Constitutional Self-GovernmentHarvard University Press, 2001 M09 30 - 260 páginas Most of us regard the Constitution as the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian, constitution? |
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... moral and political principles . I treat judicial review in a similar spirit : I argue that it , like the Constitution , should be regarded as a practical mechanism which implements a subtle form of democratic rule . I deny that the ...
... moral and political issues . Such argument enables judges , especially Supreme Court jus- tices , to speak on behalf of the American people about justice . The ju- diciary thereby makes a distinctive contribution to a political system ...
... moral principles . Chapter 5 uses the Supreme Court's controversial cases about privacy and sexual autonomy to underscore the need for judges to distinguish carefully between the moral and strategic components of their decision - making ...
... moral philosophy . " 12 Professors likewise debate how judges should balance abstract generalization against detailed study . Most people favor a complicated mixture of history , philosophy , ab- straction , and detail . They put great ...
... moral prin- ciple and institutional strategy . In one respect , however , I will join forces with the camp that regards adjudication as a domain for moral judgment rather than strategic policy - making . In Chapters 5 and 6 , I maintain ...
Contenido
The Democratic Functions of Inflexible Constitutions | 10 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Legitimacy | 46 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Flourishing | 79 |
Text and History in Hard Cases | 109 |
Liberty Strategy and Tradition | 136 |
Judicial Maintenance of Political Institutions | 168 |
Conclusion | 205 |
Notes | 213 |
253 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Self-Government Christopher L. EISGRUBER,Christopher L Eisgruber Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
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Referencias a este libro
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |