peremptorily required, and fubfequent events have completely juftified.

The production of the correfpondence between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, the French minifter at the court of London, is fo connected with the affairs of France, that we shall refer our remarks upon it to that part of our work which is affigned to foreign tranfactions.

But the most important and interefting event which is prefented to our confideration in the foregoing pages, is the declaration of war against Great Britain, by the convention of France; an event engendered by that revolutionary fpirit which menaced the conftituted authorities of every neighbouring kingdom, and which it became the intereft and the duty of every neighbouring kingdom to refift. This country, however, appears to have obferved a very ftrict neutrality with refpect to France; and if the French had confined themfelves within the limits of their own government, no reafon fuggefts itfelf to us, which can juftify the opinion, that this fcrupulous neutrality would not have been continued. But this line of conduct, Great Britain, though with great reluctance, was obliged to change, not only in its own defence, but for the maintenance of every exifting fyftem in Europe, in the balance of which the not only formed a principal part, but in the due prefervation of which the has fo material an interest.

That fpirit of aggrandizement which France had openly profeffed, fhe had now begun to execute. Under the pretext of eftablishing univerfal liberty and fraternity, the

aimed at univerfal conqueft. She had over-run the whole of the Auftrian Netherlands, the province of Nice, the dutchy of Savoy, and feveral ftates fituated on the Rhine; while her victories were attended with confequences unknown to civilized nations. She, at length, threatened to fraternize, or, in other words, to fubjugate Holland. In this ftate of things, is there a reflecting, unprejudiced man to be found, who will ferioufly deny the neceflity which impelled this country to prepare itfelf for the probable contingencies of a period fo big with menace andˇalarm?

The poffibility of preventing war by the British government has, indeed, been boldly afferted, but never, at leaft, to our comprehenfion, fatisfactorily proved. To treat with France at fuch a moment, appears to have been altogether impracticable, where the momentary and fickle will of an armed multitude had been fubftituted for order and for laws. The outcry of the leading perfons in the French government, if, at this period, it can be called a government, was a general revolution, to be obtained in every kingdom in Europe by exciting internal revolt, or menacing external attack. Could England, therefore, confiftently with her honour or her intereft, remain a tranquil fpectator of the deftructive march of fuch a people. Was the not compelled by both these influencing principles to draw her fword, and advance to protect her allies from the deftroying power that threatened them. France knew the terms on which the might fecure, as the had poffeffed, the neutrality of Great Britain. She had only to withdraw

withdraw her forces within her own territories, and to confine herself to the establishment of her own conftitution. But peace was not her object to ufe the expreffion of Briffot, when he was the predominant demagogue of the French nation, the four corners of Europe must be in flames before the power of France could be established: nay, it is a known, incontrovertible fact, that the French executive government had, with a characteristic perfidy, determined on a war with England, at the very moment when its agent in London was engaged in a correfpondence with the British miniftry, for the avowed purpose of preferving peace. It appears, therefore, that there was no alternative. Great Britain had moft fcrupulously avoided committing the leaft act of provocation, while the French were equally anxious to discover or invent fome pretext for aggreffion. The reafons which they afligned for declaring war are fo frivolous, fo ridiculous, and fo ill-founded, as to render them objects of contempt as well as deteftation, and evidently prove, that war was a conftituent part of that policy, by which their tyranny was to be maintained; that it was confidered by them as the purveyor to provide for the blood-thirty maw of a ferocious ambition.

Great eloquence was, indeed, employed by Mr. Fox, and other partizans of oppofition, to prove, that war might have been avoided, if minifters had attended to the real honour and interefts of their country; and that France itself was anxious to maintain peace, when the was forced into hoftilities by the aggreffions of Great Britain. But, furely, it may be afked, with fome

degree of confidence, if the French executive government, in the interval which elapfed between the 19th of November, and the final departure of M. Chauvelin from England, evinced a difpofition to remove the well-founded alarms experienced by our court, by a repeal of the decree which gave rise to them? The French rulers did indeed deny, that it would bear the interpretation which had been given to it by the British miniftry, but their whole conduct at this time, gave the lie to their affertions. It would be a matter of fome diffi culty to produce, from the annals of any country, a more grofs contradiction between the profeffions and practice of a government, or a more perfidious violation of truth and good faith, than those by which the political proceedings of the French were diftinguifhed. It is remarkable alfo, that, on the 15th of December, the very day when a decree paffed the national affembly, whofe articles contain a fyftematic plan for diforganifing all civilifed governments, and profefs to confider as enemies any nation who fhould prefume to reject their offer of liberty and equality, or to enter into any treaty with a prince or privileged orders;-on that very day, the provifional executive council wrote to their agent Chauvelin, inftructing him to difavow all hoftile intentions on the part of France, and to proclaim how much they detefted the thought of entering into a war with England. In fhort, the hoftile principles of the offenfive decrees were almost immediately confirmed by the inftructions of the provincial executive council, to the national commiffioners in the Netherlands: nor is it the least exH 2 traordinary

traordinary circumftance of thefe extraordinary tranfactions, that these instructions were figned by the executive council, on the 8th of January, 1793; the very day when Monf. Le Brun, one of the members who fubfcribed them, addrefied a paper to lord Grenville, in which he declared that the French knew how to refpect other governments, and did not with to impofe laws on any.

Such were the circumfiances which influenced, not only a very commanding majority of both houfes of parliament, but, as it evidently appeared, of the nation at large, to confider the war with France not only as neceflary for the maintenance of treaties and the fupport of our allies; but as effential to the preservation of our political exifience as a free and happy people.

Nor did the incredulity of Mr. Sheridan, refpecting the exiftcnce of domeftic, faction and feditious practices, meet with any fupport in parliament, but from the diminished phalanx of oppofition. His accufation of minifters for creating

and fomenting a fpirit of alarm throughout the country to answer their own political purposes, was very generally confidered as a mere ebullition of party rancour, which had no foundation in truth or probability. Men politically ignorant, or politically prejudiced, might deny the exiftence of feditious practices; but can better evidence be required to that point, than the declaration of thofe very perfons who were obvioutly planning, in concert with France, the fubverfion of our conftitution: who, in the moft public and daring manner, avowed, that numerous focieties were forming themfelves upon the fame principle in every part of England; and who declared, with an exulting expectation, the fpeedy approach of that time, when the French fhould fend addreffes to the national convention of England. After fuch a teftimony, will any ferious, unprejudiced, reflecting man, accufe minifters of raifing frivolous alarms, and fomenting public apprehenfions, in order to promote their own views of power and ambition?

Lord Rarv

The Scotch

GEORGE

"GEORGE R.

"His majefty having judged it expedient to employ, in the fervice of Great-Britain, a body of his electoral troops, for the purpose of aflifting his allies the States Gencral of the United Provinces, and of profecuting, in the moft effectual manner, the juft and neceffary war in which his majefty is engaged, his majefty has directed an estimate to be laid before the House of Commons of the charge attending the employment of the faid troops; and his majefty relies on the zeal of his faithful Commons, that they will be ready to make the neceffary provifion for maintaining the fame.

"G. R."

It was then ordered that his majefty's moft gracious meffage be referred to the confideration of the committee of the whole Houfe, to whom it is referred, to confider further of the fupply granted to his majefty.

On the fame day a fimilar meffage was delivered to the Houfe of Peers by lord Grenville, for which an addrefs of thanks was voted in the ufual forms.

On the 11th of March, the Houfe of Commons, having refolved itfelf into a committee of fupply, Mr. Pitt faid, before I proceed to enumerate the expences of the prefent year, and the means and aids by which they are to be fupplied, I muft first mention the leading object which has governed my mind upon this occafion, namely, the recollection of the unanimous opinion, with respect to the pretent ftruggle, which the Houfe have carried to the throne, and publithed to the world; that they re

garded it as a ftruggle for whatever was most dear and facred, for the fecurity of the throne and the prefervation of the conftitution; and that they were prepared to profecute it with the greateft exertion, and a zeal proportioned to the importance of the objects for which we contended. The firft object to be regarded is, the rigorous and effectual profecution of this war, in which we have every thing at ftake; and it is by fuch a profecution of the war, that we thall best confult true prudence and rational economy. I do not wish to conceal from the Houfe and from the public, that large preparations must be made, and confiderable expences incurred. Economy, in our prefent fituation, muft not appear in limiting the extent of thefe expences, but in controuling their application. There is another point alto, which it is my wifh to inculcate; that whatever degree of exertion we may regard as neceffary, or may be difpofed to make, the public ought not, in any respect, to be deluded and flattered-They ought to be made fenfible of the full extent to which they may be liable to be called upon to defray the expences of the war. But though in calculating the expences of a war much may be done by cftimate, a great deal muft ftill depend on contingency. Unforefeen occurrences will continually arife, which will render additional expences neceffary. Taking then these occurrences into view, it is proper to allow confiderable latitude for the expences that may be incurred. It is part of my plan to allow a confiderable fun for thefe extraordinary emergencies, fo as to makea full provifion for every part of the H 3

expenco.

expence. But there is another object to be attended to: whatever degree of exertion may be made in the prefent conteft, which involves the dearest and most facred objects, ftill we muft not allow ourfelves to neglect what likewife involves in it the permanent interefts of ourselves and our pofterity. I not only mean fill to employ the annual million for the reduction of the national debt, but likewife the fum of 200,000l. which was laft year understood to be fet apart for that purpose, fo as to provide, even during the continuance of the war, for the leffening of the debt by compound interett. I likewife

mean to avoid another evil which has taken place in all former wars

the accumulation of an unfunded debt. I therefore intend to bring the unfunded debt every year to a diftin&t account. In conformity with this principle, I fhall propofe the payment of the navy debt, in order to reduce it to the eftablishment mentioned by the committee in their report last year. I thall now proceed in the usual way to ftate, first, the total amount of the fupply, and the total amount of the ways and means, distinguishing the exceffes of the fervices, and of the refources.