WYOMING Wyo. Stat. Ann. Secs. 6-83-1-6-83-2 (Supp. 1961)7 Sec. 6-83-1. Discrimination on account of race, etc., in places which are public in nature-Prohibited. All persons of good deportment within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of all accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of all places or agencies which are public in nature, or which invite the patronage of the public, without any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of race, religion, color or national origin. (Laws 1961, ch. 103, Sec. 1.) Sec. 6-83-2. Same-Penalty for violation. Any person who shall willfully violate any of the provisions of this act Secs. 6-83-1, 6-83-27 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100.00) or imprisoned in the county jail for a term not to exceed ninety (90) days, or both. (Laws 1961, ch. 103, Sec. 2.) (NOTE: On May 14, 1963, the Governor Kentucky issued On June 28, 1963, the Delaware Senate passed APPENDIX IV LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE THE VALIDITY OF STATE STATUTES PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATIONS ON ACCOUNT OF RACE OR COLOR IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION Notwithstanding the invalidation by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) of Federal legislation prohibiting discrimination on account of race or color in places of public accommodation, many of the States, both before and after the passage of the Federal act, have enacted measures in this area. State activity in this field began with the 1865 passage by the Massachusetts Legislature of a statute, forbidding distinction, discrimination, or restriction on account of race or color in places of public amusement, public conveyance or public meeting. State action is still continuing as the issuance on June 26, 1963, by the Governor of Kentucky of a sweeping executive order in this area attests. Under our Federal system, the issues with regard to the validity of State legislation are utterly different from those upon which the constitutionality of Federal legislation (even that of a similar nature) hinges. By reason of the broad scope of the authority of the State to legislate under the police power to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizens, the validity of State regulation in this field has never been seriously challenged. While the Federal Government may only legislate pursuant to power delegated and enumerated in the Constitution, the police power of the State is bounded only by the express provisions of the State or Federal constitution including the requirements of due process of law. Due process does not require the demonstration of either the wisdom or sound policy of an antidiscrimination statute. However, such statute must not be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, and it must bear some relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare. Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). Although no frontal attack on the validity under the federal constitution of State statutes prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation has been made, the Supreme Court has indicated in several cases that there is no Federal constitutional infirmity in State statutes creating a right to the full enjoyment of public accommodations without regard to race or color whose violation is civilly or criminally actionable. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948). Compare Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). A categorical statement as to the validity of State regulation in this area is found in District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953), wherein the Court declared, "And certainly so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned there is no doubt that legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the use of facilities serving a public function is within the police power of the States." Id. at 109. In many of the States, the validity of state regulations in this area has been generally assumed. For example there was no direct challenge presented to the Massachusetts statute, first enacted in 1865 (Massachusetts Laws 1865, ch. 277). Yet the Massachusetts high court while rendering an advisory opinion, in Re Opinion of the Justices, 143 N.E. 808 (1924), made some pertinent comments upon the validity and reasonablness of this type of legislation. "Numerous reasons lead to the conclusion that the maintenance of theaters and other places of amusement is for the use of the public and affected with a public interest. The character of the performances presented has an intimate connection with the preservation and promotion of public morality. *** They have a tendency to gather at one time large numbers of people under a single roof and under comparatively crowded conditions. In these particulars such places require constant supervision and inspection in the interests of the public at large in order to prevent disaster by fire and accident, spread of disease, and general and individual disorder and crime. The construction and maintenance of buldings devoted to such uses demand approval and oversight by public officers acting for the general welfare. There can be no doubt as to the validity of a statute denoucning under penalty discrimination on account of race or color in admission to theaters and other places of amusement." [Emphasis supplied.] Id. at 810. And in California where the civil code, sections 51. 52, contained a prohibition against discrimination in places of public accommodation and amusement "for more than 50 years prior to the enactment of the (present) Unruh Act,” the challenges to the statute have been based upon the scope of its application rather than upon its validity. In 1918 the California court remarked, after quoting the statute, "The general intent and significance of the foregoing provisions are clear enough. The purpose, of course, is to compel a recognition of the equality of citizens in the right to the peculiar service afforded by these agencies for the accommodation and entertainment of the public. There is no doubt of the constitutionality of the provisions and of the sound public policy of such legislation (Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass'n, 140 Cal. 363, 73 Pac. 1050; Piluso v. Spencer, 172 Pac. 412, 413 (1918). See also Burks v. Poppy Construction Company 370 P. 2d 313 (1962). In other States where this type of legislation has been challenged, these laws have been sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Noteworthy is the 1888 attack upon the constitutionality of the New York public accommodation statute on the ground that, insofar “as it undertakes to prescribe that the owner of a place of amusement shall not exclude therefrom any citizen by reason of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, [it] is an unconstitutional interference with private rights in that it restricts the owner of property in respect to its lawful use, and as to an incident which is not a legitimate matter of regulation by law" (People v. King, 18 N.E. 245, 246 (1888)). In considering the assertion of invalidity, the court gave a definition of the police power that is worthy of quotation : "This legislation is under what, for lack of a better name, is called the police power of the state,-a power incapable of exact definition, but the existence of which is essential to every well-ordered government. By means of this power the legislature exercises a supervision over matter involving the common weal. and enforces the subservance by each individual member of society of the duties which he owes to others and to the community at large. It may be exerted whenever necessary to secure the peace, good order, health, morals, and general welfare of the community; and the propriety of its exercise within constitutional limits is purely a matter of legislative discretion, with which the courts cannot interfere. In short, the police power covers a wide range of particular unexpressed powers reserved to the State, affecting freedom of action, personal conduct, and the use and control of property" (18 N.E. at 247). Then the court addressed itself to the contention of unconstitutionality as follows: The final question, therefore, is, does the law in question invade this right of property protected by the Constitution? The State could not pass a law making the discrimination made by the defendant. The amendments to the Federal Constitution would forbid it. Can the State impose upon individuals having places of public resort the same restriction which the Federal Constitution places upon the State? It is not claimed that that part of the statute giving to colored people equal rights at he hands of innkeepers and common carriers is an infracion of the Constitution. But the business of an innnkeeper or a common carrier, when conducted by an individual, is a private business, receiving no special privilege or protection from the State. By the common law, innkeepers and common carriers are bound to furnish equal facilities to all without discrimination, because public policy requires them so to do. The business of conducting a theater or place of public amusement is also a private business. in which any one may engage in the absence of any statute or ordinance. But it has been the practice, which has passed unchallenged, for the legislature to confer upon municipalities the power to regulate by ordinance the licensing of theaters and shows, and to enforce restrictions relating to such places, in the public interest; and no one claims that such statutes are an invasion of the right of liberty or property guanteed by the Constitution. The statute in question assumes to regulate the conduct of owners or managers of places of public resort in respect to the exclusion therefrom of any person by reason of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The principle stated by Waite. C. J., in Munn v. Illinois, supra, which received the assent of a majority of the court, applies in this case? "Where," says the chief justice. "one devotes his property to a use in which the public have an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created." In the judgment of the legislature, the public had an interest to prevent race discrimination between citizens on the part of persons maintaining places of public amusement; and the quasi-public use to which the owner of such a place devoted his property gives the legislature a right to interfere. If the defendant, instead of basing his exclusion of a class of citizens upon color, had made a rule excluding all Germans, or all Irishmen, or all Jews, the law, as applied to such a case would have seemed entirely reasonable. See U.S. v. Newcomer, (U.S. Dist. Ct.) 11 Phila. 519. But the principle is the same; and if the law could be applied in the one case, it may in the other. The validity of similiar statutes in Mississippi and Lousana has been sustaned by the courts in those States (Donnel v. State, 48 Miss. 661; Joseph v. Bidwell, 28 La. Ann. 382). The statute does not interfere with private entertainments, or prevent person not engaged in the business of keeping a place of public amusement from regulating admission to an entertainment given for a social, public, or private purpose, as they may deem best; or does it seek to compel social equality. It was, we think, a valid exercise of the police power of the State over a subject within the cognizance of the legislature. The judgment should be affirmed. Mention should also be made of the landmark Michigan case of Bolden v. Operating Corporation, 239 Mich. 318, 323 (1927), wherein the Michigan court upheld the Public Accommodations Act of that State as follows: "The validity of the act in question is in no way affected by these decisions. The intent and purpose of the legislature in its enactment cannot be doubted. It clearly indicates a belief on their part that the public safety and general welfare of our people demand that, when the public are invited to attend places of public accommodation, amusement, and recreation, there shall be no discrimination among those permitted to enter because of race, creed, or color. It is bottomed upon the broad ground of the equality of all men before the law. It does not provide that all persons who present themselves at a theater must be admitted. The proprietor may exclude "the rough, boisterous, and rowdyish element." (Meisner v. Detroit, etc., Ferry Co., 154 Mich. 545 (129 Am. St. Rep. 493)). "In our opinion, the act is a valid regulation imposed by the State in its exercise of the police power." Cases in which State courts have construed these statutes and found them valid include the following: Darius v. Apostolos, 190 Pac. 510 (1920) [Colorado]: Chicago v. Carney, 142 N.E. 2d 160 (1957) [Illinois]; Brown v. J. H. Beel Co., 123 N.W. 231 (1919) [Iowa]; Rhone v. Loomis, 77 N.W. 31, 32 (1898) [Minnesota]: Messenger v. State, 41 N.W. 638 (1889) [Nebraska]; Commonwealth v. Athens George, 18 Dauphin 40 (1887) [Pennsylvania]; Bryan v. Alder, 72 N.W. 368 (1897) [Wisconsin]. See also Annotation 49 A.L.R. Constitutionality of "Civil Rights" Legislation by State. GALER T. BUTCHER, Legislative Attorney. June 28, 1963. APPENDIX V To: The Honorable Warren G. Magnuson, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, Washington, D.C., July 17, 1963. Subject: An episode account of economic effects of segregation and resistance to segregation in the South. This memorandum presents in chronological order from 1959 to date illustrative examples, as reported in newspapers and periodicals, of economic impact resulting from resistance to segregation practices, and from changing segregation practices, in various parts of the country, primarily in the South. It does not attempt to deal with the economic impact of long-standing segre gation practices per se, such as the cost of maintaining separate school systems and other facilities for the different races, the large-scale northward Negro migration resulting in large measure from lack of opportunity for Negroes under prevailing segregation practices, and income and other economic differentials, arising, at least in part, because of segregation practices. "Mr. Bob Short, owner of the Minneapolis Lakers, said on the matter of possible franchises for professional basketball teams in Texas, "The segrega21-544-63-pt. 2—45 tion problem would make it difficult for an NBA team to place a franchise there, in my opinion,'" (N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1959, p. 52). "As a result of Minneapolis Laker's rookie star Elgin Baylor's refusal to play in Charleston, W. Va., in protest to the refusal of a hotel there to accommodate him with other members of the team, the board of governors of the National Basketball Association announced a decision to insist on a protective clause in contracts for games in neutral cities. Officials of the NBA said there had not been any segregation problem during games played in the home cities of the eight teams in the professional league, but games have often been played in southern cities where housing problems have arisen. Of the 80 players in the league roster 20 were Negroes. Maurice Podoloff, president of the NBA, said the protective clause was aimed particularly at discrimination against Negro players and was intended to protect players from any sort of discriminatory or embarrassing situations" (New York Times, Jan. 23, 1959, p. 15). ""This thing has frightening ramifications. It is more serious than people realize. It has now become an economic situation affecting an entire community, the whole city, and the whole country,' with these words, a top retail executive described the Negro boycott in progress there against downtown stores As Negroes seek and find techniques for bringing pressure on the white community such as sit-ins, picketings and other demonstrations-accompanied in some communities by violence and arrests, their struggle against segregation is producing a situation that will affect businessmen for a long time. In many cities in the South these activities are generating great social unrest that is also having a noticeable impact on business. Merchants in several cities, for example. ascribe loss of sales not only to specific Negro boycotts but also to the tense atmosphere that keeps people, Negro and white, away from downtown stores" (Business Week, Apr. 23, 1960, p. 33, "Negro Business Pressure Grows"). "Commissioner Bernard Katzen, State commission against discrimination, announced that public golf links in New York City and Westchester and five State-owned golf courses in Nassau County will ban all future tournaments sponsored by the Metropolitan Golf Association because Negroes are reportedly barred from these events. The association's public links championship finals were played June 11, 12, 18, and 19 at Rockleigh, a Bergen County public course in New Jersey" (New York Times, June 29, 1960, p. 35). "Last February 2, when some Negro college students tried to sit down at a segregated Greensboro (N.C.) lunch counter, business became directly involved in the racial problem. And as the Negro movement has widened, businessmenfrom retailers in affected towns to chainstore management far from actual scenes of demonstrations are being increasingly drawn into the racial struggle" (Business Week, Dec. 17, 1930, p. 32, "South's Race Disputes Involve Businessman"). "The George Washington University Student Council voted to discontinue the student body's annual "Colonial Cruise" to Marshall Hall Amusement Park because the park will not admit Negroes. The "Colonial Cruise" on Wilson Line excursion boats to the amusement park at Marshall Hall, Md., across the Potomac from Mount Vernon, has been a spring event for students of the university since the early 1950's. About 500 were expected to make the trip late next month" (Washington Post, Mar. 8, 1961, p. B-2). "Economic considerations rather than sit-in demonstrations or court pressure may prove to be the decisive factor in forcing privately owned businesses to accept desegregation. That is indicated by the results of the 14-month campaign by southern Negroes against racial barriers in these establishments * * * The demonstrators have been aided by the changing patterns of the cities themselves. Whites have been moving to the suburbs in increasing numbers, while the Negro population of the central city has been growing rapidly. Downtown merchants face intense competition today from suburban shopping centers. For many of them, Negro patronage represents the difference between profit and loss" (New York Times, May 7, 1961, p. 10E). The "The Metropolitan Opera Association will no longer play to segregated audiences in the South, according to Rudolf Bing, general manager * * opera is playing to packed unsegregated audiences in Detroit this week "The time has come,' Mr. Bing said, 'when the Metropolitan Opera can no longer play to segregated audiences, and we have so advised our friends in Atlanta and Dallas, which are the two southern cities on the 1962 Metropolitan tour We are hopeful our friends in Atlanta and Dallas will be able to work things out'" (New York Times, May 23, 1961, p. 1). |