PART IX

AMERICAN PROBLEMS

CHAPTER XXX-THE SPANISH WAR

180. Reasons for War (1898)

ANONYMOUS

Bibliography of all the numbers in this chapter: Independent, Nation, Outlook, Public Opinion, Review of Reviews, and kindred publications for 1898 and 1899.

W

E have had a Cuban question for more than ninety years. At times it has disappeared from our politics, but it has always reappeared. Once we thought it wise to prevent the island from winning its independence from Spain, and thereby, perhaps, we entered into moral bonds to make sure that Spain governed it decently. Whether we definitely contracted such an obligation or not, the Cuban question has never ceased to annoy us. The controversies about it make a long series of chapters in one continuous story of diplomatic trouble. Many of our ablest statesmen have had to deal with it as secretaries of state and as ministers to Spain, and not one of them has been able to settle it. One President after another has taken it up, and every one has transmitted it to his successor. It has at various times been a "plank" in the platforms of all our political parties, — as it was in both the party platforms of 1896, and it has been the subject of messages of nearly all our Presidents, as it was of President Cleveland's message in December, 1896, in which he distinctly expressed the opinion that the United States might feel forced to recognize "higher obligations" than neutrality to Spain. In spite of periods of apparent quiet, the old trouble has always reappeared in an acute form, and it has never been settled; nor

has there recently been any strong reason for hope that it could be settled merely by diplomatic negotiation with Spain. Our diplomats have long had an experience with Spanish character and methods such as the public can better understand since war has been in progress. The pathetic inefficiency and the continual indirection of the Spanish character are now apparent to the world; they were long ago apparent to those who have had our diplomatic duties to do.

Thus the negotiations dragged on. We were put to trouble and expense to prevent filibustering, and filibustering continued in spite of us. More than once heretofore has there been danger of international conflict, as for instance when American sailors on the Virginius were executed in Cuba in 1873. Propositions have been made to buy the island, and plans have been formed to annex it. All the while there have been American interests in Cuba. Our citizens have owned property and made investments there, and done much to develop its fertility. They have paid tribute, unlawful as well as lawful, both to insurgents and to Spanish officials. They have lost property, for much of which no indemnity has been paid. All the while we have had a trade with the island, important during periods of quiet, irritating during periods of

unrest.

The Cuban trouble is, therefore, not a new trouble even in an acute form. It had been moving toward a crisis for a long time. Still, while our government suffered these diplomatic vexations, and our citizens these losses, and our merchants these annoyances, the mass of the American people gave little serious thought to it. The newspapers kept us reminded of an opera-bouffe war that was going on, and now and then there came information of delicate and troublesome diplomatic duties for our minister to Spain. If Cuba were within a hundred miles of the coast of one of our populous states and near one of our great ports, periods of acute interest in its condition would doubtless have come earlier and oftener, and we should long ago have had to deal with a crisis by warlike measures. Or if the insurgents had commanded respect instead of mere pity, we should have paid heed to their struggle sooner; for it is almost an American maxim that a people cannot govern itself till it can win its own independence.

When it began to be known that Weyler's method of extermination was producing want in the island, and when appeals were made to American charity, we became more interested. . . .

The American public was in this mood when the battleship Maine

was blown up in the harbor of Havana. The masses think in events, and not in syllogisms, and this was an event. This event provoked suspicions in the public mind. The thought of the whole nation was instantly directed to Cuba. The fate of the sailors on the Virginius, twenty-five years ago, was recalled. The public curiosity about everything Cuban and Spanish became intense. The Weyler method of warfare became more generally known. The story of our long diplomatic trouble with Spain was recalled. . . .

There is no need to discuss minor and accidental causes that hastened the rush of events; but such causes were not lacking either in number or in influence. . . . But all these together could not have driven us to war if we had not been willing to be driven, if the conviction had not become firm in the minds of the people that Spanish rule in Cuba was a blot on civilization that had now begun to bring reproach to us; and when the President, who favored peace, declared it "intolerable," the people were ready to accept his judgment.

. . . We rushed into war almost before we knew it, not because we desired war, but because we desired something to be done with the old problem that should be direct and definite and final. Let us end it once for all. . . .

Not only is there in the United States an unmistakable popular approval of war as the only effective means of restoring civilization in Cuba, but the judgment of the English people promptly approved it, giving evidence of an instinctive race and institutional sympathy. If Anglo-Saxon institutions and methods stand for anything, the institutions and methods of Spanish rule in Cuba are an abomination and a reproach. And English sympathy is not more significant as an evidence of the necessity of the war and as a good omen for the future of free institutions than the equally instinctive sympathy with Spain that has been expressed by some of the decadent influences on the Continent; indeed, the real meaning of American civilization and ideals will henceforth be somewhat more clearly understood in several quarters of the world.

American character will be still better understood when the whole world clearly perceives that the purpose of the war is only to remove from our very doors this cruel and inefficient piece of medievalism which is one of the two great scandals of the closing years of the century; for it is not a war of conquest.

The War with Spain, and After, in Atlantic Monthly, June, 1898 (Boston, etc.), LXXXI, 722-725 passim,

181. Outbreak of War (1898)

FROM THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK

For earlier articles on the relations of the United States to Cuba, see Contemporaries, III, No. 149; above, No. 176.

OTH Congress and the people had sunk the question of the Maine in the larger one of Cuban independence. Destitution among the reconcentrados was constantly growing worse, thousands dying slowly from starvation. American supplies were distributed to the sufferers through Miss Clara Barton, President of the Red Cross Society, and General Fitzhugh Lee, our Consul at Havana. . . .

On March 31 Captain-General Blanco issued a decree putting an end to reconcentration in the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, and on April 9 the Spanish Cabinet decided to grant an armistice to the insurgents, while both the Pope and the great Powers of Europe were using their influence to avert a Spanish-American war. Nevertheless the replies at this time of the Madrid government to President McKinley's demands concerning the pacification of Cuba, notwithstanding the Spanish offer to arbitrate the Maine trouble, led the authorities at Washington to believe that pacification could not be attained without the armed intervention of the United States. The President's message to Congress, which was daily expected, was withheld . . . until April 11. . . . Both Congress and the people had grown impatient waiting for the message, and when it finally came excitement was at such a height that many condemned it for its conservatism. It was, however, a wise and ably conceived document. The President stated the entire issue, rightly considering the Maine disaster a subordinate matter, and passed in review Spanish mismanagement and outrage in Cuba, and the repeated promises and the repeated failures of the Spanish government to effect suitable reforms..

The conclusion of the long message and the really important part was as follows:

"The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and act, the war in Cuba must stop.

"In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Con

gress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquility and the security of its citizens, as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

"And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island, I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

"The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action."..

. . . The resolutions . . . were accepted by both Houses in the small hours of the morning of April 19,- by the Senate, by a vote of 42 to 35, and by the House by a vote of 310 to 6,— and were signed by the President on the following day. . . . The following is the text of the act . . . ". . . be it resolved:

“First — That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

"Second-That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third―That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into active service the militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

"Fourth-That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

On the 20th of April the President signed his ultimatum to the Spanish government, a copy of which was handed to Minister Polo, who im