the bankrupt claimed to have made payments, is a ground for refusing a discharge, Re Greenberg, 114 Fed. 773; but omission, Van Ingen v. Schophofen, C. C. S., 129 Fed. 352; or false entries, Re Hamilton, 133 Fed. 823; when made solely for the purpose of concealing financial assistance or a preference, were held not to be. A discharge was granted when the bankrupt kept a cash book without any day book, blotter or register. Re Allendorf, 129 Fed. 981; and when the nature of the bankrupt's business did not require the keeping of ordinary books, his failure so to do did not prevent his discharge, Sellers v. Bell, C. C. A., 94 Fed. 801; Re Corn, 106 Fed. 143; Re Prager, 134 Fed. 1006; Re Keefer, 135 Fed. 885. The destruction of a check book and pass book at a time when the bankrupt's debts were small, Re Studebaker, C. C. A., 127 Fed. 591; the destruction of a salesman's slips of memoranda after the amount of the same had been written in the cash book, Re Allendorf, 129 Fed. 981; and the alteration and mutilation of immaterial parts of the old records of a corporation, of which the bankrupt was a bookeeper, Bauman v. Feist, C. C. A., 107 Fed. 83; were held no grounds for refusing a discharge. For cases of omissions from books, which were held to justify a denial of the application, see Re Brod, 166 Fed. 1011; Re Pomerantz & Hopkins, 168 Fed. 444; Re Schachter, 170 Fed. 683; Re Koelle, 171 Fed. 257; Re Kyte, 174 Fed. 867; Re Berger, 200 Fed. 325, where the bankrupt transacted business through a corporation which he owned; Re Josephson, 229

Fed. 272; Re Sternberg, 249 Fed. 980; Re Bloomberg, 253 Fed. 94.

For cases where they did not, see Re Barthier, 188 Fed. 394; Re Sabsevitz, 197 Fed. 109; Re Marcus, C. C. A., 203 Fed. 29. It has been held that if the intent to conceal the financial condition exists, the discharge should be denied, whether such intent was fraudulent or not, Re Hanna, C. C. A., 168 Fed. 238; Re Linker, 222 Fed. 173; but an intent to conceal must exist, Re Marcus, 192 Fed. 743; although it may be proved by circumstantial evidence, Re Schachter, 170 Fed. 683; Re Linker, 222 Fed. 173. For a disappearance of the books which caused a denial, see Re Wiedmann, 188 Fed. 684; Baylor v. Rawlings, C. C. A., 200 Fed. 131. But see Garry v. Jefferson Bank, C. C. A., 186 Fed. 461; Re Mintzer, 197 Fed. 647. The destruction of the books of a partnership of which the bankrupt was formerly a member, was held to be a bar to his discharge. Re Conley, 120 Fed. 42. In the case of a partnership, the burden is upon each partner to show that he was innocent of participation in such concealment. Re Schachter, 170 Fed. 683. Where the bankrupt lived in New York, he was not refused a discharge because a firm in Michigan, of which he was a member, did not keep proper books for a short period of time, there being no proof of his knowledge thereof. Re Garrison, C. C. A., 149 Fed. 178. Cf. Re Warne, 10 Fed. 377; Re Kamsler, 97 Fed. 194; Re Ablowich, 99 Fed. 81; Re Spear, 103 Fed. 779; Re Bemis, 104 Fed. 672; Ablowich v. Stursberg, C. C. A., 105 Fed. 751; Re Corn, 106 Fed. 143; Bragassa v.

St. Louis Cycle Co., C. C. A., 107 Fed. 77. The actual effect upon the creditors of the bookkeeping is immaterial, Re Schachter, 170 Fed. 683; Re Nadel, 211 Fed. 767; Re Josephson, 229 Fed. 279.

3 Re Josephson, 229 Fed. 272; Re Shea, 245 Fed. 363; Re Fackler, 246 Fed. 864; Re Kerner, 250 Fed. 993; Re Neuman, 251 Fed. 667; Re Troutman & Jesse, 251 Fed. 930; Re Baldwin, 253 Fed. 836; Re Goldberg, 256 Fed. 541; Re Perlmutter, 256 Fed. 862, aff'd C. C. A., 264 Shea, 245 Fed. 363; Re Fackler, 246 Fed. 957; Re Rammage, 260 Fed. 893. The fraudulent omission of a debt in a financial statement is not cured because through inadvertence an asset of the same amount was also omitted, Re Maaget, 245 Fed. 804; Re Reed, 256 Fed. 412. The right to object to a discharge because the bankrupt has obtained property or credit upon a materially false statement in writing is not confined to the person defrauded, but may be interposed by any creditor, Re Harr, 143 Fed. 421; Re A. B. Carlton & Co., 148 Fed. 63. But see Re Allendorf, 129 Fed. 981; Re Dresser & Co., 144 Fed. 318. The property

need not have been thus obtained for the benefit upon his credit as principal or surety, Re Aldridge, 168 Fed. 93. The obtaining of a loan, Re Louisville Banking Co., C. C. A., 158 Fed. 403; Re Gilpin, 160 Fed. 171; contra, Re Pfaffinger, 154 Fed. 528; Bank of Commerce & Savings V. Mathews, C. C. A., 257 Fed. 292; renewal of a loan, Samet v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, C. C. A., 247 Fed. 669, affirming Re Samet,

or a

243 Fed. 203, by means of a materially false statement in writing is sufficient. So is the obtaining of credit by a corporation, in which the bankrupt owned a majority of the stock, Re Dresser & Co., 144 Fed. 318. It has been held that the obtaining of a bond of indemnity or a surety bond is not, Re Tanner, 192 Fed. 572. But see infra, § 657. Services have been held not to be property within the meaning of this section of the statute. Gleason v. Thaw, C. C. A., 185 Fed. 345; s. c., C. C. A., 196 Fed. 359, aff'd 336 U. S. 558. It has been held that checks or drafts drawn upon an account where there are no funds, are not false statements in writing. Firestone v. Harvey, C. C. A., 174 Fed. 574, Re Rea Bros., 251 Fed. 431.

55.

Contra Re Robinson, 256 Fed.

According to the preponderance of authority before the amendment of 1910 false statements to a commercial agency were not, Re Russell, C. C. A., 176 Fed. 253; Re Foster, 186 Fed. 254; ser, C. C. A., 146 Fed. 383, 76 C. C. A., 655; Re Pincus, 147 Fed. 621; Re Carton & Co., 148 Fed. 63; Re Kyte, 174 Fed. 867. It has since been held that they may be, Haimowich v. Mandel, C. C. A., 243 Fed. 338, affirming 232 Fed. 378, but see J. W. Ould Co. v. Davis, C. C. A., 246 Fed. 228. It does not avail the bankrupt that he paid in full for the first property that he received upon the faith of the false statement. Ragan, Malone & Co. v. Cotton & Preston, C. C. A., 200 Fed. 546. Cf. Re Terens, 172 Fed. 938. But see Re Cotton & Preston, 183

Fed. 181; Re Sabsevitz, 197 Fed. 109; Re O'Callaghan, 199 Fed. 662; Re Braverman, 199 Fed. 863. The fact that credit was extended to a firm and not to the bankrupt member thereof, is immaterial. Re Terens, 172 Fed. 938. A false statement made by an agent of the bankrupt within the scope of his authority, will justify a refusal of the discharge, Re Goodhile, 130 Fed. 782; Re Dresser, C. C. A., 146 Fed. 383. See Re Hardie & Co., 143 Fed. 607; Re Reed, 191 Fed. 920. In the case of a partnership, such a statement by one of the firm is a ground for refusing a discharge to him and to the firm. Re Neyland & McKeithern, 184 Fed. 144; Ragan, Malone & Co. v. Cotton & Preston, C. C. A., 200 Fed. 546; but not the discharge of a partner who did not participate in or authorize the same. Ragan, Malone & Co. v. Cotton & Preston, C. C. A., 200 Fed. 546, affirming 183 Fed. 181; Hardie v. Swafford Bros. Dry Goods Co., C. C. A., 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 785, 165 Fed. 588. The false statement must have been made either with knowledge of its falsity, or so recklessly as to justify a finding of fraud. Re Collins, 157 Fed. 120. Where the statement was false in fact, but made in good faith through a mistake on the part of the bankrupt, his discharge denied. Re Shaffer, 169 Fed. 724. See Re Terens, 172 Fed. 938. Contra, W. S. Peck Co. v. Lowenbein, C. C. A., 178 Fed. 178; Re Mintzer, 197 Fed. 647; Re

O'Callaghan, 199 Fed. 662; Re Goldberg, 256 Fed. 541.

