Several matters not presented by this as- Suit between Joseph Manasse and the Dut. signment of error, in no wise affecting the ton Bank. Decree for the latter, and the merits of the question, are set forth and com-] former appeals. Decree affirmed.

T. B. Ellis, Jr., of Gainesville, for appellant. I any notice or knowledge of the agreement beW. S. Broome and J. C. Adkins, both of Gainesville, for appellee.

It appears that Joseph Manasse owned a policy of insurance upon his own life payable to himself, on which he had borrowed $810; that to secure a loan of $1,100 Manasse and wife, on June 29, 1910, assigned to the First National Bank of Gainesville, Fla., "all our right, title and interest in policy No. 559,- by reason whereof he is not afforded an op193," etc.; that on the same day the follow-portunity of seeing and hearing the witnessing agreement was entered into:

"In the event of the death of said Manasse before the maturity of this policy, the First National Bank aforesaid shall receive out of the amount paid by the Mutual Life Insurance Company upon said policy, the same amount as it (Supreme Court of Florida. March 19, 1918.) would have received from the equity above mentioned, if said policy had matured.

"Upon the maturity of said insurance policy 1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION the paid-up policy agreed by the said insurance company to be issued by it at that time, shall be issued to Dora Manasse, wife of said Joseph Manasse, by said company, and free of any claims of said Bank.

John U. Bird, of Clearwater, for plaintiff in error. Van C. Swearingen, Atty. Gen., and C. O. Andrews, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

ELLIS, J. The plaintiff in error was indicted by the grand jury of Pinellas county upon the charge of obtaining money from one Cy Matthews under false pretenses. Upon a trial the plaintiff in error was convicted and seeks a reversal here upon writ of error. The question presented here is the sufficiency of the indictment.

Omitting the formal parts the indictment is as follows:

"In the Name and by the Authority of the State of Florida:

quash and in arrest of judgment are: First, the lithographed paper should have been set out or copied in the indictment; second, the indictment does not allege that Cy Matthews was deceived by the alleged false pretenses, nor that he parted with his property by reason thereof; third, that the false pretenses used were not described nor alleged in which way they were made; and, fourth, that the property obtained by defendant was not described in the indictment.

The section of the statute upon which the indictment was framed provides that whoever designedly by a false pretense, or by a privy or false token and with intent to defraud, obtains from another person any property, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison. Section 3319, Gen, Stats. 1906, Compiled Laws 1914.

"The grand jurors of the state of Florida, impaneled and sworn to inquire and true presentment make in and for the body of the county of Pinellas, upon their oath do present that [1] Section 3962 of the General Statutes Charley Pruitt, late of the county of Pinel- of Florida provides that no indictment shall las and state of Florida, on the first day of May in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine be quashed or judgment arrested or new hundred and seventeen, in the county and state trial be granted on account of any defect in aforesaid unlawfully and designedly did falsely the form of the indictment, or of misjoinder pretend to one Cy Matthews, he the said Cy of offenses, or for any cause whatsoever, unMatthews being then and there a negro who was unable to read, that a certain printed or less the court shall be of the opinion that lithographed paper, said paper resembling an the indictment is so vague, indistinct, and ordinary twenty dollar bill of the United States indefinite as to mislead the accused and emof America, but being printed or lithographed in a language other than the English language barrass him in the preparation of his de and the grand jurors being unable to set forth fense, or expose him after conviction or ac in words and figures the said paper in the Eng- quittal to substantial danger of a new proselish language, and a further and more partic-cution for the same offense. ular description of said printed or lithographed paper being to the grand jurors unknown, was a good and valid twenty dollar note money current of the United States of America and of the value of twenty dollars in money current of the United States of America; that the said printed or lithographed paper was offered and given to the said Cy Matthews by the said Charley Pruitt in payment for the transporting of him the said Charley Pruitt, and one John Padilla from Tarpon Springs, Florida, to Dunedin, Florida, in an automobile by him the said Cy Matthews and in further payment for money current of the United States of America of the value of sixteen dollars and fifty cents, the denominations of said money being to the grand jurors unknown; that the said printed or lithographed paper was so given to the said Cy Mathews by the said Charley Pruitt in the nighttime when the said Cy Matthews could not see the said paper distinctly enough to know its true character, by means of which said false pretense he the said Charley Pruitt did on the first day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seventeen in the county of Pinellas and state of Florida obtain from the

said Cy Matthews property, to wit, money of the value of sixteen dollars and fifty cents in money current of the United States of America, the denominations of which being to the grand jurors unknown, of the moneys and property of him the said Cy Matthews with intent then and there to defraud him the said Cy Matthews; whereas in truth and in fact the said printed or lithographed paper was not a good and valid twenty dollar note money current of the United States of America and was not of the value of twenty dollars money current of the United States of America and this the said Charley Pruitt then and there well knew; contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the state of Florida."

The points argued in the briefs of counsel

In construing this section this court has said in substance that it is the policy of this court, as it evidently was of the Legislature in enacting sections 3962 and 3961 of the General Statutes, that indictments should be upheld where the crime charged is substantially in the language of the statute denouneing it, and the allegations are not so vague. indistinct, and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him in the prepara tion of his defense, or expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense. See Barber v. State, 52 Fla. 5, 42 South. 86: Lewis v. State, 55 Fla. 54, 45 South. 995: Tillman v. State, 58 Fla. 113, 50 South. 675, 138 Am. St. Rep. 100, 19 Ann. Cas. 91; Douglass v. State, 53 Fla. 27, 43 South. 424: Wolf v. State, 72 Fla. 572, 73 South. 740.

Section 3961, General Statutes, provides that every indictment shall be deemed and adjudged good which charges the crime substantially in the language of the statute prohibiting the crime, or prescribing the punishment if any there be, or if at common law so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the jury.

Where an offense is charged in language substantially the same as that contained in the act denouncing the offense, the indict ment is sufficient if it acquaints the accused with the nature and cause of the accusation against him. See Stutts v. State, 52 Fla. 110, 42 South. 51; Schley v. State, 48 Fla. 53, 37

South. 909; Robinson v. State, 69 Fla. 521, 68 South. 649, L. R. A. 1915E, 1215, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 506.

averment that the person parting with money or goods in exchange for the false token was induced to part with the ownership of his property by reason of his belief in the token or pretense, or that he was deceived thereby.

*

*

[2, 3] The crime of obtaining money under false pretenses is a statutory offense. Turning to the indictment we find that it charges that the defendant offered to Cy Matthews a The gist of the offense is the deception succertain lithographed paper which resembled cessfully practiced in order to obtain the an ordinary "twenty dollar bill of the United credit, money, goods, etc., and said this court, States of America." The omission of the speaking through Mr. Justice Cockrell, in word "currency" does not render the allega- Strickland v. State, supra, it is not a harsh tion so vague as to mislead. The lithograph-rule that requires the "prosecuting officers in ed bill resembled currency of the United framing their indictments or informations to States of that denomination is clearly the allege distinctly and not by way meaning of the words; that the defendant of possible inference, the vital elements of unlawfully, designedly, and falsely pretended the offense." to Cy Matthews that the lithographed paper was a good and valid "twenty dollar note money current of the United States of America and of the value of twenty dollars"; that by means of the false pretense the defendant obtained from Matthews $16.50 in money of the property of Matthews and of that value, with intent to defraud him. This is in substance the indictment, and it nowhere alleges that Cy Matthews was deceived by the pretended paper money. Non constat Matthews knew that the paper was not valid currency of the United States, in which case he was not deceived, and deception is an essential element of the statutory crime of obtaining money by false pretenses. See Ladd v. State, 17 Fla. 215; Pendry v. State, 18 Fla. 191; Strickland v. State, 51 Fla. 129, 40 South. 178; Cook v. State, 51 Fla. 36, 40 South. 490.

It does not follow that because a man parts with his money in exchange for a false token he is deceived by the pretense.

The purpose of the statute being to punish the offense of obtaining goods or money or anything of value by practicing upon the belief of others in the value of the token offered in exchange, it follows that no offense is committed if the person who parts with his money knows that the token offered or pretense is false, but carries out the form of the transaction for an ulterior purpose.

The motion to quash the indictment should have been granted, so the judgment is reversed.

BROWNE, C. J., and TAYLOR, WHITFIELD, and WEST, JJ., concur.

(75 Fla. 464)

HENDERSON v. STATE.
(Supreme Court of Florida. March 20, 1918.) .
(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. EMBEZZLEMENT 28-INDICTMENT
SCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.

1

DE

An indictment charging that the defendant borrowed a shotgun and afterwards embezzled and fraudulently converted the said shotgun to his own use sufficiently describes the property.

We think that the indictment in other re-describe the property alleged to have been emAn indictment charging embezzlement should spects was sufficient. It was unnecessary to bezzled with the same particularity that is reset out in hæc verba the pretended paper quired in an indictment charging larceny. money or make an accurate pen sketch of it 2. EMBEZZLEMENT 28 DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY-SUFFICIENCY. in the indictment, therefore the allegation that the false token bore words upon it in a language other than English which the jurors could not translate into English was immaterial. The paper was sufficiently described by the allegation of its resemblance to a $20 bill of United States currency. It is also sufficiently clear to satisiy the statute that the false pretense was made by offering to pass or uttering the paper, which we think sufficiently shows an intention to pass current that which was of litue or no value. The description of the property obtained was also sufficient in our opinion.

3. EMBEZZLEMENT

33-INDICTMENT-POS

SESSION OF PROPERTY-"BORROW."

Held,

An indictment charging the crime of embezzlement alleged that the defendant on a certain date "did borrow" from another certain personal property, to wit, one shotgun. that the indictment sufficiently alleged that the defendant received the shotgun into his possession (quoting Words and Phrases, Borrow).

Error to Circuit Court, Jackson County; C. L. Wilson, Judge.

The indictment, however, was fatally de- D. P. Henderson was convicted of embezfective in not alleging that Matthews was zlement, and he brings error. Affirmed. deceived by the false token, because as we John H. Carter, of Marianna, for plaintiff said such is an element of the offense, a nec-in error. Van C. Swearingen, Atty. Gen., and essary ingredient, and unless alleged the of- C. O. Andrews, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the fense as denounced by the statute is not sufficiently charged.

This court has repeatedly held that in such cases the indictment should contain an

State.

ELLIS, J. The plaintiff in error was convicted in the circuit court for Jackson county

of embezzlement, and comes here upon writ| American youth of tender years. This of error. ground of the motion was not well taken.

A motion made in his behalf to quash the indictment was overruled. The only assignment of error rests upon that ruling of the court.

Omitting the venue and signature of the state attorney, the indictment is as follows: "In the Name and by the Authority of the

State of Florida:

Nor do we think there is any merit in the other point. It is contended in behalf of the defendant that the indictment fails to al lege that the shotgun was ever in possession of the defendant. The indictment alleges that the defendant on a certain date "did borrow from one W. L. Pilcher certain personal property then and there the subject of larceny, to wit, one shotgun,” etc.

To quote from Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, under the word "borrow": "It is true that we often use this word in the sense of returning the thing borrowed in specie, But it is not limited to as to borrow a horse. this sense. Among the definitions given by Webster are the following: First to take or receive from another on trust, with the intention of returning or giving an equivalent for; and sec ond to take from another for one's own use; to adopt from a foreign source; to appropriate; to assume."

"The grand jurors of the state of Florida, impaneled and sworn to inquire and true presentment make in and for the body of the county of Jackson upon their oath do present that D. P. Henderson, whose Christian name is unknown to the grand jury, of the county of Jackson and the state of Florida, on the 15th day of November in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixteen, in the county and state aforesaid, did borrow from one W. L. Pilcher certain personal property then and there the subject of larceny, to wit, one shotgun of the value of twenty-five dollars and of the goods and chattels of said W. L. Pilcher, and the said D. P. Henderson did, afterwards, to wit, on the 1st day of January, A. D. 1917, in the county of Jackson and state of Florida, unlawfully embezzle and fraudulently convert ceive something from another as by way of the said shotgun to his own use;

"Against the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, to the evil example of all others in like case offending and against the peace and dignity of the state of Florida."

The two points of the motion to quash which are argued are: That the description of the property alleged to have been stolen is insufficient, and that the indictment does not sufficiently allege that the property was actually received by or came into the possession of the defendant.

The defendant below asked for no bill of particulars and pleaded not guilty to the indictment.

[1] In an indictment charging embezzlement the property alleged to have been embezzled should be described with the same particularity that is required in an indictment charging larceny. See Grant v. State, 35 Fla. 581, 17 South. 225, 48 Am. St. Rep. 263.

In Glover v. State, 22 Fla. 493, the court, in discussing the question of the particularity with which property alleged to have been stolen should be described, said: "Such articles may be described by the name by which they are generally known."

[2, 3] A "shotgun" is defined in "Webster's New International Dictionary" as "a smoothbore gun, often double-barreled, and now almost universally breach-loading designed for firing shot at short range and killing small game, esp. birds." The same authority defines a "gun" as "any portable firearm except a pistol or revolver such as a rifle, shotgun, carbine, etc." It is difficult to conceive how the defendant could have been misled or embarrassed in his defense by the use of a term descriptive of an implement of sport so generally known that the term is not unintelligible even to the average

See 1 Words and Phrases, 884.

To "borrow" means to "take, get or re

a loan." Webster's New International Dictionary. See, also, Black's Law Dictionary (2d Ed.) 146. The statute under which the indictment was presented uses the word in the following sentence:

"If any person borrows or hires property aforesaid and embezzles or fraudulently converts it or its proceeds," etc. General Statutes 1900, § 3308.

The word was used in the statute in its usual and commonly accepted meaning. Fine v. Moran, Sheriff, 77 South. 533.

There was no error in the court's ruling, and, none having been made to appear in the trial of the cause, the judgment is affirmed.