after the first day a petition of involuntary bankruptcy was filed, and that, after adjudication and qualification of the trustee the defendants to effect the object of the conspiracy concealed from the trustee "certain merchandise, property, moneys, rights and credits belonging to the estate in bankruptcy" of the defendants.23 An indictment for concealment from the trustee need not allege a demand for the property by the trustee.24 In an indictment for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States by concealing property from a trustee in bankruptcy, an averment of the appointment of a trustee is not an essential allegation, since the crime charged might be committed, although no trustee was ever appointed.25 A demurrer was sustained to such an indictment which alleged that, while the "company" was bankrupt, the defendant (an individual) did conceal from the trustee in bankruptcy the proceeds of a certain sale of the bankrupt's property, etc., but failed to allege any receipt of assets by the defendant after the filing of the petition, or any act or acts by the defendant as an officer or agent or accessory for the bankrupt corporation, were demurrable.26 Persons other than a bankrupt commit a crime when they conspire with him to conceal his property.27 A count was held to contain sufficient averments of a conspiracy to conceal from the trustee of a bankrupt corporation or to continue and accomplish such concealment of the assets of the bankrupt when it charged that the business of the bankrupt was conducted by the three defendants as its officers, specifying the offices held by each, that they, as individuals, "did business as aforesaid," and planned to sell the corporation's outstanding accounts and conceal the proceeds which were to be paid to the three defendants for the assignment of the accounts of the bankrupt corporation, : 23 U. S. v. Baker, 243 Fed. 741, 744: "So general a mode of pleading a description of property is questionable, and ordinarily requires justification by an allegation that a more particular description is to the grand jury unknown.” 24 Meyer v. U. S., C. C. A., 220 Fed. 825. 63. 25 Steigman v. U. S., 220 Feč 26 U. S. v. Rosenstein, 211 Fed. 738. 27 Tapack v. U. S., C. C. A., 220 Fed. 445. : with intent to defraud its creditors, and that the defendants conspired in anticipation of the election of a trustee in bankruptcy, to conceal from such trustee, while the corporation should be a bankrupt, the property which should then and there belong to the bankrupt; although it was objected that there was no definite allegation of the insolvency of the corporation at the time of the sale.28 It was held that an indictment was sufficient when it charged that defendants knowing that two of them were insolvent and contemplating that these would be adjudicated bankrupts, in order to defraud the creditors of the prospective bankrupts, corruptly, wickedly, and unlawfully conspired to conceal the property of such bankrupts, and to continue to conceal it, after they should be adjudicated bankrupts, from the person to be appointed trustee, and that after the adjudication and appointment of a trustee they removed, secreted, and concealed such property; although the phrase knowingly and fraudulently was omitted.29 In such a case it is not necessary to allege that the owner of the property was a bankrupt at the time of the conspiracy.30 That the trustee appointed for a bankrupt failed to give bond, where he continued to act and there was no declaration of a vacancy, was not a defense to a prosecution of bankrupt for fraudulent concealment of property from him.31 § 506u. Indictments for personation of an officer of the United States. An indictment for the personation of an officer or employe of the United States must aver that defendant assumed or pretended to be an officer or employe acting under the authority of the United States, or acting under any authority of any Department of the United States, or acting under the authority of any officer of the Government of the United States; that he was not such an officer or employe, as the case may be;1 that he took upon himself to act as such; that in such pretended character he either demanded or obtained, either from the 28 U. S. v. Rosenstein, 211 Fed. 738. 29 Tapack v. U. S., C. C. A., 220 Fed. 445. See Friedman v. U. S., C. C. A., 236 Fed. 816; Frankfort v. U. S., C. C. A., 231 Fed. 903. 30 Tapack v. U. S., C. C. A., 220 Fed. 445. 31 Sharfsin v. U. S., C. C. A., 265 Fed. 916. § 506u. 1 Criminal code, §§ 32, 33, U. S. R. S., §§ 5435, 5438, April 18, 1884, ch. 26, 23 Stat. 11, March 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 32, 33, 35 Stat. 1095, Comp. St., §§ 10196, 10197. "Whoever, with intent to defraud United States or from any person, either money or paper or other valuable thing. It need not show that the defendant pretended to be any particular officer or employe of the United States,3 nor that he pretended to hold an office or employment which actually existed. The false personation of a member of Congress, accompanied by a demand in such pretended character is an offense within the statute.5 § 507. Ordinance in Constitution as to juries in criminal prosecutions. The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the either the United States or any person, shall falsely assume or pretend to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States, or any Department, or any officer of the Government thereof, and shall take upon himself to act as such, or shall in such pretended character demand or obtain from any person or from the United States, or any Department, or any officer of the Government thereof, any money, paper, document, or other valuable thing, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. "Whoever shall falsely personate any true and lawful holder of any share or sum in the public stocks or debt of the United States, or any person entitled to any annuity, dividend, pension, prize money, wages, or other debt due from the United States, and, under color of such false personation, shall transfer or endeavor to transfer such public stock or any part thereof, or shall receive or endeavor to receive the money of such true and lawful holder thereof, or the money of any person really entitled to receive such annuity, dividend, pension, prize money, wages, or other debt, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years."' 2 In Lamar v. U. S., 241 U. S. 103, 111, the Supreme Court sustained an indictment that at a stated time the petitioner "unlawfully, knowingly, and feloniously did falsely assume and pretend to be an officer of the Government of the United States, towit, a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States of America, that is to say, A. Mitchell Palmer, a member of Congress representing the Twenty-sixth District of the State of Pennsylvania, the intent, then and there, to defraud Lewis Cass Ledyard, "and other persons who were named and others to the grand jury unknown,'' and the said defendant, then and there, with the intent and purpose aforesaid, did take upon himself to act as such member of Congress; against the peace," etc. 3 U. S. v. Barnow, 239 U. S. 74; Roberts v. U. S., C. C. A., 248 Fed. 873. 4 U. S. v. Barnow, 239 U. S. 74. State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law." This does not give him the right to be tried by a jury composed of persons representing every locality in the district, but only by a jury, every member of which is a resident of the territory. which comprised the district at the time the offense is charged to have been committed. It has been held that a direction that the grand jury shall be summoned from a certain part of the district, in accordance with the Revised Statutes,2 is not in conflict with this Amendment.3 Where a district is divided into several divisions, a grand jury selected from the inhabitants of a single division is not forbidden by the Constitution. An indictment was not quashed because the court excluded, from the grand jury, residents of counties where the acts charged were committed.5 When, between the time of the commission of an offense and that of the indictment and trial for the same, the place where it was committed is made a part of a new or different district or division, the court of the district or division where it is situated at the time of the indictment and trial has jurisdiction. § 508. Writ of venire facias. "No grand jury shall be summoned to attend any district court unless the judge thereof, in his own discretion or upon a notification by the district attorney that such jury will be needed, orders a venire to issue therefor. If the United States attorney for any district which has a city or borough containing at least three hundred thousand inhabitants shall certify in writing to the district judge, or the senior district judge of the district, that the exigencies of the public service require it, the judge may, in his discretion, also order a venire to issue for a second grand jury. And said court may in term order a grand jury to be summoned at such time, and to serve such time as it may direct, whenever, in its judgment, it may be proper to do so. But nothing herein shall operate to extend beyond the time permitted by law the imprisonment before in § 507. 1 U. S. v. Peuschel, 116 Fed. 642. See Post v. U. S., 161 U. S. 583, 40 L. ed. 816. 2 U. S. R. S., § 802. 3 U. S. v. Ayres, 46 Fed. 651. 5 U. S. v. Green, 113 Fed. 683; aff'd C. C. A., 154 Fed. 601; certiorari denied, 207 U. S. 596, 52 L. ed. 357. 6 Ex parte Moran, C. C. A., 144 Fed. 594. dictment found of a person accused of a crime or offense, or the time during which a person so accused must be held under recognizance before indictment found."1 It has been held that a writ of venire facias, or a process in the nature of that writ, is an indispensable prerequisite to the summons of a grand jury; 2 but where an order had been made § 508. 1 Jur. Code, § 284, 36 St. at L. 1087, re-enacting in substance U. S. R. S., § 810. See U. S. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 177 Fed. 780. An order for the Grand Jury need not state for what time it is to serve. U. S. v. Lewis, 192 Fed. 633. 2 U. S. v. Antz, 16 Fed. 119, 122, 123; citing Act of 1846, 9 St. at L., p. 72, §3, Rev. St., § 810; U. S. v. Reed, 2 Blatchf. 435, 451, per Nelson, J.; Peter Cook's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 311, per Treby, L. C. J., Talcot, arguendo; People v. McKay, 18 Johns. 212. "Although the writ which was to be used by the courts of the United States for summoning the juries was denominated in the statute a venire facias, and in its general features was that writ, it was not precisely that. The writ of venire facias was the process used to summon in a jury after issue joined, and when a trial was to be had in a particular cause, and was confined to that cause. Hence it was that the challenge to the array was limited to the interest or favor of the officer who summoned. The writ used throughout all the States of the Union for the summoning of petit jurors, though known as the venire facias was more precisely the 'general previous precept, by virtue of which the sheriff returned into the courts of jail delivery divers several panels, and returned and delivered in one or more of those panels from time to time as the court needed and called for any." Since at the common law the writ in the nature of venire facias was used for no other purpose than to convene grand and petit juries, it is manifest that the Congress by authorizing its issuance meant to include it as the writ of juries, under the grant to the courts of 'power to issue all writs necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions.' If the Congress had stopped here the question would have been, whether, there being a grant of power to issue all writs necessary for the exercise of their jurisdictions which were agreeable to the usages and principles of law, as well as a jurisdiction which for its exercise rendered grand juries necessary, namely, a jurisdiction in criminal causes, and the ancient and invariable writ according to the usages and principles of law being the venire, the courts of the United States must not employ that writ, or a process in the nature of that writ, in the exercise of their criminal jurisdiction. I say if Congress had stopped here, the question would have been how far the acts of Congress had made the usage of the common law the exclusive guide or rule for convening grand juries. But Congress has not yet stopped here. Congress enacted 'That no grand jury shall be summoned to attend any Circuit or District Court unless one of the judges of such Circuit Court, or the judge of said district, in his own discre |