As Christian laymen's organizations and congregations we do not support or oppose any legislation, or enter into political affairs. These are rights and privileges reserved solely to individual voters.

We have polled our memberships, and they have voted complete support of this statement.

We serve notice herewith that the National Council of Churches has not. does not, and may not, represent us at these, or any other hearings and or meetings dealing with legislation or other political questions.

SPONSORING GROUPS

Committee of Christian Laymen, Savannah, Ga.

Methodist Laymen of North Hollywood, North Hollywood, Calif.

Southern California Committee of Christian Laymen, South Bay Chapter, Torrence, Calif.

Women of St. Mark's Episcopal Church, Shreveport, La.

Edinburg Seventh-Day Baptist Church, Edinburg, Tex.

Episcopal Education & Information Council, St. Clair Shores, Mich.

Methodist Laymen's League of Redondo Beach, Redondo, Calif.

The First Presbyterian Church, Duluth, Minn.

Committee for Laiety Enlightment, Nashville, Tenn.

National Committee of Christian Laymen, Phoenix, Ariz.

San Diego Patriotic Society, San Diego, Calif.

Methodist Laymen of Chatsworth, Chatsworth, Calif.

Committee of Christian Laymen, Woodland Hills, Calif.

St. Peter's Episcopal Church, Rosedale, Long Island, N.Y.

STATEMENT BY INDIVIDUAL PROTESTANTS REPUDIATING NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A. POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMETS

The National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. may not, and cannot, speak for or represent the millions of Protestants they claim to represent on any political or legislative matters.

As individual American voters, officials of the National Council of Churches may, with perfect propriety, come before any committee of Congress or State legislature and give their personal, individual opinions on such matters-provided that they make it clear to the committee and to the press that they are doing so as individuals and not as NCCCA officials, or representing the membership of that organization.

The National Council of Churches has never been authorized by the millions of members it purports to speak for to appear before any congressional. State, or local committee, speaking on-or to legislation and other matters political.

As a member of a church affiliated with the NCCCA who has never authorized anyone to speak for me on political subjects, I hereby repudiate any and all such pronouncements, and/or political and legislative testimony given by any officials of the National Council of Churches.

I hereby serve notice that the National Council of Churches has not, does not, and may not represent me at any hearings, this particular hearing or any other, and/or meetings dealing with legislation and other political questions.

Date:

Signed:

(Name)
(Address)

(Church affiliation)

(Copy of authorizations in our possession, signed and dated.)

APPENDIXES
APPENDIX I

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS PROVISIONS OF TITLE II

(Prepared by the Department of Justice)

There is no doubt that Congress has the constitutional power to enact title II, the public accommodations section of the proposed legislation. There are at least two immediately apparent sources of legislative authority. The first, the Commerce Clause, provides a much stronger and surer foundation for this section of the bill than does the second, the 14th amendment. It is clear, however that it is both unnecessary and unwise for Congress to select any single or particular source of power as the basis for this legislation. It is helpful, nonetheless, for Congress to insert in the act whatever findings of fact are appropriate to call into play the applicable sources of congressional power. But once this objective has been accomplished, there is no reason for Congress to commit itself to any one identified constitutional theory. Federal statutes often rest upon several sources of congressional power.

The danger of tying a statute to a single particular source of congressional authority is illustrated by the original Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. In the Court's view, sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875-the provisions of which were in some respects identical to those of the present bill-had been tied by Congress exclusively to section 5 of the 14th amendment. The Court held the statute unconsititutional as based upon this amendment, and refused to consider whether it would be constitutional in some of its possible applications under the power to regulate interstate commerce (id. at 19). See also Butts v. Merchants and Miners Transportation Co., 230 U.S. 126.

I

UNDER FAMILIAR CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES THE COMMERCE CLAUSE GIVES CONGRESS AMPLE POWER TO REQUIRE ALL SIGNIFICANT BUSINESSES SERVING THE GENERAL PUBLIC TO REFRAIN FROM RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

The power of Congress over interstate commerce and activities affecting interstate commerce is broad and plenary. "The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions," Chief Justice Hughes said in Labor Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37, "is not limited to transactions deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce. ** The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power to enact all appropriate legislation' for 'its protection and advancement' *** to adopt measures to promote its growth and insure its safety' *** 'to foster, protect, control, and restrain.'"

Congress may exercise this power notwithstanding that the particular activity is local, that it is quantitatively unimportant, that it involves the retail trade, or that it may not be regarded as interstate commerce. "*** [W]hatever its nature. [it] may be reached by Congress if it asserts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 215.

Thus, in Wickard v. Filburn, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was applied to a farmer who sowed only 23 acres of wheat and whose individual effect on interstate commerce amounted only to the pressure of 239 bushels of wheat upon the total national market. In Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 C.S. 178, the wage and hour law was applied under the Commerce Clause to a newspaper whose circulation was about 9.000 copies and which mailed only 45 copies

about one-half of 1 percent of its business-out of State.' And in United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, the Court held, without dissent on this point, that Congress has power to forbid a small retail druggist from selling drugs without the form of label required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.), even though the drugs were imported in properly labeled bottles from which they were not removed until they reached the local drugstore and even though the drugs in question had reached the State 9 months before being resold.❜

Of course, there are limits on congressional power under the Commerce Clause. It may be conceded that Congress does not hold the power to regulate all of a man's conduct solely because he has relationship with interstate commerce. What is required is that there be a relationship between interstate commerce and the evil to be regulated. Over the course of the years, various tests have been established for determining whether this relationship exists. The proposed legislation clearly meets these tests.

1. Artificial restrictions upon the market for goods

Supreme Court decisions have many times sustained the power of Congress to enact legislation which would remove artificial restrictions upon the markets for products from other States. The removal of such restrictions, as the Supreme Court recognized in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, promotes interstate traffic and therefore constitutes an appropriate object for the exercise of congressional authority. On that basis, restraints involving the local exhibition of motion picures have been the subject of Federal regulation under the Sherman Act (Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208; White Bar Theater v. State Theater Corp., 219 F. 2d 600; Youngclaus v. Omaha Film Board, 60 F. 2d 538. IPC Distributors v. Chicago Moving Picture Machine Operators Union, 132 F. Supp. 294), and so have stage attractions (United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222), professional boxing matches (United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236), and professional football games (Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445).

Like unlawful monopolies, racial discrimination and segregation in the estab lishments covered by the proposed legislation constitute artificial restrictions upon the movement of goods in interstate commerce, and they may be dealt with by the Congress for that reason. The restrictive impact of discriminatory practices is perhaps best illustrated by reference to the motion picture industry. Motion picture theaters which refuse to admit Negroes will obviously draw patrons from a narrower segment of the market than if they were open to patrons of all races. The difference will often not be made up by separate theaters for Negroes because there are localities which can support one theater but not two (or two but not three, etc.); and because the inferior economic position in which racial discrimination has held Negroes often makes their custom alone financially inadequate to support a theater. Thus, the demand for films from out of State, and the royalties on such films, will be less. What is true of exclusion is true, although perhaps in less degree, of segregation. During any patricular performance, a segregated theater may well lack sufficient seating space in the "white" area while offering ample seating in the Negro section, and vice versa. Moreover, the very fact of segregation in seating discourages attendance by Negroes.

The principles are applicable not merely to motion picture theaters but to the other establishments included under the proposed legislation as well. All of them receive supplies, equipment, or goods for resale, through the channels of interstate commerce. If these establishments narrow their potential markets by aritificially restricting their patrons to non-Negroes, the volume of sales and

1 See also, Labor Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S 100, 123.

Laws enacted pursuant to the congressional Commerce Clause power have also berc applied to businesses furnishing accommodations to interstate travelers (Hotel Employers Local 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99); to retail auto dealers (Howell Chevrolet Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 346 U.S. 482); to corner drugstores (United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689); to department stores (J. L. Brandeis v. National Labor Relations Board 142 F. 2d 977 (C.A. 8), certiorari denied, 323 U.S. 751; May Department Stores Co. T National Labor Relative Board, 326 U.S. 376); to theaters (League of New York Theaters Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 1429; National Labor Relations Board v. Combined Century Theaters 278 F.2d 306 (C.A. 2)); and other retail enterprises (see, e.g., Meat Cutters v. Fairlaws Meats, 353 U.S. 20; San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26; National Labor Relations Board v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224; National Labor Relations Board v. Gene Compton's, 262 F. 2d 653 (C.A. 9).

therefore the volume of interstate purchases will be less. Although the demand may be partly filled by other establishments that do not discriminate, the effect will be substantial in those areas where segregation is practiced on a large scale. Stores selling to Negroes and stores selling to non-Negroes will not be alike and will not carry all the same lines and quality of goods. The economic impact is felt in interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause vests power in Congress to remedy this problem.

2. Restrictions on interstate travel

Congress has long exercised authority under the Commerce Clause to remove impediments to interstate travel and interstate travelers. As long as 1887, legislation was enacted (49 U.S.C. 3(1)) forbidding a railroad in interstate commerce "to subject any particular person *** to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." Similar statutory authority is provided with respect to motor carriers (49 U.S.C. 316(d)) and air carriers (49 U.S.C. 1374 (b)).

These provisions have been authoritatively construed to proscribe racial segregation of passengers on railroads (Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80; Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816; N.A.A.C.P. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 297 I.C.C. 335), on motor carriers (Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454; Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 64 M.C.C. 769), and on air carriers (Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F. 2d 499 (C.A. 2)). The decisions in these cases are, of course, direct authority for the proposition that Congress may enact legislation appropriate to secure equality of treatment for Negroes using the facilities of interstate commerce.

The constitutional authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause, moreover, extends beyond the regulation of the interstate carriers themselves; it covers all businesses affecting interstate travel (i.e., interstate commerce). Thus the wages of employees engaged in preparing meals for interstate airlines, sandwiches for sale in a railroad terminal and ice for cooling trains have all been held subject to Federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. Walling v. Armstrong, 68 F. Supp. 870, affirmed, 161 F. 2d 515; Sherry Corine Coke Corp. v. Mitchell, 264 F. 2d 831, cert denied, 360 U.S. 934; Mitchell v. Royal Baking Co., 219 F. 2d 532; Chapman v. Home Ice Co., 136 F. 2d 353, cert denied, 320 U.S. 761. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held restaurants to be within the scope of the Interstate Commerce Act's antidiscrimination provision if part of the facilities of an interstate carrier. In Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 463, the Court declared:

"Interstate passengers have to eat ***. Such passengers in transit on a paid interstate *** journey had a right to expect that this essential transportation food service voluntarily provided for them under such circumstances would be rendered without discrimination prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Act." While in Boynton the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act of its own force reached only restaurants connected with the carrier itself, the reasoning with respect to effect on commerce is no less applicable to service stations, hotels, motels, and other establishments serving interstate travelers. Such establishments affect travelers, and therefore, interstate commerce, in the same manner as restaurants. Just as travelers need food, they must have gasoline and places to sleep. Clearly, discrimination by such establishments severely burdens and restricts interstate travel and may therefore be regulated by the Congress. In removing impediments to interstate travel, Congress is not limited to forbidding discrimination against interstate travelers alone; it may forbid discrimination against local customers as well. Congress may "choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though they involve control of intrastate activities." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121. Interstate commerce is burdened if interstate travelers are required to carry with them proof that they are in the course of a trip through more than one State. See Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F. 2d 750. And interstate travel is discouraged if the interstate traveler is aware that those of his race who are not involved in interstate travel are refused service or accommodations in facilities needed by interstate travelers. Congress may eliminate these incidental impediments to interstate travel along with the more direct burdens discussed above. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1; Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414; Shreveport case, 234, U.S. 342.

3. Elimination of adverse effects on the allocation of resources and flow of interstate commerce

The Commerce Clause also vests Congress with the authority to deal with conditions which adversely affect the allocation of resources and to eliminate the causes of disputes that may curtail the flow of interstate commerce.

The Federal Government has, of course, a legitimate interest in the interstate movement of capital and goods, and Congress has frequently acted in furtherance of that interest. Thus, in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Congress invoked the commerce power because excessive supplies of farm products caused a dispartiy between industrial and farm prices and thereby tended to reduce "the volume of interstate and foreign commerce in industrial products. Similarly, the Fair Labor Standards Act speaks of the effect of "labor conditions detrimental to the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers" upon “the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce." See also, the declaration of policy in section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act.

Experience shows that discrimination, when widely practiced throughout ser tions of the country, has a markedly adverse effect upon the interstate flow of both capital and goods. Capital is reluctant to invest in the region. Skilled or educated men who will be the victims of discrimination are reluctant to settle in the area even when opportunities are available. The inferior economic position to which general discrimination and segregation relegate a large segment of the population in some regions reduces their purchasing power thus reducing the flow of goods and the incentive to bring capital into the area. It is perfectly apparent that Congress may legislate with respect to such conditions. 4. Elimination of causes of disruption in the flow of interstate commerce

There is a parallel congressional power to eliminate the causes of disputes that may curtail the flow of interstate commerce-power which was recognized and sustained in a number of decisions under the National Labor Relations Act These decisions show that Congress may, by legislation, deal with labor disputes which halt production or the resale of manufactured goods because, based or the Federal interest in the elimination of obstructions to the free flow of commerce, there is a corresponding power to remove the causes of the disputes which are responsible for these obstructions. See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1; N.L.R.B. v. Suburban Lumber Co., 212 F. 2d 829; J. L. Brandeis v. N.L.R.B., 142 F. 2d 977, cert denied, 323 U.S. 751; N.L.R.B v Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224.

Disputes involving the racially discriminatory practices of places of public ac commodation give rise to picketing and other demonstrations. The picketing and the demonstrations interfere with the sale of goods and thus affect interstate commerce in precisely the same manner as would labor disputes involving such establishments.

In any discussion of the Commerce Clause as a source of congressional authority for the public accommodations provisions in title II, it is important to emphasize that the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, involved no question concerning congressional power under the Commerce Clause, In its decision holding the Civil Rights Act of 1875 beyond the power of Congress under the 14th amendment, the Court did not pass upon the power of Congress to enact similar legislation under the Commerce Clause. It had been argued to the Court that the act was effective at least as to public conveyances, since they were plainly in interstate commerce, but the Court felt that "as the sections in question are not conceived in any such view," the statute could not even be considered under the Commerce Clause and had to stand or fall on the power of Congress under the 14th amendment (109 US. at 19).

News media and publications have noted a dramatic reduction in business activity in regions which suffer from the effects of racial discrimination. Thus, the Wall Street Journal of May 26, 1961, pointed out that new construction contracts in the first quarter of 1961 ran 11 percent below the first quarter of 1960 in the six Southern States served by the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, while during the same period there was a rise nationally of 0.2 percent.