The French expeditionary force was placed under the chief comman of Marshal St. Arnaud, who at the time was Minister at War, in which office he was succeeded by Marshal Vaillant. The first division was commanded by Gen. Canrobert; the second, by Gen. Bosquet. The brigade of cavalry, consisting of the first and fourth regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique, was commanded by Gen. d'Allonville, and the first corps of reserve, formed of a regiment of Zouaves, a regiment of light infantry, and a regiment of marines, by Prince Napoleon Bonaparte. A second corps of infantry, as a body of reserve, was commanded by Gen. Forey, and a reserve brigade of cavalry by Gen. Cassargnalles, At this time an opinion was universally, and not quite unreasonably, entertained of the incapacity of the Turks to resist the advance of the Russians upon Shumla and the passes of the Balkan Mountains. Gen. Sir John Burgoyne had previously been commissioned by the British Government to proceed to Bulgaria, or the country lying between the Danube and the Balkan, and, from a personal inspection of the Turkish army under Omar Pasha, to judge of the probability of their being able to make an effectual stand against the invading army. Except for defending stone walls, or fighting under strong cover, the Turkish soldier was not supposed to be worth much. It had been seen that they could do well in a position like that at Kalafat; but it was generally believed that they would be unable to cope with the Muscovite columns in the field, if those invaders should cross the Danube, and march to the Balkan passes, as they had done in the campaign of 1829. Sir John Burgoyne participated in this opinion, and, in consequence of the fears which he expressed for the safety of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, it was resolved to occupy and throw up defensive works across the peninsula which forms. the eastern side of those straits. It certainly showed little confidence in the prospects of success in the field that the troops sent to the assistance of Turkey should be occupied for a considerable period in fortifying a corner of the empire so very remote from the scene of action, on the line of the Danube, where the contest was raging between the Russian and Turkish armies. This corner, moreover, is at a considerable distance from Constantinople; and it might be thought that the fortification of the peninsula would be of little avail in preventing the fall of that city if the Russians attacked it. But it is to be observed that an army, posted as the French and English were at Gallipoli, would be on the right flank of the Russians if they really crossed the Balkan to try their fortunes at Stamboul, and that, with such a force threatening their weak side, it is not very probable that the Russians would have made any such attempt. The Emperor Louis Napoleon had been strongly in favour of an occupation of the peninsula. In a paper of instructions drawn up by him, as late as the 12th of April, for the guidance of Marshal St. Arnaud, he had said, "In placing yourself, Marshal, at the head of a French army departing for combat at more than six hundred leagues from the mother country, my first recommendation is, to have the greatest care for the health of the troops, to expose them no more than is necessary, and not to give battle without being assured that two-thirds of the chances at least are in your favour. The Peninsula of Gallipoli is selected as the principal site of disembarkation, because it should be, as a strategical point, the basis of our operations-that is to say, the place of arms for our depôts, our ambulances, and our provisions--and from whence we may with facility march for ward or re-embark. That will not hinder you, on your arrival, should you consider it advisable, from lodging one or two divisions in the barracks to be found either at the west of Constantinople or at Scutari. So long as you are not in front of the enemy, the dispersion of your forces will cause no inconvenience, and the presence of your troops at Constantinople may produce a good moral effect; but, if, by chance, after having advanced towards the Balkans, you are constrained to make a movement in retreat, it will be of much more advantage to regain the coast of Gallipoli than that of Constantinople, for the Russians will never venture from Adrianople to Constantinople with an army of 60,000 good troops on their right flank. If, however, it is desirable to fortify the line of Karasu in advance of Constantinople, it must be done with the intention of leaving its defence to the Turks only, because, I repeat it, our position will be more independent, more redoubtable, in finding ourselves on the flanks of the Russian army than if we were blockaded in the Thracian Peninsula." The entrenched camp, upon which the English and French troops were now busily employed, consisted of a series of field works about seven miles in length, running along the crest of a ridge, from the Sea of Marmora, on the east, to the Gulf of Saros or Exaros, at the head of the Peninsula, on the west. After undergoing the fatigue of making these field works, and when they were nearly finished, the allied forces were removed to the Bosphorus, the British landing at Scutari, on the east side of that narrow strait, and the French occupying the neighbourhood of Constantinople. Lord Raglan arrived at Constantinople on the 29th of April, and Marshal St. Arnaud on the 8th of May. Before quitting France, the Marshal had issued a spirit-stirring order of the day to his army, in which he had said-" France and England, rivals in other times, are now friends and allies. The two countries have learned to esteem each other while combating. United, they command the seas, and their fleets will feed the army while famine is in the camp of the enemy. Soldiers! the eagles of the empire resume their flight, not to menace Europe, but to defend it. Bear them on once more, as your fathers bore them before you; and, like them, let us all, before we quit France, repeat the cry which so often led them to victory-Vive l'Empéreur!'" There were now about 20,000 French on the European, and about 10,000 British on the Asiatic, side of the Bosphorus. CHAPTER VIII. HISTORY OF THE WAR WITH RUSSIA Continued.-Campaign of the Turks on the Danube-Kalafat-Desperate combats between Russians and Turks-Despatch of Omar Pasha-Passage of the Danube by the Russians-Bombardment of Odessa by the Allies-Challenge to the Russian Fleet in Sebastopol-Siege of Silistria-Failure and Retreat of the Russians-French and English Armies removed to Varna-A portion of them advanced to Devna-Storming of Russian Forts at the Sulina Mouth of the Danube-Death of Captain Parker-Fearful mortality at Varna-The Dobrudscha-Mortality among the Russian Troops-Convention with Austria-An Austrian Army enters the Danubian Principalities-Austrian Proclamation-Conflagration at Varna -Lord Cardigan's Reconnaissance with the Light Cavalry-Utterly desolate state of the country--Loss of the steam-ship "Tiger"-Kindness of the people of Odessa to our Prisoners-The Blockade of Sebastopol successfully broken by the Russian Ship "Waldimir"-Number of Turkish Troops collected in the Valley of the Danube at the end of July. THE HE campaign on the Danube, where the troops of the Sultan were left to act by and for themselves, opened this year, on the 6th of January, with a vigorous engagement between the Turks and Russians. The scene of action was a fertile plain extending in an oblong form in front of Kalafat, and between it and the village of Citate, or Zetati, on the north-west, where the troops of the Czar occupied a slightly-fortified position. The river forms a curve round Kalafat, the fortifications of which extend to the Danube on either side. Through the middle of these works runs the road from Kalafat to Krajova. The Turkish out-pickets were at Cioroine, the second post station towards Krajova, and the Russians were at Radovan. Between these two places, or round about them, lie several villages, where the outposts often came into contact. The object of the Russians was to dislodge the Turks from all these villages, as their presence there was an impediment to any decided operation against Kalafat, from which it was their great object to drive the Mussulmans; the "material guarantee" being certainly not complete so long as a Turkish soldier remained on the left bank of the Danube. During several days before the 6th, skir mishes had taken place on the plain to the north of Citate, between the Turkish cavalry and the Cossacks; but about noon on that day, the Turkish cavalry, in a mass, made a charge upon the Russian lines at Citate, and there then ensued a desperate contest. The combat soon became general, and it was waged with all arms, horse, foot, and artillery, until the deep shades of evening fell over the plain. The Turks drove the Russians out of Citate, and although desperate attempts were made to retake the position, they remained masters of it at nightfall. We quote Omar Pasha's own account of the action: "A very serious engagement has taken place within about six hours' journey in advance of Kalafat, near the village of Citate, on the Russian Christmas day. Our force consisted of 11 battalions of infantry, 22 field pieces, three regiments of cavalry, and 450 irregular horse, under the orders of Ahmed Pasha. The Russians had upon the spot 15 battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, besides two squadrons of Paskiewitch's Hussars, and five squadrons of Cossacks, all under the command of General Aurep. In order to keep up the communications between the village of Citate and Kalafat, three other battalions had advanced as far as the village of Pojana. Citate was occupied by four battalions of Russian infantry, 12 pieces of cannon, two squadrons of Paskiewitch's Hussars, and five squadrons of Cossacks. The Russians had raised a redoubt behind the village. The village was attacked by six battalions of infantry, 12 pieces of cannon, and two regiments of cavalry, under the orders of Ismail Pasha. The rest of our troops, commanded by Mustapha Pasha, and consisting of five battalions of infantry, ten pieces of cannon, and one regiment of cavalry, were posted before the village. "After an obstinate combat of three hours, the enemy was completely dislodged from the village; incumbered the streets were "While our troops were engaged in taking the village by assault, another Russian detachment of nine battalions of infantry, six guns, and two regiments of cavalry attacked our reserve, posted before the village, and committed the fault of attempting to take our rear instead of charging our right. This was the cause of their defeat, because our troops in changing from front to rear, and by placing themselves nearer to the back of the village, were able to profit by the advantage of the ground, particularly those battalions placed in first line, which were covered by a ditch, as well as the other two battalions of the second line, which were also placed in a very advantageous position. "The fight upon this point lasted an hour and a half. From the commencement of the cannonade our artillery had caused so much loss to the enemy, that the latter, despairing of holding his position, advanced within the range of our guns. Thanks to the coolness of our troops, this movement was fatal to him; the well-directed fire of our infantry, aided by grape-shot, produced such ravage in the enemy's line, that, once forced to beat a retreat, he was soon compelled to fly in disorder, pressed by our infantry, who rushed in pursuit of him. Had it not been for the night, and the fatigue of our troops, who had been on the march that and the preceding day, the enemy would have been completely routed."* The moment the fresh Russian detachment came up was a most critical one for the Turks, but Omar Pasha proved himself equal to the emergency. Instead of waiting for this formidable at tack, he boldly assumed the of fensive with his reserves, and fell upon the enemy before they had time to deploy. In a brief space of time those newly-arrived Russians were retreating in disorder on all sides. At the close of the combat, the whole of the Russian force threw itself into a redoubt at a very short distance from the scene of the carnage, and from this they could not be dislodged. The combat was fiercely renewed on the following morning by the Russians, who in vain endeavoured to recover the village they had lost on the preceding day. They were repulsed with loss. The struggle recommenced on the 8th, and was continued at intervals on the 9th and 10th, rather to the advantage of the Turks, on the whole. But when the Turks made an attempt against the Russian redoubt near Citate, they, in their turn, were repulsed and thoroughly beaten. The events, however, of these few days were very honourable to the Ottoman arms, and, like the combat of Oltenitza, they made a great impression on public opinion in Europe. A desultory warfare was now *The Pasha does not correctly state the numbers; the Russian force was numerically very inferior to the Turkish: instead of having 5000, they had not 3000 men on the field. for some time carried on along the whole line of the Danube, between the Turks and the Russians, with no decisive result. The Minié rifle was actively used on both sides, and numbers of individual lives were sacrificed with no effect upon the ultimate fortunes of the campaign. It would only weary our readers if we were to attempt to give a narrative of these obscure and unconnected conflicts, which were, however, very useful to the Turks by exercising their new levies and giving them confidence in the presence of the enemy. We pass over, for the present, the negotiations which were still proceeding in the different European capitals, and the more serious matter of the Hellenic insurrection, and proceed to the next great military event, the passage of the Danube by the Russians, which took place on the 23rd of March, ten days after the signing of the Treaty of Alliance between France and England, by which those two Powers became com-, mitted, irrevocably, to the defence of Turkey. The time had therefore now arrived for Russia to strike some decisive blow at the tottering Ottoman Empire before the Allies could arrive to its succour. Nothing short of forcing the Balkan could be regarded as a decisive blow. The difficulties of the attempt would doubtless be very great. Thirty thousand Turks garrisoned Kalafat, and had been allowed time to throw up numerous earthworks, and to provide otherwise for that cover under which they generally fight so well. Kalafat, therefore, must be masked by not less than half of the advanced Russian army. Moreover, the small forts in the |