422 FRENCH TRADE AND NAVIGATION. [Book IV. send out fleets of forty or fifty large ships and an army of thirty thousand men. In short, the foreign commerce of Holland grew so large as quite to overshadow that of England, and to excite the jealousy of our merchants and adventurers, as may be seen in the Observations 67 addressed to James I. by Sir Walter Raleigh shortly before his execution; from which, after making large allowances for exaggeration, it is evident that the trade of the Dutch was then far more considerable than that of the English. France also appeared as a competitor in the race of colonisation; but that nation does not seem to be well fitted by nature for such enterprises, which, instead of giving birth at once to brilliant and striking results, must be fostered and brought to maturity by long years of patient care and industry. It is, at all events, certain, that the attempts of the French in this way were not crowned with any remarkable success. Sully had observed this characteristic in their national genius; he had dissuaded Henry from renewing the attempts to form plantations in New France 6; and he might have pointed to their failures at Cape Breton and Florida. But Henry was not to be discouraged. He resolved to compete with Spain and England in the foundation of transatlantic colonies; but in order to avoid disputes with those powers, he confined the researches of his navigators to the regions beyond the fortieth degree N. latitude. These efforts resulted in the foundation by Champlain of the colonies of Acadia and Canada (1608). The Gallic race obtained a permanent footing in the New World, though destined at length to fall under the dominion of their English rivals in that hemisphere. Henry also attempted in 1604 to establish a French East India Company; but there was not commercial enterprise enough in the country to carry out his views. The company remained in abeyance till 1615, when Louis XIII. gave them a new charter, and they took possession of the vast island of Madagascar. But it was soon found not to answer their expectations, and the company sank into oblivion. While the Western Powers were thus extending their trade and planting colonies in the most distant parts of the then known world, their naval resources, in a military point of view, seem to have been very inadequate to the vastness of their enterprises. Although Queen Elizabeth had sometimes as many as one hundred and fifty ships of war at sea, yet only thirteen of them belonged to herself; the rest consisted of vessels hired from the merchants, and 67 An abstract of them will be found in Macpherson, ibid. p. 233 sqq. Letter of Sully to the President Jeannin (1608), ap. Martin, t. x. p. 464. 69 Ibid. p. 465 sq.; Macpherson, vol. ii. p. 282. CHAP. I.] EUROPEAN NAVIES. 423 fitted up on occasion as men of war. King James I. added eleven ships to the royal navy.70 The navy of France was in a still worse condition. It appears from the Memoirs of Sully that in the reign of Henry IV. the French did not possess more than some half dozen indifferent ships at Brest and La Rochelle, and a score of galleys in the Mediterranean. It was reserved for Cardinal Richelieu to revive the French navy, and to make the fleurs de lys flourish on sea as well as on land; in token of which he caused to be inscribed on the sterns of his new built vessels the motto, "Florent quoque lilia ponto." The Turks, although not naturally fond of the sea, nor a commercial people-for what little trade they had was mostly in the hands either of Europeans, or more especially of Jewsnevertheless surpassed, during the period of their prosperity, the other nations of Europe in their maritime forces. Early in the sixteenth century, under Selim I., the Turkish fleet numbered 400 sail of all descriptions, carrying 30,000 men. After the time of Selim, though still very formidable, it somewhat declined; and the battle of Lepanto inflicted on it a blow from which it never thoroughly recovered. The rapidity, indeed, with which after that tremendous defeat the Turkish vessels that had been destroyed were replaced with new ones, excited the astonishment of the Bishop of Acqs, the French ambassador to the Porte; but fresh crews could not so easily be supplied, and still less experienced officers.71 Through mismanagement and neglect the Turkish navy began rapidly to decline towards the end of the sixteenth century; and Sir Thomas Roe, who was at Constantinople in 1622, describes the Turkish galleys as mostly so rotten and decayed that not fifty were fit to put to sea, and those very ill-manned and equipped.72 The corsair fleets of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli appear not, however, to have shared this decay. It was remarked early in the seventeenth century that the Beys of those places possessed a fleet of forty lange square-rigged vessels, with which they infested the commerce of the Mediterranean; and they are related on one occasion to have blockaded Malaga, while another division of their ships cruised between the Tagus and the Guadalquivir.73 The chief naval stations of the Turks, besides Constantinople 70 Macpherson, vol. ii. pp. 155, 230. The whole sum set apart by Elizabeth for the repairs of her fleet was under 90007. per annum. Burchet's Naval Hist. ibid. p. 194. "Négociations de France dans le Le vant, t. iii. p. 269. 72 Négociations of Sir Thos. Roe, pp. 27, 28, &c. 73 Sir F. Cottington's Letter to Duke of Buckingham, in Morgan's Hist. of Algiers, vol. ii. p. 629. 424 DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN POWER. [BOOK IV. and Gallipoli, were Nicomedia, Negropont, and Valona in Albania. The Greeks formed the best sailors in the Turkish fleet; galleyslaves for the oars were supplied by Christian prisoners, and there was also a maritime conscription throughout the Ottoman Empire. Before the battle of Lepanto, the Turkish galleys carried only from three to seven guns, one or two of which were of heavy calibre. After that disastrous defeat the number of guns was doubled, yet were still unequal to those of the Venetian ships. The Turks understood but little of manoeuvring in line; their tactics were to reserve their fire till they came to close quarters, and then to board the enemy. The Capudan-Pasha, or chief officer of the fleet, not only commanded at sea, but had also the uncontrolled direction of the arsenal. In favour of Chaireddin-Barbarossa, this office was elevated to that of Beglerbeg of the sea and the dignity of a Pasha of two tails; for the sea, like the land, was divided into Sandjaks, fourteen in number. After the taking of Chios by Selim II. in 1566, the Capudan-Pasha was made a Vizier and Pasha of three tails.74 Not only the Ottoman navy, but also the empire in general, was beginning towards the close of the sixteenth century to feel the approaches of decay. The wars of Selim II. had so exhausted the treasure, that he caused it to be removed to his private treasury. It had previously been kept in the ancient Byzantine castle, called the "Seven Towers." In the palmy days of the Ottoman empire each of these seven towers had had its appropriate use one contained the gold, another the silver money; a third the gold and silver plate and jewels; valuable remains of antiquity were deposited in the fourth; in the fifth were preserved ancient coins and other objects, chiefly collected by Selim I. during his expeditions into Persia and Egypt; the sixth was a sort of arsenal, and the seventh was appropriated to the archives. After the time of Selim II. the Seven Towers were used as a prison for distinguished persons and as an arsenal. Amurath III., whose avarice was prodigious, retained and improved upon the custom of his predecessor. He caused, it is said, a vault to be built, with treble locks, in which his treasure was deposited, and over which he slept every night; it was opened only four times a year to receive fresh heaps of wealth, which have been estimated at twelve million ducats annually; but two millions are perhaps nearer the truth.75 74 Von Hammer, Staatsverfassung, B. ii. S. 280 ff.; see also Hadji Khalifeh, Maritime Wars, by Mitchell, passim; Zinkeisen, Gesch. des Osm. Reich. B. iii. 75 Inform. Pol.ap. Zinkeisen, B. iii. S. 353. CHAP. I.] THE CHRISTIANS IN TURKEY. 425 More than a century of Turkish despotism had at length done its work. Ragazzoni describes 76 the Christians in the Ottoman empire in 1571 as so depressed and degraded that they dared hardly look a Turk in the face; the only care of their listless existence was to raise enough for their maintenance, and to pay their Karatsch, or poll-tax-all beyond would be seized by the Turks. Constantinople, however, still afforded a secure place of residence, whither the Greeks flocked in great numbers; so that towards the end of the sixteenth century it was reckoned that there were 100,000 of them in that capital. Many of these acquired great wealth, either by trade or by farming certain branches of the Grand-Seignior's revenue. Among them one Michael Kantakuzenus was conspicuous both for his enormous wealth and his intrigues, which procured him the name of the "Devil's Son" (Seitan Oglie), although it was thought that he was no true Greek, but an Englishman by birth and belonging to the family of an English ambassador. The fate of whole provinces lay in his hands; he could fit out twenty or thirty galleys at his own expense, and the splendour of his palace at Anchioli rivalled the seraglio of the Grand Seignior. Kantakuzenus had gained his influence through the favour and friendship of Mohammed Sokolli; but even that powerful vizier could not at last save him from the wrath of Amurath III.; and he was hanged before the gate of his own palace (March 1578). The Jews also occupied an important position in the Ottoman empire. From the earliest period the physicians of the Sultan were of the Hebrew race; they monopolised most branches of commerce, they were the chief musical performers, and acted obscene comedies for the entertainment of the Grand Seignior."7 76 Relatione, in Albéri, ii. p. 100 (ser. iii.). "Gerlach's Tagebuch contains much information on the state of Constantinople. Axii. 426 POLICY OF HENRY IV. [Book IV. CHAPTER II. THE peace of Vervins, recorded at the close of the preceding book, was not very well observed on the part of France. The ruling idea that guided the foreign policy of Henry IV. was, to curb the power of the House of Austria: a plan incompatible with the letter of the treaty. In pursuance of this policy Henry became the supporter of Protestantism; not, perhaps, from any lingering affection for his ancient faith-his indifference in such matters has been already seen-but because the Protestants were the natural enemies of the Austrian House. Hence he was determined to support the independence of Holland. He annually paid the Dutch large sums of money; he connived at the recruiting for them in France; and in spite of a royal prohibition, granted at the instance of the Spanish ambassador in 1599, whole regiments passed into the service of the United Provinces. In aid of his plans Henry fortified himself with alliances on all sides. He courted the Protestant princes of Germany, and incited them to make a diversion in favour of the Dutch; he cultivated the friendship of Venice, reconciled himself with the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, and attached the House of Lorraine to his interests by giving his sister, Catherine, in marriage to the Duke of Bar (January 31st 1599); who, formerly, when Marquis de Pont, had been his rival for the French crown. The Porte was propitiated by Savari de Brèves, an able diplomatist, and the vanity of France was gratified by obtaining the protectorate of the Christians in the East. The Pope was gained through his temporal interests as an Italian prince. Henry had promised, on his absolution, to publish in France the decrees of Trent; and, as he had refrained from doing so out of consideration for the Hugonots, he had, by way of compensation, offered to support Clement VIII. in his design of reuniting Ferrara to the dominions of the Church; although the House of Este had often been the faithful ally of France. The direct line of the reigning branch of that family having become extinct on the death of Alphonso, Clement VIII. seized the duchy; id Cæsar d'Este, the cousin and heir of Alphonso, obtained only na, an Imperial fief (1597). The connivance of Henry grati Mari |