Constitutional Self-GovernmentHarvard University Press, 2001 M09 30 - 260 páginas Most of us regard the Constitution as the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian, constitution? |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 70
... Interpretations & Original Sins , " 95 Michigan Law Review 2005 ( 1997 ) . Chapter 6 includes material origi- nally pubished in " Democracy , Majoritarianism , and Racial Equality : A Response to Professor Karlan , " 50 Vanderbilt Law ...
... interpret . Moreover , you need no legal training to say what it means . The real question is what to do with the Consti- tution's abstract provisions . The Constitution declares that " [ t ] he exec- utive Power shall be vested in a ...
... interpret the Constitution : by applying their legal expertise , the justices can give precise content to norms approved generations ago . In this book , I suggest a different way to reconcile the Supreme Court's prominent political ...
... interpretations of the American people's best judgment about justice . There is no getting around those dis- agreements . One hopes that , over time , moral progress will occur . Peo- ple will develop new political theories and ...
... interpret ambiguous constitutional provi- sions , it will often be their duty to speak on behalf of the American peo- ple about justice . The book's final three chapters consider how judges should pursue that task . Chapter 4 considers ...
Contenido
The Democratic Functions of Inflexible Constitutions | 10 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Legitimacy | 46 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Flourishing | 79 |
Text and History in Hard Cases | 109 |
Liberty Strategy and Tradition | 136 |
Judicial Maintenance of Political Institutions | 168 |
Conclusion | 205 |
Notes | 213 |
253 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Self-Government Christopher L. EISGRUBER,Christopher L Eisgruber Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
Términos y frases comunes
Referencias a este libro
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |