Constitutional Self-GovernmentHarvard University Press, 2001 M09 30 - 260 páginas Most of us regard the Constitution as the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian, constitution? |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 87
... justice . At a pivotal moment of worldwide interest in judicial review and renewed national controversy over the Supreme Court's role in politics , Constitutional Self - Government ingeniously locates the Constitution's value in its ...
... Justice Scalia is more likely to hold af- firmative action laws unconstitutional than is Justice Ginsburg . Dis- agreements of this kind correlate visibly with the political views of the justices and ( less reliably ) with the views of ...
... justice wrote the opinion in Nixon , and a liberal justice wrote the opinion in Clinton . If we reflect for a moment on the psychology of political communi- ties , we can see how the judiciary's institutional characteristics make it a ...
... justice , and , as a result , they will produce different interpretations of the American people's best judgment about justice . There is no getting around those dis- agreements . One hopes that , over time , moral progress will occur ...
... justice . I conclude that when judges interpret ambiguous constitutional provi- sions , it will often be their duty to speak on behalf of the American peo- ple about justice . The book's final three chapters consider how judges should ...
Contenido
The Democratic Functions of Inflexible Constitutions | 10 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Legitimacy | 46 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Flourishing | 79 |
Text and History in Hard Cases | 109 |
Liberty Strategy and Tradition | 136 |
Judicial Maintenance of Political Institutions | 168 |
Conclusion | 205 |
Notes | 213 |
253 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Self-Government Christopher L. EISGRUBER,Christopher L Eisgruber Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
Términos y frases comunes
Referencias a este libro
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |