Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

29, 1842,8 which has been re-enacted in the Revised Statutes. The object of the law was stated by its introducer into the Senate, Senator Berrien of Georgia, in the following language which has been approved by the Supreme Court of the United States: "The object was to allow a foreigner, prosecuted in one of the States of the Union for an offence committed in that State, but which he pleads has been committed under authority of his own sovereign or the authority of the law of nations, to be brought up on that issue before the only competent judicial power to decide upon matters involved in foreign relations or the law of nations. The plea must show that it has reference to the laws or treaties of the United States or the law of nations, and showing this, the writ of habeas corpus is awarded to try that issue. If it shall appear that the accused has a bar on the plea alleged, it is right and proper that he should not be delayed in prison awaiting the proceedings of the state jurisdiction on the preliminary issue of his plea at bar. If satisfied of the existence in fact and validity in law of the bar, the federal jurisdiction will have the power of administering prompt relief."9

The Revised Statutes further provide that "when a writ of habeas corpus is issued in the case of any prisoner who, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein, is committed, or confined, or in custody, by or under the authority" or law of any one of the United States, or process founded thereon, on account of any act done or omitted under an alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, claimed under the commission or order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations, notice of the said proceeding, to be prescribed by the court, or justice, or judge at the time of granting said writ, shall be served on the attorney-general or other officer prosecuting the pleas of said State, and due proof of such service shall be made to the court, or justice, or judge before the hearing." 10

§ 461g. Errors which may be corrected by the writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to correct Massachusetts, Appendix to 26 Wen- 9 Re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 71. dell 699. 10 U. S. R. S., § 762, Comp. St. § 1290.

85 St. at L., ch. 257, p. 539.

errors and irregularities, however flagrant, committed within the sphere of the authority of the court. But a party imprisoned

§ 461g. 1 Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 304, 32 L. ed. 405, 408; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. ed."717; Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 23 L. ed. 787; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371, 27 L. ed. 232; Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328, 28 L. ed. 1005; Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 46 L. ed. 236; U. S. v. Lair, C. C. A., 195 Fed. 47; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219; Cooley v. Morgan, C. C. A., 221 Fed. 252; Morgan v. Sylvester, C. C. A., 231 Fed. 886; Harrison v. Mayer, 224 Fed. 224. After judgment of conviction, a prisoner cannot be released by a writ of habeas corpus upon the ground that the facts charged in the indictment do not constitute a crime within the meaning of the statute, Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 23 L. ed. 787; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 203, 7 L. ed. 650, 653; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 654. Hopkins v. McClaughry, C. C. A., 209 Fed. 821; Collins v. Morgan, C. C. A., 243 Fed. 495. But see Re Mayfield, 141 U. S. 107, 116, 35 L, ed. 635, 638. Nor because of a slight lack of certainty in the indictment, U. S. v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48, 38 L. ed. 631. Nor because of its duplicity, although in violation of a Territorial statute, Connella v. Haskell, C. C. A., 158 Fed. 285. See Collins v. Morgan, C. C. A., 243 Fed. 495. Nor because an improper person sat on the grand jury which indicted him, Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 30 L. ed. 824; Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U. S. 146, 53 L. ed. 125. See Re Wilson, 140 U. S. 575, 35 L. ed. 513. Nor because of an error in sustain

ing or overruling a challenge to a juror, Re Schneider, No. 2, 148 U. S. 162, 37 L. ed. 406; Ex parte Murray, 66 Fed. 297. Nor because the court improperly consolidated indictments. De Bara v. U. S., C. C. A., 99 Fed. 942; Howard v. U. S., C. C. A., 34 L.R.A. 509, 75 Fed. 986. Nor because the court refused to assign him counsel and forced him to trial without sufficient time to prepare his defense, Re MeKnight, 52 Fed. 799. Nor because of an error as to the time allowed him, within which to plead. McMicking v. Schields, 238 U. S. 99. Nor because he was convicted upon insufficient evidence, Re Harkell, 52 Fed. 195; Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442, 54 L. ed. 1101. Nor for errors committed in the course of his trial, even, it has been held, if these errors were infractions of the Constitution, such as a refusal to sustain a plea of a former conviction for the same cause, Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328, 28 L. d. 1005; Ex parte Ulrich, 43 Fed. 661, or former jeopardy. Collins v. Morgan, C. C. A., 243 Fed. 495; or even an erroneous ruling as to the validity of the statute under which the proceeding was brought, Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219; provided the infringement of the Constitution does not clearly appear upon the record, Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 176, 33 L. ed. 118. Nor because he was deaf and the testimony was not read to him through his ear trumpet. Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123, 50 L. ed. 689. Nor because he was refused compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses on his behalf, Ex

under an order made by a court of the United States, where it does not possess jurisdiction of either the person or the subjectmatter, can review that order by such a writ.2

parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 30 L. ed. 824. See Re Wilson, 140 U. S. 575, 35 L. ed. 513. Nor because he was tried by a de facto State judge who had no legal title to the office, Ex parte Ward, 173 U. S. 452, 43 L. ed. 765. Nor because he was convicted upon an information filed by a de facto State prosecutor who was not an officer de jure, Re Humason, 46 Fed. 388. Nor because he was denied bail pending a writ of error in a State court, Ibid. Nor because his petition for a removal was enied. Ex parte Murray, 66 Fed. 297. Nor, in bankruptcy, when committed for contempt before a referee, who has not certified to the District Court the disobedience of the relator. U. S. v. Henkel, 185 Fed. 553. Nor, it has been held, because the judge insisted on proceeding in the case after an affidavit of prejudice had been filed by the relator. Ex parte Glasgow, 195 Fed. 780.

2 Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 21 L. ed. 872; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717; Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604, 26 L. ed. 861; Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 485, 31 L. ed. 216, 223; Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 221, 31 L. ed. 402, 409; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713, 28 L. ed. 1117; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 29 L. ed. 89. This may be done when he is imprisoned after conviction by a court martial composed of officers in the regular army, which had no jurisdiction over him, a volunteer officer, although the objection was not raised at the trial. McClaughry v. Dem

ing, 186 U. S. 49, 46 L. ed. 1049; affirming C. C. A., 113 Fed. 639, 650. The employee of a contractor working in a training camp was discharged from arrest for trial before a court martial for manslaughter of a soldier within the limits of the camp, through the negligent operation of an automobile. Ex parte Weitz, 256 Fed. 58.

A court will not, however, thus interfere with the judgment of a court martial which had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter although there was error in the proceedings, except possibly under extraordinary circumstances. Ex parte Tucker, 212 Fed. 569. A prisoner was discharged by writ of habeas corpus, when he had been convicted in a court of the United States of an infamous crime upon an information without an indictment. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 29 L. ed. 89. A crime is considered infamous when punishable by imprisonment in a State prison or penitentiary with or without hard labor. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 29 L. ed. 89; Mackin v. U. S., 117 U. S. 348, 29 L. ed. 909. A prisoner may be discharged by habeas corpus when his conviction was in a court of the United States, under an indictment, the body of which was amended by the court. Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1, 30 L. ed. 849. Or under an indictment found by a grand jury unauthorized by law, but see Re Wilson, 140 U. S. 575, 35 L. ed. 513; Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 30 L. ed. 824, or he has been sentenced in his absence,

The rule that, unless the contrary appears on the record, a cause is deemed to be without the jurisdiction of a District

Anderson v. Denver, C. C. A., 265 Fed. 3. But not because he was tried while he was insane. Myers v. Halligan, C. C. A., 244 Fed. 420%. A prisoner may be discharged

when he is confined under a statute, State or Federal, Medley, Petitioner, 134 U. S. 160, 33 L. ed. 835; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, 43 L. ed. 699; Re Waite, 81 Fed. 359; Re Fair, 100 Fed. 149; which is repugnant to the Federal Constitution, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717; Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S. 399, 25 L. ed. 715; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371, 27 L. ed. 232. But see Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219. Or when he is held by any court, State or Federal, under process based upon a city ordinance, Stockton Laundry Case, 26 Fed. 611; or a statute State or Federal; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717; Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S. 399, 25 L. ed. 715; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371, 27 L. ed. 232; Medley, Petitioner, 134 U. S. 160, 33 L. ed. 835; but see Ex parte Crowder, 171 Fed. 250; which is repugnant to the Federal Constitution. "Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet if it is administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 368. Such was held to be the refusal of the State court to pass upon the

illegality of a commitment for lunacy when the person committed had no notice of the proceeding nor opportunity to be heard. Walters v. McKinnis, 221 Fed. 746; (as to ef fect of intimidation of the jury by a mob, see Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 335). Or when held by a State court under a charge of a crime exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, Re Loney, 134 U. S. 372, 33 L. ed. 949; Re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55. Cf. Ex parte Thompson, 1 Flippin, 507; U. S. v. McClay, 4 Cent. L. J. 255; Ex parte Larsen, 233 Fed. 708, where the State statute had been repealed; of a consul of a foreign country, Ex parte Anderson, 184 Fed. 114.

Red

A prisoner who is held in custody under a conviction of a Federal court may, after his pardon by the President of the United States, be released by habeas corpus, Greathouse's Case, 2 Abb. U. S. 382. But the decision of a Board of Parole denying a release on parole cannot ordinarily be thus reviewed. man v. Duehay, C. C. A., 246 Fed. 283. Or, it seems, if in custody under sentence by a State or Federal court without a trial upon a plea of not guilty, Re Converse, 42 Fed. 217, 219. Or it seems if, when indicted for one crime, he has pleaded guilty of another, and is held in custody under sentence for either. Re Converse, 42 Fed. 217, 219. But see Re Maldonado, 63 Fed. 825. Or under a judgment imposing a second penalty or different penalty from that previously imposed upon the same party for the same offense, although

[ocr errors][merged small]

PRACTICE AT COMMON LAW IN CIVIL ACTIONS [§ 461g

Court of the United States, has no application where the judgment of such a court is attacked collaterally by habeas ment with hard labor in the same place of confinement. Re Christian, 82 Fed. 199.

the former judgment was entered at the same term as the latter. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 21 L. ed. 872; Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 176, 33 L. ed. 118. Or under a judgment entered upon a conviction under several indictments, and imposing more than one punishment for a continuous offense. Re Snow, 120 U. S. 274, 30 L. ed. 658; Munson v. McClaughry, C. C. A., 198 Fed. 72. Stevens v. McClaughry, C. C. A., 207 Fed. 18.; O'Brien v. McClaughry, C. C. A., 209 Fed. 816. But see Moyer v. Anderson, C. C. A., 203 Fed. 881; Blake v. Moyer, C. C. A., 208 Fed. 678; Hopkins v. McClaughry, C. C. A., 209 Fed. 821. And when for any reason the sentence is beyond the jurisdiction of the court; Stoneberg v. Morgan, C. C. A., 246 Fed. 98; Collins v. C. C. A., 243 Fed. 495. Where part of the sentence is unlawful, the petitioner will not be discharged until he has performed such part thereof as was legally imposed. Re Swan, 150 U. S. 637, 37 L. ed. 1207; U. S. v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48, 63, 38 L. ed. 631, 637; Ex parte Davis, 112 Fed. 139; Collins v. Morgan, C. C. A., 243 Fed. 495.

A prisoner will be thus discharged when confined under a judgment sentencing him to a penitentiary for a crime punishable by imprisonment in a jail only, Re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242, 38 L. ed. 149. Cf. Re Burns, 113 Fed. 987. But see Re Terrill, C. C. A., 144 Fed. 616. Or even, it has been held, when sentenced to imprisonment without hard labor in a house of correction for a crime punishable by imprison

Or for contempt of a court of the United States by disobedience to an order beyond the power of such court. Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604, 26 L. ed. 861; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713, 28 L. ed. 1117; Re Ayres, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216; Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 31 L. ed. 402; Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280, 33 L. ed. 154. Or for contempt of a court of the United States for an act not committed in the presence of the court, when the prisoner has been given no hearing. Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 32 L. ed. 405. Or for disobedience to an order when the prisoner was not a party to the suit, nor named in the order, nor bound by the same. Re Reese, C. C. A., 107 Fed. 942. But see supra, § 435.

Or for contempt of a Federal court because of his refusal to answer a question that might tend to criminate him. Ex parte Irvine, 74 Fed. 954. See Re Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 35 L. ed. 1110, Butler v. Fayerweather, C. C. A., 91 Fed. 458. But not, unless he objected to the question upon this ground, although he subsequently contends that the statute under which he is punished is unconstitutional. Ex parte Blair, 253 Fed. 800.

Or, before conviction, when held under a warrant issued by a United States judge or commissioner, under a complaint which does not state an offense under a statute of the United States; Ex parte Bollman

« AnteriorContinuar »