1441 CHAP. IX. the original and composition of our ideas1, I began to examine BOOK III. the extent and certainty of our knowledge2, I found it had so near a connexion with words, that, unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge 3. At least they interpose themselves so much between our understandings, and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend, that, like the medium through which visible objects pass, the obscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes, and impose upon our understandings. If we consider, in the fallacies men put upon themselves, as well as others, and the mistakes in men's disputes and notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain or mistaken significations, we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in the way to knowledge; which I conclude we are the more carefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being taken notice of as an inconvenience, that the arts of improving it have been made the business of men's study, and obtained the reputation of learning and subtilty, as we shall see in the following chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that, were the imperfections of language, as the instrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a 1 In Bk. II. 2 In Bk. IV. 3 The Essay, as its author tells us in the prefixed 'Epistle' (p. 10), was 'written by incoherent parcels,' with 'long intervals of neglect,' during nearly twenty years, so that it is difficult to determine the order in which it was composed. Probably not only most of the second, but parts of the fourth Book had been thought out, and reduced to writing, before the subject of the third Book was seen to be necessary to the original design of the BOOK III. great many of the controversies that make such a noise in the CHAP. IX. World, would of themselves cease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does. This should teach us Moderation in our own Sense of old Authors. 22. Sure I am that the signification of words in all languages, depending very much on the thoughts, notions, and ideas of him that uses them, must unavoidably be of great imposing uncertainty to men of the same language and country. This is so evident in the Greek authors, that he that shall peruse their writings will find in almost every one of them, a distinct language, though the same words. But when to this natural difficulty in every country, there shall be added different countries and remote ages, wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions, tempers, customs, ornaments, and figures of speech, &c., every one of which influenced the signification of their words then, though to us now they are lost and unknown; it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations or misunderstandings of those ancient writings; which, though of great concernment to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech, which (if we except the names of simple ideas, and some very obvious things) is not capable, without a constant defining the terms, of conveying the sense and intention of the speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the hearer. And in discourses of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of the highest concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty. Especially of the Old and New 23. The volumes of interpreters and commentators on the Old and New Testament are but too manifest proofs of this. Testament Though everything said in the text be infallibly true, yet Scriptures. the reader may be, nay, cannot choose but be, very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be wondered, that the will of God, when clothed in words, should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance, when even his Son, whilst clothed in flesh, was subject to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, sin excepted. And we ought to magnify his goodness, that he hath spread before all the world such legible characters of his works and providence, and given all mankind so sufficient a light of reason, that they to whom this 144 CHAP. IX. written word never came, could not (whenever they set them- BOOK III. selves to search) either doubt of the being of a God, or of the obedience due to him. Since then the precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter 1. 1 Locke's remarks in this section, on the insufficiency of language, as an organ for the infallible transmission of divine revelation, and on the superior catholicity of natural religion, show CHAPTER X IF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. First Words 1. Bast as the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several fal faults and neglects whith men are guilty of in this way of communication, whereby they render these sigs less clear and distinct in their signification than naturally they need to be1. 2. First, In this kind the first and most palpable abuse is, are then the using of words without clear and distinct ideas; or, which employed is worse, signs without anything signified. Of these there are any, or two sorts:— With out clear Ideas. Some words I. One may observe, in all languages, certain words that, if they be examined, will be found in their first original, and their appropriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct introduced ideas. These, for the most part. the several sects of philosophy clear ideas and religion have introduced. For their authors or promoters, annexed either affecting something singular, and out of the way of without to them, even in their first original. common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions, or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new words, and such as, when they come to be examined, may justly be called insignificant terms. For, having either 1 The foregoing chapter treats of the natural imperfection of words, as instruments for conveying into the mind of another the ideas which men desire to communicate. This chapter illustrates aggravations of this natural imperfection, caused by the 'wilful faults and neglects which men are guilty of' when they employ words. Cf. Novum Organum, Bk. I. ap. 60, on the idola fori. 2 'insignificant,' i. e. meaningless. He recognises in the next chapter (§ 12) that, with the advance of philo СНАР. Х. had no determinate1 collection of ideas annexed to them when BOOK III. they were first invented; or at least such as, if well examined, will be found inconsistent, it is no wonder, if, afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths, as the distinguishing characters of their Church or School, without much. troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up instances; every man's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him. Or if he wants to be better stored, the great mintmasters of this kind of terms, I mean the Schoolmen and Metaphysicians (under which I think the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him 2. Words, annexed wards 3. II. Others there be who extend this abuse yet further, II. Other who take so little care to lay by words, which, in their to which primary notation have scarce any clear and distinct ideas ideas were which they are annexed to, that, by an unpardonable neg- at first, ligence, they familiarly use words which the propriety of used afterlanguage has affixed to very important ideas, without any without distinct meaning at all. Wisdom, glory, grace, &c., are words frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many of those who use them should be asked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer : a plain proof, that, though they have learned those sounds, sophy, men must come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones,' and so need, either a special philosophical nomenclature, or the employment of old terms for the conveyance of new meanings, with the risk of ambiguity to which this double use exposes them. But this necessity does not vindicate those who offer new terms that are empty of meaning, not annexed to new and genuine thought. 1 6 determinate,' i. e. clear and distinct. See Epistle to the Reader,' pp. 22, 23. 2 This abuse by professed disciples of terms specially formed by the masters to express subtle philosophical distinctions is not peculiar to mediæval schoolmen. It is illustrated in the history of every great philosophical system-Locke's own, with its 'ideas,' 'simple and complex,' 'modes, simple and mixed' and 'relations,' not excepted. Philosophers have been discredited by the parrots of their nomenclature, incapable of thinking out the meanings with which that nomenclature was originally charged by the genius of discoverers. distinct meanings. |