city, nor a village, Urga is a collection of yurts1 and wooden houses, sprinkled with Lama temples, the former surrounded as a rule by heavy log palings eight to ten feet high. The Russian settlement, in which was the European-built Russian Consulate as well as the Cossack fort, lies in the eastern part of the town. The fort consisted of a modest earthwork, whose ditch was protected by a barbed-wire entanglement and trous-de-loups.

From the native standpoint the distinction enjoyed by Urga -or, to give its native name, Ta Kuren or Bogdo Kuren, meaning the sacred encampmentlies in the fact that it is the earthly abode of their Everliving God or Kutukhtu.

To

Mongols, Urga ranks next to Lhassa in sacred character, as containing the third figure in the Thibetan patriarchate. In the doctrine of the Lamas, as is well known, these earthly impersonations of God can never die, but are reincarnated by the passing of their souls after death into new-born infants. At the time of the writer's visit the Ever-living God was represented represented by a young man whose age was not yet thirty. He lived in a replica of the Russian Consulate, from whose representative, possibly, his abode was a votive offering. Any personification of the deity was said to be confined to public life. In private it was whispered he was of the

to

world, worldly. Possessing not a few traits which it might be thought must discredit his godlike attributes in the eyes of the Buddhist faithful, this extraordinary being yet remains the spiritual god of millions. To mention one only of such characteristics—he is unable to provide himself with the various objects upon which his ever-changing fancy settles without having recourse the vulgar method of paying for the same in brick tea, the "hard cash" of the surrounding country. Yet considerations such as these do not enter into the minds of the simple Mongols, who gols, who revere his name. Should any such disturbing thought flash through some more than usually inquisitive brain, who is there to offer an answer? Of a certainty not the common Lama. His business, so far as he can make it, is with his own concerns: how he shall live, not how he shall die; what the morrow may bring forth; what he shall eat and what he shall drink. Though it is true that as yet he confines himself to a scrip and perhaps a staff, it is only because the possession of these satisfies all his present needs.

It was a day of good luck which afforded the writer the chance of studying in the flesh such a remarkable entity as one of the spiritual heads of the Buddhist religion. Nor was the setting of the picture

VOL. CLXXVIII.-NO. MLXXVII.

H

him to be credited with the manners of the latest civilisation.

After a bout was ended and the obeisance made, the happy winner left the ring, to be welcomed by a whole crowd of proud and admiring friends, who proceeded to thrust him back into his clothes, carrying him off, no doubt to celebrate a glorious victory in many bowls of dirty tea and

curds.

Of the physique of the men there is little to remark. Unlike the more famous Japanese professors to be seen at Kioto or any of the great annual wrestling shows in that country, the Mongol is distinctly spare and sinewy. Nature and his own inclination have made him a born rider, though a horseman in our sense of the word he is not. And years spent in the saddle must tend after many generations to create a type.

It was while engaged in watching the wrestling that a remark made to the writer on quite another occasion came back with some force. Whilst travelling in company with a Russian officer we discussed the Turcoman irregular cavalry, the merits of such troops, and numbers available at the call of their Russian masters. The statement was made that, in addition to 8000 or 10,000 Turcoman horsemen, on the face of it an exaggeration, swarms of mounted Kirghiz and Mongols would be available "when the day comes, as the Russian pithily expressed

it.

Whether the remark was made unconsciously, the speaker momentarily forgetful to whom he spoke, or whether with intentional arrière pensée, is not easy to say. Whether or no, the point is immaterial,-the phrase alone was sufficient to fix it in one's mind, also serving to make all subsequent study of both Mongol and Kirghiz, as well as of all that appertained to their wild existence, of unusual interest. That either would make irregular cavalry of a high type is not the result of the writer's experience. Both are wanting in pluck and intelligence, nor has the proximity of Russian civilisation been in any sense to their advantage. To conquer, not civilise, might well be the motto adopted by the forward party in Asia. Of such ordinary attributes to civilisation as schools, education moral or physical, the conquered Asiatics know little. It is true some schools have been opened both in Russian Turkestan and other Central Asian territories; but that there is any serious intention to attempt to raise the moral nature or condition of the conquered Kirghiz or Mongols even a Russian would hardly consider worth arguing.

In the present state of affairs in the Far East it is unsatisfactory, if not wellnigh impossible, to hold up particular causes as contributing to the general hopeless failure of Russia and of her methods. But among the many minor disappointments that the army

has provided, few equal that caused by the total collapse of the much vaunted Cossack. In Europe a halo of romance still clings round this picturesque fraud. Could, however, even a few of the wicked atrocities perpetrated by him upon defenceless Chinese during the period 1898-1902 in Manchuria under the cloak of so-called war be exposed, he would soon find himself execrated for what he is-a blustering, overbearing brigand where defenceless women and children are concerned, a fraud and a failure where cold-blooded

modern war is the rule. If, then, the Cossack, with years of Russian training and, as has usually been considered by those to whom he is unknown, a natural aptitude for war, cannot be made of use, what chance is there that the ignorant Kirghiz will surpass him? There is none. So let us hope that the lessons of the present war may reach even to far-away Urga, and that this one at any rate may tend to confine the harmless Mongol to his peaceful amusements.

PU-LU-SSU.

THE sanguinary encounter in the Straits of Tsushima which culminated in the practical annihilation of Rojdestvensky's armada by the 29th of May, complements to a very cona very considerable degree the forecast with which we closed the last article in this series. Although we expressed the belief that the success or failure of all battles lay on the knees of the gods, yet we committed ourselves to the assertion that Togo had "so many advantages in naval essentials that we cannot conceive any other issue except the one which, as allies, we desire." We also divined correctly the route which the Russian admiral took after entering Japan's colonial waters. Where we went astray-and of course we could only balance probabilities—was in the course of action which Rojdestvensky pursued after he sighted the island of Quelpart. Instead of reconnoitring the Tsushima Straits from some temporary anchorage, the Russian admiral selected to follow the almost puerile course of steaming at once into confined Japanese waters. There could only be two reasons for this course: either Rojdestvensky imagined that he had eluded a portion of the Japanese fleet and left it behind him in the Formosa Straits; or he was so confident

in the main fighting strength of the battleship and the inferiority of the torpedo, that he was prepared to meet and fight Togo without taking into consideration strategical or geographical considerations. It cannot be that he had only sufficient coal to take him to Vladivostok, since it is definitely reported that Russian agents had made the coaling arrangements farther north along the Chinese coast, which we suggested as probable when writing before the event. These arrangements, however, may be now claimed as strategic counter-moves, made for the purpose of covering up the trail. Not that we believe that a false move like that would have deceived such an astute strategist as Admiral Togo. It is our impression, now that the action has been fought, that Rojdestvensky had abandoned as impracticable the only sound course which lay open to him, and had selected to hazard everything upon a fleet action. Possibly, while he was waiting on the coast of Annam, it may have been borne in upon him that the coal and supply question would take too long to perfect; or he may have received information which left him the sole choice to employ tactics which we cannot but condemn.