Constitutional Self-GovernmentHarvard University Press, 2001 M09 30 - 260 páginas Most of us regard the Constitution as the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian, constitution? |
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... able to speak for Americans about justice . At a pivotal moment of worldwide interest in judicial review and renewed national controversy over the Supreme Court's role in politics , Constitutional Self - Government ingeniously locates ...
... able to present por- tions of the manuscript to multiple sessions of the New York Univer- sity School of Law's Colloquia in Law , Philosophy , and Social Theory and in Constitutional Theory , where rigorous questioning from con- veners ...
... able to pursue politics in a fashion that is principled rather than partisan . Supreme Court justices will , of course , disagree along political lines . For example , we know that Justice Scalia is more likely to hold af- firmative ...
... able to represent the people's convictions about what is right and what is in their interest , and it must also reflect the people's judgment that values should take priority over interests . Congress and the president , because they ...
... able to avoid taking contestable stands about political issues . I doubt that they could do so ; in any event , I shall argue that they ought not even to try . Professors and judges have disserved the American political system by ...
Contenido
The Democratic Functions of Inflexible Constitutions | 10 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Legitimacy | 46 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Flourishing | 79 |
Text and History in Hard Cases | 109 |
Liberty Strategy and Tradition | 136 |
Judicial Maintenance of Political Institutions | 168 |
Conclusion | 205 |
Notes | 213 |
253 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Self-Government Christopher L. EISGRUBER,Christopher L Eisgruber Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
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Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |