subjected to severer trials of temper and discretion. Disregarding all personal sufferings and sacrifices, by a steady perseverance in the course of action which I deliberately adopted, I had the satisfaction of succeeding in all my objects. The predatory and desultory warfare was suspended (not a hostile shot having been fired in the country since I entered upon my mission); the khan was placed upon the throne of his ancestors; the Brahue and Beluche tribes were taught to rely implicitly upon the honour and integrity of a government which they had previously distrusted and were converted from bitter enemies into confiding friends.

The sincerity of the khan and his chiefs, and the success of my negotiations, were severely tested by the calamitous events at Cabul, in 1842; but so firmly had I established throughout the country a trust in the British name and power, that these disasters, which cast a temporary cloud upon the lustre of our arms and tempted some of our allies to desert us, had no effect upon the khan and chiefs of Kelat, who even repelled the solicitations of the Shahzadeh Sufter Jung and the sirdars of Candahar to join them in a religious confederacy against us. In the hour of our supposed adversity (to use the words of Lord Ellenborough, the Governor-General of India), "the Court and chiefs of Kelat remained firm in their allegiance;" and although Beluchistan had, for eighteen months before, inspired the Indian Government with anxiety, if not with alarm; at a time when the whole of Affghanistan was in arms against us, animated by a contagious spirit of enthusiasm, to which a British army appeared to have fallen a sacrifice, the country beyond the Bolan Pass, inhabited by restless and barbarous tribes, had been soothed into unwonted tranquillity. It was, I believe, generally admitted that, if I had not succeeded in bringing in the khan of Kelat, and conciliated the Brahue and Beluche sirdars, not a man of our army above the passes would have returned to India.

Meanwhile, the success which had attended my negotiations with the khan and chiefs of Kelat, attended, or rather facilitated, my exertions in the Bolan Pass, the free passage of which became, in the unfavourable position of our affairs, a matter of vast importance, since this formidable defile was the route by which alone reinforcements and supplies could be sent to the beleaguered garrison at Candahar. For upwards of four months, I was engaged in the arduous task of completing arrangements with the tribes between the foot of the pass and the Indus, who had a multitude of real or colourable grievances to allege against the British authorities, and which had inflamed their animosity to the highest pitch. After much difficult negotiation, the Bolan Pass was opened; our convoys were permitted to traverse it without molestation; the Doda Murris, the most powerful of the tribes, and whose hostility was the most inveterate, were brought to accept our terms; treaties were concluded with them, with the Bugtis, the Dumkis, and other principal and minor tribes, the result of which was, their complete subjection to the authority of the khan, our ally, and the entire cessation of hostility and extinction of enmity on their part towards us; so that the country, singularly fitted by its physical features and the habits of its population to be the nest of political disorder, and which in 1840 was a scene of tumult and bloodshed, presented in 1841 the aspect of a settled and peaceful province.

The beneficial effects of this state of things, the fruit of my labours in Beluchistan,-brought about at a pecuniary cost utterly insignificant in amount,-were not restricted to the mere pacification of this particular country, and the transmutation of a vindictive people, mistrustful of our faith, into steady adherents to our interests; they exerted a material moral influence upon the operations of MajorGeneral Nott at Candahar, whose bold and magnanimous movement from that city upon Ghuzni and Cabul would have been scarcely practicable but for the opening of the communication between Candahar and the Indus, and the tranquillization of a country which, in its former state, would have rendered the safety of all our troops above the Bolan Pass problematical. It will be seen from the Narrative, that General Nott, a man not prone to exaggerate difficulties, told the Government that the check experienced by Major-General England at Hykulzye (and which, I repeat, in my opinion, would not have happened if my suggestion had been

acceded to) had produced a great moral effect throughout the country, and “had added considerably to the difficulties of his position."

The influence which my success, and I may justly add the means whereby it was attained, gave me amongst the chiefs and tribes of Beluchistan, operated (if I may so speak) as a species of talisman, in the march of Major-General England from Quetta to Candahar, the communication between which city and the posts to the south was completely closed, owing to the enemy's having taken possession of Killa Abdulla. It was of essential importance that this communication should be re-opened, and my acquaintance with the local chiefs, and especially with Mir Salu Khan, who held paramount authority, enabled me to bring them over to the British cause, and they were conducted by me, in the train of Major-General England's force, to Candahar. The arrangements I had made with these chiefs were sanctioned and ratified by General Nott, and, to repeat the acknowledgment of Major Rawlinson, the able political agent at Candahar, they “provided for the re-opening of our dak communication with India, and maintained that communication regularly and uninterruptedly during the remainder of our stay at Candahar.”

The re-opening of this communication is an incident in the history of this critical campaign which attracted the keen and experienced observation of the Duke of Wellington, who, in the House of Lords, passed a high eulogium upon the measure, the importance of which could not escape his discernment, although his Grace was not, of course, aware of even the name of the individual who had rendered this service.

In the triumphant march of Major-General Nott from Candahar to Ghuzní and Cabul, I had an active share in all the actions with the enemy, and after the arrival of that force at Cabul, I was selected to command the detachment furnished from General Nott's army for the expedition into the Kohistan of Cabul. In the attack on Istaliff, which has been described as one of the most brilliant and decisive actions of that campaign, I commanded the left column of attack, which, it will be seen from the Narrative, did eminent service both at the fortified village of Emillah and at the fortress of Istaliff, the strongest place in Affghanistan. If the army of Aminulla Khan had not been so effectually disposed of at this place (the killed alone of the enemy amounted probably to 1,000), they would have followed and harassed us as we retired, and occasioned our encumbered army much trouble, and perhaps considerable losses.

As it was, on the march of the British forces from Cabul to Peshawur, various attempts were made by the mountain tribes to impede their progress through the tremendous defiles. During this most painful and difficult march, my brigade was every day in the rear (the most arduous position, as even non-military men must know, in a retiring army), and in the Jugdulluk Pass, which has acquired a fatal celebrity, the second brigade, which I commanded, is entitled to almost the entire honour of having saved, by my arrangements, many lives, besides a large portion of the baggage and commissariat supplies, together with the Somnath Gates, a very precious, but a most cumbersome and embarrassing charge, and which nearly fell into the hands of the enemy. In the march from Lundi Khana to Alli Musjid. the most dangerous and critical of all, owing to the desperate determination of the enemy, who saw their expected prey escaping them, and were elated by their success the evening before over a portion of Major-General M'Caskill's force, I was specially ordered by General Nott to take charge of the baggage, guns, gates, &c. My dispositions kept the enemy in check, and brought the long and heterogeneous train of baggage, supplies, artillery, and gates, together with the troops I had in charge, unharmed into Alli Musjid; and in the onward march from thence to Jumrud, the Narrative will shew that my resources were again most severely taxed to provide against the assults of the Kyberries. On one occasion, I was obliged to act, though junior brigadier, upon my own responsibility. It is always difficult, and sometimes presumptuous, to predict what would have happened if certain measures had not been taken; but I am justified in affirming that, if I had not, upon that occasion, strengthened the picquets and rear-guard

with two regiments of my own brigade, the enemy might have cut in upon the gates, baggage, and godown, and inflicted upon us a severe loss of reputation as well as of property. I assert this with the more confidence, because it was generally acknowledged in the force that, but for the second brigade, the Somnath Gates and the greater part of the baggage would have been lost (besides the disgrace of a reverse) in the Jugdulluk Pass, in that of Lundi Khana, and near Alli Musjid. At Jugdulluk we had no orders, yet that affair has never been mentioned in any public despatch.

None of these transactions, indeed, have found any but a very penurious record in the official reports of General Nott. It is mortifying to the officers employed in Sir William Nott's army to observe the extraordinary contrast between his official reports and those of Sir George Pollock; the latter, full, complete, excluding no action or name from notice that had the smallest pretension to such a distinction; the former, brief, meagre, defective, and parsimonious. This contrast is not, however, a source of mortification merely, but of injury, inasmuch as it necessarily led to an incorrect estimate of the relative merits and services of the two divisions of the force, and by an inevitable consequence to an unequal distribution of those honours and distinctions which legitimate and much-coveted reward of military services. The disapprobation of the distinctions conferred upon the officers of the two armies is enormous, being, perhaps, ten to one in favour of Sir George Pollock's.

When the distribution of honours to the Candahar force was promulgated, conceiving myself (as well as other officers of the second brigade, who had been entirely overlooked) to be unfairly treated, having had the hardest work; having been taken several times out of my roster of duty, marching my brigade every day in the rear from Cabul to Jumrud,-I first addressed myself to Sir William Nott, calling upon him to see me righted. In his answer, he congratulated me upon my having received the Companionship of the Bath (for which I am most grateful), and declared that he made his reports of actions and officers according to the best of his judgment, and could not interfere with the arrangements of Government in the distribution of honours. It seems difficult to understand how, if Sir William did not interfere,—that is, did not recommend and point out the respective claims of his officers, he discharged his debt of justice towards those who had so heartily co-operated with him and assisted him to win the high distinctions he received. Disappointed in this application, I made an appeal to the Governor-General (Lord Ellenborough), and, failing there, I drew up, in July, 1844, a Memorial to the Honourable Court of Directors of the East-India Company, which I transmitted through the proper channels, setting forth the nature of my services, and soliciting that, through the Honourable Court, a representation of those services might be made to Her Most Gracious Majesty, whereby I might obtain such a mark of the royal approbation as my zeal and success might appear to deserve. In my letter to the Governor-General in Council, which accompanied this Memorial, I ventured respectfully to urge that, of the many difficult, yet successful, duties performed by me, both in the political and military departments, no adequate notice had been taken either by the Honourable Court or her Majesty's Government; and added as follows:

"I am a cadet of February, 1804; have often been a volunteer, when active service was to be performed,* from the taking of the Cape in 1805-6. I was more recently a volunteer in the Army of the Indus, and served through the whole of the Trans-Indus campaign, from 1838 to 1842. During this period, it is my pride to say, that, as my opportunities of military service were frequent and of moment, so have they ever been successful, though frequently unacknowledged. And here I would beg most respectfully to remark that the different mode of proceeding observed by the two generals (General Pollock and General Nott) towards the

* I may mention that, in October, 1840, when Major-General Nott was preparing to move against Kelat, I volunteered to lead all storming parties; and again, în 1842, when the general resolved to move from Candahar upon Ghuzni and Cabul; in both instances, General Nott, who was much pleased, accepted my offer.

officers under their respective commands, as regards the notice taken of their individual merits in their reports, must not only have left many officers of General Sir William Nott's force reason to complain of neglect as regards distinction, but must also have led to an erroneous estimation of the comparative services of the officers of the two armies by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the GovernorGeneral, the Honourable the Court of Directors, and the Home Government." This Memorial has hitherto been ineffectual.

Let it not be supposed or suspected that there is any desire on my part to detract in the slightest degree from the merits of the late Sir William Nott, or to carp at the honours and distinctions bestowed upon him. His conduct merits the highest praise; he was brave and intelligent, and deserved all the Government gave him, perhaps even more; for by his gallant and adventurous move upon Ghuzni and Cabul (and the resolution was exclusively his own) he retrieved his country's honour. He may, nevertheless, inadvertently, have neglected an essential duty of a commander, that of bringing fully to the notice of the ruling authorities and of the public the services of his subordinate officers, and thereby caused temporary injustice, which it is still in the power of the Government to repair.

The design of this Narrative does not require that it should be pursued further. I may, however, briefly add that I commanded a large brigade at the battle of Maharajpore, near Gwalior, on the 29th December, 1843; that at the great and decisive action with the Sikhs at Sobraon, on the 10th February, 1846, I had the command of the 3rd brigade, belonging to Major-General Dick's division, and was ordered by Lord Gough to lead the advance against the enemy's intrenchments, which were forced by my brigade; that on the fall of Major-General Dick, at the fourth gun, on the right of the entrance, the command of the division devolved upon me, and I continued to command it until the close of the battle, at the passage of the Sutlej, while in the enemy's country, and up to the termination of the campaign.”

In conclusion, we may state, what indeed might be fully anticipated from his generous and chivalrous character, that Colonel Outram, the political agent for Sindh and Beluchistan, at once recognized and keenly appreciated the distinguished services of Colonel Stacy in Kelat, yea more, that he did his very utmost to secure from the Supreme Government "the acknowledgment so justly due, for the untiring zeal and indomitable courage with which he (Col. Stacy) pursued his object to a successful termination." This earnest and magnanimous attempt to notify, accredit and reward the rare merits of a political subordinate, is only one of the many leaves that form the laurel crown which has long adorned the brow of him, whom his rival and antagonist (Sir C. Napier) in one of his generous and soldierly moods, pronounced "the Bayard of the Indian Army," in other words," the knight without fear and without reproach."

BANDERS, CONES AND CO., TYPS., NO. 7, MISSION BOW.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTICES.

Historical and Statistical Sketches of Aden in Arabia Felix, during a two years' Residence in that Colony. By an Officer in the Queen's Army. Madras: 1848.

THIS is evidently the production of a poetical spirit. The author we can imagine to be one who denounces the age as unpoetical, who seeks to be useful in prose, having failed to take Parnassus by storm. If such be the case, the "Officer" has done wisely; and it is with some satisfaction that we introduce his "Sketches" of an important Colony to the readers of this Review. Some sixty-three years have elapsed since Dr. Johnson, during his memorable tour to the Hebrides, remarked at Lord Haile's, that "it is wonderful how ignorant many officers of the army are, considering how much leisure they have for study, and the acquisition of knowledge." The liberal Boswell hoped the moralist was mistaken. But the Rambler, although, doubtless, prejudiced against the possibility of literature or general knowledge flourishing among the Sons of Mars, was not entirely in the wrong. He was, if we may so express it, unfairly right. For it is decidedly unfair, in general society, to judge officers of the army by the same code as men of other professions, or of no profession at all, as regards ordinary literature and general knowledge.

Military education is entirely unique; and influential Journals and voices have long been, and are still, denouncing the various systems pursued among the British, as poor and insufficient. We will let them speak and write on, to make military education better if they

can.

This should form the basis of the civil argument. To go beyond it is uncharitable. For, as to the inclination to study, and the state of general knowledge among the officers of the army, we would ask, how many are there of those not in the military profession in England, who, when they have finished their education at School or College, or fitted themselves for the calling they are to pursue in life, are inclined to indulge much in literature as an amusement or gratify the noble ambition of becoming wise and sensible through the continued acquisition of knowledge ?-Very-very few!-Comparatively speaking.

When a military Officer enters society, too much is often expected from him. He must be the perfection of a man; or he is nothing. In society he becomes the darling of the ladies, and the butt of the learned; for ignorance is totally incompatible with the dignity of scarlet and gold.