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which, affection, is variable and relative, while the other, the will, or me, is permanent and absolute - in the successive modes of their combination. There result four systems;" the affective system (le système affectif), the sensitive system (le système sensitif), the perceptive system (le système perceptif), and the reflective system (le système réflectif). The first comprehends the animal life, - pains, pleasures, instinctive phantasies, images, etc., but no will; the second self-consciousness, the localization of affections in the organs, referring intuitions to space, and associating the idea of cause with them, the beginning of memory and generalization, and will in the lowest degree; the third, attention, which involves a higher degree of volitional effort, the seeking of objects of knowledge, exercising active touch and judging of externality, distinguishing primary and secondary qualities, classification, formation of general ideas, intelligence being occupied in this system with external objects calling it forth; the fourth, all acts of intelligence concerned with its own nature, the me here distinguishing itself completely from its opposite, becoming completely conscious of the notions of which it is the source, - the universal and necessary ideas, and establishing upon them the mathematical and metaphysical sciences.

cor,

Third Stage.-There is something higher even than will. Will is incapable of being or becoming all that intelligence perceives. In the presence of the idea of the good, the will feels a certain defect in itself, requires aid. The mere light of reason is insufficient. God is the only suc- who is both the source of light in the world of intelligence, and of power in the sphere of will. The me conscious of its weakness, is in a new relation; it is presented with the alternative of submission to sensible nature, towards which its lower tendencies carry it, or of union with the divine nature, the need of which (union) its higher instincts make for it. The higher life thus opened to the me is the life of spirit, of love, - instead of will; it is the life on which man turns towards the source of light and force, intelligence and

will, and identifies itself with God, the absolute Truth and absolute Good. Below this highest life are the "life of man (i. e., the life of will, including the systèmes sensitif, perceptif, et réflexif), and the "animal life" (système affectif). By will man rises out of the animal life, by love out of the "life of man," into the life of spirit. This life is exalted above both Stoicism (which is self-assertion) and Quietism (which is all submission); it is a life of both will and submission, effort and prayer, the life of Christianity.

Result. Maine de Biran may be said to have begun in France the revolt against sensationalism begun in Scotland by Reid, in Germany by Kant, etc. He is, indeed, sometimes styled the French Kant, and not inappropriately on other accounts than the one here implied. He is admitted to be an original thinker, the most original of the French philosophers since Descartes, or perhaps Malebranche; and his thought is strongly marked by that twofold energy of self-distinction and self-identification which marks the thought of Kant (and German philosophy after him). Most of the French philosophers who follow in our account were largely indebted to him.

§ 106.

Pierre Laromiguière (1756-1839) was teacher of philosophy in Toulouse and at the École Normale in Paris. We mention his "Éléments de Métaphysique" (1788), and "Leçons de Philosophie, ou Essai sur les Facultés de l'Âme" (1815-1818). Laromiguière, once a close follower of Condillac, departs from the doctrine of his master in an important respect, in that he consciously makes the mind essentially active instead of passive: with him, not mere sensation, but attention, is the primary faculty of the mind. This is in fact a revolt against the whole principle of sensationalism. From attention are deduced, on the one hand, comparison and reasoning, which together with it constitute the understanding; and on the other, desire, together with

preference and liberty springing from it. The material of knowledge originates in sensibility, which is either (1) simple sensibility, or (2) reflection, or (3) the feeling of relation, or (4) the sense of right and wrong. The idea of God is immediately given to us.

§ 107.

Pierre Paul Royer-Collard (1763-1845). — Royer-Collard graduated at the College of Charmont, afterwards read mathematics and philosophy, making the works of Plato, Descartes, and Leibnitz, and especially Reid, the main objects of his studies. He was at various times advocate in the Parliament at Paris, member of the Council of Five Hundred, professor of philosophy in the College of France, president of the Commission of Public Instruction, president of the Chamber of Deputies, etc. He published no independent philosophical work. His "Fragments Philosophiques" were issued by Jouffroy, with a French translation of Reid's works (1828-1835).

Philosophy. Royer-Collard opposed the sensationalism and materialism of the school of Condillac with weapons of doctrine borrowed from Reid. The method of philosophy is identical with that of natural science: principles are to be sought through the collecting, sifting, and arranging of observed facts. The ideas of substance, cause, time, space, originate, not in sense, but in consciousness as such. In perception we infer directly, or without reasoning, the external world; the truth of perception in general depends on the will of God; the ego is in all phenomena of consciousThat it is identical, memory teaches us. Time and space are objective, eternal, infinite, and infinitely divisible; what they are in themselves we do not know, and never shall know. We could never become aware of a reality outside of ourselves but for perception, etc. RoyerCollard is the founder of the doctrine of eclecticism, of which the chief expounder is Victor Cousin, to whom we now turn.

ness.

§ 108.

Victor Cousin1 (1792-1867). —Cousin was educated at the Lycée Charlemagne and at the École Normale in Paris, at which latter place he heard the lectures of Laromiguière and Royer-Collard on philosophy. At the lycée he distinguished himself in the classics, and at the normal school in philosophy. Here he became a maître de conférences, and on the resignation of Royer-Collard at the Sorbonne was appointed as his successor there. The liberality of his political opinions, together with his popularity and influence as a lecturer, excited the distrust of the Government, and he was in 1820 deprived of his professorship. He had already acquired some familiarity with German philosophy and had personally met both Schelling and Hegel; and in the interval of seven years which elapsed after his dismissal before he again became a public lecturer on philosophy, he renewed his acquaintance with German philosophy and its greatest living representative when on a stay in Berlin. At the same time he undertook a translation of the works of Plato, and published editions of the works of Descartes and Proclus, as well as important original works. In 1828 he was reinstated at the Sorbonne, and lectured for three years with the highest distinction. In 1830 he was made member of the Academy, in 1832 peer of France, and in 1840 minister of Public Instruction, as such exercising an important influence towards the improvement of education in France. In 1848 he retired to private life. He is quite as worthy (if indeed not more worthy) of a place in the history of philosophy for the stimulus he gave to philosophical thinking and learning as for what he himself accomplished as a philosopher. A large number of pupils have under his inspiration written, translated, edited, commentated works in philosophy; e. g., Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Émile Saisset, Jules Simon, Paul

1 Franck; Cousin, "Fragments Philosophiques; " " Encyclopædia Britannica; " Ravaisson's "Philosophie en France au xixe Siècle; " "Cousin," by Jules Simon; Morell.

Janet, Adolphe Franck, Charles de Rémusat, M. Waddington, Ph. Damiron, Renouvier, Hauréau, Janet, Taine, etc. Works. Of Cousin's numerous philosophical works the following are perhaps the most worthy of mention: "Cours de Philosophie" (1818, published 1836), revised and published as "Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien" ("The True, the Beautiful, and the Good"), (1854); "Fragments Philosophiques" (1826); "Cours d'Histoire de la Philosophie " (1827 and 1840); "Cours d'Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne" (published 1841); "Cours d'Histoire de la Philosophie Morale au xvi Siècle" (1840); "Leçons de Philosophie sur Kant" (1842); "Nouveaux Fragments" (1847). The "Fragments Philosophiques" (1826) are regarded as containing the best statement of his views, though the "Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien" is the more widely known. Cousin translated a large number of standard works on the literature of philosophy.

Philosophy: The Genesis of Cousin's System. — The genesis of Cousin's philosophy (as described by himself) is substantially as follows: Laromiguière taught him mental analysis; from Royer-Collard he learned the fact of universal and necessary truths, after the Scotch method; Maine de Biran taught him to see volitional activity in all consciousness, the three together grounding him in psychology, the "basis of all science;" his ontological conceptions came to him from Germany, -i. e., from Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

Divisions of Cousin's System. — Cousin's system falls naturally under the heads: method, psychology, ontology, ethics, and the history of philosophy.

Method. The method of philosophy is (according to Cousin) that of (self-) observation and induction, which may be called the "psychological method." This method assumes that there are certain primary "facts of consciousness." These it attempts to discover and analyze and raise to the dignity of laws, necessary and universal truths. Some of these, by their self-evidence, take the rank of intu