Constitutional Self-GovernmentHarvard University Press, 2001 M09 30 - 260 páginas Most of us regard the Constitution as the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian, constitution? |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 76
... theory that would enable interpreters to unlock the Constitution's meaning . My reflec- tions took me in unexpected directions , and I have ended up writing a book far different from the one I envisioned . Democratic theory has ...
... Theory and in Constitutional Theory , where rigorous questioning from con- veners Dworkin , Nagel , and Sager , and from other workshop partici- pants , led me to make numerous revisions . I presented related papers to faculty audiences ...
... theory of democracy : we will , in particular , have to say what counts as a good representative institution . Executing that assignment will be the task of later chapters , but it is possible to suggest now the course we Introduction 3.
... theories and institutions ; judges and other Americans will reconsider their views ( or , more likely , new gen- erations will reconsider the prejudices of their parents ) . Over the long run , we must hope , more people will come to ...
... theory . The first dis- pute is about whether judges should be free to draw upon their moral and political ... theories that call upon judges to aim for neutrality or to suppress their moral convic- tions when deciding cases . The second ...
Contenido
The Democratic Functions of Inflexible Constitutions | 10 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Legitimacy | 46 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Flourishing | 79 |
Text and History in Hard Cases | 109 |
Liberty Strategy and Tradition | 136 |
Judicial Maintenance of Political Institutions | 168 |
Conclusion | 205 |
Notes | 213 |
253 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Self-Government Christopher L. EISGRUBER,Christopher L Eisgruber Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
Términos y frases comunes
Referencias a este libro
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |