the police power, to make such reasonable regulations as are necessary to that end."

Other instances of such kind of legislation are given in the opinion. There is no written provision in the Constitution forbidding the Legislature from enacting laws for particular localities, or suspending the general laws in certain localities. The prohibition, if it exists in this respect, must therefore come from some great underlying principle of right and justice inherent in the nature and spirit of the social compact, whose universal application and binding authority command the assent of every freeman.

the business under the General Law. See | for and maintained, and has a right, under also General Law for the Incorporation of Cities, How. Stat. p. 659, and following. This question was in a measure involved in the case of People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, in which the power of the Legislature to grant authority to local municipalities to legislate on subjects covered by the General Laws was upheld, and the conclusion reached that the Local Act might be exclusive of the General Law, and operate to repeal it by implication, as when its provisions are repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the General Law. By Act No. 31 of the Public Acts of 1887 it was enacted that it should not be lawful to establish or maintain a saloon, or other place of entertainment, where intoxicating liquors were sold or kept for sale within one mile of the Soldiers' Home, an institution belonging to the State, located near the City of Grand Rapids. The Act also prohibited the sale of such liquors to any soldier, sailor or marine who was an inmate or employé of such home within the distance stated. This Act was held constitutional and valid by this court. Whitney v. Grand Rapids Twp. Board, 71 Mich. 234. The justice who wrote the opinion based it upon the ground that "the liquor traffic has ever been considered a business fraught with so much damage and disturbance to the public welfare as to be peculiarly under police surveillance and control, and the State had a right to guard and protect its poor and its unfortunates within and about the state institutions in which they are cared

nowise affect or invalidate the result of the election
as determined and declared by such board.
"Sec. 13. When the result of the county canvass
shall show that a majority of all the legal votes cast
is in the affirmative of the proposition to prohibit
within such county the manufacture of liquors and
the liquor traffic, and when the board of supervis-
ors shall have so determined and declared, it shall
be lawful for such board of supervisors in any
county, having so voted in the affirmative of the
proposition to so prohibit, as aforesaid, and such
board of supervisors is hereby authorized and em-
powered, to order, by a majority vote of all the
members elect, the prohibition within the limits of
such county of the manufacture, sale, keeping for
sale, giving away or furnishing of any vinous,
malt, brewed, fermented, spirituous or intoxicat-
ing liquors, or any mixed liquor or beverage, any
part of which is intoxicating, and to prohibit the
keeping of a saloon, or any other place where such
liquors are manufactured, sold, stored for sale,
given away or furnished, by resolution, adopted
at that same meeting of the board, or at a meeting
to which the same may be adjourned, not more than
ten days after such canvass, and not less than forty
days before the first day of May next ensuing. Such
resolution shall be spread in full upon the journal
of their proceedings, and shall set forth in a pre-
amble the fact that an election submitting the
proposition of prohibition, as aforesaid, was duly
called and held in the county; that sufficient returns
and statements of the votes cast in the several
townships, wards and election districts in the
county have been made, as required by this Act;
that such statements have been canvassed by them
and the result thereof ascertained; that such result
was in the affirmative of such proposition, giving
the majority, and that the same has been so deter-
mined and declared by them. Such resolution of
prohibition shall take full effect within such county
on the 1st day of May next following its adoption,
and shall not be subject to repeal by the board of
supervisors within two years next thereafter, after
the expiration of which period the board may again,
by a majority vote of all the members elect, act as
in the first instance, and repeal such resolution of
prohibition; but not unless a maiority of the eler-

|

The right of the judiciary to declare a statute unconstitutional as violating some great underlying principle of natural right or justice, when such statute violates no part of the written Constitution, is not universally admitted. It does not arise in this case, and need not be discussed nor decided. No such underlying principle as that the Legislature shall not enact laws for a particular locality, different from those applicable to other portions of the State-or, which is the same thing, shall not suspend the operation of general laws as to any particular locality-has ever been recognized in this State. On the contrary, there is an unbroken record of instances where such legislation has been had without question, and such laws have been upheld by the decisions of this court. In this State it is not a question of legisla tive power, but of expediency, and the exer

tors of the county, voting on such proposition, at a subsequent election duly called, and held in accordance with the provisions of this Act, shall have declared against the prohibition of the manufacture of liquors and of the traffic therein; and upon the repeal of such resolution of prohibition by the board of supervisors, all former suspension and superseding of the General Laws of the State relative to the taxation and regulation of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, as provided in section two of this Act, shall cease within such county: provided, however, that all actions which may have been brought and all rights of actions which may have accrued before such repeal, shall remain and continue to exist as fully as if no such repeal had taken place.

"Sec. 14. It shall be the duty of the clerk of such board of supervisors to publish without delay, for at least four weeks, in a newspaper published and circulated in such county, to be designated by the board, a copy of the preamble and resolution adopted by the board, as provided by section thirteen of this Act: provided, that if such proposition shall have been decided in the negative, such publication shall not be required. The said clerk shall also, without delay, forward to the secretary of state a certified transcript of such resolution, and of so much of the journal of the proceedings of the board of supervisors as pertains to such election, including the tabular statement of votes, together with a copy of the affidavit of publication of the notice of the adoption of the resolution. Such original affidavit of publication shall be filed with the clerk of the board of supervisors, and he shall spread the same on the records of the board, following the record of the adoption of the resolution of prohibition, and the said clerk shall state next on the record the date when said notice and affidavit of publication was entered for record, and shall then sign the record officially. The record of such resolution of prohibition, and of the publication of notice, and all duly.certified copies thereof, shall be the evidence of the facts therein stated so far as relates to the territory and municipalities within the limits of said county; and the regularity of any proceedings prior to the adoption of such resolution by the board of supervisors shall not be open

cise of legislative discretion. Judge Cooley, continues in force, and the traffic is reguin speaking of the constitutionality of Local lated. The Legislature in conferring upon Option Laws, says: "They relate to sub- the board the authority to pass such order jects which, like the retailing of intoxicat- had the right to prescribe the conditions ing drinks, or the running at large of cattle under which it should be exercised; and in the highways, may be differently regarded this condition is that the majority of the in different localities, and they are sustained legal voters vote in favor of the proposition. on what seems to us the impregnable ground There is no constitutional objection to this. that the subject, though not embraced within The voters do not make the law. The law the ordinary powers of municipalities to was enacted by the Legislature, and provided make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless that it should take effect on and after the 1st within the class of police regulations, in day of May immediately following the respect to which it is proper that the local adoption by the board of supervisors of such judgment should control." Cooley, Const. county of the resolution ordering such proLim. 5th ed. 148. hibition, and upon the publication of the notice of the adoption of such resolution. Section 15. Numerous authorities might be cited to show that it is legal and competent for the Legislature to provide that a law shall go into effect upon the happening of a contingency, some of which are cited in the brief of the attorney-general. The proposition is too clear to need the citation of authorities. It makes no difference with the

The objection that the authority is delegated to the board of supervisors jointly with the majority of the voters is not borne out by the Statute. By section 13 of the Act, authority is given to the board of supervisors, if the county canvass shows that a majority of all the legal votes cast is in the affirmative, to order by a majority vote of all the members elect the prohibition within the county of the manufacture and constitutionality of the law whether one call sale of intoxicating liquors. The vote is the action of the board of supervisors in not compulsory upon the supervisors. They passing the order an exercise of legislative may make the order or not, as they choose. power, as the counsel for relator contends it The law, very wisely, in my judgment, is, or whether it is called an exercise of adprovided for ascertaining the will of the ministrative power, as contended for by the qualified electors of the county upon the attorney-general. In either case, the action subject; for experience has demonstrated was authorized by the authority of the Legisthat a prohibitory law cannot be enforced lature, conferred under the provision of the unless the law itself has the moral support Constitution sanctioning it. When this acof the majority of the electors. If public tion is taken by the board, then it is the law sentiment is not in favor of such law, that prohibits, and not the board of superit ought not to be forced upon the public. visors. Sections 1, 2. The law prescribes The Statute provided for ascertaining the the penalties for disobedience. The law sense of the community by vote of the legal provides remedies for its violation. This law electors. That is all their vote expresses, was complete and binding the moment it was and there it ends. If the people prefer taxa- approved by the governor, and filed in the tion to prohibition, then the General Law office of the secretary of state, and took

to question on the examination or trial of any person for a violation of any of the provisions of section one of this Act.

Sec. 15. The prohibitory provisions of this Act shall take effect and have full force within such county of this State on and after the 1st day of May immediately following the adoption by the boarding for sale, giving away or furnishing of any of of supervisors of such county of the resolution ordering such prohibition, and upon publication of the notice of the adoption of such resolution: provided, however, that nothing in this Act shall be so construed as to prohibit the sale of wine for sacramental purposes, nor shall anything herein contained prohibit druggists or registered pharmacists from selling or furnishing pure alcohol for medicinal, art, scientific and mechanical purposes.

"Sec. 16. Any person who, himself, or by his clerk, agent or employé shall violate any of the provisions of section one of this Act shall, for the first offense, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars, and the costs of his prosecution, or to imprisonment in the county jail not less than twenty days nor more than six months, in the discretion of the court. For the second, and every subsequent, offense so committed, whether in the same or any other county in this State where the provisions of sections one and two of this Act are operative, he shall, upon conviction thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, and to imprisonment in the state house of correction and reformatory at Ionia for a term of not less than six months nor more than two years, in the discretion of the court. "Sec. 17. Upon the trial for any violation of the provisions of section one of this Act it shall be competent to introduce the record, or a certified

transcript thereof, of the preamble and resolution of the board of supervisors of such county, required by section thirteen of this Act, and such record and transcript shall be the evidence that the provisions of this Act are in full force within such county, and that the manufacture, sale, keepthe liquors herein designated, and the keeping of a saloon, or any other place, for the manufacture, sale or storing for sale or giving away or furnishing of the same, is prohibited and unlawful, and shall also be the evidence of the suspension and superseding of the provisions of the General Laws of this State for the taxation and regulation of the business of manufacturing, selling, keeping or offering for sale, giving away or furnishing of any of the liquors hereinbefore designated, so far as relates to the territory and municipalities within the limits of such county, so long as such resolution remains unrepealed.

"Sec. 18. Proof of a single sale of any one or more of the liquors or beverages mentioned in this Act, or of the posting in any distillery, brewery, saloon or other place of business of a United States revenue receipt permitting the manufacture or sale of any one or more of the liquors or beverages mentioned in this Act, at the time and place alleged in the complaint or information, shall be presumptive evidence of such manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, giving away or furnishing of any such liquors, or of keeping a place where such liquors are manufactured, sold, kept for sale, given away or furnished, as the case may be.

"Sec. 19. In every county in this State where the provisions of sections one and two of this Act are operative, every wife, child, parent, guardian, husband or other person who shall be injured in person or property or means of support, or otherwise, by any intoxicated person, or by reason of

effect throughout the State ninety days after villages, and upon the board of supervisors the close of the Legislature. Action could of the several counties, such powers of a then be taken under it for the purpose of local, legislative and administrative characlocal option. The validity of similar laws ter as they may deem proper. Article 4, is supported by a large line of authorities, § 38. among which are the following: Locke's App. 72 Pa. 491; State v. Court of Common Pleas, 36 N. J. L. 72; Paul v. Gloucester Co. 50 N. J. L. 585, 1 L. R. A. 86; Anderson v. Com. 13 Bush, 485; State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279; State v. O'Neill, 24 Wis. 149; Ex parte Sicann, 96 Mo. 44; Schulherr v. Bordeaux, 64 Miss. 59; State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606, 12 West. Rep. 368. See also the notes to Com. v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 359, 35 Am. Dec. 337, and cases cited; Summerville v. Pressley (S. C.) 8 L. R. A. 854; Ironek v. People (Ill.) 8 L. R. A. 837.

I have noticed all the constitutional objections relied upon in the brief of counsel for relator. The objections stated in the petition for mandamus not noticed in the brief are considered waived. I see nothing in the Act which conflicts with the Constitution, and am of opinion that the writ should be denied.

Long, Grant and Cahill, JJ., concurred with Champlin, Ch. J.

Morse, J., dissenting:

The title to the Act under consideration is all right, and I find no constitutional objection to the law but one, which one to me is insuperable. Our system of state government under the Constitution is not a pure democracy, but a representative one. The making of laws has been fixed by the people themselves in the Organic Law, and they have delegated the power and confined it to the Legislature, except in so far as the Constitution authorizes that body to confer upon organized townships, incorporated cities and

the selling, giving or furnishing to any person any | vinous, malt, brewed, fermented, spirituous or intoxicating liquors in violation of section one of this Act, shall have a right of action in his or her own name against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving any such liquors, have caused or contributed to the intoxication of such person or persons, or who have caused or contributed to such injury; and in an action provided for in this section the plaintiff shall have a right to recover actual and exemplary damages. In case of the death of either party, the action and right of action given by this section shall survive to and against his or her executor or administrator. And in every action by any wife, husband, parent or child, general reputation of the relation of husband and wife, parent and child, shall be prima facie evidence of such relation, and the amount so recovered by every wife or child shall be his or her sole and separate property. Such damages, together with costs of suit, shall be recoverable in an action of trespass on the case before any court of competent jurisdiction. And in any case where parents shall be entitled to such damages either the father or the mother may sue alone therefor. But recovery by one of said parties shall be a bar to a suit brought by the other.

"Sec. 20. Any township, city or county clerk, member of the board of registration, inspector of election, supervisor or other officer, who shall refuse or willfully evade or neglect to perform any of the duties imposed upon him by the provisions of this Act, shall, upon conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceed ing six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.

"Sec. 21. The several officers required to render

The people, without the consent of the Legislature, could not meet at the different polling-places in the State and enact a law by ballot, nor can they do it with the consent of the Legislature. Nor can the Legislature pass a law and enact that it shall not take effect until the people vote in favor of it at the polls. It is argued that in the case last mentioned a majority of the people voting for the law is not passing the law; that the Legislature has already done so, and only calls upon the people to vote whether or not they will accept its conditions. It is claimed that the majority of the Missouri Supreme Court so held in State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606, 12 West. Rep. 368. This argument is the merest sophistry, and an evasion of the Constitution. The people, it is argued, do not make the law; but it is admitted that it cannot become a law until the people vote to accept it. I have no appreciation of such an argument. It amounts to this, and this only: The Legislature says to the people, "Do you want this law or not? If you want it, you can have it; if you don't want it, you can't have it. Now meet at your polling places and vote upon it, and make your choice." If in such case the people do not, by an election, make the Act a law, or reject it, then I am obtuse. This would be a convenient thing for a Legislature wishing to shirk their responsibility, to submit all their laws to the vote of the people, for if they can submit one, they may submit all; but it is not the way provided by our Constitution for the enactment of laws. Perhaps it would be a better system of government than the other,

any service by reason of this Act shall receive the same compensation allowed by law for other like services and from the same sources, and the fees for publishing the required notices shall be allowed by the board of supervisors and paid by the county. "Sec. 22. It shall be the duty of any township, city or county clerk, on the demand of any qualified elector in the county, and on payment or tender to him of the fee herein prescribed, to make out within a reasonable time and at his office deliver to such elector a true and certified copy of the poll-list or poll-lists of the last general election held in his township, city or county, on file in his office, for which he shall be entitled to receive at the rate of fifty cents for every one hundred names.

"Sec. 23. The secretary of state is hereby required to prepare all suitable blank statements and pollbooks to be used at elections held under this Act, and to furnish the same in sufficient numbers, upon application, to each county clerk, whenever they shall be needed in the county. And it shall be the duty of such county clerk, whenever such election is to be held in the county, to make requisition upon the secretary of state for a sufficient number of such blank statements and poll-books, and at least ten days before such election distribute, and deliver the same to the several township and city clerks in the county.

"Sec. 24. It shall be the duty of the attorney-general to draft, or cause the same to be done under his supervision, a complete set of all the blank forms that may be used or required under the provisions of this Act; and it shall be the duty of the secretary of state to publish and distribute a suthcient number of copies of this Act in pamphlet form, with an appendix containing a copy of all such blank forms.

"Approved June 29, 1889."

78

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT.

Therefore, if the
they vote for prohibition, they may have it
or not, as you see fit."
people vote against prohibition, they make
the law. This is certain, as the supervisors,
who are made by the Constitution the legis-
lature of the county, are then powerless to
act. Only in case the people vote for pro-
hibition is their will of no avail unless
affirmed by the supervisors. Why this ad-
vantage is given regulation over prohibition
is not apparent, yet it does not in itself con-
Is this kind of legislation consti-
cern us.
tutional? As before shown, it has always
been conceded in this State that the making
of general laws cannot be delegated even to
the people. The Constitution authorizes the
Legislature to confer powers of a local,
and administrative character
legislative
Can it authorize the board
upon the board of supervisors, -that is as
far as it can go.
of supervisors to delegate a power to the
people that it cannot delegate to them itself?
The Legislature
The answer is obvious.
cannot authorize the people of the county to
meet at their various polling-places, and
vote, regardless of any action of the board
of supervisors to suspend any general law of
the State relative to liquor, or anything else.
The county, under our Constitution, is not
governed by a mass-meeting, nor by a direct
It is gov
vote of its people at the polls.
erned by a representative body, -the board
of supervisors elected by the people,-and
which may be changed entirely in its mem-
bership each year. But by this Act it is
different.

but it is not our system at present, and can-
not be until our Organic Law is amended to
that end. This subject has been once before
a matter of discussion in this court, in the
case of People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343, in the
consideration of the Prohibitory Liquor Law
of 1853. In that Act provision was made for
its submission to the people of the State, not
to decide whether it should become a law or
not, but when it should take effect. If a
majority of the people voted "Yes," it was
to go into operation and take effect December
1, 1853. If they voted "No," it was not to
take effect until March 1, 1870. Four of the
judges sustained the law,—Green, Whipple,
Four were of the
Martin and Johnson.
was not constitutional.
opinion that it
Green, P. J., held that the power to enact
laws was by the Constitution vested exclus-
ively in the Legislature, and that the Legis-
lature could not delegate it and exclude itself
He sustained the law en-
from its exercise.
tirely upon the ground that the submission
to the people and their approval of the law
did not enact the law, but simply fixed the
happening of the event or contingency when
the Act, which was a law when it passed the
Legislature, should take effect; and that
thereby nothing was added to or taken away
Martin,
from the law itself by the people.
J., put his decision nearly upon the same
ground. No one of the judges contended
that, had the effect of the submission of the
Act been to determine whether it should be-
come a law or not, it would have been valid.
It has always seemed to me that the argu-
ment of Judge Douglass, in his opinion in
People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 413-427, is unan-
swerable;
that the power of enacting general
laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature
even to the people. I need say no further
on this subject than that his views meet my
own. The power of the Legislature, there-
fore, even in People v. Collins, to pass an Act,
and then to take the sense of the people,
whether it shall become a law or not, was
not admitted, nor has it ever been in this
State. The Act under consideration provides
that the board of supervisors shall, upon a
Nor is this all. When the supervisors once
certain showing, submit the question to the
electors of any county whether or not the order prohibition, it cannot be repealed by
General Laws of the State for the taxation and them for two years at any rate, and they can
never repeal it unless the people vote to so
regulation of the liquor traffic shall be sus-
pended, and a prohibitory law go into effect. repeal it; so the law of prohibition is made
If such electors, by a majority vote, express by the people, and can only be repealed by
their will in favor of prohibition, then the the people. It is true the Legislature may
supervisors may or may not suspend the Tax repeal the General Law, -this Act, known as
But for
Law, and put in force the Prohibitory Law; the "Local Option Act,"-but that repeal
but if a majority declare in favor of the Tax must be general all over the State.
Law the supervisors have no option, and the a particular county, the people rule virtually
county cannot have prohibition because the by mass-meeting, a pure and simple democ-
This Act is simply racy, and the Legislature of the county is
This delegation of power
people have so voted.
The Legislature powerless to move.
this, and nothing more.
passes two general laws entirely antagonistic to the people is attempted to be justified on
and irreconcilable, two opposite principles the ground that it is in accordance with the
and methods of dealing with the liquor principles of local self-government. But it
question. Then it says to the board of
supervisors of the several counties, "You
may, upon certain conditions, submit to the
people of your county which law they will
put in force and which they will suspend.
If the people vote for taxation and regulation,
they can have that, and nothing else. If

The people govern the liquor
question by their votes, regardless of the
supervisors, if they want taxation instead of
prohibition. The law-making power is di-
rectly in the people, unless they want pro-
hibition.

It is argued that this vote of the
people is only advisory, a sort of petition,
as it were, to the supervisors, setting them
If they
in motion, upon which they can act or not,
as they see fit. This is not so.
petition for prohibition, the supervisors may
give it or not; but if they petition for taxa-
tion, the supervisors must give them taxation,
whether they wish to do so or not.

is a local self-government, which the people
took pains to deny themselves in their
written Constitution, and is not in harmony
with the representative idea which is the
basis of a republican government. There is
no one, I trust, more strongly impressed
with the benefits and blessings of local self-

government than the writer of this opinion: | Rapids Twp. Board, 71 Mich. 246. See also but it is the local self-government of the People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 97-112 (opinion, Constitution, as expressed therein. The trend Cooley, J.), and Atty-Gen. v. Detroit Com of the majority opinion in this case is at mon Council, 58 Mich. 213, 216, where the war with local self-government, as I under-right of the people to govern themselves stand it. It is there asserted that, in refer- through their own officers, as to their local ence to the liquor question, which is one of concerns, is asserted under the Constitution, the subjects to be governed by the general although such instrument did not expressly police power of the State, the Legislature prohibit the Legislature from taking away would have the right to pass laws not gen- the particular rights involved in those cases. eral, but special, applying to certain locali- I am not now questioning the right of the ties, and in that respect to ignore the county, Legislature to confer upon townships, cities municipal and township governments. At and counties the right to regulate or prohibit least I so understand the opinion, and the the sale of liquors as they see fit; but this case of Whitney v. Grand Rapids Twp. Board, must be authorized, in my opinion, by a 71 Mich. 234, is cited in favor of the proposi- general law, and when done must be done tion. It was expressly stated in that case by by the supervisors of the county or common the writer, in the majority opinion, that the council of the city, and not by a direct vote Legislature could not, in his opinion, without of the people. This is the local selfgood reason, prohibit the sale and manufac- government intended to be preserved by our ture of liquor in one township or county, or Constitution. And I do not believe that the any specified number of towns or counties, Legislature has any more right to say arbiand legalize the traffic in the rest of the State; trarily that selling liquor shall be lawful in that the Legislature could not pass a law al- Wayne County, and unlawful in some other lowing liquor to be sold in Detroit, and not county, than they have the right to pass a elsewhere. "Such legislation is contrary to special Act suspending the operation in one the spirit of our state government, and would county of any general law making any act a confer special and local privileges against misdemeanor in the State, while in the other right and reason, and in defiance of the prin- counties it still remains in force, or to enact ciples upon which our free institutions are that horse-stealing shall be a felony, punished based." 71 Mich. 238. with five years in prison in one county, and with ten years in another. See People v. Police Justice, 7 Mich. (opinion of Campbell, J.,) at page 465. For the reason that the adoption of local option-or, in other words, the choice between prohibition and regulation or taxation of the liquor trafficis left to the people, and not to the board of supervisors, who, under the Constitution, are the sole representatives of the people in such matters, and because such board can no more abrogate their functions and delegate their powers direct to the people in mass than can the Legislature so delegate its power to make laws under the same instrument, I must dissent from the conclusion of my brethren in this case. It is true this delegation of power has been sustained in other States, but by divided courts, and the dissent has ever been most vigorous. See Locke's App. 72 Pa. 491; State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606, 12 West. Rep. 368; Paul v. Gloucester Co. 50 N. J. L. 593, 1 L. R. A. 86; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71.

And in this connection I refer to the opinion of our late lamented associate, Mr. Justice Campbell, found on pages 245-249, 71 Mich. and say that I agree with him in that opinion, except in so far as it applies to the public institutions of this State, and to the Soldiers' Home, which was under consideration in that case. To permit the Legislature to say that in Ionia County the selling of liquor shall be a crime, and that in the adjoining County of Kent it shall be lawful, without reference or regard to any action of the board of supervisors of either county, thus arbitrarily determining for itself how the liquor traffic shall be regulated or dealt with in each locality, would be destructive of local self-government, and place in the discretion of the Legislature the whole power of governing localities, each as it saw fit in reference to the sale of liquor. And if this power belongs to it as to the sale of liquors, why not to every other business that may be said to come at all under the supervision of the police power? And why not extend it further, and authorize the Legislature in all cases to judge upon what particular subjects the people of each county, township and municipality are entitled to govern themselves through their regularly constituted constitutional agents and officers? Why not let the legislative will be expressed by local and special, rather than by general, laws? The Constitution does not expressly prohibit this in so many words, but, as was well I do not understand the case of People v. said by Justice Campbell, "equality before Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, to announce or susthe law is one of the fundamental principles tain the doctrine that the Legislature may of representative government. Our Consti- arbitrarily and at will make an act a felony tution, in recognizing counties and townships in one place in the State, and no crime at and other districts, with their inhabitants, all in another. The laws upon the subject cannot contemplate the right anywhere to of fishing are not such laws. The Legislaclassify them or to place them singly under ture may prohibit with penalties fishing in different conditions." Whitney v. Grand one stream, and not in another in the State;

In other cases laws have been held invalid because of such attempted delegation, the rule being laid down that a statute to take effect upon a subsequent event must, when it comes from the hands of the Legislature, be a law in in præsenti, to take effect in future, not one which is to take effect unless the people vote to accept it. Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279; State v. Weir, 33 Iowa, 134; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483.