tions con 6. Every one's experience will satisfy him, that the mind, BOOK IV. either by perceiving, or supposing, the agreement or disagree- CHAP. V. ment of any of its ideas, does tacitly within itself put them When into a kind of proposition affirmative or negative; which Mental I have endeavoured to express by the terms putting together Proposiand separating. But this action of the mind, which is so tain real familiar to every thinking and reasoning man, is easier to be when Truth, and conceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm Verbal. or deny, than to be explained by words. When a man has in his head the idea of two lines, viz. the side and diagonal of a square, whereof the diagonal is an inch long, he may have the idea also of the division of that line into a certain number of equal parts; v. g. into five, ten, a hundred, a thousand, or any other number, and may have the idea of that inch line being divisible, or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the sideline. Now, whenever he perceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree or disagree to his idea of that line, he, as it were, joins or separates those two ideas, viz. the idea of that line, and the idea of that kind of divisibility; and so makes a mental proposition, which is true or false, according as such a kind of divisibility, a divisibility into such aliquot parts, does really agree to that line or no. When ideas are so put together, or separated in the mind, as they or the things they stand for do agree or not, that is, as I may call it, mental truth. But truth of words is something more; and that is the affirming or denying of words one of another, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree: and this again is two-fold; either purely verbal and trifling', which I shall speak of, (chap. viii.,) or real and instructive 2; which is the object of that real knowledge which we have spoken of already. verbal 7. But here again will be apt to occur the same doubt Objection about truth, that did about knowledge: and it will be objected, against that if truth be nothing but the joining and separating of Truth, that words in propositions, as the ideas they stand for agree or may all be 1 Analytical or explicative propositions. 2 Synthetical or ampliative proposi. tions, a priori and a posteriori. thus it chimerical. BOOK IV. -- CHAP. V. What A right joining or of signs, i. e. either Ideas or Words. CHAPTE OF TRUTH IN I. WHAT is truth? was an inq being that which all mankind ei after1, it cannot but be worth o wherein it consists; and so acq of it, as to observe how the mi hood. 2. Truth, then, seems to m separating word, to signify nothing but t as the Things signified by th another 2. The joining or s what by another name w properly belongs only to two sorts, viz. mental and signs commonly made us CHAP. V. existence in nature. But then it is they contain real truth, BOOK IV. when these signs are joined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature: which in substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed. Falsehood 9. Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or Truth and disagreement of ideas as it is. Falsehood is the marking in general. down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas otherwise than it is. And so far as these ideas, thus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the truth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas, according as it is marked by those words 1. more at 10. But because words are looked on as the great conduits General Proposiof truth and knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving tions to be of truth, and commonly in reasoning about it, we make use treated of of words and propositions, I shall more at large inquire large. wherein the certainty of real truths contained in propositions consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to show in what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being certain of their real truth or falsehood. I shall begin with general propositions2, as those which most employ our thoughts, and exercise our contemplation. General truths are most looked after by the mind as those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by their comprehensiveness satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to knowledge. 11. Besides truth taken in the strict sense before mentioned, Moral there are other sorts of truths: As, 1. Moral truth, which and Metaphysical is speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own Truth. minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things 3; 2. Metaphysical truth, which is nothing 1 'Truth' is thus (mental or verbal) proposition that is (either consciously or unconsciously) in harmony with the reality to which the proposition relates. 'Knowledge of truth' is the perception self evident or demon strated) of this real harmony. 2 Chh. vi, vii, viii. 3 Propositions may thus be morally true whilst they are intellectually false. 1441 CHAP. V. BOOK IV. but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names1. This, though it seems to consist in the very beings of things, yet, when considered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before settled with the name to it. But these considerations of truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to have mentioned them. 1 Conformable, that is to say, to their nominal essences. Leibniz thus comments on this section:-'La vérité morale est appelée véracité par quelquesuns; et la vérité métaphysique est prise vulgairement par les métaphysiciens pour un attribut de l'être; mais bien inutile, et presque vide de sens. Contentons-nous de chercher la vérité dans la correspondance des propositions qui sont dans l'esprit avec les choses dont il s'agit. Il est vrai que j'ai attribué aussi la vérité aux idées, en disant qu'elles sont vraies ou fausses; mais alors je l'entends en effet de la vérité des propositions qui affirment la possibilité de l'objet de l'idée; et dans ce même sens on peut dire qu'un être est vrai, c'est-àdire la proposition qui affirme son existence actuelle ou du moins possible.' (Nouveaux Essais.) If we limit the term metaphysical truth to the ultimate propositions concerned with real existence, chh. ix, x, xi, which follow, dealing with the three final realities, might be said to refer to metaphysical truth; also ch. vii. On the other hand, ch. vi and others, which insist upon the imperfection of a human knowledge of the qualities and powers that belong to particular substances, are concerned with physical truth and probability. CHAPTER VI. OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY. 1. THOUGH the examining and judging of ideas by them- BOOK IV. selves, their names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct knowledge: yet, through the Treating CHAP. VI. to Know prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very of Words seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is necessary for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, ledge. even when men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other1. Truths 2. All the knowledge we have, being only of particular or Genera general truths, it is evident that whatever may be done in the hardly to 1 To carry men out of empty words, and to bring genuine ideas or meanings into words, is in the main the lesson of the Essay. Hence' idea' is its watchword. This lesson is not a new one, though perhaps it was never more persistently enforced. 'The new way, as your lordship calls it, of "ideas," and the old way of speaking intelligibly was always, and will ever be, the same. Herein it consists: (1) That a man use no words but such as he makes the signs of determined objects of his mind in thinking; (2) That he use the same word steadily for the |