For evidence held to be sufficient to show that the statement was intentionally false, see Re Taff & Conyers, 182 Fed. 899; Shaffer v. Kohlegard Co., C. C. A., 183 Fed. 71; Re Puschkin, 183 Fed. 882; Re Miller 192 Fed. 730; Re Ellerbee, 198 Fed. 952. The denial of the discharge operates as to all claims and is not limited to that of the objector. Re Miller, 192 Fed. 730. A creditor can make the objection, although the discharge would not release the bankrupt from the debt thus incurred. Re Reed, 191 Fed. 920. An agreement by a creditor for a valuable consideration, by which he canceled and agreed to surrender certain written statements, upon which the bankrupt obtained credit, and conceded that any inaccuracies therein were inadvertent, was held to estop him from using the same as a ground of objection to the discharge. Russell, C. C. A., 176 Fed. 253.

Re

4 It has been held that concealment at a time when no trustee was appointed is no ground of objection. Re Adams, 171 Fed. 599. But see U. S. v. Comstock, 161 Fed. 644; Radin v. U. S., C. C. A., 189 Fed. 568. The advice of counsel may be considered when determining whether the concealment was fraudulent. Re Alleman, 162 Fed. 693; Klein v. Powell, C. C. A., 174 Fed. 640. It has been held that the word "conceal" means a continuous concealment, and the fact that the first

concealment was prior to the four months' period is no excuse if continued. Re Quackenbush, 102 Fed. 282; Re Toothaker Bros., 128 Fed. 187 U. S. v. Cohn, 142 Fed. 983; Re Jacob & Verstandig, 147 Fed. 797. A discharge will not be denied because of an omission of assets from the bankrupt 's schedules, caused by inadvertence or a mistake of fact or law, Re Scott, 11 Fed. 133; Re Crenshaw, 95 Fed. 632; Re Hirsch, 96 Fed. 468; Re Morrow, 97 Fed. 574; Re McAdam, 98 Fed. 409; Re McBryde, 99 Fed. 686; Re Wetmore, 99 Fed. 703; Re Neely, 134 Fed. 667; nor, it has been held, be cause of the omission of a leasehold, where there is no evidence that it has any value, Re Hirsch, 97 Fed. 571. Nor for the omission of an asset of nominal value. Devorkin v. Security Bank & Tr. Co., C. C. A., 243 Fed. 171; Anderson v. Forest City Nat. Bank, C. C. A., 254 Fed. 793. Nor because of the omission of an interest in property, which has been pledged, when there is no evidence that it is worth more than the debt due the pledgee, Re Hirsch, 96 Fed. 468; nor, an omission of an asset which the bankrupt supposed he owned, but in fact did not. Re Hughes, C. C. A., 262 Fed. 500. It has been held that a preference, which does not amount to a fraudulent concealment, is not a bar to discharge. Re Pierce, 103 Fed. 64; Re Brown, 140 Fed. 383; Re Maher, 144 Fed. 503; Re Friedrich, 199 Fed. 193; Re Doyle, 199 Fed. 247; Re Bouck, 199 Fed. 453; Gill v. White, C. C. A., 249 Fed. 50. But see Grafton v. Meikleham, C. C. A., 246 Fed. 737, reversing Re Meikleham. It has been held that the transfer must have been effective. W. A. Liller B. 'g. Co. v. Reynolds,

C. C. A., 247 Fed. 90; 239 Fed. 401, certiorari denied, 246 U. S. 665, 83 Sup. Ct. 334, 62 L. ed. 929; Sternburg v. M. Cohen & Co., C. C. A., 254 Fed. 1, affirming Re Sternburg, 249 Fed. 980. It has been intimated that the use and loss of money belonging to the estate in gambling after the filing of the petition and before the appointment of the trustee might be held to be a cause for refusing the discharge. Re Sternberg, 249 Fed. 980. The pledge by a stockholder of securities owned by his customers to secure a loan to himself is not such a transfer of property with intent to defraud his creditors as will prevent his discharge, although it is property on which he has a lien, Re Jacob Berry & Co., 146 Fed. 623, in which the author was counsel. It seems that a transfer of property in fraud of creditors when made by a bankrupt's general agent with complete control of the same will bar a discharge, although the bankrupt did not know it was made. Ibid.; Re James, C. C. A., 181 Fed. 476, affirming 175 Fed. 894. See § 621, supra. Cf. Johnson v. U. S., C. C. A., 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1194, 163 Fed. 30. Contra, Warren v. U. S., C. C. A, 199 Fed. 753. Where prior to the six months, the bankrupt parted with the title and all control to the property, there is no such concealment as is described in the statute. Re Hammerstein, C. C. A., 189 Fed. 37. Cf. Re Boner, 169 Fed. 727. For cases where it was held that there was such a fraudulent concealment, see Re Roy, 96 Fed. 400; Re Skinner, 97 Fed. 190; Re Kamsler, 97 Fed. 194; Re Lewin, 103 Fed. 852; Re Lowenstein, 106 Fed. 51; Re Becker, 106 Fed. 54; Re Bemis, 104 Fed. 672; U. S. v.

Young & Holland Co., 170 Fed. 110; Re Wright, 177 Fed. 578; Re McCann, 179 Fed. 575; Re Margolis, 181 Fed. 591; Re Taylor, 182 Fed. 187; Re Sussman, 183 Fed. 331; U. S. v. Stern, 186 Fed. 854; Re Graves, 189 Fed. 847; Re Sussman, 190 Fed. 111; Re Doyle, 199 Fed. 247; Re Berger, 200 Fed. 325; Re Singer, C. C. A., 251 Fed. 51. For cases holding that there was not, see Re Alleman, 162 Fed. 693; Johnson v. U. S., C. C. A., 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1194, 163 Fed, 30; Re Boner, 169 Fed. 727; Re Reed, 191 Fed. 920; Re Mintzer, 197 Fed. 647; Re Doyle, 199 Fed. 247. It seems that money borrowed to pay the expenses of the bankruptcy proceedings need not be put in the schedules. Sellers v. Bell, C. C. A., 94 Fed. 801. The advice of counsel is no excuse for the omission of assets from the schedule, unless the bankrupt gave him a full disclosure of the facts; but, in such a case, it may have weight with the court. Re Alleman, 162 Fed. 693; Re Kyte, 174 Fed. 867; Re Nelson, 179 Fed. 320.

5 See Re Wheeler, 5 Fed. 299; Re Wolff, 100 Fed. 430; Re Chase, 186 Fed. 408; Re De Lewandowski, 243 Fed. 787. A discharge by composition has the same effect. Re Radley, 252 Fed. 205. It makes no difference whether the former proceedings were voluntary or involuntary or whether the second proceeding is of the same character as the former. Re Neely, 134 Fed. 667; Re Seaholm, C. C. A., 136 Fed. 144. The discharge of a firm in former bankruptcy proceedings is no bar to the subsequent discharge of another co

partnership within the six years, although one of the partners of the former was a member of the latter. Re Neyland & McKeithen, 184 Fed. 144, where the former order of discharge, although purporting to discharge the individual partners also, was construed as a discharge of the partnership only, since there had been no adjudication against the individuals. A creditor, who held a provable claim under the former proceeding, is not estopped from raising his objection to the bankrupt's discharge in a subsequent proceeding, although he proved his claim therein, when the bankrupt scheduled no assets not exempt. Re Bacon, C. C. A., 193 Fed. 34; Re Neely, 134 Fed. 667; Re Seaholm, C. C. A., 136 Fed. 144. The discharge of a firm in former bankruptcy proceedings is no bar to the subsequent discharge of another co-partnership within the six years, although one of the partners of the former was a member of the latter. Re Neyland & McKeithen, 184 Fed. 144, where the former order of discharge, although purporting to discharge the individual partners also, was construed as a discharge of the partnership only, since there had been no adjudication against the individuals.

In computing the time which has intervened since the bankrupt was discharged in voluntary proceedings, the six years are counted back from the time of the hearing on the application for the second discharge, and not from the time of the filing of the second voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Re Jordan, 142 Fed. 292; Re Haase, 155 Fed. 553.