nistration, if the Catholic world desires to maintain a Pope, the Catholic world is numerous and wealthy enough to maintain him in becoming splendour.

That this would be the wisest and smoothest solution of the problem we can entertain no doubt. But the sentiment of the Italians, however unreasoning, is, we fear, far too strong and too unanimous to leave much hope of its adoption. They have an unhealthy feeling, which writers, orators, demagogues, and even statesmen, have contributed to foster, that Rome contains the idea and the soul of Italy, and that without Rome as their centre they will never be a great people. The fancy of proclaiming unity from the Capitol,' of discussing European questions in 'the Forum,' seems to have a fascination for them which is not of hopeful augury for their political maturity or practical manliness of mind. But so it is. The claims of Rome, we are told, will silence all other aspirants. Every city in the land will bow to the claims of Rome, but every city would contest the claims of every other proposed metropolis. In the last Session, Count Cavour, who represents Turin in the Sardinian Parliament, announced that Rome was to be the future capital of the amalgamated monarchy, and not one of his constituents uttered a word of remonstrance. Those who are best acquainted with the state of feeling there, assure us that had he upheld the claims of Turin, he would have been coldly received even by the Piedmontese, and that had he ventured to suggest Florence, he would indisputably have forfeited his re-election. The difficulties we have endeavoured to explain, therefore, must be met, and the obstacles must be overcome, in the best mode that sagacious politicians can devise. In any attempt to solve the Papal problem we encounter the most embarrassing perplexities: our only choice lies between schemes, some one of which must be adopted, but all of which are open to grave and undeniable objections. Our comfort lies in the plain and notorious truth that the problem must be solved, and that no solution can be so imperfect, so full of mischief and danger, and so essentially and avowedly transient, as the maintenance of the Pope in a provisional existence, with a diminished territory, and behind the bayonets of France.

We need only add one or two words in conclusion, as to the other great pending embarrassment of the Italian question. The sooner the cession of Venetia, for a fair and honourable equivalent, can be completed, the better will it be for Europe, for Austria, and perhaps (though as we have seen not quite in all respects so certainly) for Italy likewise. Europe can hope for little steady tranquillity so long as an irritation like that lies open,

which cannot be cut out of the body politic, and can be healed in no way but one. It is, moreover, a wound which spreads and a peril which augments with every hour. No statesman, insular or continental, liberal or despotic, can be blind to the imminent convulsion and confusion, if not the ultimate mischief, which is preparing in the east of Europe among the Hungarian and southern Sclavonic populations. If something in the way of amicable prevention be not done, and done speedily, we shall see almost certainly before the year is over the outbreak of a war of singular virulence and complication. The safety of Turkey, the ambition of Russia, the existence of Austria, will all be compromised in the strife. If the principle of non-intervention be rigidly enforced, the case will be difficult and hazardous enough. If that principle be violated, and the conflicting-or the coinciding-arms of France and Russia once come upon the stage, who can foresee the issue, or the end? The forcible retention, or rather the military occupation, of Venetia by Austria is to no one more fatal than to Austria herself. It is still the doctrine of European diplomatists that a powerful empire is needed for European interests in the geographical position now occupied by Austria:-but Austria, as long as she clings to Venetia, cannot be that empire cannot fulfil that necessity -cannot discharge those functions. The finances of Austria are in a desperate state: her first obligation, the very indispensable condition of her existence, is to restore those finances. Ruin stares her in the face: if she insist on retaining Venetia, that ruin is consummated; if she consent to cede it, that ruin is averted. The harsh severity of her rule in her Italian dependencies, and the partial cruelty with which the fiscal burdens of her subjects there are apportioned and exacted, in comparison with the other provinces of the empire (the per centage being nearly double), have operated to the injury of Austria in a two-fold manner :-in the first place, they have given her a bad name in Europe, perhaps even worse than she deserves, and have alienated from her the sympathies of humane and liberal men throughout the world; and in the second place, they have trained her officials, both military and bureaucratic, to habits of insolence and oppression, which accompany them when transferred elsewhere, and create in the citizens on whom they are exercised, that irritation and dislike of the government which is fast spreading even to those provinces which used to be comparatively placid and contented. Lombardy and Venetia have demoralised the whole body of Austrian functionaries; both for the sake of quiet and of character she would do well to relieve herself from the cause of

the infection. We believe that she might cede her Italian dependencies with safety and with credit; we are sure she cannot keep them with either. She will not be the first great Power that has surrendered territory at the dictate of policy, and with a profitable result. England ceded a continent in 1783, and France sold a province (Louisiana) in 1803, and neither Power has ever repented the transaction.

Amongst the signs of the times which appear to mark out the year on which we have just entered as an epoch of important changes in either hemisphere, there is none that we hail with more satisfaction than the radical alteration which appears to be in progress in the councils and policy of the Court of Vienna. If it be true that the determination to restore the constitution of Hungary on the basis of 1848 and to shake off the fetters of the Concordat is already taken, two most important steps are made. A third remains, which by the cession of Venetia on amicable terms would complete the structure of the Kingdom of Italy, remove a constant source of weakness and dissension, enable Austria and all the other Powers to reduce their military establishments, and give the best pledge of peace to Europe.

ART. X.- Admiralty Administration; its Faults and its Defaults. 8vo. London: 1861.

6

A MODERN writer, to whom the world is indebted for a great deal of practical wisdom, conveyed in a very pleasing form, has recently directed his ingenious powers of analysis and illustration to the effects produced by Organisation on human affairs. Half the labour,' he says, 'of the most laborious people in the world is wasted, or is of such an im'perfect character as to require much further labour, which need not have been if there had existed considerable skill in organising. Moreover, the loss of life, the loss of comfort, the loss of enjoyment which take place from a want of this skill are incalculable.' To suppose that things will go well, or indeed that they will go at all, without careful preparation and constant supervision, is a delusion which at once unfits a man for the exercise of authority. To organise the common affairs of life, from a dinner-party to a review in Hyde Park, is a task requiring forethought, quick apprehension, and judgment; but when it is requisite that the organisation be such as to meet extraordinary emergencies, and to provide against events of

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which we have no previous experience, these qualities are demanded in a very high degree. A man endowed with them knows his course of action beforehand, — he has already reflected what he should do if the house were on fire, if he were wrecked at sea, or if an accident threatening life were suddenly to occur to him. He is never unprepared; he never attempts to extemporise an expedient; knowing the vicissitudes of life to be great, he is ready, as far as possible, to meet them and in this respect mainly the wise man differs from the fool. Much more, however, do these duties of provision and prevention devolve on those who conduct the affairs of the commonwealth. The nation entrusts to them its vast resources, on condition that they are to provide for the national security, and that the State suffer no loss at their hands. In the rulers of a great empire, organisation is the first of duties; they have authority to establish it; they are responsible for enforcing it; and they have more ample means than private citizens of observing how often deficiencies and disorganisation in small things lead to disasters in great things.

The English character, and especially the character of modern English society, is not, we fear, favourable to a high degree of organisation, and this as much from our national virtues as from our national defects. The enjoyment of individual liberty of judgment and action to its fullest extent is not consistent with that respect for subordination and authority which complete organisation demands, though it tends eminently to develope the opposite principle of self-reliance. But although self-reliance and independence are great and noble gifts, it is a delusion, and a dangerous delusion, to suppose that in a sudden crisis of national peril any amount of individual energy can countervail or supply a thoroughly-organised force. It would not be difficult to show in many different ways that the want of organisation tells injuriously upon the strength, the health, the time,

*The people of England not unfrequently organise their own affairs, when they set about it, better than the Government could organise those affairs for them, probably because assent and obedience are more heartily and thoroughly given when they are not exacted in the name of authority. Of such organisations, the most remarkable is, without doubt, that of the Volunteers, in which, by spontaneous combination, a whole army of 120,000 men has been raised, drilled, equipped, and is administered with the smallest possible infusion of legal authority; indeed, it is hard to say where the authority which has organised the Volunteers is to be found, except in the universal determination of every man among them to serve the common object, and to sink the individual in the whole.

and general welfare of the British nation. We build without a plan; we legislate without method; our public offices are the product partly of tradition and partly of accident; the business of Parliament is conducted with incredible irregularity and confusion; and an immense amount of labour is wasted in all public and private affairs for want of precision, forethought, and contrivance. The result is that even in the arts of peace and of manufacturing industry, the competition of foreign nations which excel us in organisation is far more severe than it would otherwise be; but, if the same principle be applied to the art of war, in which nothing can be extemporised, and everything depends on the effective co-operation of all parts of a vast system, we are in danger of losing even that superiority which we owe to our natural resources and position.

To turn again for a moment to the essay from which we borrowed our opening remarks, the author goes on to say :

England is arming now to prevent foreign invasion, yet few perhaps, even of governing people, have stated to themselves in writing (for I hold to writing) what they want - what they would like to have in the way of defences, if time and money were in abundance at their disposal, and have then seen how much of the essence of the best plan in theory can be obtained in practice by the means which they are likely to have at their command. As things go on in the world, great efforts will be made in a scattered, incomprehensive, and unbusiness-like way; and probably one-third of the force brought to bear upon this object will be lost. At the present moment, what is wanted for England in her dealings with foreign nations, is to organise a policy, and then to prepare the moral and material forces necessary to sustain that policy. Doubtless this is a considerable difficulty for any country not despotically governed, since one of the drawbacks upon the representative form of government lies in the frequent changes which take place in the governing persons; changes, too, which often have their origin in very slight questions, and are not connected with any great change of policy, especially as regards foreign affairs. Still these changes in the governing persons may be very detrimental, if only in creating the idea abroad of a proneness to mutability in our foreign policy. If England ever undergoes any deplorable reverse, it will probably be for want of preparedness, from deficiency in organisation generally, and from the want of an organised plan of policy steadily pursued and prepared for. A further danger is that one kind of policy should be adopted in ordinary times, and then be suddenly changed at a crisis, when there are no preparations made to sustain and enforce the new policy, and when the old preparations are unserviceable. Indeed, a large part of our preparations, even in the most civilised countries, are like those which are made in Thibet for the Great Lama festival called the Feast of Flowers, held at the Lamaserai of Kounboun. There are colossal statues of men and women,