abolishing privateering, protecting enemies' goods under a neutral flag, and neutrals' goods under an enemy's flag, and denouncing what are termed paper blockades."

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These principles, so largely and exclusively affecting the belligerent rights of maritime powers, amongst whom Great Britain stands in the foremost rank, were promptly agreed to, as was also a provision for submitting them to the other powers for their acceptance. It was little thought of doubtless at the time, that these principles, with the exception of the first, were but a revival of, and improvement upon the famous declaration of "armed neutrality," which Catherine II. of Russia propounded, and, in combination with other States, endeavoured to force upon Great Britain in 1780, with the sole and averred purpose, of destroying her maritime superiority; a hostile combination which we so gloriously faced and resisted then, and have ever since repudiated. Is the world now grown so wise in its own conceit—is statesmanship so superior in perception and judgment to that in the time of our fathers, that we should lightly disregard the principles which they considered essential to the national dignity and power? And is it not somewhat worthy of remark, that whilst some score or two of states, great and small, who have all to gain and nothing to lose by the change, have responded in the affirmative to the appeal to recognize this new maritime code, the United States of America, being the maritime power next in importance to ourselves, has declined to do so? But, indeed, all pretences to restrict the

natural rights of nations, and to surrender generally, in times of peace, the powers of war, are but futile ; and there can, as we apprehend and hope, be little doubt that in any future case of belligerency, no British Government will hold itself too stringently bound by the restraints of the "Declaration of Paris," should the success of the war, and the safety of the state be seemingly prejudiced by them.

In the course of the late Franco-German war we suffered indignities, and committed absurdities utterly incompatible with all idea of a great power in Europe. When Count Bernstorff, in the name of the Prussian Government, sent a stern letter of rebuke for our not having interfered to prevent the export of horses, coals, and arms to France, instead of boldly repudiating the correspondence as being upon a subject on which the Prussian Government had no right to address us, Earl Granville condescended to enter upon a dicsussion in which he certainly justified our conduct, though at the sacrifice of the national dignity which was prejudiced by offering any justification at all.

When the German Army of the North was at Rouen, a detachment of this force seized six British colliers, which were peaceably lying in the Seine, near Havre, and after forcibly carrying away the crews, and casting them helpless on shore, on the very field of hostilities, then actually going on, they proceeded to scuttle and sink these ships in order to obstruct the passage of some French gun boats which were supposed to be approaching. And what was done by our Government to vindicate the hon

our of the British flag, and the personal freedom of British subjects, which had been thus recklessly outraged? A mild and hesitating letter of remonstrance was written by Earl Granville, to which Count Bismarck replied, justifying the proceeding as one strictly within the rights of belligerency, and citing an English authority, Sir Robert Phillimore in support of his position; but adding in almost the tone of a gracious act of concession, that the German Government would compensate the owners of the vessels for their loss; and with this the British Government were satisfied, and the British press, some portions of which had spoken out very loudly at first, were silenced. In the interests of truth it behoves us, however, to make a brief remark upon this subject. In the first place, as, indeed, need hardly be pointed out, Sir Robert Phillimore, the author of a very valuable work on International Law, has not the province to lay down any dogma concerning belligerent, or neutral rights, or other subject of the kind, unless justified by the authority of the older jurists, who were the founders of the science; except, indeed, under exceptional circumstances under treaty, or municipal law. The right of embargo to which alone the German Government can appeal in its justification, is mentioned by Sir R. Phillimore, as well as by some, but not all of the earlier writers. But this power, the right of which is much disputed, is of a very different kind, and available under very different circumstances, to that usurped by the German Army in this case. Sir R. Phillimore, who speaks of the power by the

"It is an

French term, le droit d'angarie, says: act of the state, by which foreign as well as private domestic vessels which happen to be within the jurisdiction of the state, are seized upon and compelled to transport soldiers, ammunition, and other instruments of war, in other words to become parties against their will to carrying on direct hostilities against a Power with whom they are at peace. The owners of such vessels receive payment of freight before hand. Such a measure is not without the sanction of practice and usage, and the approbation of many good writers upon International Law; but if the reason of the thing, and the paramount principle of national independence be considered, it can only be excused, and perhaps scarcely justified, by that clear and overwhelming necessity which would compel an individual to seize his neighbour's horse or weapon to defend his own life." Martens in his 'Droits des Gens' states: "The property of a neutral power which is found on the enemy's soil, whether moveable or immoveable, ought to be exempt from hostilities, the belligerent having no power over them,”—and then goes on to say, "It is doubtful whether the universal law of nations permits, except in cases of extreme necessity, the seizure (embargo) of neutral vessels which happen to be in our harbours at the time when the war breaks out, with the intention of employing them for the requirements of the fleet, paying them for their service. Usage has introduced the exercise of this right, but many treaties have abolished it," mentioning several, beginning with that of the Pyrenees, in 1659.

Nor were the above the only instances in which our known weakness of purpose exposed us to indignity and ridicule during the late war. Another visitation of retributive justice for our base desertion of Denmark, and in natural sequence to the disasters of Sadowa and Sedan. Russia taking advantage of the prostrate position of our ally, France, sent a peremptory note repudiating the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris as to the neutrality of the Black Sea. Lord Granville replied in a rather spirited letter, and sent Mr. Odo Russell to the German Court at Versailles to feel the way to their good offices on the subject, but without success. Mr. Odo Russell, however, emulated the the tone of his chief, and talked boldly about treaty obligations, what would be a casus belli, etc. But it was only talk. After the unmeaning formality of a Conference, the haughty demands of Russia were assented to, and Mr. Odo Russell, without being called upon for a word of explanation, was shortly afterwards promoted to the distinguished post of Ambassador at the Court of Berlin. So much for 80,000 men, and £80,000,000 of treasure sacrificed in the Crimea !

We cannot pass from this subject without acknowledging the manly conduct of Lord Denbigh and Mr. Cavendish Bentinck, who, at the time the Treaty of Paris was thus being smashed up, brought forward motions in the two Houses, urging that the occasion should be seized to withdraw from the mischievous declaration of neutral rights. They spoke in vain, however, failing to rouse the repre