explanation of mere phenomena is a purely mechanical explanation such as the Cartesians gave (of physical nature). But since real being (substance) is active force and not mere motion, the only real explanation of the external world is a dynamical one, one governed by the law of sufficient reason, or, since the principle of sufficient reason necessitates a knowledge of ultimate end and purpose, the law of final, as opposed to secondary, causes. Now, of nature as an organic force, or rather organism of forces, two special laws may be predicated: (1) as governed throughout by a single end, nature is continuous, never makes any leaps, there can be, for example, no (Newtonian) action at a distance; (2) as substance is neither created nor destroyed, the sum of "living" (or active) force (not of motion, as the Cartesians maintained), or MV2 (product of the mass by the square of the velocity), is forever the same.1 According to the law of continuity, the universe is an infinite series of beings of infinite varieties of perfection; for, in the first place, though the existence of two or more exactly similar monads is in a manner conceivable, yet there is, in reality, no sufficient reason why there should be two or more monads precisely alike (principium indiscernibilium), and, in the second place, that there be no leaps in nature, every possible degree of difference must be contained in the monads collectively regarded. The real sufficient reason and principle of identity and continuity in the universe is, of course, God. As regards body and soul, each has its nature and existence, not through the other, but from a precedent being of its own kind, though there is no body without a soul, no soul without a body, and there is a constant harmony between them. This connection of body and soul is, in fact, but a special instance under the general law of pre-established harmony. In this union of body and soul we have, on

1 According to the doctrine of the present day, the doctrine of the "Conservation of Energy," it is the sum of the "living," or kinetic, and the "dead," or potential, forces that is constant.

one side, a being that comes into and passes out of being, namely, the body, and on the other, a being that is eternal, undergoing no change except that of metamorphosis, or transformation from a lower to a higher form of existence (which must not be confounded with metempsychosis). The changes of the body, as existing, are by the law of continuity gradual only, take place as a result of the entering and leaving the body of a few particles at a given time. The soul is contained, in germ and as central monad, in the corporeal seed that develops, after the union of the sexes, into the human body.

God. (1) By the law of the sufficient reason, we must infer the existence of an eternal, supra-mundane, omnipotent power. (2) By that of final cause, we infer the existence of an eternal supra-mundane will and end of all things. (3) From the fact that the contingent generally presupposes the necessary, we infer the existence of a single necessary being. (4) From the existence of necessary truths, we must infer that of a necessary mind as their "place," a divine understanding. Thus we arrive at the truth of the existence of God. (5) We may further argue God's existence from the very idea of him, as did the Cartesians, provided the Cartesian argument be supplemented with the addition that the idea of God is not self-contradictory (since it embraces "realities" or "perfections" only). (6) A still further proof of God's existence is as follows if God is possible, he exists; for if he were not, he would not even be possible, and nothing else would exist; but other things-for example, I myself - exist, ergo, etc. (Proofs 1, 2, and 3, it may be noted, are teleological proofs, proof 4 is psychological, proof 5 ontological, proof 6 partly ontological and partly teleological.) The attributes of God are not so strictly a matter of proof as is his existence. As the individual (human) soul is indestructible and maintains a separate existence after death, there is possible no universal all-absorbing being (Spinoza's God). The idea of individual consciousness

and existence is incompatible with that of consciousness and existence as a part of a universal, all-absorbing spirit. Further, the beauty and order of the universe were nought were the variety of existence in innumerable separate souls reduced to a sabbath of quietude" in a single individual being. God is a separate individual, a distinct monad. Since he is the "place" of eternal truths, he must be conceived as possessing wisdom; since he is the source and end of all acts aiming at the better life, or perfection, he possesses goodness; since perfection includes satisfaction in the welfare or happiness of others, he is love. Since he is the sufficient reason of the existence of all things, he is power. His chief attribute is necessarily wisdom; by this, all acts of his will are determined, as the strivings of the monad are determined by its ideas. Hence the world of nature is the best possible natural world, and the world of spirit (of "grace") is the happiest possible; and the two are in the highest possible harmony. God is the author of evil (as well as of the good) because he is the author of that which is, by its very nature, finite, imperfect (it is not finite because of a will to make it such). There can, in other words, be only one perfect or infinite being. Things are good or evil, not in themselves, but in their relation to the general nature and end of existence. From this point of view, the world of finite beings must be deemed the best possible world of finite things. That all sorts of good may-in accordance with the law of continuity-be realized, there is, necessarily, inequality. This is, abstractly and metaphysically speaking, a necessary evil. From this necessary, metaphysical evil flow two others, physical evil, or pain, and moral evil, or sin; inequality is necessarily felt, and there are necessarily imperfect degrees of rationality in action. But evil of whatever nature has a negative rather than a positive existence. God does not will it; he merely suffers it. God's choice of the present world among all conceivable worlds, was governed by moral necessity; he created the world accor

ding to a "divine mathematics." The world, therefore, is the harmony of the principles of freedom, or "grace," and of necessity, or nature; teleological and mechanical laws are everywhere in perfect accord. And since moral necessity is the necessity of the idea of the good, or happiness, or complete perfection of personality, the reality of happiness or personal perfection is a thing of mathematical certainty. The contemplation of the world in its perfection must result in tranquillity of mind, and yield the deepest satisfaction. Man's capacity to apprehend this perfection, a capacity which he possesses by virtue of the possession of reason and the knowledge of the eternal verities, renders him a denizen of the City of God, of which God is sole ruler, as he is the architect of the realm of nature. In that society there is no crime without punishment, no good deed without proportionate recompense, and as complete virtue and enjoyment as are possible.

Result. The theory of Leibnitz is a rationalistic idealism (the opposite of Berkeley's empirical idealism). Its cardinal features and those, naturally, which have had the most important influence upon succeeding thinkersare its conciliatory aim, its monadism, or dynamic atomism, its assertion of the spontaneity of thought (as against the sensationalistic doctrine of the mere passivity or receptivity of thought), the doctrine of pre-established harmony, its determinism and eudæmonism, its optimism, or attempted reconciliation of mechanical and teleological views of nature. The course of philosophical thought since Leibnitz, has demonstrated that his rationalism was somewhat too subjective and formal, and required to be supplemented by its opposite empiricism, as was in fact done in the system of Kant.

§ 73.

Walther Ehrenfried, Count von Tschirnhausen1 (1651– 1708). — Von Tschirnhausen was a native of Upper Lusatia.

1 See Zeller's "Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie."

He resided for a long time in Holland and France (Paris). He took courses in mathematics and physics in the University of Leyden, and afterwards travelled very extensively, and made the acquaintance of distinguished scholars and artists. Among his friends were Spinoza, the mathematician Huyghens, and Leibnitz. He was elected member of the French Academy. His death is said to have deeply grieved Leibnitz.

Works. Works of Tschirnhausen are, "Medicina Mentis sive Artis inveniendi Præcepta generalia" (1689), his chief work, and dissertations in the Leipsic "Acta Eruditorum " and in the "Mémoires" of the Paris Academy.

Philosophy.-Tschirnhausen emphasizes four "fundamental facts" of consciousness, (1) the consciousness of ourselves (as shown by Descartes), through which we get the idea of mind; (2) the consciousness of agreeable and painful feelings, whence we derive the idea of good and evil; (3) the consciousness of our comprehending some things and not others, whence we derive the notion of the understanding, and of the true and the false; (4) the consciousness of passivity in ourselves and of our having impressions, upon which the knowledge of external existences is based. All knowledge begins with these inwardly experienced facts: all knowledge is based on experience. To constitute real knowledge experience has to undergo a reduction to the third sort of consciousness above mentioned, i. e., to terms of the understanding, or to conceptions (rationalia); which must be discriminated from perceptions (sensibilia) and from imaginations (imaginabilia). From the simplest conceptions expressed in genetic definitions or definitions explaining the origin of the thing defined (for, as Spinoza showed, all things must flow from a single primal nature)—must be deduced, by analysis, axioms; by synthesis, theorems, etc. That is to say, knowledge is a product of experience transformed by the application of "mathematical" method, or mathematics verified by expe