Constitutional Self-GovernmentHarvard University Press, 2001 M09 30 - 260 páginas Most of us regard the Constitution as the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian, constitution? |
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... speak for Americans about justice . At a pivotal moment of worldwide interest in judicial review and renewed national controversy over the Supreme Court's role in politics , Constitutional Self - Government ingeniously locates the ...
... speak on behalf of the people about questions of moral and political principle . What distinguishes the justices from the people's other representatives is their life tenure and their consequent disinterestedness , not their legal ...
... speak on behalf of the American people about justice . The ju- diciary thereby makes a distinctive contribution to a political system that might otherwise be overly sensitive to the people's desires at the expense of their values . Open ...
... speak on behalf of the American peo- ple about justice . The book's final three chapters consider how judges should pursue that task . Chapter 4 considers the implications of my argument for jurisprudential methodology . It emphasizes ...
... speak about justice on behalf of the people . Although this view can accommodate a wide variety of ap- proaches to constitutional interpretation , it has at least one crucial con- sequence . It implies that judges who invoke history in ...
Contenido
The Democratic Functions of Inflexible Constitutions | 10 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Legitimacy | 46 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Flourishing | 79 |
Text and History in Hard Cases | 109 |
Liberty Strategy and Tradition | 136 |
Judicial Maintenance of Political Institutions | 168 |
Conclusion | 205 |
Notes | 213 |
253 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Self-Government Christopher L. EISGRUBER,Christopher L Eisgruber Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
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Referencias a este libro
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |