to give compensation for injury to a house numbered 'one' in a particular row of houses, and he professed to award such compensation, although in fact the whole evidence before him related to injury to a house numbered "two,' and his award really was made for injury to that house. Can it be doubted but that this circumstance might be proved by the defendant on the trial of an action on the award, and, if so, I see no reason why it should not be proved by the evidence of the umpire himself." This view was supported by Baron MARTIN, who said, "It is true that a juryman would not be permitted to disclose what passed in the jury box, but the principles of public policy which exclude him do not apply to an arbitrator. I do not see why he should not himself be able to prove that fact, which would vitiate the award." There would appear to be much in favour of this, for we have shown that the court admit a paper delivered with an award as evidence against the award. We have mentioned one case where this occurred. may be quite safe in laying down the following principles. Of course, no award where there is anything like fraud can stand for a moment, nor could one by possibility shut out evidence on fraud; but we have nothing whatever to do with that subject in the present case. I can see no reason why the arbitrator should not be just as well called as a witness on proper points on which to examine him. If there is mistake in point of subject-matter-that is, if a particular thing is referred to an arbitrator, and he has mistaken the subject-matter on which he ought to make his award, or if there is a mistake in point of legal principle going directly to the basis on which the award is founded, these are subjects on which he ought to be examined, and also grounds for setting aside his award. In this case there has been, I think, a mistake on both these grounds. First of all there has been a mistake as to subject-matter. What the arbitrator had to do was this: he had to take the what the rights of the claimants were I mean notice in his hand, and to take from that notice the rights in point of title to the property, and term in the property, and so forth; and, taking the notice in his hand, what he ought to have done was to take into consideration the surrounding circumstances, such as the situation of the land, the slope, the intervention of the Taff Vale Railway, and, if you like, such a circumstance as this, that the damage had been done until 1867. All those were legitimate circumin 1864, and that there had been no claim made stances; but when he took into consideration, the covenant on the part of the lessor to conas he obviously has according to his first reason, lessor to take back to himself whatever surface struct a railway, and the right on the part of the any other railway might take, he mistook, I think, the subject-matter of the reference to him. What was referred to him was to ascertain what damage had been sustained by these parties claiming to have an absolute right in the term, and he had no business to assess anything except the damage which they might sustain as having an absolute right in this term. subject-matter upon which he awarded was not subject to the lessor's right, to take away a poran absolute right in this term, but it was a right, tion of that land. In my judgment that was not referred to him at all, and, that being so, there the reference." The learned Judge also found was a mistake in point of the subject-matter of that the arbitrator had made a mistake in legal principle, but held that the error to which he first referred at length would have caused him to send the award back. Now the So stand the cases at law and in equity. The general principles are clear, but it is even now difficult to say how they may be applied to the variety of circumstances coming before the different courts. THE BILLS RELATING TO MARRIED WOMEN. A better known case to the same effect is Kent v. Elstob, 3 East. 17, where Mr. Justice GROSE said, THERE are two Bills before Parliament whose "The award is clearly wrong considering it to be object is to amend the law relating to the profounded upon the reasons stated by the arbi-perty of married women, one introduced by Mr. trator in the paper delivered with it (which RUSSELL GURNEY and the other by Mr. RAIKES. altogether must be taken as one instrument); for The difference between them is broad and disit appears from thence that he proceeded upon a tinct, and we shall do little more at present than ground which cannot be supported in our law. place before our readers some remarks of Mr. And he has done wrong according to his own HOBHOUSE On the one Bill and on the other as principles and view of the subject; for it is an aid to them in forming their opinions. Mr. evident that he meant to determine according to GURNEY'S Bill was introduced in 1869, and it the law, and he has mistaken it; therefore the provided in effect, that married women, or at award is not such as he intended it to be." And least those married subsequently to the Act, if a paper stating reasons is to be accepted, we shall be as capable of holding property as single cannot see why upon principle the umpire's oral ones. The Bill was referred to a select comevidence should be excluded. mittee, by whom the principle was preserved uninjured. The third reading was carried in the House of Commons by a large majority, but the measure was stopped in the House of Lords, on the ground that its provisions required further consideration. Now weturn lastly to an important case recently decided in equity by one of our best equity Judges. The head note in Re Dare Valley Railway Company, L. Rep. 6 Eq. 429, is this: "The court will admit evidence of an arbitrator in explanation of his award; and when it appears from such evidence that there has been a mistake on his part either as to the subject-matter referred to him, or in point of legal principle affecting the basis on which the award is made, the award will be set aside or referred back to the arbitrator. The very clear and able judgment of Vice-Chancellor (now Lord Justice) GIFFARD will thoroughly repay quotation. He determined to send the award back, and gave the following as his reasons: "There is no doubt," he said, "that this sort of jurisdiction is sometimes somewhat difficult to deal with, but I think one Mr. RAIKES' Bill, as described by Mr. HOBHOUSE, who we may remark is a firm supporter of Mr. GURNEY is this. The main principle is that a wife shall not, irrespectively of the question what she earns, be free to own property, but that her property shall, in the absence of contract, be placed under strict settlement. For this purpose trustees must be provided. And it is proposed, in the first instance, to make the husband himself the trustee. If, however, the wife chooses she may obtain from the County Court an order of the Judge making himself and a Vice-Chancellor the trustees. And other per sons interested in the property may apply to the Judge to have other trustees appointed; an application which is to be litigated and adjudicated in due form. Such being the trustees, the Bill In the first goes on to declare the trusts. place the husband-trustee is precluded from receiving any of the property without a written order by his wife, and from altering any investment without a Judge's order. Husband and wife may jointly apply to the Judge, and may have trusts declared by him, provided they fall within the range of those usually inserted in settlements by the Court of Chancery, but with a freer range of investment. In default of any such declaration, the trustees may invest with the written consent of the wife, and the Judge's sanction, and hold the funds upon strict settlement trusts; viz., during marriage for the separate use of the wife without power of anticipation, with remainder to the husband for his life or until he aliens or becomes children as the wife by deed or will appoints, bankrupt, with remainder to husband and and in default of appointment for the children equally, and if no children, as she appoints by will, and in default of that appointment for her next of kin. If she survives her husband she again becomes absolute owner of her property. Such are the provisions which are to regulate the wife's property, "except such parts thereof as are transferable by mere delivery," and apparently without any limit of value. With respect to earnings, the Bill provides that when a wife can show that for six months her family, the Judge of the County Court shall she has earned more than half the expenses of have power to grant her a protection order. Mr. HOBHOUSE raises some very strong objections to this Bill, and we certainly agree with him that the evils attendant on trusts should not be extended to the small properties of married administration employs the Court of Chancery women. Trusts are an immense evil. Their half its time, and to make a County Court Judge a party to small settlements would be a very great mistake. Again, to leave moveables at the mercy of the husband protection orders would be a hardship which would be unjust, and to place a limitation on could not be justified. From all we have seen, we think that Mr. DROOP, whose paper we reMr. GURNEY'S counsels. He appears to have cently noticed at length, should be taken into the most statesmanlike appreciation of the question, and the most lawyerlike notions how it is to be dealt with. FIRE INSURANCE. THE fire insurance case just tried at the present Assizes at Kingston is worthy of attention. Many persons suppose that the insurance against fire is an insurance of a sum certain, in the event of a fire. That is, in other words, that it is like a valued policy, where the value stated is taken as the real value of the claim in the event of total loss. But as every lawyer ought to know, though all lawyers don't know it, there is all the difference in the world between an ordinary fire policy and a valued policy. In a valued policy, there is an express stipulation that the value stated shall be taken to be the value. If it were not for such a stipulation, the value would have to be proved. For it is a general principle that a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity, and is good only to the extent of the loss or damage, to ascertain which, of course, the value of what is lost must be proved. In sea policies, for obvious reasons of convenience-a cargo being shipped at one port to be carried to another, and the policy being only for a few months, the duration of the voyage-the value is often stated and agreed upon, so that it need not be proved. Even in that case, however, the whole value cannot be recovered unless there is a total loss. This shows that the contract is only one of indemnity. In an ordinary sea policy the insurance is against loss by perils of the sea. In an ordinary fire policy it is against loss by fire, and in both, if not valued, the value must be proved of what has been lost. The assured cannot recover beyond it. A fire policy is never valued, that is, its value is never stated or agreed upon, but only as the amount on which the party has insured against loss. It is therefore only his statement of the value or quantity of the goods insured, and it is merely a maximum limit, so that he cannot recover above the amount so |