sense, which are ideas of external objects, and simple apprehension of the intellect (or in the present terminology, "self-consciousness"). The simple apprehension of the intellect is knowledge without ideas; it is perfectly direct (and hence the term "idea" has meaning only in relation to sense-perception). But the apprehension does not occur apart from the consciousness of external objects. Mediate knowledge is either demonstrative certainty, moral certainty, certainty based upon sight, or certainty based on evidence. Our notions of the supersensible are derived from an analogical extension of the application of sensible ideas. Browne's works of importance in this connection are, “The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Understanding" (1729), and "Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by Analogy with Things Human" (1733). - Mayne, who published anonymously a work entitled "Two Dissertations Concerning Sense and Imagination, with an Essay on Consciousness" (1727), unless, indeed, this work be a work of Browne's,1-distinguishes from sense and imagination, which he declares to be non-intellectual in character, the understanding as the sole faculty of conceptions. He "distinctly recognizes the functions of consciousness and selfconsciousness as they have been subsequently developed by the schools of Reid and Hamilton." 2. Locke's views were defended by Vincent Perronet, Samuel Bold, and Mrs. Catherine Cockburn. § 61. English Deism. Owing largely to the influence of Locke's teaching, but partly also to that of the teachings of Lord Cherbury and Hobbes, there appeared conspicuously in England about the beginning of the eighteenth century a certain phase of philosophical thought, hardly characterized by any definiteness or identity of particular doctrines among different thinkers, which is known as Eng 1 See Noack, and Franck, under Browne. 2 Porter. 3 English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, by Leslie Stephen. VOL. I. II lish Deism. It was in general a denial of supernaturalism in religion and morals, together with the (complementary) assertion of the inherent truth and sufficiency of reason, or common-sense, in religion and morals. We may take as perhaps the most important of the Deists, John Toland (1689-1722), Anthony Collins (1676-1729), Matthew Tindal (1657-1733), Thomas Chubb (1677-1747), Henry St. John, Lord Bolingbroke (1698–1751). — Toland, in a work entitled "Christianity not Mysterious" (1st ed., 1696, 3d ed., 1702), maintains that all things have their real foundation in reason alone, and that, consequently, the only legitimate ground of assent is reason or demonstration, and that whenever this is wanting, suspension of judgment is the only proper attitude of mind. True Christianity cannot be mysterious in the sense of being "above all reason;" and no alleged revelation which does not show the "indisputable character of divine wisdom and sound reason " deserves acceptance. By "reason," Toland, who is a professed Lockean, means what Locke means by "knowledge" when he defines it as "the perception of the agreement or disagreement among ideas."-Collins, a personal friend and acknowledged disciple of Locke, wrote a work entitled a "Discourse of Freethinking" (1713), in which he maintained the necessity of free thought as an instrument of truth and human welfare, and a work entitled "Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty" (1715), defending the (Hobbean) doctrine of necessitarianism. Among Collins's arguments upon freethinking occur the two, (1) that thought cannot in reality be limited, since it would be only by a reason or thought which should show that it is not permitted to think on a subject on which one may wish to think; and (2) the limiting of thought takes away the only means of arriving at the truth, - especially in religion. Collins admits liberty (with Locke and Hobbes) in the sense of a power to do as one wills or pleases, but denies it of man in any other sense, and for the following reasons (among others) When two contrary objects of choice are presented : to us, we are not able to choose either; our choice is at bottom only a practical judgment that one thing is better than another; and as all judgment is necessary, so must all choice be; even in actions which appear the most indifferent our choice is determined by a multitude of causes, as temperament, habitude, prejudice, etc.; our belief in freedom is in part a consequence of our inability to give an account of the motives determining the will. In a "Letter to Mr. Dodwell," Collins, following out a suggestion contained in the "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" (to the effect that God might have endowed matter with the capacity to think), maintains that the soul might be a resultant of the activities of thinking particles composing the body, and would not therefore be in itself capable of immortality. Tindal, perhaps the most important of the Deists, wrote a work entitled "Christianity as Old as Creation" (1732), which received the appellation of the "Bible of the Deists." It is very much in the line of the Lockean thought upon the subject with which it deals. So-called “revealed religion teaches nothing," says Tindal, "which nature, or reason, has not always taught, could teach nothing that would not have to be tested by the standards of reason." Human nature is a fixed quantity, and what it apprehends is apprehended by all alike. "The attempt to destroy reason by reason is a demonstration that men have nothing but reason to trust to." Chubb (a tallow-chandler and a self-taught scholar) held that the accountability of man is a guaranty of the possession by him of a capacity to discern and fulfil his responsibilities, and that religion has for its content nothing not revealed in nature; that Christianity is not mere intellectual adherence to dogma, but life according to the nature of things. Chubb's principal works are: "A Discourse Concerning Reason" (1731), "The True Gospel of Jesus Christ" (1739), "The Author's Farewell to his Readers" (1748). With Bolingbroke, Deism passes into Scepticism: Bolingbroke, though a professed theist, affirms the uncertainty of all science. - English Deism, as will hereafter appear, has exerted a powerful influence in modern philosophizing since its day. § 62. George Berkeley1 (1685-1753). — Berkeley, though of English descent, was born in Ireland, in the county of Kilkenny. He early displayed a peculiar inquisitiveness of temper and a habitual enthusiasm for pure ideas, decided intellectual precocity; also a love of nature, and the possession of a quick eye for its phenomena. He was educated first at Kilkenny school, and then at Trinity College, Dublin, where in 1702 he received the degree of B. A., in 1704 that of M. A., and in 1707 an appointment as fellow, tutor, Greek lecturer, etc. During his college course he manifested the deepest interest in the physical and metaphysical speculations of his age, viz., those of Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Newton; and was greatly interested in the making of certain original investigations in the field of metaphysics. Not long after his graduation two of his principal works were published. In 1713 Berkeley removed to London. The next ten years of his life were filled with social and intellectual intercourse with the chief literary luminaries of England, Steele, Swift, Addison, Pope, and others, travelling on the Continent, and philosophical reflection and writing. As early as 1724 he had projected the philanthropical enterprise of founding a university in the Bermudas for the education of English-speaking youths, and savages, there. Three years were spent by him in meditative retirement in Rhode Island, awaiting the action of Parliament in relation to a promised grant of funds for the founding of the proposed university. The scheme failed, and Berkeley returned to Ireland. Made bishop of Cloyne in 1734, he lived in philosophical seclusion, studying ancient thinkers, and developing his own early-discovered philosophical principle on its higher side, until 1752, when 1 See "Berkeley," by Professor Fraser ("Blackwood's Philosophical Classics "); "Selections from Berkeley," by Professor Fraser; etc. he moved to Oxford, where a son was studying, to spend the remainder of his days. He died suddenly in January of the following year. Works. Berkeley's principal works are: "An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision" (1709), "The Principles of Human Knowledge" (1710), "Hylas and Philonoüs, or Dialogues" (1713), "Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher" (1733), "Siris: a Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries concerning Tar-Water," etc. (1744). The first two of these set forth his principle in its earliest form; the third is taken up with the refutation of objections to his doctrine; the fourth, with a somewhat transitional phase of his thought; and the last, with the exposition of his thought in its maturest form. We may mention also the “ Common Place Book." Philosophy. The starting-point of Berkeley's philosophizing is to be found in a class of queries suggested, it would seem, by the following passage of Locke's "Essay" (book ii., ch. iv., § 8): "The ideas we receive by sensation are often in grown people altered by judgment without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform color, e. g., gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted on our minds is of a flat circle variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes, etc. But we have, by use, been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearances convex bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the differences in the sensible figures of bodies, and the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes, etc." To the query (also to be found in Locke) "whether a man born blind and then made to see would at first give the name distance to any idea (object of consciousness) intromitted by sight," Berkeley's answer is that he would "take distance that he had perceived by touch to be something existing without his mind, but would certainly think nothing seen was without his mind." He would come |