ART. III-1. Quarterly Review, No. CLXIV.

2. North British Review, No. XVI.

3. General Appendix to the Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the affairs of the East India Company, 16th August 1832; and minutes of India in the Military Department.

4. The Marquis of Hastings' summary of the operations in India, with their Results, from the 30th April 1814 to the 31st January 1823.

5. Circular letter from T. Hyde Villiers, Esq., dated India Board 2d February 1832, and the replies thereto from Lieut. General Sir W. K. Grant, Major Generals Sir John Malcolm, Sir Thomas Pritzler, and Sir H. Worsley, Colonels Sherwood, Pennington, Limond, Mayne, and T. Munro, Lieut. Colonels Salmond, Colebrooke, Hopkinson, De Haviland, and E. Baker, Majors D. Wilson and J. Nut, and Captains J. G. Duff, Page, and Balmain.

6. Inquiry into the state of the Indian Army, by Walter Badenach, Esq., Captain Bengal Army. London, 1826.

7. Malcolm's Political History of India.

8. Life of Sir Thomas Munro.

9. Narrative of the Bengal Army, by Captain Williams. 10. Orme's History of India.

11. General Orders of the Governor-General of India in Council. 12: General Orders of the Right Hon. the Commander-in-Chief. 13. Bengal Army List.

14. East India Register.

IN the Quarterly Review for March is an able article on the Military Establishments of Great Britain; and as many of the observations contained in that article appear to us applicable at the present time to the condition of our establishment in Bengal, we wish to draw attention to that article, and point out what we consider to be some of the more prominent defects in the formation of our Eastern Army. These observations would apply to the armies of the other presidencies as well as to that of Bengal, but it is principally to the latter that we wish. to confine our attention. The Quarterly Reviewer finds fault with the appointment of a Select Committee of the House of Commons to investigate the items of expenditure on the Home

Military establishment, but hopes that good may come out of this appointment, by the attention of the Committee being also directed to the consideration of the fitness of the Army and Navy for their work.

In India we have no similar carefully prepared estimates of the probable cost of the Army and Navy for the current year, and no Select Committee to which to submit them, except when the Government, pressed for finances, orders the assembly of a Committee to retrench whatever is in their power: and there can be no doubt but that in their zeal for the financial improvement of the state, these Committees are too apt to cripple its real powers by applying the pruning knife too indiscriminately to its Military establishment. A reaction is then sure to take place, and greater expense is eventually incurred by hastily prepared and ineffective armaments, because conducted on too small a scale for military operations. Still we cannot altogether agree with the Reviewer that the effect of submitting such estimates to a Select Committee of the House of Commons will be so injurious, as he would lead us to infer is his opinion. On the contrary we conceive that it is the duty of the House to inquire into not only the fitness for their individual purpose of the Army and Navy, but more especially into the items of expenditure of each and every establishment under the crown: and the Reviewer himself shows the necessity of this inquiry into the expenditure under the Board of Ordnance, which he terms "the most costly and the clumsiest working of our establishments."

We should like to see a financial Committee, composed of Civil and Military Officers of the Indian Establishment, appointed to inquire into the items of expenditure of this Board and of the different Magazines and Dockyards in the United Kingdom. The Report of such a Committee would, we consider, be one of the richest things imaginable. The Indian Army, with all its establishments, has already passed through the ordeal of an examination before a Select Committee of the House of Commons, and it would be but fair to return the compliment. We throw this out as a hint for Jos. Hume, Esq., when the next estimates are brought forward.

Reading as we have taken the liberty to do "India" for "England," how strictly applicable are the following passages of the Review to our Empire in the East. Thus-" the point at which India ought to aim in the arrangement of her military establishment is, that she shall have at all times on foot and in a state of perfect efficiency such an amount of 'force as shall give confidence to her Government in its negotiations with the Native powers, and insure both the Paramount

'power and its innumerable dependencies from the hazard of sustaining a coup de main [or being insulted by some refractory chief]. When states are circumscribed by lines of frontier, more imaginary than real, they must always stand towards their neighbours on every side in an attitude more or less of distrust; the safety of each depends upon its readiness to enter at any moment upon a campaign; and a campaign once opened, no matter on which side or for what purpose, must be accepted as the first of a series of movements in a war of conquest."

The Italics in the above extract are ours, as we wish to touch more particularly on our general deficiency in this important point of perfect efficiency and readiness; for we may say in the words of an eminent writer* and practical reformer of the present day, that as we feel as strongly as any one can do that efficiency in the Public Service is more essential than cheapness; nay more, we contend that efficiency is the greatest cheapness. Our principle may be summed up in a single sentence; with so wide an empire and such mighty interests at stake as we have to care for, inefficiency in any branch of the public service would be nothing short of imbecility.

As the Reviewer states with respect to England, so in India we may also presume it to be a maxim, that a war of conquest or even of aggression is a sort of game that she should never play again of her own free choice or option. We hold that the well-being of this country depends on the preservation of the British rule intact, and except for its defence therefore, there can be no conceivable inducement to engage in war. This maxim has been inculcated on every Governor-General that came to India, and has been as uniformly set aside; and consequently we must conclude that the very existence of our power in the East must be maintained by continued war: unless indeed we suppose that motives of ambition and vain glory do continually creep into the minds of the rulers of this land, and that the Government is held by men who come but to reap their laurels and depart. But this we cannot believe, for though it might be insinuated that as far as this country is concerned they are at best but foreign rulers serving for rewards of some kind or other; either for glory or titles or wealth, and that in general, they have not even the advantage of being chosen from the ranks, of the Civil and Military services of India, who from long residence in the country become in some measure naturalized and identified with the best interests of the country, but that on the contrary our

Economist, June 10, 1818.

Governors-General and Commanders-in-Chief do usually pass but one Olympiad of their lives amongst us and depart, and that to such men motives of ambition or vain glory must act as strong inducements to plunge the country in expensive wars or squander the resources of the state in vain parade and empty show, or in acts which will conduce to raise them in the estimation of their own party, and give them influence in the British Parliament, as power and influence in the Roman senate was often gained on the confines of the Empire;-still we remember that these rulers are British born and British bred, and we trust that not a few of them do seek nobly and honorably the true welfare of this land; and while they endeavour to extend the renown of the British Empire in general, are not forgetful of the interests of India in particular, or of the people of Hindustan committed to their care; and we are free to confess that their position in this country is often difficult and trying, seeing that the interests of the British Empire, or rather the party questions of the rulers for the time being of the British Empire, and the interests of India separately considered do often clash, and more especially in the commercial policy of the empire. Could the virtual sovereigns of this country free themselves from these British State trammels and gain some insight into the actual working of politics in India, ere they come to rule, it would doubtless have a more beneficial effect on our expenditure than all the committees that ever sat on Indian affairs.

Thus although in general it is not the interest of this country or of the paramount power to extend its rule over the adjacent kingdoms or provinces, still in justice to the people over whom we rule it may be at times necessary to do so. For example, it is not to be expected that the people in Bengal are to be at the expense of keeping up vast armies for the purpose of preserving peace in the Punjab, when by the annexation of that kingdom to the empire it would be made to defray its own expenses. It may not be the fault of the British Government that the Sikhs are unable to govern themselves, but we feel certain that it is the duty of every paramount power to deprive their enemies of the means of attacking and disturbing the peace of the realm when once they have by commencing hostilities brought the war upon themselves; and we hold further that it is the duty of the paramount power to provide permanently for the Government of any tributary state, incapable of governing itself, and which by its constant rebellion openly defies the paramount power and materially weakens the resources and injures the commerce of the peaceful portion of its dominions. Not but that we are fully aware of our present extended posi

tion and our consequent weakness; concentration is strength, and every addition to our empire can only increase our difficulties. We are now like a tree extending far and wide its spreading branches, while weak and hollow at the core;-our provinces large enough for kingdoms, our roads and means of communication throughout the country very imperfect; the circulation in our system far too slow. We want more of nervous vital energy in our Government; and these objects can only be gained by connecting in the most efficient manner our distant provinces, and thus virtually concentrating our power; for in this respect we may say that what is true in physics is also true in politics or in war; and if the intensity of light diminishes according to the square of its distance from the illuminating body, so does the force of the governing power; so that if by railway communication we can move through the same space in one day that we do now in ten, we increase the real governing power of the country one hundred fold. To render therefore our establishments effective and efficient we require the best means of communication of modern times, we require in fact Rail-roads, not for commerce or for convenience, but to strengthen our empire. Some may think this subject very irrelevant to the heading of our article, but we hold it to be true, that to be enabled to concentrate the strength and power of the state on any menaced frontier, more rapidly than the enemy can do, is half the science of war; and to enable a Commander-in-Chief to do so, he must have roads and communications of the best kind, as without them the most expensive armaments are useless; unable to reach the required point except in scattered detachments, and at distant intervals of time, they are liable to be attacked in detail, and also afford the most unskilful enemy leisure to concentrate and prepare for action. Lord Hardinge is said to have calculated the gain in power of a Railroad from Calcutta to Delhi at four regiments, but we should say that had he rated it at forty regiments, he would have been below the mark.

It is not too much to say, that had a Rail-road between Calcutta and Delhi or the frontier been in existence during the last year, the present disturbances in the Punjab would either never have taken place, or had the Sikhs, in ignorance of the vast increase of power which such a road to the frontier would give, ventured to show hostile intentions, such an amount of force both in men, horses, ammunition, stores and artillery, could in a few days have been poured on their country, and that too at comparatively a small expense, that all ideas of resistance would have vanished. This is the secret of our success, that we have usually been able from some hidden source to bring to bear upon our refractory neighbours a power which they never dreamt of; as Hyder Ali is reported to have said; "it is not

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