—13— Co. v. Standard Oil Co. (D.C. Cir. 1962), 304 F.2d 387, 394).* Amici are entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard while the judicial "slate" is still clean. Atlantic Development Corp. v. United States (5th Cir. 1967), 379 F.2d 818, 829. Nor can it be argued that the government is an adequate representative of Amici's interests in this proceeding. It is the general rule that the government is not an adequate representative of a private party's interest (Trobovich v. United Mine Workers of America (1972), 404 U.S. 528, 538, n. 10, 30 L.Ed.2d 686, 694, n. 10; National Farm Lines v. I.C.C. (10th Cir. 1977), 564 F.2d 381, 384; Holmes v. Government of Virgin Islands (D.V.I. 1973), 61 F.R.D. 3, 5, and New England Petroleum v. Federal Energy Administration (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 71 F.R.D. 454, 459). The government is a particularly inappropriate representative of Amici's interest in this case because the Secretary of the Treasury is charged with the obligation of raising and collecting customs duties. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 1505. He can hardly adequately represent Amici's interests since they challenge the imposition of countervailing duties, which would generate new revenue for the United States. Because it is his duty to uphold the laws of the United States, the Secretary has also failed to raise the important issue that Amici are trying to raise now, viz., that 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) is unconstitutional. By opposing Amici's participation, he even opposes bringing this issue to the attention *Participation as Amici Curiae in this case, which has been resisted both by Zenith and the government, does not give Amici their right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard (New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. Regents (2d Cir. 1975), 516 F.2d 350, 352, n. 3 and Nuesse v. Camp (D.C. Cir. 1967), 385 F.2d 694, 704, n. 10). V. -12 had due process of law been accorded to him Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 The holding in Armstrong is precisely dispositive of the issue raised by Amici. In the instant case, when and if Amici finally obtain a hearing in the Customs Court to argue that countervailing duties should not be imposed on their goods, they will be faced with factual and legal determinations by the United States Supreme Court that the electronics products they import from Japan are subject to countervailing duties. With the facts and law having already been determined against them by the highest court in the land, Amici could not possibly obtain a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the Customs Court. Such a hearing after the judicial "slate" has already been covered with factual and legal findings against them violates the principle articulated in Armstrong. Nor can the Customs Court remedy the situation because it would undoubtedly consider itself bound by this Court's decision. The present litigation will, for all practical purposes, resolve the issue of the imposition of countervailing duties with respect to Amici's products. This is especially true in the instant circumstances because this litigation raises a question of first impression with a critical impact on international trade (Nuesse v. Camp (D.C. Cir. 1967), 385 F.2d 694, 702) and because it will set a nationwide policy (Textile Workers Union of America v. Allendale Co. (D.C. Cir. 1955), 226 F.2d 765, 767, cert. den., 351 U.S. 909; Atlantic Refining -13 Co. v. Standard Oil Co. (D.C. Cir. 1962), 304 F.2d 387, 394).* Amici are entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard while the judicial "slate" is still clean. Atlantic Development Corp. v. United States (5th Cir. 1967), 379 F.2d 818, 829. Nor can it be argued that the government is an adequate representative of Amici's interests in this proceeding. It is the general rule that the government is not an adequate representative of a private party's interest (Trobovich v. United Mine Workers of America (1972), 404 U.S. 528, 538, n. 10, 30 L.Ed.2d 686, 694, n. 10; National Farm Lines v. I.C.C. (10th Cir. 1977), 564 F.2d 381, 384; Holmes v. Government of Virgin Islands (D.V.I. 1973), 61 F.R.D. 3, 5, and New England Petroleum v. Federal Energy Administration (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 71 F.R.D. 454, 459). The government is a particularly inappropriate representative of Amici's interest in this case because the Secretary of the Treasury is charged with the obligation of raising and collecting customs duties. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 1505. He can hardly adequately represent Amici's interests since they challenge the imposition of countervailing duties, which would generate new revenue for the United States. Because it is his duty to uphold the laws of the United States, the Secretary has also failed to raise the important issue that Amici are trying to raise now, viz., that 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) is unconstitutional. By opposing Amici's participation, he even opposes bringing this issue to the attention *Participation as Amici Curiae in this case, which has been resisted both by Zenith and the government, does not give Amici their right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard (New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Regents (2d Cir. 1975), 516 F.2d 350, 352, n. 3 and Nuesse v. Camp (D.C. Cir. 1967), 385 F.2d 694, 704, n. 10). -14 of the Court. Finally, since important international policies as well as issues significant to the national economy, involving potent political forces, are involved, such factors may easily affect the arguments which the government chooses to advance or the vigor with which they are presented. This Court has been ever mindful of the principle that the truest guarantee of just and equitable judicial decisions is full and effective participation by all directly concerned. The litigation before this Court cannot abide by that principle as long as it excludes Amici and other importers who will bear the direct monetary impact of any decision imposing countervailing duties. B. Importers of Goods Subject to the Imposition of Countervailing Duties Are Denied Equal Protection Because They Cannot Participate in Proceedings Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d). Access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right embraced within the First Amendment's guarantee of the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances. California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited (1972), 404 U.S. 508, 510, 30 L.Ed.2d 642, 646; see also Bounds v. Smith (1977), 430 U.S. 817, 828, 52 L.Ed.2d 72, 83; NAACP v. Button (1963), 371 U.S. 415, 430-431, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, 416-417 and United Transportation Union v. Michigan (1971), 401 U.S. 576, 587, 28 L.Ed.2d 339, 347. This is especially true where, as here, the only way in which the dispute may be resolved is in the courts (Boddie v. Connecticut (1971), 401 U.S. 371, 28 L.Ed.2d 113). A compelling governmental interest must be shown to justify the denial of Amici's constitutional right of access to the courts (Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), —15— 394 U.S. 618, 634, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 615)-especially where their competitors are allowed access to such courts. No such compelling interest justifies Amici's exclusion from the § 1516(d) proceedings. (Compare Korematsu v. United States (1944), 323 U.S. 214, 89 L.Ed. 194.) Indeed, the existence of Section 1516 (c), which allows a negative countervailing duty determination to be challenged in a truly adversary proceeding, implicitly recognizes that Section 1516(d) is not in any way essential to the testing of such administrative decisions. Since Section 1516(d) infringes a fundamental constitutional right-the First Amendment right of access to the courts-this Court should declare it unconstitutional because it is not justified by any compelling state interest. In any event, § 1516(d) cannot survive scrutiny under the "lesser" equal protection standard of "some rationality in the nature of the class singled-out" (James v. Strange (1972), 407 U.S. 128, 140, 32 L.Ed.2d 600, 610). An after the fact rationalization cannot be created to support the constitutionality of § 1516(d) (McGinnis v. Royster (1973), 410 U.S. 263, 35 L.Ed. 2d 282). Rather, the challenged statute must be considered in the light of whether it rationally furthers some articulated state purpose (410 U.S. at 270, 35 L.Ed. at 289). In 1974 Congress amended § 1516(c) and enacted § 1516(d) for the express purpose of giving American manufacturers the same right to judicial review of adverse countervailing duty determinations of the Secretary of the Treasury as American importers previously had, thus overturning United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc. (1971), 58 CCPA 129, C.A.D. 1017, 440 F.2d 1024, cert. den., 404 |