Constitutional Self-GovernmentHarvard University Press, 2001 M09 30 - 260 páginas Most of us regard the Constitution as the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian, constitution? |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 49
... suppose , and that , at least in constitutional cases , what matters most is moral conviction and practical judgment . As the book evolved , I received more collegial support than I can ad- equately acknowledge . For comments and ...
... suppose that the Constitution is a set of binding constraints which Americans inherit from their past , and that legal craftsmanship is essential to decode the meaning of that in- heritance . This view is common ground among people who ...
... suppose that books about constitutional adjudication should aspire to the model of John Hart Ely's great work , Democracy and Distrust . 1" In fewer than two hundred tautly reasoned and lucidly written pages , Ely covered the whole of ...
... suppose that this mix is the essence of legal craftsmanship , and that judges cannot decode the Constitution's hidden meanings un- less they practice this craft with surgical precision . As I have already said , however , I do not think ...
Christopher L. Eisgruber. more to offer one another than people commonly suppose : I will argue that constitutional adjudication involves a complex mix of moral prin- ciple and institutional strategy . In one respect , however , I will ...
Contenido
The Democratic Functions of Inflexible Constitutions | 10 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Legitimacy | 46 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Flourishing | 79 |
Text and History in Hard Cases | 109 |
Liberty Strategy and Tradition | 136 |
Judicial Maintenance of Political Institutions | 168 |
Conclusion | 205 |
Notes | 213 |
253 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Self-Government Christopher L. EISGRUBER,Christopher L Eisgruber Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
Términos y frases comunes
Referencias a este libro
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |