Book 3 : of words. Book 4 : of knowledge and probabilityClarendon Press, 1894 |
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Página 2
... particular , as general or universal ( ch . iii ) . The names of simple ideas and of their simple modes ; the names of mixed modes and of relations ; and the names of the different sorts of substances , have each something peculiar ...
... particular , as general or universal ( ch . iii ) . The names of simple ideas and of their simple modes ; the names of mixed modes and of relations ; and the names of the different sorts of substances , have each something peculiar ...
Página 4
... particular things : for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use , had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by . [ To remedy this incon- venience , language had yet a further improvement in ...
... particular things : for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use , had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by . [ To remedy this incon- venience , language had yet a further improvement in ...
Página 8
... particular articulate sounds and certain ideas , for then there would be but one language amongst all men ; but by a voluntary imposition , whereby such a word is made arbitrarily 2 the mark of such an idea . 1 Leibniz ( Nouveaux Essais ) ...
... particular articulate sounds and certain ideas , for then there would be but one language amongst all men ; but by a voluntary imposition , whereby such a word is made arbitrarily 2 the mark of such an idea . 1 Leibniz ( Nouveaux Essais ) ...
Página 13
... particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them ; this is certain , their signification , in his use of them , is limited to his ideas , and they can be signs of nothing else1 . 1 ' Let us consider the false appear- ances that ...
... particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them ; this is certain , their signification , in his use of them , is limited to his ideas , and they can be signs of nothing else1 . 1 ' Let us consider the false appear- ances that ...
Página 14
... particular Thing 2. First , It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name . For , the signification and use of words depending on that connexion which the mind Name for makes between its ideas and the ...
... particular Thing 2. First , It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name . For , the signification and use of words depending on that connexion which the mind Name for makes between its ideas and the ...
Términos y frases comunes
abstract ideas actually affirm agree agreement or disagreement annexed aqua regia assent body BOOK BOOK IV called capable cerning certainty changeling CHAP clear co-exist colour complex idea concerning connexion constitution demonstration depend Descartes determined discourse discover distinct ideas divine doubt edition Essay eternal evidence experience faculties faith gold hath human ideas of substances imagine inquiry intellectual intuitive knowledge judgment Julius Cæsar language ledge Leibniz Locke Locke's malleableness matter maxims meaning men's ment mind mixed modes moral motion names of substances nature necessary never nexion nominal essence Novum Organum observe opinions perceive perception philosophical principles probability proofs propositions rational real essence real existence reality reason relations revelation Secondly self-evident sense sensible signification signs simple ideas sort species spirits stances supposed syllogism thought tion true truth understanding universal propositions universe whereby wherein whereof words СНАР
Pasajes populares
Página 393 - Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: Revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God. So that he that takes away reason, to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both...
Página 390 - ... the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making, or wooing of it ; the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it ; and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it ; is the sovereign good of human nature.
Página 226 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Página 8 - ... might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas...
Página 191 - We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think...
Página 68 - ... we see no chasms, or gaps. All quite down from us the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other.
Página 391 - I think there is one unerring mark of it, viz. the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance, than the proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain, receives not truth in the love of it; loves not truth for truth's sake, but for some other by-end.
Página 383 - Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever: and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident, and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in.
Página 22 - When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them.
Página 140 - The ends of language, in our discourse with others, being chiefly these three : First, To make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another : Secondly, To do it with as much ease and quickness as is possible : and, Thirdly, Thereby to convey the knowledge of things.