chief supervisor. How such necessity can exist is not shown. The law does not authorize copies for such purpose, and as it does not, no right to compensation for making them can grow out of a fancied necessity which the statute ignores. There is no statute which gives legal validity to the claim for compensation for copies on this ground.

The second charge, for "retained copies," is disallowed.

The third charge, "for certified copies" of papers to be retained in the chief supervisor's office, is disallowed.

The fourth charge-for seals to certificates of such copies-falls with the disallowance of the third charge.

The supervisor will be allowed the proper amount for entering and indexing the records of his office.*

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, August 27, 1883.

*The following are head notes of cases decided by the Court of Claims:

A chief supervisor of elections prepares and furnishes instructions for his subordinates by printing them in pamphlet form and filing one copy as a part of the records of his office. He claims fees as if each printed copy was a copy of the paper on file in his office, riz fifteen cents per folio.

I. The Revised Statutes (§ 2031), which allow the chief supervisor of elections fifteen cents per folio for a copy of any paper on file" in his office, do not extend to a pamphlet of instructions printed by him and sent to his subordinates: they must be regarded as original instructions printed for convenience; filing one copy did not constitute the others copies of it.

II. The chief supervisor of elections has no power to administer oaths.

III. A commissioner having power to administer oaths is entitled to no fee for affixing his seal to an affidavit. (Muirhead's case, 13 Ct. Cl., 251.)

A chief supervisor of elections prepares instructions for the supervisors. He files the original in his office and furnishes copies to the supervisors by sending them printed copies. To each copy he attaches a certificate under his hand and official seal. The accounting officers refuse to allow him compensation by the folio for the copies furnished, as copies of papers on file in his office. He brings his action, and the defendants demur.

I. A chief supervisor of elections is not entitled to be paid 15 cents per folio for each copy of instructions which he prepares and furnishes to the supervisors. (Rev. Stat., § 2031.)

II. The fact that the claimant filed his original instructions in writing and furnished to each supervisor a printed copy thereof, certified under his hand and officisi seal, does not take the present case out of the former decision of this court relative to his compensation for such service. (13 Ct. Cls., 251.)

III. It is not necessary that the instructions furnished by a chief supervisor of elections to the supervisors under him be certified as copies of a paper on tile in his office. The subordinates are bound to recognize the instructions of their supervisor without formal authentication.

IV. Where an officer gives his subordinates formally authenticated copies of his instructions to them, and this is neither required nor authorized by law, he cannot recover for the copies so furnished. (Muirhead's case continued 15 Id., 116.)

IN THE MATTER OF THE RIGHT OF THE MARSHAL OF THE DISTRICT OF OREGON TO DOUBLE THE USUAL FEE FOR SERVING A SUBPŒNA ON A WITNESS IN ANOTHER DISTRICT.-OREGON MARSHAL'S CASE.

1. A subpoena for a witness in a criminal case, may lawfully issue to the marshal of the district in which it is issued, to be by him served on such witness in another district.

2. The marshal is entitled to compensation for serving such subpoena beyond the limits of his own district.

3. The opinion of Attorney-General Black of February 9, 1859 (9 Op. Att.-Geu., 265) concurred in.

4. The opinion of Attorney-General Bates of November 10, 1863 (11 Op. Att.-Gen., 4), that, "The Attorney-General has no power to give an official opinion for the guidance of [an] auditor, in a case which cannot come before

[the head of a Department]," and the opinion of Attorney-General Bates of June 5, 1861 (10 Id., 48), that, in matters within the jurisdiction of officers in the Departments, "the Attorney-General has no power to decide a question of law," concurred in.

5. The marshal of the district of Oregon is entitled only to the usual single compensation, for serving a subpoena on a witness residing in any other district.

The marshal of the United States for the district of Oregon, in an account rendered to this Department, charges twelve cents a mile for travel to serve a subpoena, issued in a criminal cause, on a witness in San Francisco, Cal., and one dollar for the service of the writ. The subpoena was served April 25, 1883. (See form of subpoena, 2 Abbott, U.S. Practice, 309.) The question is presented to the First Comptroller to decide what allowance shall be made to the marshal for the travel and service.

DECISION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller.

The Revised Statutes contain the following sections:

SEC. 787. It shall be the duty of the marshal of each district to attend the district and circuit courts when sitting therein, and to execute, throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United States; and he shall have power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty. [See § 4299.]

SEC. 788. The marshals and their deputies shall have, in each State, the same powers, in executing the laws of the United States, as the sheriffs and their deputies in such State may have, by law, in executing the laws thereof.

SEC. 823. The following and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed to attorneys, solicitors, and proctors in the courts of the United States, to district attorneys, clerks of the circuit and district courts, marshals, commissioners, witnesses, jurors, and printers in the several States and Territories, except in cases otherwise expressly provided by law.

32 D 83

SEC. 829. For serving a writ of subpoena on a witness, fifty cents; and no further compensation shall be allowed for any copy, summons or notice for a witness.

For travel, in going only, to serve any process, warrant, attachment, or other writ, including writs of subpoena in civil or criminal cases, six cents a mile, to be computed from the place where the process is returned. to the place of service, or, when more than one person is served therewith, to the place of service which is most remote, adding thereto the extra travel which is necessary to serve it on the others.

SEC. 837. The district attorneys and marshals for the districts of Oregon and Nevada shall be entitled to receive, for the like services, double the fees hereinbefore provided; but neither of them shall be allowed to retain of such fees any sum exceeding the aggregate compensation of such officer as herein before provided.

(Dreskill v. Parish, 5 McLean, 241; 2 Abbott, U. S. Practice, 136; In re Phillip Henrich, 5 Blatchford, 420; 2 Op. Att.-Gen., 564.)

It is important to observe that sections 823 and 829 are taken from the act of February 26, 1853 (10 Stat., 161), and see act of March 3, 1855 (10 Stat., 670, 671), and that section 837 is taken from the act of February 27, 1865 (13 Stat., 440).

On the 9th of February, 1859, Attorney-General Black advised the Secretary of the Interior, who then had supervision over marshals' accounts (Act August 16, 1856, 11 Stat., 49, sec. 4), that, "A marshal of the United States is entitled to compensation for serving a subpoena in a criminal case on a witness beyond the limits of his own district, and also for executing an attachment on the same witness for failing to appear" (9 Op. Att.-Gen., 265). This opinion was concurred in by the then Secretary of the Interior (letter Sec'y Int. to First Compt., February 12, 1859). These are opinions, not decisions (3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., Introduction XVI; 11 Op. Att.-Gen., 5; 10 Id., 48). Since the Secretary of the Interior no longer has any supervision over these accounts, there is no provision of law which authorizes any such opinion even as advisory to accounting officers. (Id.) The opinion of AttorneyGeneral Black is, however, fully concurred in on the point upon which it was given. It may be regarded as settled that the subpoena now in question was properly issued, and that the marshal of Oregon is entitled to compensation for serving it.

The question, how much compensation the marshal is entitled to receive for the service now in question, is not without difficulty. The act of February 26, 1853 (10 Stat., 169), prescribing costs and fees for all officers of courts, contained the following proviso:

"That in the State of California and the Territory of Oregon, officers, jurors, and witnesses shall be allowed, for the term of two years, double the fees and compensation allowed by this act, and the same fees allowed by this act, with fifty per cent. added thereto, for two years thereafter."

The act of February 27, 1865 (13 Stat., 440, sec. 6), “providing for a district and a circuit court of the United States for the district of Nevada and for other purposes", declares:

“That the marshal and district attorney of the United States for said

district of Nevada, and also for the district of Oregon, shall severally be entitled to charge and receive for the services they may perform double the fees and compensation allowed by the act entitled, 'An act to regulate the fees and costs to be allowed clerks, marshals, and attorneys of the circuit and district courts of the United States, and for other purposes,' approved February twenty-six, eighteen hundred and fiftythree: Provided, That the aggregate compensation allowed said officers shall not exceed the amount provided for such officers by said act." This is carried into the Revised Statutes, as section 837.

It will be noticed that the act of 1853 apparently in terms limits. the double allowance for services "in * *the Territory of Oregon" while the act of 1865 declares that "the marshal

for the dis

trict of Oregon shall * be entitled to charge and receive for the services" he "may perform, double the fees," &c. This gives some color to the claim, that he is entitled to double compensation for all services he may perform, whether in or out of his district. Statutes are to be construed, however, not solely by their letter, but in view of their purpose. In reenacting a statute, it does not necessarily follow that every change of phraseology is to result in a change of meaning. Thus, it is said, "slight changes of language will not work changes of meaning." So a revision made to render a statute more plain, "is to receive the interpretation which has been given to the old laws, except where the contrary intention affirmatively appears. (Bishop, Written Laws 98, 144.) It is quite apparent that Congress intended to give the double compensation only in those cases in which the statute expressly requires it. Thus, section 823 of the Revised Statutes declares that only the single fees authorized by section 829 shall be paid, "except in cases otherwise expressly provided by law." As to the fee now under consideration, therefore, the rule of construction does not apply, that reasonable doubts arising on an ambiguous statute which gives compensation to an officer, are generally to be resolved in his favor. (Utah District Attorney's case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 122; Durkee's case, Id., 165.) The real question, therefore, is this: Does the statute expressly provide double compensation for the service in question?

Among the considerations which tend to show that it does not, are these:

1. The act of February 26, 1853 (10 Stat., 169), by reasonable interpretation of its terms, in view of the rule of construction just stated, gives double compensation only for services "in the Territory of Oregon." The act of February 27, 1865 (13 Stat., 440, sec. 6), reproduced in section 837 of the Revised Statutes, does not expressly show a purpose to adopt a different rule as to process served out of the district.

2. All these statutes have in view the general duties and services of the marshal of Oregon, which are to be performed in the district. Their controlling purpose was not to provide for the rare and exceptional cases in which the marshal may serve a subpoena in another district; nor are these within their general object. Their language does not necessarily and expressly require them to be extended to the exceptional cases.

3. The reason for which the provision for double compensation was made, does not extend to services rendered outside of Oregon. The provision was made because of the great expense of subsistence, the small amount of business, the sparseness of population, and the want of railroad facilities in Nevada and Oregon, as compared with other States. This reason cannot apply to service performed by the marshal of Oregon in other districts, where only single compensation is authorized. A portion of the travel to serve the subpoena was in Oregon, but any reason which might apply to that, could not extend to travel in California. There seems to be no provision making a distinction in the compensation for travel between that portion performed in Oregon and that in California. The service is an entirety, and the subpoena was served in California.

4. The statute does not require the subpoena, in such case as this, to be served by the marshal of Oregon. The district of Oregon is in the same circuit with California. The subpoena in this case might have been transmitted to, and served by, the marshal of California (9 Op. Att.-Gen., 265).

It cannot be presumed that Congress intended to allow more compensation to the marshal of Oregon for service and travel in California, than it allows to the marshal of California for service and travel in his own district. It can scarcely be presumed that Congress intended to authorize double compensation for a mode of service both unusual and generally unnecessary. Such double compensation would invite service in the unusual and unnecessary manner. If the marshal of California, or of any other district, should serve a similar subpoena on a witness in Oregon, he would be entitled only to the ordinary single compensation.

It seems to be a reasonable conclusion from all that has been stated that for the service of the subpœna in question, the marshal of Oregon is entitled only to the single compensation authorized to be paid to marshals generally.

The allowance of compensation will be made accordingly.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, September 13, 1883.