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plain terms of the Statute but the safety and integrity of the public record demand.

As to the answer of the appellant, it is, it seems to us, fully responsive to every allega

tion in the bill, and the exceptions thereto
ought therefore to have been overruled.
Order reversed, injunction dissolved and bill
dismissed.

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT.

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1. An Act general in its terms, which permits all cities in the State having parks under the control of park commissioners to surrender the control of streets to such commissioners for park purposes, is not unconstitutional as being special legislation, although by NOTE.-Dedication of land for parks and squares. Where a town company files a plat of land which it owns and has laid out into a town site, in the office of the register of deeds, and the land is all laid out on such plat in lots, blocks, streets and alleys, except two blocks, which are designated only as "public square" and "seminary square," the former of which is used as a public square or park, and the other remains vacant until all the lots are sold and the town site becomes a city, the seminary square belongs to the public for seminary purposes; and it is immaterial whether the plat was ever acknowledged or not. Miami County v. Wilgus, 42 Kan. 457.

The fact that a proprietor of land while mayor of the city, and in his official capacity, approved an ordinance appropriating a certain sum for city maps, on which the block is marked "park," does not amount to the assertion by such proprietor that the statement made upon the map is true. Baker v. Vanderburg, 99 Mo. 378.

A plat which recites that "this park is reserved for public use and title kept in the proprietors," the same statement being in effect repeated in the acknowledgment, shows on its face that the park was not dedicated to public use. Ibid.

A declaration of proprietors of land that they intended to turn a certain square over to the city for a park or market place when the city was ready to accept and improve it amounts at most only to a conditional offer to dedicate the land, and, if never accepted, does not constitute a dedication. Ibid.

A tract of land denominated as a certain-named park, and laid down on the plat as being all one park, is not to be considered two separate parks because an alley runs through it. Middleton v. Wharton, 41 Minn. 266.

reason of the option given the city authorities it may not be adopted by all cities having parks under the control of park commissioners; nor is it unconstitutional although it may be applicable to the conditions existing in only a single city in the State.

2. Where an Act erecting a portion of a city into a park district under the control of park commissioners for the purpose of establishing a system of parks therein has been submitted to, and ratified by, the people, the Legislature may afterwards enlarge the jurisdiction of the commissioners over streets within the

bility to pay for lands taken for parks, except from the fund provided for the payment for such lands; and there are no adequate provisions for securing compensation for lands taken by condemnation proceedings. Ibid.

Park commissioners, authority of.

Mich. Local Laws 1889, p. 607, § 11, providing that the park commissioners shall have the custody and control, and may appoint necessary engineers and bridge tenders, of the bridge across the Detroit River, in so far as it attempts to confer the legis lative power of regulation, is in contravention of 24 U. S. Stat. at L., 147, § 12, providing that the care, control and use of such bridge shall be governed by city ordinances; and hence an appointment by the park commissioners of engineers and bridge tenders is invalid. Comrs. of Parks & B. v. Detroit, 80 Mich. 663.

N. Y. Laws 1865, chap. 565, § 8, et seq., conferring upon the commissioners of Central Park authority 155th Street, and empowering them by proper proto lay out streets in the City of New York north of ceedings to acquire land for such streets, were not repealed by N. Y. Laws 1874, chap. 604, simply because those sections were not re-enacted therein, but § 8 was superseded, though not expressly repealed, by the Consolidation Act (N. Y. Laws 1882, chap. 410). Re New York Inst. for Deaf & Dumb, 121 N. Y. 234.

Residents of the City of Rochester are incompetent to serve as commissioners of appraisal in

proceedings to acquire lands for park purposes pursuant to N.Y. Laws 1888, chap. 193; and the fact that such commissioners are not shown to be taxpayers is immaterial. Re Rochester, 31 N. Y. S. R. 75.

The provision that the common council shall at the next regular meeting after filing the map declare by resolution that the city intends to take the ex-land, is mandatory, and the council has no power to act after that meeting. Ibid.

The dedication of a public park on a water front of a bay does not carry the park into the bay, cept to the extent of accretions thereto. Ruge v. Apalachicola Oyster Canning & Fish Co. 25 Fla. 656.

Compensation for lands taken for parks. Under the Act creating a park board for the City of St. Paul, Minnesota, the compensation for land taken for parks is to be paid out of the special fund called the "park fund," made up of the proceeds of a limited number of bonds of the city, and assessments for benefits to the amount of 50 per cent upon lands benefited, and is not made a general charge upon the city treasury. Godfrey v. Ramsey County Dist. Ct. (Minn.) Aug. 20, 1890.

Compensation of surveyors.

A surveyor of public parks is entitled to reasonable compensation only, based on the ordinary salaries of competent surveyors and civil engineers. Re Department of Public Parks, 32 N. Y. S. R. 832, 836.

The approval, by the commissioners of estimate, of a surveyor's bill for surveying the public parks in New York City and Westchester County, is not conclusive or final, but it is subject to the examination and review of the court appointing them,

The City of St. Paul, Minnesota, is under no lia- | under N. Y. Laws 1884, chap. 522. lbid. 10 L. R. A.

Hmits of the district, which are to be used in connection with the parks, without any further submission of the question to the vote of the people. 3. Power given to park commissioners to take possession of a street or streets and exercise control over the same for the pur

pose of connecting the park with any part of any incorporated city is not exhausted, so far as a particular city is concerned, by one exercise thereof in taking a street to connect the park with one part of that city; and the taking of one street will not prevent the subsequent taking of a parallel street only four blocks distant from the first one, if it is required for the public convenience or necessity.

4. The argument that power alleged to have been given to a municipal corporation may be abused is not pertinent as tending to show that the power was not in fact given.

(October 31, 1 90.)

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incorporating cities, towns and villages, or changing or amending the charter of any town, city or village."

Const. art. 4, § 22; People v. Cooper, 83 III. 585.

While in some respects the original Park Acts may be supplemented by the Legislature without submitting the Supplemental Act to the vote of the people, yet, in other respects, they cannot be supplemented without a new Vote of the inhabitants of the park district to be affected by such supplement. There is a limit to the power of the Legislature to make such changes without the vote thereon of the people.

Cornell v. People, 107 Ill. 372.

The Act confers upon the Park Commissioners power to levy assessments and taxes for other than the purposes of parks as inaugurated and established, and is therefore void.

APPEAL by defendants from a judgment of supra, Dunham & People 96 10. 3311 400;

the Circuit Court for Cook County in favor of complainants in a suit brought to enjoin defendants from maintaining West Jackson Street in the City of Chicago as a boulevard. Reversed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Messrs. John N. Jewett, W. C. Goudy and A. W. Green, with Messrs. Francis A. Riddle, Francis Adams and Frank H. Collier, for appellants:

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The word any" extends to an indefinite number.

Dubuque County v. Dubuque & P. R. Co. 4 G. Greene, 4; McComas v. Amos, 29 Md. 141; Stiles' App. 41 Conn. 329; City Bank v. Young, 43 N. H. 459; Logan v. Small, 43 Mo. 254; Davidson v. Dallas, 8 Cal. 239; McMurray v. Brown, 91 U. S. 257, 23 L. ed. 321; People v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 390; People v. Hoffman, 3 West. Rep. 522, 116 Ill. 587.

Const. 1870, art. 9, § 9; Cornell v. People, ward v. St. Clair & M. L. & D. Co. 51 Ill. 130; School Trustees v. People, 63 Ill. 301.

Shope, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

By the legislation of A. D. 1869, known as the "Park Acts," the park system of the City of Chicago was inaugurated, and three park districts, respectively called Lincoln, South and West Chicago Park Districts, were established, under the control of boards of park commis sioners, whose powers and duties were defined. The Act relating to the West Chicago Park District authorized the West Chicago Park Commissioners to select and take lands for three parks, within such district, and for boulevards or pleasure-ways, running from the river on the north to the canal on the south, and connecting such parks. 1 Pub. Laws 1869, 342. By this Act and a supplemental Act, passed at the same session (Id. 354), the northerly and southerly range of the parks and their maximum area was fixed. Three parks were located in pursuance of the Act, called "Humboldt." "Central" (now Garfield) and "Douglas" Parks, and a boulevard connecting them was established as contemplated by said Act. The West Park Act was submitted to and adopted by a vote of the people residing within the territory of which the park district was composed, and the district became thereby a quasi municipal corporation for park purposes; and the Board of Park Commissioners, created by such Act, became the corporate officers thereof, and one of the agencies of the State for carrying on government, in respect of Athough the Act did enlarge the pow- the parks, within said West Chicago Park Disers of the Commissioners it was entirely unob-trict. People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37; Wilcox v. jectionable, so long as they were to be exercised People, 90 Ill. 192. by the corporate authorites of the park district established by the people.

Whether laws are general or not does not depend upon the number of those within the scope of their operation. They are general, "not because they operate upon every person in the State, for they do not, but because every person who is brought within the relations and circumstances provided for is affected by the laws." Nor is it necessary, in order to make a statute general, that it should be applicable to all parts of the State. It is sufficient if it extends to all persons doing or omitting to do an act within the territorial limits prescribed in the statute.

People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388; People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585; People v. Hoffman, supra; Guild v. Chicago, 82 Ill. 472.

Cornell v. People, 107 Ill. 372; Andrews v. People, 83 11. 530; People v. Brislin, 80 11. 423. Messrs. Smith & Pence, for appellees: The Act of 1879 is unconstitutional. A municipal corporation cannot devest itself of power which its charter confers.

Kreigh v. Chicago, 86 Ill. 407.

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The Act is in the face of the following provision of the Constitution: The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws,

In Kreigh v. Chicago, 86 Ill. 411, decided in 1877, it was determined that, under the then existing legislation the city, being vested with the control of the streets for the benefit of the people at large, could not transfer them to the park commissioners, or absolve itself from the duty of maintaining the same; nor was there power, under the laws then in force, for such commissioners to take or control such streets. At the next session of the Legislature an Act was passed, entitled "An Act to Enable Park Commissioners or Corporate Authorities to

Take, Regulate, Control and Improve Public | son Boulevard,' so called, and from preventing Streets Leading to Public Parks; to Pay for the general traffic to be carried on along the line of Improvement thereof, and in that Behalf to said Jackson Boulevard,' so called." It is Make and Collect a Special Assessment or averred and shown that the Park CommissionSpecial Tax on Contiguous Property." The ers had placed their police in charge of the first section provided as follows: "Section 1. street, caused its employés to sprinkle and Be it enacted by the people of the State of Illi- clean the same, and have been and are proposnois, represented in the General Assembly, that ing to pay therefor out of moneys raised by every board of park commissioners shall have taxation, and have extended the ordinances of power to connect any public park, boulevard said district concerning boulevards, including or driveway under its control, with any part an ordinance excluding traffic wagons and of any incorporated city, town or village, by teams therefrom, over said portion of said selecting and taking any connecting street or street. streets or parts thereof, leading to such park: No substantial objection is made to the proprovided, that the streets so selected and taken, ceedings by which the Park Commissioners so far as taken, shall lie within the district or sought to take such portion of Jackson Street territory, the property of which shall be tax- if the Act referred to is valid, and the power of able for the maintenance of such park: and the Park Commissioners was not exhausted in provided further, that the consent of the cor- the taking and acceptance of Washington porate authorities having control of any such Street as a boulevard. It is urged, however, street or streets so far as selected and taken, that the Act is invalid: first, because in violaand also the consent in writing of the owners tion of art. 4, § 22, of the Constitution of the of a majority of the frontage of the lots and State; and, secondly, because the Act was not lands abutting on such street or streets, so far submitted to and adopted by a vote of the peoas taken, shall be first obtained: and provided, ple. The provision of the Constitution which further, that such connection or improvement it is said this Act violates provides "that the shall embrace only such street or strects as are General Assembly shall not pass local or spenecessary to form one continuous improve- cial laws. . . incorporating cities, towns and ment.' Section 2 authorizes the levy of taxes villages, or changing or amending the charter and assessments to improve and maintain such of any town, city or village." It is said that the streets. By section 3, such park boards are Act authorizes a certain class of cities to devest given the same power and control over the themselves of the control of their streets; that streets and parts of streets taken under the Act | it relates only to those cities having parks unas they are vested with in respect of the parks der control of park commissioners, and not to and boulevards under their control. Section all of such cities for the reason that it is op5 confers powers upon towns, villages and cit- tional with the city to avail itself of the provisies to invest such park boards "with the right ions of the Act or not, and the Act is therefore to coutrol, improve and maintain any of the unconstitutional. We do not concur in this streets of such city, town or village" for the view. The Act applies to all cities in the State purpose of carrying out the provisions of the having parks under the control of park comAct. Act April 9, 1879. .By the Act of June missioners. The law confers the power upon 27, 1885, the first section of the Act of 1879 was the city authorities to consent, and the park amended by giving power to the Commission-commissioners, upon securing the requisite couers to accept and add to any such park any street or part thereof which a joins and runs parallel with any boundary line of the same," and by striking out the last proviso of said section. Rev. Stat. 1889, chap. 105, § 49-54.

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In the year 1880, in conformity with the original Act, the West Chicago Park Commis sioners acquired control of West Washington Street, and converted it into a boulevard connecting Garfield Park with the city. Subsequently to the conversion of Washington Street into such boulevard, by and with the consent of the city, and of the owners of a majority of the frontage thereon, in writing, the Park Commissioners accepted and assumed control of West Jackson Street in Chicago from Halstead Street to said park for the purpose of converting it into a boulevard also connecting Garfield Park with the city. The present bill was brought by appellees on behalf of themselves and other taxpayers in the Town of West Chicago, etc., against the West Chicago Park Commissioners, and prays for a decree "perpetually enjoining said West Chicago Park Commissioners from paying any moneys for the support of police officers or other employés employed upon the line of West Jackson Street from Halstead Street to Garfield Park, and from incurring any debt with respect to the control, management or maintenance of 'Jack

sent, to assume control of streets in every place within the State where the conditions exist which it was intended to affect.

In People v. Walsh, 96 Ill. 232, it was held that this Act of 1879 supplied the necessary legislation to enable the city to invest the park commissioners with control of its streets for park and boulevard purposes. The court in that case, after stating that it was held in the Kreigh Case, supra, that the Act of 1874 had no reference to the acquisition of control of established streets of the city, by the park commissioners, for boulevard purposes, says: "What was there held to be wanting, we have here; and the question is not, Have the city and the commissioners power under the Statute? but Was it competent for the Legislature to enact the Statute conferring the power upon the city and park commissioners?" The validity of the Act was thus presented and sus tained, and the right of the park commissioners to assume control of the street, upon having obtained the consent of the city authorities, and the consent of a majority of the owners of the frontage thereon, was upheld under the Act in question. It would seem that there could no longer be any question of the constitutionality of the Act. But it is insisted that the point was not made in argument, nor considered by the court in that case. We will not pause to

determine whether such was the fact or not. If it be true, as suggested, that the Act is applicable to the conditions existing in a single city in the State, that fact does not necessarily render it local or special legislation. It is general in its terms, and applies to all cities of the State which, at the time of its passage, had parks under the control of park commissioners, or that might at any time thereafter so have parks. If, because only a single city had such parks, an Act, general in its application to all cities, would be local or special legislation, no valid Act could be passed affecting such existing parks. And it would necessarily result from such holding that substantially all of the park legislation, enacted since the adoption of the present Constitution, should for the same reason have been held invalid. An examination of the various Park Acts (Rev. Stat. chap. 105), will show that they are equally obnoxious to the objection being considered, as the Act of 1879. Yet the constitutionality of these Acts has been repeatedly affirmed by this

court.

In People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585, relied upon by counsel, the "City Tax Act" was held to be invalid, as establishing dissimilarity in the powers and modes of different cities in the levy and collection of taxes. By that Act, an option was conferred on the city to levy and collect its taxes by the officers created by that Act, or by those provided in and by the general law, and they might change from one to the other at pleasure. No such condition exists here, and the Cooper Case can therefore have no application. A law may be general and yet be operative in a single place. It is not requisite that it should be presently applicable to every person or to every city within the State. The general law for the incorporation of cities, towns and villages, until it was adopted by some city, town or village, was inoperative, having no application anywhere. Upon its adoption by a single city it became operative therein, and created, in a sense, dissimilarity in the organization of that city from every other. And to-day only a portion of the cities of the State have adopted that Act, yet it is settled that the Act is not in violation of the Constitution. So the City Election Law held in People . Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 3 West. Rep. 522, to be a valid enactment, applies only to such cities as may adopt the mode of conducting elections therein prescribed. We are not required, by any means, to go to the same length to hold the Act under consideration valid. The dissimilarity sought to be avoided, it must be apparent, is not such as will arise by reason of one city having a power to appropriate such of its streets as the public welfare may demand for pleasure-ways under the control of park commissioners, and another city, for the reason that it has no parks, not having such power. As well might it be urged that so much of the City and Village Act as authorizes cities, towns and villages "to erect and keep in repair public landing places, wharves, docks and levees," and the like provisions are invalid, because inapplicable to many, if not to the great majority, of the cities, towns and villages of the State.

It is also insisted that, as the effect of the Act is to extend the jurisdiction of the Park Commissioners over streets connecting the

| parks with the city, not included in the original Park Acts when adopted by the people, it is necessary to its validity that the consent of the people to be taxed for the improvement and maintenance of such street as a boulevard be first obtained. It is settled by repeated decisions of this court that the Park Commissioners are a municipal corporation, vested with power of government, and are agencies of the State, for governmental purposes, in respect of such parks within their respective park districts. People v. Salomon, supra; People v. Williams, 51 Ill. 63; South Park Comrs. v. Dunlevy, 91 Ill. 49; Wilcox v. People, 90 Ill. 192; People v. Walsh, supra.

We said in People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. 423: "The park district, when established in pursuance of the Act creating it, became a municipality for certain purposes, and as such came within the domain of legislation. The powers of the corporate authorities of this municipality are subservient to the legislative power, precisely as in the case of other municipalities, and are not interfered with by the present Constitution." The consent of the people required is consent to the creation of the new proposed municipality. When such municipality is established, within the general purposes of its creation, and within the territory consenting, it becomes a creature of legislative control, and, with the single exception of the saving of private right, the Legislature may in respect of such agency, as with other munici palities, repeal the law of its creation, curtail its powers or extend them, within the prescribed territory, at will. By adopting the Park Act, the people to be affected have consented to the creation of this municipality, and invested it with governmental powers, in re spect of parks within the district. And the Park Commissioners have thereby become, as said in Wilcox v. People, supru, "agents by whom, in part, the people of the State carry on government. Their functions are essentially political and concern the State at large, although they are to be discharged within the Town of West Chicago." If the question was an open one, which as we have seen it is not, we should have no hesitation in deciding that it is competent for the Legislature, within the original park district, to alter, contract or en large the power to be exercised by the Park Commissioners over any portion of the territory within the original limits of the park district. The City of Chicago holds its streets for the use of the public,-not for its citizens ouly, but the entire public, of which the Legislature is the representative. And, when no private right is invaded, the law is well settled that the Legislature may vacate a street or highway, abridge or limit its use, in its discretion.

The principal point made, however, seems to be that appellant, having exercised the power given it by the Statute, by selecting and taking West Washington Street, its power is thereby exhausted, and thereafter no street, or part of a street, could be taken for the purpose of connecting the park with the city or any other part of the city. The power to take streets connecting the park with the city is expressly given, subject only to the consent of the city and of the owners of a majority of the frontage thereon. Appellees, however,

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contend that the provision of the Act that street or streets may be taken to connect the park "with any part of any incorporated city," etc., means some one part, or point, in such city only. To so hold would be to adopt a narrow and strict rule of construction. Its effect would be to limit the benefits of the boulevard to one single locality-to some one part of the city-regardless of the public necessity. The language of the Statute giving the park board the power "to connect any public park, boulevard or driveway, under its control, with any part of any incorporated city, town or village, by selecting and taking any connecting street or streets, or parts thereof leading to such park," very clearly indicates that more than one connection might be made between the park and the city. Any connecting street or streets, or parts of streets, might be taken to connect the park with any part of any incorporated city. The word "any,' as applied to the parks under the control of the Park Commissioners, cannot be construed as limiting the power to connect by a street or streets only one park with the city; but it is apparent that the power to connect any parks under their control was intended to mean that all parks under their control might be so connected. So, also, the language employed, that they may connect with "any incorporated city," does not mean with one incorporated city necessarily, but was intended to apply to all cities having a park or parks within their territorial limits. So we think the word "any," as used in the sentence "with any part of any incorporated city," was intended to confer power to connect the parks under such control with such parts of the city as the public convenience might demaud. The word "any" is used in the second sense given by Worcester and Webster, i. e., "some; an indefinite number or quantity." The rapid growth of the City of Chicago, for whose benefit, in common with the other cities of the State, this Act was passed, would naturally suggest that a demand for increased facilities to reach these places of public resort would be required. And the Legislature, comprehending the public necessity in that behalf, unquestionably sought, by the language here employed, to invest the Park Commissioners with power to accommodate the public needs and convenience by authorizing them, from time to time, within the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, to take such streets as might be necessary to that end. We are of opinion that the grant of power to take any street or streets connecting any park under the control of the Park Commissioners with any part of the city was intended to be a continuing power to be exercised as the public convenience and necessity should demand. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Wilson, 17 Ill. 123. The first section of the Act of 1879 contained the proviso "that such connection or improve ment shall embrace only such street or streets as are necessary to form one continuous improvement." It might, under that proviso, be urged that the street or streets taken should only be such as were "necessary to form one continuous improvement; " that is, that the Legislature had in contemplation a single continuous connection. This proviso was repealed by the Amendatory Act of 1885, and the restriction

thereby created, if one was created, was removed. It cannot be doubted that the Legislature intended by such repeal to remove any and all restrictions that might have arisen upon construction of the proviso, and to prevent controversy in respect of the right of the commissioners to make connection between the park and the city. We do not find it necessary to further consider the effect of the repeal of such proviso. The power to make connections, by means of boulevards, between the city and park must still be by such streets or parts of streets as will connect the park with some part of the city by some continuous route or connection. After the selection and taking of the street, the burden of improving and keeping it in repair devolves upon the park district; and it might well be that too heavy a burden would be imposed, by a selection of all the streets necessary to a proper connection of the park with the city, at one time. And if power is given to the Park Commissioners to connect the park with any part of the city there is nothing in the Statute, nor is any reasor perceived, why the selection of streets for the purpose should not be made from time to time, as the public necessity may require. It is urged that the power thus conferred may be abused. This may have been a good reason why the power should not have been conferred at all, or, if conferred, why it should have been properly guarded, but is not pertinent as showing that the power was not in fact given. The Legis lature has provided safeguards against the abuse by placing the power in the hands of a local municipality, to which the persons in'erested and to be affected have given their consent, and requiring the consent of the city, the officers of which are elected by and responsible to the people; and likewise the consent of a majority of the owners of the frontage on the street proposed to be converted, before the power shall be exercised. These were regarded by the lawmaking power as sufficient; and, when these prerequisites are conformed to, the power is vested in and may be exercised by the municipality.

It is also insisted that this connection is not with another "part" of the city than that with which the park is already connected by Washington Boulevard. Jackson Street is the fourth street south of Washington Boulevard. We cannot judicially say that Jackson Boule. vard will form a connection of the park with the same part of the city that is now connected by Washington Boulevard. The authority conferred upon the Park Commissioners is, in the respect being considered, political in its nature, to be exercised in their discretion. Courts of equity will not inquire into, or attempt to control, the exercise of such power, except to preserve private right, or to prevent gross abuse of it. It is also urged that the ordinance by which it is sought to take Jackson Street is void, and the Park Commissioners should not be permitted to control and maintain the same as a boulevard, for the reason that thereby the ordinance of the Park Commissioners excluding traffic wagons and teams therefrom is extended over Jackson Street; and it is said that such exclusion is illegal. It will be time enough to determine the validity of that ordinance when some person claiming to

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