Constitutional Self-GovernmentHarvard University Press, 2001 M09 30 - 260 páginas Most of us regard the Constitution as the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian, constitution? |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 90
... judgment . As the book evolved , I received more collegial support than I can ad- equately acknowledge . For comments and discussions pertaining to portions of the manuscript , I am grateful to Sot Barber , Vicki Been , Yochai Benkler ...
... judgments about political jus- tice . The effect of the Executive Power and Equal Protection Clauses is to put certain questions about presidential power and equality " outside of the political process " —to " take them off the table ...
... judgment about moral and political principles . I treat judicial review in a similar spirit : I argue that it , like the Constitution , should be regarded as a practical mechanism which implements a subtle form of democratic rule . I ...
... judgment that values should take priority over interests . Congress and the president , because they must please voters to get re - elected , are likely to represent peo- ple's interests . But Supreme Court justices , because they have ...
... judgment about justice . There is no getting around those dis- agreements . One hopes that , over time , moral progress will occur . Peo- ple will develop new political theories and institutions ; judges and other Americans will ...
Contenido
The Democratic Functions of Inflexible Constitutions | 10 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Legitimacy | 46 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Flourishing | 79 |
Text and History in Hard Cases | 109 |
Liberty Strategy and Tradition | 136 |
Judicial Maintenance of Political Institutions | 168 |
Conclusion | 205 |
Notes | 213 |
253 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Self-Government Christopher L. EISGRUBER,Christopher L Eisgruber Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
Términos y frases comunes
Referencias a este libro
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |