Constitutional Self-GovernmentHarvard University Press, 2001 M09 30 - 260 páginas Most of us regard the Constitution as the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian, constitution? |
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... democracy when we are bound by an entrenched , and some- times counter - majoritarian , constitution ? In Constitutional Self - Government , Christopher Eisgruber focuses directly on the Constitution's seemingly undemocratic features ...
... Constitution's meaning . My reflec- tions took me in unexpected directions , and I have ended up writing a book far different from the one I envisioned . Democratic theory has displaced interpretive method as the central topic . My ...
... Constitution is a set of binding constraints which Americans inherit from their past , and that legal craftsmanship is ... Constitution's meaning . " 2 " No , " says yet another group , " to read the Constitution responsibly , 1 one must ...
... Constitution's abstract pro- visions operate in a way parallel to the specific ones . On this view , the Constitution's abstract clauses ( like its specific ones ) state principles or standards or rules that restrict the ability of ...
... Constitution's purpose is to constrain American democracy on the ba- sis of rules or principles laid down long ago . Instead , I interpret the Constitution as a practical device that launches and maintains a sophis- ticated set of ...
Contenido
The Democratic Functions of Inflexible Constitutions | 10 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Legitimacy | 46 |
Judicial Review and Democratic Flourishing | 79 |
Text and History in Hard Cases | 109 |
Liberty Strategy and Tradition | 136 |
Judicial Maintenance of Political Institutions | 168 |
Conclusion | 205 |
Notes | 213 |
253 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Self-Government Christopher L. EISGRUBER,Christopher L Eisgruber Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
Términos y frases comunes
Referencias a este libro
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |