622

TORSTENSON THREATENS VIENNA.

[BOOK IN Although during the period we have been surveying no open breach occurred between the Empire and the Porte, yet the Turkish pashas who ruled in Hungary supported Ragotski, Voyvode of Transylvania, in an attempt upon Ferdinand's dominions which had been stimulated by the policy of Mazarine. On the pretext that the Emperor had violated his promises to the Hungarian Protestants, Ragotski incited a revolt in that kingdom, and the Austrians had great difficulty in maintaining themselves in Presburg and some of the Hungarian counties. Torstenson, after his victory at Jankowitz, united himself with Ragotski (1645), threw a bridge over the Danube, and attempted to seize the Emperor at Vienna; but the wild and undisciplined troops of his ally proved rather a hindrance than a help, and Ragotski himself concluded a separate peace with the Emperor. Torstenson, who was so ill that he could travel only in a litter, was soon after forced to raise the siege of Brunn. Being now determined to retire, he intrusted the maintenance of his conquests in Bohemia and Silesia to General Königsmark, but subsequently devolved the chief command on Charles Gustavus Wrangel. His last feat, before his retirement, was the capture of Leitmeritz. In the boldness and decision of his military genius Torstenson more resembled his great master, Gustavus Adolphus, than did any other of that sovereign's generals. He was accompanied in his last campaign by Charles Gustavus, son of the Count-Palatine of Kleeburg, who was subsequently to mount the throne of Sweden, and who in the school of Torstenson became a distinguished commander.

Negociations for a general peace had been already opened. Ever since France had taken up arms, Pope Urban VIII. had not ceased to press that power to abandon the Protestant alliance and recon

cile herself with the House of Austria. In 1636 Urban had so far succeeded as to induce some of the Catholic powers to treat at Cologne, whither he despatched Cardinal Ginetti as legate and mediator; but, though the Emperor and the King of Spain sent representatives to Cologne, France declined to do so, regarding the assembly only as intended to separate her from her Protestant allies, Sweden and Holland, who could not be expected to treat under the mediation of the Pope. The Count d'Avaux and John Adler Salvius, the ministers of France and Sweden, renewed at Hamburg, March 15th 1638, for three years, the alliance between those countries, with the express provision that neither should enter into a separate peace 22; and, as at the commencement of 1641 the

22 Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 161.

CHAP. VII.]

CONGRESS AT MÜNSTER.

623

prospect of a general peace was as distant as ever, the alliance was again extended, not for any definite term, but till such a peace should be effected. 23 Meanwhile the Emperor had conceived the impracticable design of treating with the States of the Empire alone, without the participation of foreign powers; and it was with this view that he had summoned a Diet at Ratisbon in 1640; where, as already related, he had been so nearly captured by Baner. At length, in December 1641, preliminaries were arranged at Hamburg between Conrad von Lützen, the Imperial ambassador, and D'Avaux and Salvius on the part of France and Sweden. It was agreed that the towns of Münster and Osnabrück in Westphalia, which were to be declared neutral, should become the seats of two congresses composed of the representatives of the powers directly or remotely interested in the war, that is, of most of the states of Europe. The reasons for choosing two towns were, because one would not have sufficed to accommodate the crowd of ministers who were expected to attend; and because it was desirable to avoid any collision between the Papal nuncio and the Protestant plenipotentiaries, as well as any disputes concerning precedence between France and Sweden. Hence, as a general rule, the representatives of the Catholic powers were to assemble at Münster, and those of the Protestant powers at Osnabrück, but the Dutch plenipotentiaries were to treat at Münster with the Spanish, without any mediator; and as the affairs of the Empire were to come before both assemblies the Emperor was to be represented both at Osnabrück and Münster. The two congresses were, however, to be considered as one; and the towns mentioned were selected because they lay near each other and had every facility of communication.

The conferences were to have been opened in March 1642; but more than a year was lost in squabbling about forms and points of etiquette. At last, in July 1643, the Imperial plenipotentiaries opened the congresses, and the ministers of the other powers began to arrive; but it was not till October that the Spaniards appeared; the Venetian envoy came in November, and the French plenipotentiaries did not arrive till April 1644. The Papal nuncio, Fabio Chigi, bishop of Nardo, afterwards Pope Alexander VII., and the Venetian senator Contarini, who subsequently became Doge of Venice, took up their residence at Münster, as mediators between the Catholic powers; while the King of Denmark, as mediator between the Emperor and Sweden, had despatched to Osnabrück

23 Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 207.

624

INSINCERITY OF THE CHIEF POWERS.

[BOOK IV. as his ministers Lipsius and Langermann. It was this attempt at mediation on the part of Denmark which produced the war already related between that country and Sweden; and the functions designed for Christian IV. were ultimately transferred to Contarini.

Never before had such an assembly of the members of the European commonwealth met together. Not only were the greater states represented, but ministers from the Electors, spiritual and temporal princes, and great cities of Germany, whom the Emperor with much reluctance at length consented to admit, as well as from such powers as the Duke of Savoy, the Duke of Mantua, the GrandDuke of Tuscany, nay, even from Catalonia, newly revolted from Spain, also appeared at the congress. The quiet little town of Münster, a century before the scene of the strangest suppression of all social distinctions, was now astonished and enlivened with court ceremonies, splendid banquets, and the equipages of prelates, princes, and ambassadors; while the Papal nuncio might behold, suspended from the tower of St. Lambert's church, the bones of that fanatical heretic who for a brief period had enjoyed a more absolute sway over his followers than had ever fallen to the lot of the haughtiest pontiff. One nation alone accustomed to play a great part in the affairs of Europe was conspicuous by its absence.24 England was unrepresented in these important transactions. The civil troubles of that country had effaced her for a time as a member of the great European system; but it was perhaps fortunate for her liberties that the nations of the continent were then engrossed by the vast struggle of the Thirty Years' War. While the hostile parties in England were during some years so equally balanced, the aid of a foreign power might probably have turned the scale in favour of Charles and despotism.

Considering the extent, the variety, the complication, and the importance of the interests at stake, it was not to be expected that the negociations for a peace should be brought to any very speedy termination; but a still more efficient and dangerous cause of delay was the insincerity of some of the chief powers, who had engaged in them rather by way of homage to public opinion than from any wish for their success. The generals and ministers of these states loved the war for its own sake, as it gave them em

24 The only Christian powers, besides England, not directly interested in the negociations, were Denmark, Poland, Russia, the Pope, and the Republic of Venice. The King of Denmark, however, had a resident at the Congress to watch over the interests of his son, as Archbishop of

Bremen, and his own if necessary; the Pope and Venice were represented in their quality of mediators; and thus England, Poland, and Russia were the only countries that had no ambassadors at Münster or Osnabrück. Garden, Hist. des Traités, t. i. p. 133 sq.

CHAP. VII.]

FERDINAND INDISPOSED TO PEACE.

625

ployment and made them of importance. France and Sweden were intent on seizing as large a share as possible of the spoils of the Empire; while the Emperor himself felt a repugnance to negociations which he saw could be completed only by vast sacrifices on his part. Since the fatal mistakes committed by Ferdinand II. in engaging in the Italian war, and dismissing his army under Wallenstein, almost every year had been marked by signal defeats and losses. France had made herself mistress of Alsace and the Forest towns, as well as of several places in Luxemburg and in the electorates of Trèves and Cologne; the Swedes occupied Pomerania, and had garrisons in Saxony, Westphalia, Bohemia, Silesia, and Moravia; and the Emperor might sometimes see with his own eyes, from the ramparts of his capital, the ravages of the enemy and the burning of his villages. A portion of his own subjects was in arms against him, another large part of the Empire, comprising the electorates of Brandenburg and Saxony, and the dominions of the Dukes of Lüneburg, had declared its neutrality; and Ferdinand III. was thus reduced to recruit his armies from his hereditary dominions, and those parts of Germany which remained faithful to him, now almost exhausted by the efforts and sufferings of so long a war. Yet he was still disposed to protract the struggle, and risk the fortune of events rather than immediately consent to inevitable sacrifices, and such were the instructions he gave to the Count of Nassau and M. Wolmar, his plenipotentiaries at Münster. Spain also, mindful of her former grandeur and prosperity rather than of her present fortunes, could not persuade herself to make concessions to an enemy whom she both feared and despised. France, from the hopes of gain, adopted the same procrastinating policy. No sooner did the French ministers arrive at Münster, than they began to raise questions respecting their right of precedence over the Spanish ambassadors, more for the sake of protracting the negociations than with any other view 25; whilst the Germans, without any such motive, but merely from a puerile love of titles and distinctions, followed their example. The title of "Excellence," a common one in Italy, borne by the Venetian minister, excited the jealousy of the Electors of Brandenburg and Bavaria, who insisted that their representatives were entitled to the same distinction; and when the Emperor conceded that title to such of them as were "persons

25 The French did not begin to think of treating seriously till the middle of 1645. Garden, t. i. p. 142. The French and Swedes handed in some propositions

VOL. II.

S S

in June, but the answer of the Imperial ministers was delayed some months, so that the negociations did not properly commence till early in 1646.

626

CAMPAIGNS OF 1644 AND 1645.

[Book IV. of rank" (Standespersonen), new disputes arose as to who were to be included in that category! While the conferences at Münster were thus embarrassed by the French, those at Osnabrück were suspended altogether by the war between Sweden and Denmark, which rendered the latter kingdom a belligerent instead of a mediating power; and, as the French would not take a step without the Swedes, the negociations were for a time arrested. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the proceedings of the congress were prolonged several years, and made dependent on the events of the war, to which we must now return.26

Whilst Torstenson was pursuing his successes in Germany, as already related, the campaigns of 1644 and 1645 had also been favourable to France. In Flanders, the French under the nominal command of the Duke of Orleans, but in reality under that of Meilleraie, Gassion, and Rantzau, captured Gravelines after a brave resistance, July 28th 1644, while about the same time the Prince of Orange had taken the Sas of Ghent. D'Enghien and Turenne, having marched to the Rhine, attacked the Imperial general Merci at Freiburg in the Breisgau; and, though they were repulsed, Merci found himself compelled to retire into Würtemberg. It is on this occasion that D'Enghien is said to have thrown his cane into the enemy's lines, a story of somewhat doubtful authenticity. Turenne and D'Enghien now descended the right bank of the Rhine towards Baden, and captured Philippsburg, September 9th 1644, where they found a hundred guns. D'Enghien established himself in this fortress, while Turenne crossing the Rhine took Worms, Oppenheim, and Mentz, without firing a shot. Bingen, Baccharach, Landau, and Kreutznach were also occupied by the French, who thus commanded the course of the Rhine from Basle to Coblentz. When D'Enghien entered Mentz, and, to the Latin harangue of the chapter and municipality, replied with facility in the same language, he astonished the Germans almost as much as by his victories.

The French campaign in Germany in 1645 was also brilliant, but chequered. D'Enghien, quitting the valley of the Rhine, entered that of the Danube, and laid siege to Nördlingen; Merci flew to its rescue, but was defeated on the heights near the town,

26 For the negociations at Münster and Osnabrück see Bougeant, Hist. des Guerres et des Négociations qui précédèrent le Traité de Westphalie, and Hist. du Traité de Westphalie. Bougeant's works are founded on the correspondence and documents which remained in the hands of the French

plenipotentiary D'Avaux. An account of the negociations was also written by Adam Adami, the representative, at the congress, of the Abbots and Princes of the Empire (Relatio Historica de Pacifications Osnabrugo-Monasteriensi, ed. Meiern, Lips. 1737).