of creatures above than below us,
67-8; of creatures, very gradual,
ib.; what is necessary to the mak-
ing of species by real essences,
69-71; of animals and plants, not
distinguished by propagation, 74;
of man, 76-8; species is but a
partial conception of what is in the
individuals, 83-4; it is the complex
idea which the name stands for
that makes the species, 63, 71-2,
85-6; man makes the species or
sorts, 85-7; the foundation of it is
in the similitude found in things,
86-7; every distinct abstract idea
a different species, 87-8.
Speech, its end, ii. 3; proper speech,
13; intelligible speech, ib.
Spirits, finite, existence of, not know-
able, ii. 337-8; how it is proved,
ib.; operation of spirits on bodies
not conceivable, ii. 221; what
knowledge they have of bodies, ii.
160-1; how their knowledge
may exceed ours, i. 199–200;
we have as clear a notion of the
substance of spirit as of body, i.
395-6, 406 ff.; a conjecture con-
cerning one way of knowledge
wherein spirits may excel us, i.
404-5; our ideas of spirit as clear
as of body, 406-7; primary ideas
belonging to spirits, 407-8; spirits
capable of motion, 408-9; ideas of
spirit and body compared, 409 ff.;
existence of, as easy to be admitted
as that of bodies, 406-7, 417; we
have no idea how spirits communi-
cate their thoughts, 421-2; how
far we are ignorant of the being,
species, and properties, of spirits,
ii. 218-20.
Stupidity, i. 199.

Substance, i. 390 ff.; we have no
clear idea of substance, 107-8,
229-31, 391-2; we talk like chil-
dren about it, 392; supposition of,
observable in our complex ideas of
the several sorts of substances,
422; ideas of substances are single
or collective, 216; collective ideas
of substances, 424-5; they are
single ideas, ib.; how we come to
have our ideas of the particular
sorts of substances, 392 ff.; the
three sorts of substances of which

we have ideas, 440; the powers of
substances innumerable, and only
a few can be known by man,
510-1; the perfectest idea of any
sort of substance, 397; three
sorts of ideas enter into our com-
plex ones of corporeal substances,
399-400; our ideas of substances
have a double reference, and in
both inadequate, 506; the con-
fused idea of substance in general
makes always a part of the essence
of the several species of sub-
stances, ii. 72; in substances we
must rectify the signification of
their names by the things more
than by definitions, 161-2; our
certainty concerning the powers or
attributes of substances reaches but
a little way, 235-7, 255 ff.
Subtlety, what, ii. 127.
Succession, an idea got chiefly from
the train of our ideas, i. 163-4,
239-42; which train is the measure
of it, 244.

Summum bonum, wherein it con-
sists, i. 351-2.

Sun, the name of a species, though
but one, ii. 56.
Sydenham, i. 14.

Syllogism, no help to reasoning, ii.
388 ff.; the use of syllogism, 396;
inconveniences of syllogism, 394–5 ;
of no use in probabilities, 401;
helps not to new discoveries, 401–
2; or to the improvement of our
knowledge, 402-3; whether in
syllogism the middle term may
not be better placed, 404-5; reason-
ings about particulars, 404.

T.

Taste and smell, their modes, i. 295.
Testimony, how it lessens its force,
ii. 377-8.

Thinking, i. 298; modes of thinking,
298-9; men's ordinary way of
thinking, ii. 245-6; an operation
of the soul, i. 128; without memory
useless, 134-5:

Time, what, i. 246-7; not the
measure of motion, 250 ; and place,
distinguishable portions of infinite
duration and expansion, 261-3;
twofold, 262-3; denominations
from, are relatives, i. 436-7.

Toleration, necessary in our state of
knowledge, ii. 371-4.

Tradition, the older the less credible,
ii. 377-8.

Trifling propositions, ii. 292 ff.;
discourses, 299–301.

Truth, what, ii. 244, 249; verbal and
real, 245, 247-9; moral, 249;
metaphysical, 249-50, i. 514-5;
general, seldom apprehended but
in words, ii. 251-2; in what it
consists, 246; love of it necessary,
428-30; how we may know we
love it, ib.

Vacuum, possible, i. 231-3; motion

proves a vacuum, 233; we have an
idea of it, 153, 155-6.

Variety in men's pursuits accounted
for, i. 350-2.

Vice lies in wrong measures of good,
ii. 456.

Virtue, what, in reality, i. 83; what
in its common application, ib.; is
preferable under a bare possibility
of a future state, i. 364-6.
Volition, what, i. 313-4, 320, 329-
30; better known by reflection
than by words, 331.
Voluntary, i. 314, 318, 329.

W.

'What is, is,' not universally as-
sented to, i. 39-40.

Where and when, i. 263.
Whole, the, bigger than its parts:
use of this maxim, ii. 284-5.
Whole and part, not innate ideas,
i. 95.

Will, what, i. 313, 320-1, 329-30;
what determines the will, 330 ff.;
often confounded with desire, 331-
2, 338; is conversant only about
our own actions, 331, 339-40; ter-
minates in them, ib. ib.; is deter-
mined by the greatest present re-
moveable uneasiness, 332 ff., 339–40.
Wit and judgment, wherein differ-
ent, i. 203.

Words, an ill use of, one great
hindrance of knowledge, ii. 223-4;
abuse of words, ii. 122 ff.; sects in-
troduce words without signification,
122-3; the schools have coined
multitudes of insignificant words,
123; and rendered others obscure,
126 ff.; often used without signifi-
cation, 123-4; and why, 124-5;
inconstancy in their use, an abuse
of words, 125-6; obscurity, an
abuse of words, 126-31; taking
them for things, an abuse of words,
132-5; who most liable to this
abuse of words, 132; this abuse of
words is a cause of obstinacy in
error, 135; making them stand for
real essences we know not, is an
abuse of words, 135-40; the sup-
position of their certain evident
signification, an abuse of words,
140-2; use of words is, (1) to com-
municate ideas, (2) with quickness,
(3) to convey knowledge, 142-3;
how they fail in all these, 143-4;
how in substances, 144-5; how in
modes and relations, 145-6; mis-
use of words, a great cause of
error, 149; of obstinacy, 149-50;
and of wrangling, 150; signify one
thing in inquiries, and another in
disputes, 150-1; their meaning is
made known, in simple ideas, by
showing, 155-6; in mixed modes,
by defining, 156; in substances,
by showing and defining too, 158-
60; the ill consequence of learning
words first and their meaning after-
wards, 161-2; no shame to ask
men the meaning of their words,
where the words are doubtful, 162–

3; are to be used constantly in the
same sense, 164; or else to be
explained, where the context de-
termines it not, ib.; how made
general, ii. 4, 16-7; signifying in-
sensible things, derived from names
of sensible things, 4-6; have no
natural signification, 8; but by
imposition, 12-13; stand imme-
diately for the ideas of the speaker,
9-10; yet with a double reference:
(1) to the ideas in the hearer's mind,
10-1; (2) to the reality of things,
II; apt, by custom, to excite ideas,
ib.; often used without signification,
11-2; most are general, 14; why
some words of one language can-

not be translated into those of
another, 48-9; why I have been so
large on words, 53-5; new words,
or in new significations, are cau-
tiously to be used, 96-7; civil use
of words, 105; philosophical use of
words, ib.; these very different,
114; words miss their end when
they excite not in the hearer the
same idea as in the mind of the
speaker, 105; what words most
doubtful, and why, 105-6; what
words unintelligible, 106.
Worship not an innate idea, i. 95.
Wrangling about words, ii. 150.
Writings, ancient, why hardly to be
precisely understood, ii. 120.

(B)

-

A.

Abstract Ideas, lxxiii-v; Locke's
view of, I. 2072, II. 172, 274',
3401; transcend sense and sensuous
imagination, I. 140o, II. 17', 183,
223.

Abstract Propositions, account of,
in the Essay, cviii. ff.
Action, I. 3301.
Anselm, II. 310*.

Appetite and desire X will, I. 3062.
Aquinas, St. Thomas, II. 662.
Argumentum ad hominem, I1.4112;
ad ignorantiam, 4111.
Aristotle, axiom of contradiction,

I. 393; distinction of active and
passive power, 3092, and of in-
telligent and unintelligent powers,
309; essence II. 26', 65; defini-
tion of motion, 34", and of light,
362; categories, 1321; materia
prima, 1352; use of the term
Axiom, 2671; eternity of the world,
319'; gradations of the principle of
life, 3802; inventor' of syllogism,
3902; also I. 197*, 3031, 435', 5081,
II. 673, 281'.

Assent, difference in Locke's usage,

I. 401, 42, 44'; regarded as
caused, II. 364'. See also Prob-
ability.
Association of Ideas, Locke's treat-
ment of, I. 5271; association X
objective causality and rational
necessity, 529', 5292, 530'; physio-
logical explanations of, 530.

Atomism, Locke's hypothetical, I.
1811, X mechanical or atheistic,
II. 2005, 2055; sensible qualities
of bodies and, xcvi. ff., 1. 1763, 179',
374'. See also Essence, atomic
real.

Attention, and passivity, I. 194o.
Authority, place of, II. 368', 4102,
444'; of one's own past judgments,
3701, 370; in religion, 4182;
reason and, 4212, 4572; Locke on
motive of assent to, 458'.
Axiom, see Maxim.

B.

Bacon, idola, 1. 891; on words, II.
131; his doctrine of forms, 2013;
his ideal of physical knowledge,
2171, unrealisable on Locke's view,
2013, 204, 216, 2232; his use of
the term Axiom, 2671; 'antiquitas
saeculi juventus mundi, 378';
reason in things, 3802; syllogism,
4002; love of truth, 4282; lumen
siccum, 453; his levelling antici-
pations guarded against by Locke,
456; division of the sciences,
463'; also 1. 83, 253, 124, 501',
II. 715, 1471, 206", 4201.
Balfour, A, J., II. 2173.
Berkeley, and the Essay, cxxvi ff;

raises the question of the meaning
of reality in sensible things, I. 1631,
1821, 4972, II. 186. 226; reality
and perception, Berkeley's new
doctrine, cxxvii-viii; doctrines in