Constitutional Self-GovernmentHarvard University Press, 2001 M09 30 - 260 páginas Most of us regard the Constitution as the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian, constitution? |
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... Supreme Court should be regarded as another of the institutions able to speak for Americans about justice . At a pivotal moment of worldwide interest in judicial review and renewed national controversy over the Supreme Court's role in ...
Christopher L. Eisgruber. Introduction THE UNITED STATes supreme Court intervenes in many political con- troversies ... Court's recent docket . Most scholars and judges assume that the Court's power is justifiable ( if at all ) on the ...
... Supreme Court is called upon to interpret . Moreover , you need no legal training to say what it means . The real ... courts or Congress ? People disagree vigorously about such issues . They also disagree about the meaning of many ...
... Supreme Court , a body of nine unelected judges , to interpret the Constitution : by applying their legal expertise ... Supreme Court's prominent political role with democratic ideals . I deny that the Constitution's purpose is to ...
... Supreme Court justices are not elected , they high- light an important fact — but they conceal something else that is equally important . Though the justices are not chosen by direct election , they are nevertheless selected through a ...
Contenido
The Democratic Functions of Inflexible Constitutions | 10 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Legitimacy | 46 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Flourishing | 79 |
Text and History in Hard Cases | 109 |
Liberty Strategy and Tradition | 136 |
Judicial Maintenance of Political Institutions | 168 |
Conclusion | 205 |
Notes | 213 |
253 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Self-Government Christopher L. EISGRUBER,Christopher L Eisgruber Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
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Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |