the East India Company said in their petition to Parliament, drafted by John Stuart Mill—

"Owing their nomination to the same authority, many of them probably to the same individual Minister, whom they are appointed to check, and looking to him alone for their reappointment, this desire of recommending themselves to him, and their unwillingness to risk his displeasure by any serious resistance to his wishes, will be motives too strong not to be in danger of exercising a powerful and injurious influence over their conduct."

The Council Act of 1876 enabled the Secretary of State, for special reasons, to appoint any person having professional or peculiar qualification to be a member of the Council of India with the old tenure "during good behaviour." But there is a grave objection to the power thus given, that it may be turned to political purposes for which it was not intended. By an Act of 1889, passed by the House of Commons at midnight without due discussion, the Secretary of State was authorised to abstain from filling vacancies in the Council until the number should be reduced to ten. This reduction is a cogent reason for not allowing a Member of Council to be absent from his duties for any length of time. The superintendence, direction, and control of the civil and military government of British India is vested by statutory provision in the Governor-General of India in Council. The Governor-General is appointed by his Majesty by warrant under the Royal Sign Manual. He holds office "during Our Will and

a

Pleasure," but the usual term is five years, though many instances have occurred of its being extended. It took Lord Cornwallis seven years to complete the work which Hastings began, of introducing a sound and honest system of administration. Wellesley laboured for seven years at the Imperial Policy which established close bond of connection between the British Government and the principal States of India; and the Marquis of Hastings was occupied for seven years in completing the work of making the British authority supreme throughout the Continent. William Bentinck also worked for seven years in carrying out those reforms in the internal economy of the government which have given his administration a living name in India second only to that of Cornwallis. Dalhousie's splendid reign lasted more than eight years. It has been suggested that the customary term of office of the Viceroy should be extended to seven years. The main argument brought forward in favour of the change is that for the first two years Governor-General is learning his work, and when he is becoming most useful he has to leave. On the other hand, there is the vital objection that in his fourth year the Viceroy practically becomes a despot. All his Councillors owe their appointments to his recommendation, and he is able to carry any measure without a note of dissent. After a man of masterful genius has ruled for five years, his sub

ordinates learn to regard themselves as mere instruments, and lose the spirit of initiative and the readiness to assume responsibility SO absolutely necessary in an Indian administrator. No Viceroy, however, would be able to endure for seven years the unspeakable anxieties and toils of one of the most responsible and laborious offices in the world, without having a short spell of rest at home. As the law stands, a Governor-General cannot come home on leave. By the Act of 1793, a departure from India with intent to return to Europe was declared to vacate the office of Governor-General, Commander-in-Chief, and certain other high offices. It has been proposed that the Act should be repealed, but the balance of the argument is against the suggestion. If the GovernorGeneral were, during his five years' tenure, allowed to return to England on six months' leave, the office would be eagerly sought for on account of its emoluments, its powers, and its patronage. But the statesmen who established British dominion in India were men who were willing to sacrifice a brilliant career at home, to endure exile, and who had to reckon burdens, not privileges. A Viceroy might avail himself of the privilege of taking leave, in order to exercise his personal influence with his old friends and colleagues for passing a measure to which his Councillors or the Council of India objected. On the other hand, a man who has exercised despotic sway is

apt to lose sympathy with, and even to be impatient of, some elements in a parliamentary statesman's judgment. It is hard for him to realise that his old friends and colleagues are Cabinet Ministers, the masters whom he must obey. The ruler of an Empire might damage his policy and diminish his own influence by a too strenuous insistence of his views from a footing of perfect equality. Lord Curzon's return to England, with the definite promise that he should, after the lapse of a few months, be reappointed, was an evasion of the Act. It was, however, eminently a case for special consideration. Lord Curzon had rendered distinguished service; his health demanded that he should enjoy some rest in England, and it was most desirable that he should return to India to carry out the measures of improvement he had in hand. But the grave embarrassments which are bound to arise from the presence of a Governor-General in England, and his temporary departure from India, were fully illustrated. It is true that Lord Curzon, when he was in England, was a private individual, but the India Office and the Cabinet were bound to treat him and consult him as de facto Viceroy. Lord Ampthill was legally and constitutionally Governor-General, but he had to be loyal to the man whose office he was filling for a few months; he had also to be loyal to the India Office and the Cabinet. The Mission to Tibet might easily have ended in disaster. It was conducted

with conspicuous success, and this was, in a great measure, due to the rare tact and judgment of the Governor of Madras. There have been some able and eminent Governors of minor Presidencies, but the majority of them have not been men of sufficient mark to carry on the Government of India at a difficult crisis. And no man can tell at what hour a crisis may arise in that continent, or on the border, occupied by barbarous and turbulent tribes. It is only to the superficial observer that disorder in India may seem impossible of

recurrence.

It was enacted by the India Councils Act of 1861 that the ordinary number of the Governor-General's Council should be five, of whom three must be persons who at the time of their appointment have been for at least ten years in the service of the Crown in India, and one must be a barrister of England or Ireland, or a member of the Faculty of Advocates of Scotland, of not less than five years' standing. As a rule, the members who must have served in India are members of the Covenanted Civil Service; but a native, or any member of the Uncovenanted Service who has served ten years in India, is eligible. By an Act passed in 1869 it was provided that all the members of

the Governor-General's Council should be appointed, like the Governor-General himself, by Royal Warrant. The

Secretary of State has virtually the patronage, but the Governor-General recommends demiofficially two or three names in order of merit. The salary of an ordinary Member of Council is Rs. 76,800 (£5120)— a very handsome salary for an Indian civilian, who has, at the end of his term, a pension of £1000 a-year, but it is hardly sufficient to tempt a man of the first class to desert his English career. As in the case of the Governor-General, no limit of time for their tenure of office is specified, but custom, not often disregarded, has fixed it for five years.1

1

The Indian Councils Act of 1861 enabled the GovernorGeneral to make rules for the more convenient transaction of business in his Council, and gave validity to all acts done in accordance with such rules. Exercising this power, Lord Canning assigned to each Member of Council the charge of a separate department of the administration. The Governor-General retains under his own immediate control the Foreign Office, the most important branch of the administration. The Home Member, who belongs to the Indian Civil Service, has, up to recent date, had charge of the Home Department, and the Department of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce. The Public Works Minister, who was also a member of the Indian Civil Service, had charge of the Public Works Department.

economist of the first order.

Four great English jurists, Macaulay, Barnes Peacock, Henry Sumner Maine, and Fitzjames Stephen, have given British India codes of substantive law and procedure, criminal and civil, which have converted "a regimen of caprice into a regimen of law." The Law Member is, however, not merely the responsible adviser of the executive on questions having a legal bearing. Macaulay was for three years the most powerful colleague of Lord William Bentinck, and by his wide knowledge and sagacious advice materially aided him in framing his great measures for the benefit of India. Maine, during the seven years after the

Mutiny, not only carried on the great work of codification, but as a statesman and a thinker profoundly influenced every branch of the administration. The Military Member, like the Finance Member and the Legal Member, is an expert. According to custom, but not by statutory provision, he is a soldier of high rank, and if three members of the Council have served ten years in India, he may be an officer who does not belong to the Indian army. But if any person appointed an ordinary member of the Governor-General's Council is, at the time of his appointment, in the military service of the Crown, he may not, during his continuation in office as such member, hold any military command or be employed in active military duties. The Secretary of State in Council (not the Crown) "may, if he thinks fit," appoint the Com

mander-in-Chief an extraordinary member of the Governor-General's Council, and in practice he is always so appointed, and has rank and precedence in the Council next after the Governor-General. The Governor-General has, therefore, the advantage of having two military experts in his Cabinet. But it must always be borne in mind that the supreme authority over the army in India is vested by law, not in the Governor-General nor in the Commander-in-Chief, but in the Governor-General in Council. The Commanderin-Chief is at the head of the most important department of the Indian army- the command and discipline of the troops. In that respect he has full authority, subject to the regulations laid down by the Government, and, as responsible for the discipline and efficacy of the troops, he has practically uncontrolled power of selection for appointments in all the combatant branches of the army. The patronage, as regards the native troops, extends to every regimental post as well as to every staff appointment. The Military Member of Council is the head of the other great department of the army called the Military Department. The Military Department is answerable for the administration of the great administrative and spending departments of the army-the ordnance, commissariat, transport, stud, clothing, fortifications, and military buildings. The Military Department also disposes of all the business which must come up from the