IN THE MATTER OF THE RIGHT OF A PARTY, WHO FURNISHES STATIONERY FOR A COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, TO PAYMENT THEREFOR BY THE UNITED STATES.-LEE'S CASE. 1. Long delay in presenting a claim against the United States to the proper accounting officers for allowance, is a strong circumstance against it. 2. Section 3145 of the Revised Statutes does not authorize a collector of internal revenue to impose a liability on the United States in favor of a person who supplies him with stationery for official use. 3. But, in any view of this section, a party who furnishes a collector with a receipted account for stationery, for which the collector receives credit in the settlement of his account as a disbursing officer, without objection from the party giving such receipt, is estopped from making a claim against the United States for payment. Section 3145 of the Revised Statutes provides, that "There shall be paid after the account thereof has been rendered to, and approved by, the proper officers of the Treasury, to each collector [of internal revenue], his necessary and reasonable charges for advertising, stationery, and blank books used in the performance of his official duties." Joshua F. Bailey was internal-revenue collector of the fourth district of New York in April, 1869, and as such, presented, in his account of disbursements, the receipt of Daniel W. Lee & Co. to him as collector for payment for stationery in that month. This receipt was credited to the collector in the settlement of his account, without any notice to the accounting officers that payment had not in fact been made. It is now alleged, that the receipt was given without payment, and Daniel W Lee asks for payment to be made by the United States. The claimants present other claims in the same condition. The question is presented to the First Comptroller to decide whether payment can be made. The regulations of the Treasury Department, applicable to these claims, are as follow: "Vouchers for stationery, blank books, postage, express, depositing money, and advertising. "Vouchers for these items will be entered on Form 85, and the oath on the form must be filled. The bills must in all cases be made out in detail, showing the date, price, quantity, and character of each article purchased or expense incurred. All bills must be receipted by the parties giving them. The receipt of a clerk will not be accepted. Bills given by a firm must be receipted by a member of the firm, or a duly authorized agent of the firm. Express bills may be receipted by a reg ular agent of the company. "The proper vouchers for postage are the receipted bills of the post master. These should be furnished in all cases in which it is possible to obtain them. Where these cannot be obtained, the certificate of the collector, showing the amount of postage used in the discharge of his official business, should be sent. The receipt of a deputy for postage will not be accepted, unless accompanied by a receipted bill of a post master. Bills for depositing money should show the amount deposited e rate per thousand, and the points between which it was transported. Ils for sending money from deputies to the collector will not ordinay be allowed, as they are part of the expense of collecting, which must paid out of the commissions. Collectors will send their money to the depositary in the cheapest inner consistent with safety. The size of envelopes purchased should be given, or a specimen sent. Ils for printing and advertising should be accompanied by a specimen the printing and a copy of the advertisements. Handbills and posts will be treated as advertisements. "Collectors will have no blanks printed at the expense of the Governnt, without first obtaining authority from the Commissioner of Internal venue. Charges for furniture, gold pens, penknives, and for expenses fitting up offices, will not be allowed to collectors or assessors. Coltors will, as far as possible, supply their deputies with stationery and stage. When deputies are compelled to purchase for immediate use, ey should obtain receipted bills made out in detail, the same as is reired of the collector. These should be given to the collector. Coitors in purchasing stationery and blank books for Government uses e expected to exercise the same economy as if purchasing for their ivate business." The form 85 is as follows: (85.) chedule of vouchers for stationery, postage, express, depositing money, advertising, and misellaneous disbursements paid by J. F. Bailey, late Collector of the Fourth Dist. of New York, for the month ending April 30, 1869. I. J. F. Bailey, late collector of District No. 4, in the State of New York, do solemnly sear that the foregoing statement is in all respects just and true, according to my est knowledge and belief; that the several items charged, as set forth in detail in the onchers therein referred to, are at the reasonable and customary prices at the place here the charges were incurred; that each and all of them were necessary for the roper discharge of my official duties; that I have not received or retained, and am ot entitled to receive or retain, for the benefit of myself or other persons, directly or directly, any portion of the sums disbursed; and that the disbursements charged vere made in good faith. J. F. BAILEY, Collector. Sworn and subscribed before me, this the 21st day of December, 1869. J. T. Power, for the claimant. 1. The receipts furnished for stationery to the collector, Bailey, were, by regulation and practice of the Internal Revenue Bureau, prerequisites to receiving payment, and when claimants furnished stationery, and gave receipts, they are not estopped from showing that no payment was made, nor from demanding payment of the Government. The collector was the agent of the United States for the payment of the account. Sausser's case, 9 Court Cl., 338. 2. No payment has been made from the Treasury, on the faith of these receipts. This case does not fall within the rule in Sears' case, 7 Opinions, 40; McKnight v. the United States, 98 U. S., 179. There was no concealment, misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the claimants. 3. The Department had knowledge that no money had been paid. The receipts raise no presumption of payment. Such presumption is rebutted by the "regulation," the practice and knowledge of the usage. A presumption of fact only stands, until proof is given to the contrary. 2 Dall. Pa. R., 22; 4 Johns., N. Y., 287. DECISION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller. This claim cannot be paid. The long delay in presenting it, or in urg. ing its payment, is a strong circumstance against it. It has been well said, that "it is a rule of common sense and reason, as well as law, that when a party has lain by with a claim, until the evidence concerning it has ceased to exist, and then produces it, the other party is not bound to explain it." (9 Op. Att. Gen., 204.) But it is not necessary to place the disallowance upon any question of this kind. The usage is to pay claims, even of longer standing than this, on sufficient evidence. Sec. tion 3145 of the Revised Statutes was the law in force when this claim originated. It does not authorize a collector to impose a liability on the United States, in favor of a person who supplies him with stationery for official use. It simply provides, that approved accounts for stationery, shall, by the United States be "paid to each collector," not to parties who furnish the stationery to the collector. The statute declares, that the amount to be paid to the collector shall be "his necessary and reasonable charges for stationery." It is because of this, that the collector is required to produce receipted accounts. The theory of the law is, that the collector makes the purchase, and pays for it in advance. If, in fact, he does not do so, and the stationer who furnishes supplies, chooses to give a receipt without payment, he relies solely on the personal liability of the collector to him. If he treats the collector as an agent to obtain money on receipted accounts, he makes the collector his agent, not that of the United States. There is no privity between the United States and Lee. (Herndon's case, 15 Ct. Cl., 446; s. c., 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 45; Landram's case, 16 Ct. Cl., 82; Hedrick and Warden's cases, 16 Ct. Cl., 88.) If the statute should even authorize a collector to make purchases of stationery in the name of the United States, and to be paid for by the United States, the result in this case would not be changed. The "regulations" were authorized by law. (Rev. Stats., 161.) Parties who deal with officers of the Government, are bound at their peril, to know the extent of their anthority. (Exigency case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 92; Clark v. United States, 95 U. S., 542; Strong v. District of Columbia, 1 Mackey, D. C. Rep., 272; Filor v. United States, 9 Wall., 48; Whiteside et al. v. United States, 93 U. S., 247; Merriam v. United States, 107 U. S., 437; s. C., 18 Ct. Cl., 760; s. c., 14 Ct. Cl., 289.) The receipted accounts required by the regulations are furnished, to authorize the accounting officers of the Treasury Department to give credit to collectors, in the settlement of their disbursing accounts. This is presumed to be known to stationers, who furnish supplies to collectors. The collectors thus become the agents of the stationers. On every principle of law, the claimants in this case are estopped from asserting any claim now against the United States. (Pray v. United States, 106 U. S., 594; s. c., 14 Ct. Cl., 256; Wilder's case, 18 Ct. Cl., 528; Buffalo Bayou R. R. case, Id., 238; Bailey's case, 15 Id., 490; Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S., 556; McKnight v. United States, 98 U. S., 180; s. c., 13 Ct. Cl., 292; Swain v. Seamens, 9 Wall., 254.) The claims are disallowed. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, First Comptroller's Office, June 19, 1883. IN THE MATTER OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT TO APPOINT A CLERK IN THE DEPARTMENT ON THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF JULY, 1883, WITHOUT AN EXAMINATION UNDER THE ACT APPROVED JANUARY 16, 1883, TO REGULATE AND IMPROVE THE CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES.-STATUTE-TIME CASE. 1. The act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States, approved January sixteenth, 1883, provides (Sec. 7) "that after the expiration of six months from the passage of this act no officer or clerk shall be appointed, and no person shall be employed to enter or be promoted in either of the said classes now existing, or that may be arranged hereunder pursuant to said rules, until he has passed an examination." Held: (1) This provision became operative on the sixteenth day of July, 1883. (2) Hence no appointment can be made on or after this day, until the person to be appointed has passed an examination as required by said act. An act of Congress which provides that it shall take effect "from and after its passage takes effect and becomes operative from the first moment of the day on which such act is approved by the President. The act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States, "approved January sixteenth, 1883," contains a provision as follows: "SEC. 7. That after the expiration of six months from the passage of this act no officer or clerk shall be appointed, and no person shall be employed to enter or be promoted in either of the said classes now existing, or that may be arranged hereunder pursuant to said rules, until he has passed an examination, or is shown to be specially exempted from such examination in conformity herewith. July 16, 1883, the First Comptroller is asked to decide whether this provision is now in force. DECISION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller. The simple question for decision is, have six months expired from the passage of the act, approved January 16, 1883? An act is said to be passed on the day it is approved by the President. This act was approved and so passed on the sixteenth of January, 1883. If the "six months" mentioned in the act are to be computed commenc ing with the seventeenth day of January, the provision above quoted is not in force on this sixteenth of July, but will be at and after midnight of this day. But if the six months are to be computed commencing with the day the act was passed, then said provision is now in force on this sixteenth day of July. The whole question turns on the meaning of the expression "from the passage of this act." Is it inclusive or exclusive of the day of the passage of the act? The answer is, it is inclusive. In other words, in computing the six months, the sixteenth of January is to be counted as the first day. This conclusion seems to result from the evident purpose of the act. It was intended to introduce a reform in the civil service. It made a radical change in the mode of making certain appointments to office. Congress evidently intended to give a period of time of six months-no more, no less-in which the provision above quoted should not operate. In other words, the law in all its provisions, except that above quoted, was to be in operation for six months before this special provision should take effect. The law took effect and was in force on the sixteenth day of January. This is well settled. Thus in Arnold et al. v. United States (9 Cranch, 119), it appeared that the act approved July 1, 1812, provides "that an additional duty of 100 per cent. upon the permanent duties now imposed by law, &c., shall be levied and collected upon all goods, wares, and merchandises which shall from and after the passing of this act be imported into the United States." The court said, "it is contended that this statute did not take effect until the second day of July; nor indeed until it was for mally promulgated and published. We cannot yield assent to this construction. The statute was to take effect from its passage; and it is a general rule that where the computation is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included.” (United States v. Williams et al., 1 Paine, C. C., 261; see People v. Clark, 1 Cal., 406; In re Welman, 20 Vermont, 653; Rex v. Moore, Jefferson, 9; Cushing, May 25, 1855, 7 Op. Att.-Gen., 216.) In Matthews r. Zane (7 Wheat., 164, 211), the Supreme Court held that an act approved March 3, 1803, took effect and was operative “on that day." This is affirmed in Lapeyre v. United States (17 Wall., 198); and Swayne, Justice, says, "there is no statute fixing the time when acts of Congress shall take effect, but it is settled that where no other time is prescribed, they take effect from their date. Where the language em ployed is, “from and after the passing of this act" the same result follows. The act becomes effectual upon the day of its date. In such cases |