can a private person do in such a case, wishing to be a mediator for peace, having access to both parties, but equally uncertain of the reception of his mediation on either side? I must hesitate to take any public step, as by a proposition in parliament, or by any other means to drive the parties to an explanation upon any specific proposals and yet I am very unwilling to let the session pass without some proposition, upon which the parties may meet, if they should be so inclined, as I suspect them to be. I have been endeavoring to feel pulses for some months, but all is dumb show. I cannot say that I meet with any thing discouraging, to my apprehension, either as to equitableness or practicability of the proposition for preliminaries. If I could but simply receive sufficient encouragement that I should not run any hazard of obstructing any other practicable propositions, by obtruding mine, I should be very much satisfied to come forward, in that case, with mine to furnish a beginning at least which might lead to peace. There is nothing that I wish so much as to have an opportunity of seeing and conversing with you, having many things to say to you; but if that cannot yet happen, I have only to say, that whatever communication you may think proper to make to ⚫me, which may lead to peace, you may be assured that I shall be most strenuous in applying it to that end. In all cases of difficulty in human life, there must be confidence somewhere to enable us to extricate nations from the evils attendant upon national disputes, as they arise out of national passions, interests, jealousies, and points of honor. I am not sure whether the extreme caution and diffidence of persons in political life be not the cause almost as frequently of the unnecessary protraction of the miseries of war, as of the final production of any superior good to any state. Peace now is better than peace a twelvemonth hence, at least by all the lives that may be lost in the meanwhile, and by all the accumulated miseries that may intervene by that delay. When I speak of the necessity of confidence, I would not have you to think, that I trust to all professions, promiscuously, with confidence my thoughts are free respecting all parties; and for myself, if I thought it necessary for the end of attaining any addi

tional confidence in your esteem, to enable me to co-operate the more effectually towards the restoration of peace, there is nothing that I would wish you to be assured of but this ; that no fallacious offers of insincerity, nor any pretexts for covering secret designs, or for obtaining unfair advantages, shall ever pass through my hands."

In answer to this communication, Dr. Franklin observedI need not repeat, what we have each of us so often repeated, the wish for peace. I will begin by frankly assuring you, that though I think a direct, immediate peace, the best mode of present accommodation for Britain as well as for America, yet if that is not at this time practicable, and a truce is practicable, I should not be against a truce; but this is merely on motives of general humanity, to obviate the evils men devilishly inflict on men in time of war, and to lessen as much as possible, the similarity of earth and hell. For with regard to particular advantages, respecting the states I am connected with, I am persuaded it is theirs to continue the war, till England shall be reduced to that perfect impotence of mischief, which alone can prevail with her to let other nations enjoy, peace, liberty, and safety.' I think, however, that a short truce, which must, therefore, be an armed truce, and put all parties to an almost equal expense with a continued war, is by no means desirable. But this proposition of a truce, if made at all, should be made to France, at the same time it is made to America. They have each of them too much honor, as well as too much sense, to listen separately to any propositions which tend to separate them from each other. I will now give you my thoughts on your ideas of a negocia tion, in the order you have placed them. If you will number them in your copy, you will readily see to which my observations refer. and I may, therefore, be more concise.

"To the first. I do not see the necessity or use of five commissioners. A number of talkers lengthen discussions, and often embarrass instead of aiding a settlement. Their different particular views, private interests and jealousies of each other, are likewise so many rubs in the way, and it sometimes happens that a num

ber cannot agree to what each privately thinks reasonable, and would have agreed to, or perhaps proposed if alone. But this as the parties please.

"To the second. The term of twenty one years, would be better for all sides. The suspension of hostilities should be expressed to be, between all parties at war: and that the British troops and ships of war now in any of the United States be withdrawn.

"To the third. This seems needless, and is a thing that may be done or omitted as you please. America has no concern about those acts of parliament.

“To the fourth. The reason of proposing this is not understood, nor the use of it, nor what inducement there can be for us to agree to it. When you come to treat with both your enemies, you may negociate away as much of these engagements as you can; but powers who have made a firm solid league, evidently useful to both, can never be prevailed with to dissolve it, for the vague expectation of another in nubibus; nor even on the certainty that another will be proposed, without knowing what are to be its articles. America has no desire of being free from her engagements to France. The chief is that of continuing the war in conjunction with her, and not making a separate peace; and this is an obligation not in the power of America to dissolve, being an obligation of gratitude and justice, towards a nation which is engaged in a war on her account, and for her protection; and would be forever binding, whether such an article existed or not in the treaty; and though it did not exist, an honest American would cut off his right hand rather than sign an agreement with England contrary to the spirit of it.

"To the fifth. As soon as you please. If you had mentioned France in your proposed suspension of arms, I should immediately have shewn it to the minister, and have endeavored to support that idea. As it stands, I am in doubt whether I shall communicate your paper or not, though by your writing it is so fair, it seems as if you intended it. If I do, I shall acquaint you with the result.

"The bill of which you send me a copy was an excellent one at the time, and might have had great and good effects, if in

stead of telling us haughtily, that our humble petition should receive no answer, that the ministry had received and enacted that bill into a law. It might have erected a wall of brass round Engand, if such a measure had been adopted when friar Bacon's brazen head cried out, TIME IS! But the wisdom of it was not seen, till after the fatal cry of TIME IS PAST!"

France was not without apprehensions that the United States might consider themselves at liberty to make a separate peace. About the 1st of January, 1779, the French minister, in a communication to congress says, "It is pretended the United States have preserved the liberty of treating with Great Britain separately from their ally, as long as Great Britain shall not have declared war against the king his master." In consequence of this representation, congress, on the 14th of January, of the same year, unanimously declared, "that as neither France nor these United States may of right, so these United States will not conclude either truce or peace with the common enemy, without the formal consent of their ally first obtained; and that any matters and things which may be insinuated or asserted to the contrary thereof, tend to the injury and dishonor of the said states."*

The offer of mediation by his catholic majesty, was made known to congress by letters from Arthur Lee, and by the French minister, Mons. Gerard; and on the 17th of February, 1779, the subject was referred to a committee, consisting of G. Morris, Mr. Burke, Mr. Witherspoon, Samuel Adams, and M. Smith. This committee soon after reported as their opinion, " that his catholic majesty is disposed to enter into an alliance with the United States. That he hath manifested this disposition, in a decisive declaration made to the court of Great Britain. That, in consequence of such declaration, the independence of the United States must be finally acknowledged by Great Britain; and immediately thereon a negociation for peace will be set on foot, bebetween the powers of France, Great Britain, and the United States, under the mediation of his catholic majesty; or that Spain will take part in the war, and his catholic majesty will unite his

* Secret Journals of Congress, vol. 2, p. 517,

force with the most christian king and the United States." In the event of a negociation, the committee were of opinion, that the United States should not treat of peace, but on the footing of an independent nation; and that, as a preliminary, their independence should be acknowledged on the part of Great Britain.

In case of such an acknowledgment, they recommended the appointment of ministers on the part of the United States, to assist at such negociation, and that such ministers should be instructed by congress.

"1. What to insist on, as the ultimatum of the states.

"2. What to yield, or require, on terms of mutual exchange or compensation."

Under the first head, the committee recommended six articles. 1. That the bounds of the United States, should be northerly by the ancient limits of Canada, as contended for by Great Britain, running from Nova Scotia, south westerly, west, and north westerly, to lake Nipissing, thence a west line to the Mississippi; easterly by the boundary settled between Massachusetts and Nova Scotia; southerly by the boundary between Georgia and Florida; and westerly by the Mississippi.

2. All the posts and places, within these limits, to be evacuated. 3. The right of fishing and curing fish, on the banks and coast of Newfoundland, equally with the subjects of France and Great Britain, to be reserved and ratified to the citizens of the United States.

4. The navigation of the Mississippi, as low down as the southern boundary of the United States, to be acknowledged and ratified free to the citizens of the states.

5. Free commerce to be allowed with some port or ports, below the southern boundary of the United States, on the river Mississippi, except for such articles as may be particularly enumerated.

6. In case the allies of the United States would agree to support them in such claim by continuing hostilities, to insist that Nova Scotia be ceded to the United States, or declared independent.