under them the people of Kansas possess every right, privilege, and immunity, in respect to their internal polity and domestic relations, which the people of Pennsylvania can exercise under their Constitution and laws. Each is invested with full, complete, and exclusive powers in this respect, "subject only to the Constitution of the United States."

The question recurs, then, if the Constitution does establish Slavery in Kansas or any other Territory beyond the power of the people to control it by law, how can the conclusion be resisted that Slavery is established in like manner and by the same authority in all the States of the Union? And if it be the imperative duty of Congress to provide by law for the protection of slave property in the Territories upon the ground that "Slavery exists in Kansas" (and consequently in every other Territory) "by virtue of the Constitution of the United States," why is it not also the duty of Congress, for the same reason, to provide similar protection to slave property in all the States of the Union, when the legislatures fail to furnish such protection?

only recognizes the right of property in slaves, as stated by the Court, but explicitly states what class of persons shall be deemed slaves, and under what laws or authority they may be held to servitude, and under what circumstances fugitive slaves shall be restored to their owners, all in the same section, as follows:

"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such ser laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of vice or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

Thus it will be seen that a slave, within the meaning of the Constitution, is a "person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof"-not under the Constitution of the United States, nor by the laws thereof, nor by virtue of any federal authority whatsoever, but under the laws of the particular State where such service or labor may be due.

in the Constitution in order to satisfy the people of the It was necessary to give this exact definition of Slavery Without confessing or attempting to avoid the inevitable South as well as of the North. The slaveholding States consequences of their own doctrine, its advocates endeavor would never consent for a moment that their domestic reto fortify their position by citing the Dred Scott decision lations-and especially their right of property in their to prove that the Constitution recognizes property in slaves should be dependent upon Federal authority, or slaves that there is no legal distinction between this and that Congress should have any power over the subjectevery other description of property-that slave property either to extend, confine, or restrain it, much less to proand every other kind of property stand on an equal foot-tect or regulate it-lest, under the pretense of protection ing-that Congress has no more power over the one than and regulation, the Federal Government, under the influover the other-and, consequently, cannot discriminate which prevailed at that period, might destroy the instituence of the strong and increasing anti-slavery sentiment tion, and divest those rights of property in slaves which were sacred under the laws and constitutions of their respective States so long as the Federal Government had no power to interfere with the subject.

between them.

Upon this point the Court say:

"Now as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. . And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guaranties which have been provided for the protection of private property against the encroachments of the And the government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words-too plain to be understood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights."

government.

owner."

The rights of the owner, which it is thus made the duty of the Federal Government to guard and protect, are those expressly provided for in the Constitution, and defined in clear and explicit language by the Court-that "the government, in express terms, is pledged to protect it (slave property in all future time, if the slave escapes from his This is the only contingency, according to the plain reading of the Constitution, as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court, in which the Federal Government is authorized, required, or permitted to interfere with Slavery in the States or Territories; and in that case only for the purpose "of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights" to reclaim his slave property. In all other respects slaves stand on the same footing with all other property-"the Constitution makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen;" and "no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any other description." This is the basis upon which all rights pertaining to slave property, either in the States or the Territories, stand under the Constitution as expounded by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case.

In like manner, the non-slaveholding States, while they were entirely willing to provide for the surrender of all fugitive slaves-as is conclusively shown by the unanimous vote of all the States in the Convention for the provision now under consideration-and to leave each State perfectly free to hold slaves under its own laws, and by virtue of its own separate and exclusive authority, so long as it pleased, and to abolish it when it chose, were unwilling to become responsible for its existence by incorporating it into the Constitution as a national institution, to be protected and regulated, extended and controlled by Federal authority, regardless of the wishes of the people, and in defiance of the local laws of the several States and Territories. Northern States united in giving a unanimous vote in the For these opposite reasons, the Southern and Convention for that provision of the Constitution which recognizes Slavery as a local institution in the several States where it exists, "under the laws thereof," and provides for the surrender of fugitive slaves.

It will be observed that the term "State" is used in this provision, as well as in various other parts of the Constitution, in the same sense in which it was used by Mr. Jefferson in his plan for establishing governments for the new States in the territory ceded and to be ceded to the United States; and by Mr. Madison in his proposition te confer on Congress power" to institute temporary governments for the new States arising in the unappropriated lands of the United States," to designate the political communities, Territories as well as States, within the dominion of the United States. The word "States " is used in the same sense in the ordinance of the 18th July, 1787, for the government of the Territory northwest of the river Ohio, which was passed by the remnant of the Congress of the Confederation, sitting in New York while its most eminent members were at Philadelphia, as delegates to the Federal Convention, aiding in the formation of the Constitution of the United States.

In this sense the word "States" is used in the clause providing for the rendition of fugitive slaves, applicable to all political communities under the authority of the United Inasmuch as the Constitution has delegated no power States, including the Territories as well as the several to the Federal Government in respect to any other kind States of the Union. Under any other construction, the of property belonging to the citizen-neither introducing, right of the owner to recover his slave would be restricted establishing, prohibiting, nor excluding it anywhere within to the States of the Union, leaving the Territories a secure the dominion of the United States, but leaves the owner place of refuge for all fugitives. The same remark is apthereof perfectly free to remove into any State or Terri-plicable to the clause of the Constitution which provides tory, and carry his property with him, and hold the same subject to the local law, and relying upon the local authorities for protection, it follows, according to the decision of the Court, that slave property stands on the same footing, is entitled to the same rights and immunities, and, in like manner, is dependent upon the local authorities and laws for protection.

The Court refer to that clause of the Constitution which provides for the rendition of fugitive slaves as their authority for saying that "the right of property in slaves is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution." By reference to that provision, it will be seen that, while the word "slaves" is not used, still the Constitution not

that "a person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on the demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." Unless the term State, as used in these provisions of the Constitution, shall be construed to include every distinct political community under the jurisdiction of the United States, and to apply to Territories as well as to the States of the Union, the Territories must become a sanctuary for all the fugitives from service and justice, for all the felons and criminals who shall escape from the several States and seek refuge and immunity in the Territories.

not only to the preservation of property, but to the peace of
the Territory. It will leave the right to make such police
regulations as are necessary to prevent disorder, and which
secure its beneficial use to its owner.
will be absolutely necessary with such property as that to
With this brief ex
planation I submit the amendment."

Mr. Clay, in reply to Mr. Davis, said:

If any other illustration were necessary to show that the political communities which we now call Territories (but which, during the whole period of the Confederation and the formation of the Constitution, were always referred to as "States" or "new States'), are recognized as "States" in some of the provisions of the Constitution, they may be found in those clauses which declare that "no State" shall enter into any "treaty, alli-ing of the amendment offered by the Senator from Mississippi. ance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility."

It must be borne in mind that in each of these cases where the power is not expressly delegated to Congress the prohibition is not imposed upon the Federal Government, but upon the States. There was no necessity for any such prohibition upon Congress or the Federal Government, for the reason that the omission to delegate any such powers in the Constitution was of itself a prohibition, and so declared in express terms by the 10th amendment, which declares that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Hence it would certainly be competent for the States and Territories to exercise these powers but for the prohibition contained in those provisions of the Constitution; and inasmuch as the prohibition only extends to the "States," the people of the "Territories" are still at liberty to exercise them, unless the Territories are included within the term States, within the meaning of these provisions of the Constitution of the United States.

It only remains to be shown that the Compromise Measures of 1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 are in perfect harmony with, and a faithful embodiment of, the principles herein enforced. A brief history of these measures will disclose the principles upon which they are

Counded.

"I am not perfectly sure that I comprehend he full mean If I do, I think he accomplishes nothing by striking out the clause now in the bill and inserting that which he proposes to insert. The clause now in the bill is, that the Territorial legislation shall not extend to anything respecting African Slavery within the Territory. The effect of retaining the clause as reported by the Coinmittee will be this: That if in any of the Territories Slavery now exisis, it shall not be abolished by the Territorial Legislature; and if in any of the Territories Slavery does not now exist, it cannot be introduced by the Territorial Legislature. The clause itself was introduced into the bill by the Committee for the purpose of tying up the hands of the Territorial Legislature in respect to legislating very. It was intended to leave the legislation and the law of at all, one way or the other, upon the subject of African Slathe respective Territories in the condition in which the Act will find them. I stated on a former occasion that I did not, in Committee, vote for the amendment to insert the clause, though it was proposed to be introduced by a majority of the time, and I attach very little to it at present. It is perhaps of Committee. Iattached very little consequence to it at the stand the measure proposed by the Senator from Mississippi, no particular importance whatever. Now, sir, if I underit aims at the same thing. I do not understand him as proposing that if any one shall carry slaves into the Territoryalthough by the laws of the Territory he cannot take them should be so tied as to prevent it saying he shall not enjoy the there-the Legislative hands of the Territorial government fruits of their labor. If the Senator from Mississippi means to say that-"

Mr. Davis:

"I do mean to say it."
Mr. Clay:

"If the object of the Senator is to provide that slaves may being introduced, nothing shall be done by the Legislature to be introduced into the Territory contrary to the lex loci, and, impair the rights of owners to hold the slaves thus brought contrary to the local laws, I certainly cannot vote for it. In doing so I shall repeat again the expression of opinion which I announced at an early period of the session."

Here we find the line distinctly drawn between those who contended for the right to carry slaves into the Territories and hold them in defiance of the local law, and those who contended that such right was subject to the local law of the Territory. During the progress of the discussion on the same day, Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, said:

Territory, which act rests upon the basis of our right to make
"We are giving, or proposing to give, a government to a
such provision. We suppose we have a right to confer
legislate, and are bound not to confer power beyond that
which exists in Congress. If we give them power to legislate
beyond that, we commit a fraud or usurpation, as it may be
done openly, covertly, or indirectly."
To which Mr. Clay replied:

On the 29th of January, 1850, Mr. Clay introduced into the Senate a series of resolutions upon the Slavery question which were intended to form the basis of the subsequent legislation upon that subject. Pending the discussion of these resolutions, the chairman of the Committee on Territories prepared and reported to the Senate, on the 25th of March, two bills-one for the admission of California into the Union of States, and the other for the organization of the Territories of Utah and New Mexico, and for the adjustment of the disputed boundary with the State of Texas, which were read twice and printed for the use of the Senate. On the 19th of April a select committee of thirteen was appointed, on motion of Mr. Foote, of Miss-power. If so, we may mark out the limit to which they may issippi, of which Mr. Clay was made chairman, and to which were referred all pending propositions relating to the slavery question. On the 8th of May, Mr. Clay, from the select committee of thirteen, submitted to the Serate an elaborate report covering all the points in controversy, accompanied by a bill which is usually known as the "Omnibus Bill." By reference to the provisions of this bill, as it appears on the files of the Senate, it will be seen that it is composed of the two printed bills which had been reported by the Committee on Territories on the 25th of March previous; and that the only material change in its provisions, involving an important and essential principle, is to be found in the tenth section, which prescribes and defines the powers of the Territorial Legislature. In the bill, as reported by the Committee on Territories, the legislative power of the Territories extended to "all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States," without excepting African Slavery; while the bill, as reported by the committee of thirteen, conferred the same power on the Territorial Legislature, with the exception of African Slavery. This portion of the section in its original form read thus:

"And be it further enacted that the Legislative power of the Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the

provisions of this act; but no iaw shall be passed interfering with the primary disposition of the soil."

To which the committee of thirteen added these words: Nor in respect to African Slavery." When the bill came up for action on the 15th of May, Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, said:

Now, sir, I only repeat what I have had occasion to say before, that while I am willing to stand aside and make no legislative enactment one way or the other-to lay off the Territo I understand we are threatened, or without an attempt to ries without the Wilmot Proviso, on the one hand, with which introduce a clause for the introduction of Slavery into the Territories-while I am for rejecting both the one and the other, I am content that the law as it exists shall prevail; and if there be any diversity of opinion as to what it means, I am of the country. While I am content thus to abide the result, I willing that it shall be settled by the highest judicial authority must say that I cannot vote for any express provision recognizing the right to carry slaves there."

To which Mr. Davis rejoined, that

hope we have something of the same character of the hardy "It is said our Revolution grew out of a preamble; and 1 men of the Revolution who first commenced the war with the mother country-something of the spirit of that bold Yankee who said he had a right to go to Concord, and that go he would; and who, in the maintenance of that right, met his death at the hands of a British sentinel. Now, sir, if our right to carry slaves into these Territories be a constitutional right, it is our first duty to maintain it."

suggestion of friends, modified his amendment from time Pending the discussion which ensued, Mr. Davis, at the to time, until it assumed the following shape:

Pro

"Nor to introduce or exclude African Slavery. vided that nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to prevent said Territorial Legislature from passing such laws as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of property of every kind which may have been, of the United States, held in or introduced into said Terrior may be hereafter, conformably to the Constitution tory."

"I offer the following amendment. To strike out, in the sixth line of the tenth section, the words 'in respect to African Slavery,' and insert the words, rith those rights of property growing out of the institution of African Slavery as it exists in any of the States of the Union. The object of the amendment is to prevent the Territorial Legislature from legislating the following amendment: against the rights of property growing out of the institution of Slavery...... It will leave to the Territorial Legislatures those rights and powers which are essentially necessary,

To which, on the same day, Mr. Chase, of Ohio, offered

"Provided further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing or permitting the introduction of

"I have a word to say to the honorable Senator from Mis-ries, of the Senate, to which had been referred a bill for sissippi (Mr. Davis). He insists that I am not in favor of pro- the bill back, with an amendment, in the form of a substithe organization of the Territory of Nebraska, reported tecting property, and that his amendment is offered for the purpose of protecting property under the Constitution. Now, tute for the entire bill, which, with some modifications, is sir, I ask you what authority he has for assuming that? Do I now known on the statute book as the "Kansas-Nebraska not desire to protect property because I wish to allow the Act," accompanied by a Report explaining the principles people to pass such laws as they deem proper respecting upon which it was proposed to organize those Territories, their rights to property without any exception? He might as follows: just as well say that I am opposed to protecting property in merchandise, in steamboats, in cattle, in real estate, as to say that I am opposed to protecting property of any other description; for I desire to put them all on an equality, and allow the people to make their own laws in respect to the whole of them."

After presenting and reviewing certain provisions of the | of Congress, and became the law of the land by the ap bill, the Committee conclude as follows:

First-That all questions pertaining to Slavery in the Territories, and in the new States to be formed therefrom, are to be left to the decision of the people residing therein, by their appropriate representatives to be chosen by them for that purpose. "Second.-That all cases involving title to slaves and questions of personal freedom, are referred to the adjudication of the local tribunals, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.

proval of the President, May 30, 1854.

In 1856, the Democratic party, assembled in National Convention at Cincinnati, declared by a unanimous vote of the delegates from every State in the Union, that

"The American Democracy recognize and adopt the principles contained in the organic laws establishing the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska as embodying the only sound and safe solution of the 'Slavery question,' upon which the great national idea of the people of this whole country can repose in its determined conservatism of the Union-noninterference by Congress with Slavery in State and Territory, or in the District of Columbia; "Third.-That the provision of the Constitution of the "That this was the basis of the Compromises of 1850, conUnited States in respect to fugitives from service, is to be car-firmed by both the Democratic and Whig parties in National ried into faithful execution in all the organized Territories, the Conventions-ratified by the people in the election of 1852same as in the States. The substitute for the bill which your and rightly applied to the organization of the Territories in Committee have prepared, and which is commended to the 1854; That by the uniform application of this Democratic favorable action of the Senate, proposes to carry these pro- principle to the organization of Territories and to the admispositions and principles into practical operation, in the precise sion of new States, with or without domestic Slavery as they language of the Compromise Measures of 1850."'" may elect, the equal rights of all will be preserved intact-the original compacts of the Constitution maintained inviolateand the perpetuity and expansion of this Union insured to its utmost capacity of embracing in peace and harmony any future American State that may be constituted or annexed with a Republican form of government."

By reference to that section of the "Kansas-Nebraska Act" as it now stands on the statute book, which prescribed and defined the power of the Territorial Legislature, it will be seen that it is, "in the precise language of the Compromise Measures of 1850," extending the legislative power of the Territory "to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution," without excepting African Slavery.

It having been suggested, with some plausibility, during the discussion of the bill, that the act of Congress of March 6, 1820, prohibiting Slavery north of the parallel of 86° 30' would deprive the people of the Territory of the power of regulating the Slavery question to suit themselves while they should remain in a Territorial condition, and before they should have the requisite population to entitle them to admission into the Union as a State, an amendment was prepared by the Chairman of the Committee, and incorporated into the bill to remove this obstacle to the free exercise of the principle of popular sovereignty in the Territory, while it remained in a Territorial condition, by repealing the said act of Congress, and declaring the true intent and meaning of all the friends of the bill in these words:

"That the Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the Territory as elsewhere within the United States, except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March 6, 1820, which being inconsistent with the principle of non-interven: tion by Congress with Slavery in the States and Territories, as recognized by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the Compromise Measures,' is hereby declared inoperative and void it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate Slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it there; from, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.

In accepting the nomination of this Convention, Mr Buchanan, in a letter dated June 16, 1856, said:

"The agitation on the question of domestic Slavery has too long distracted and divided the people of this Union, and alienated their affections from each other. This agitation has assumed many forms since its commencement, but it now from its present character, I think we may safely anticipate seems to be directed chiefly to the Territories; and judging that it is rapidly approaching a finality.' The recent legislation of Congress respecting domestic Slavery, derived, as it has been, from the original and pure fountain of legitimate political power, the will of the majority, promises, ere long, to allay the dangerous excitement. This legislation is founded accordance with them has simply declared that the people of a upon principles as ancient as free government itself, and in Territory, like those of a State, shall decide for themselves whether Slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits."

This exposition of the history of these measures shows conclusively that the authors of the Compromise Measures of 1850, and of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, as well as the members of the Continental Congress of 1774, and the founders of our system of government subsequent to the Revolution, regarded the people of the Territories and Colonies as political communities which were entitled to a free and exclusive power of legislation in their Provincial Legislatures, where their representation could alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity. This right pertains to the people collectively as a lawabiding and peaceful community, and not to the isolated individuals who may wander upon the public domain in violation of law. It can only be exercised where there are inhabitants sufficient to constitute a government, and capable of performing its various functions and duties-a fact to be ascertained and determined by Congress.

To which was added, on motion of Mr. Badger, the fol- Whether the number shall be fixed at ten, fifteen or lowing:

"Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to revive or put in force any law or regulation which may have existed prior to the act of the sixth of March, 1820, either protecting, establishing, of abolishing slavery."

In this form, and with this distinct understanding of its "true intent and meaning," the bill passed the two houses

twenty thousand inhabitants does not affect the principle. The principle, under our political system, is that every distinct political Community, loyal to the Constitution and the Union, is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of self-government in respect to their local concerns and internal polity, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.

NATIONAL POLITICS

SPEECH OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, OF ILLINOIS.

Delivered at the Cooper Institute, Monday, Feb. 27, 1860.

MR. PRESIDENT AND FELLOW-CITIZENS OF NEW-YORK: The facts with which I shall deal this evening are mainly old and familiar; nor is there anything new in the general use I shall make of them. If there shall be any novelty, it will be in the mode of presenting the facts, and the inferences and observations following that presentation.

In his speech, last autumn, at Columbus, Ohio, as reported in "The New York Times," Senator Douglas said:

"Our fathers, when they framed the Government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better than we do now."

I fully indorse this, and I adopt it as a text for this discourse. I so adopt it because it furnishes a precise and an agreed starting point for a discussion between Republicans and that wing of Democracy headed by Senator Douglas. It simply leaves the inquiry: "What was the understanding those fathers had of the question mentioned ?"

What is the frame of Government under which we live?

The answer must be: "The Constitution of the United States." That Constitution consists of the original, tramed in 1787 (and under which the present Governmen: Arst went into operation), and twelve subsequently framed amendments, the first ten of which were framed in 1789.

In 1787, still before the Constitution, but while the Convention was in session framing it, and while the Northwestern Territory still was the only Territory owned by the United States-the same question of prohibiting Slavery in the Territory again came before the Congress of the Confederation; and three more of the "thirty-nine" who afterward signed the Constitution, were in that Congress, and voted on the question. They were William Blount, William Few and Abraham Baldwin; and they all voted for the prohibition—thus show ing that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from federal authority, nor anything else, properly forbids the Federal Government to control as to Slavery in federal territory. This time the prohibition became a law, being part of what is now well known as the Ordinance of '87.

The question of federal control of Slavery in the Territories, seems not to have been directly before the Convention which framed the original Constitution; and hence it is not recorded that the "thirty-nine," or any of them, while engaged on that instrument, expressed any opinion on that precise question.

In 1789, by the first Congress which sat under the Constitution, an act was passed to enforce the Ordinance of '87, including the prohibition of Slavery in the Northwestern Territory. The bill for this act was reported by one of the "thirty-nine," Thomas Fitzsimmons, then a member of the House of Representatives from Pennsyl vania. It went through all its stages without a word of opposition, and finally passed both branches without yeas and nays, which is equivalent to a unanimous passage. In this Congress there were sixteen of the thirty-nine" fathers who framed the original Constitution. They were John Langdon, Nicholas Gilman, Wm. S. Johnson, Roger Sherman, Robert Morris, Thomas Fitzsimmons, William Few, Abraham Baldwin, Rufus King, William Patterson, George Clymer, Richard Bassett, George Read, Pierce Butler, Daniel Carroll, James Madison.

Who were our fathers that framed the Constitution? I suppose the "thirty-nine" who signed the original instrument may be fairly called our fathers who framed that part of the present Government. It is almost exactly true to say they framed it, and it is altogether" true to say they fairly represented the opinion and sentiment of the whole nation at that time. Their names, being familiar to nearly all, and accessible to quite all, need not now be repeated.

I take these " thirty-nine," for the present, as being our fathers who framed the Government under which we live."

What is the question which, according to the text, those fathers understood just as well, and even better than we do now?

It is this: Does the proper division of local from federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, forbid our Federal Government to control as to Slavery in our Federal Territories?

Upon this, Douglas holds the affirmative, and Republicans the negative. This affirmative and denial form an issue; and this issue-this question-is precisely what the text declares our fathers understood better than we. Let us now inquire whether the "thirty-nine," or any of them, ever acted upon this question; and if they did, how they acted upon it-how they expressed that better understanding.

In 1784-three years before the Constitution-the United States then owning the Northwestern Territory, and no other-the Congress of the Confederation had before them the question of prohibiting Slavery in that Territory; and four of the "thirty-nine," who afterward | framed the Constitution were in that Congress, and voted on that question. Of these, Roger Sherman, Thomas Mifflin, and Hugh Williamson voted for the prohibition-thus showing that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from federal authority, nor anything else, properly forbade the Federal Government to control as to Slavery in Federal Territory. The other of the four-James McHenry-voted against the prohibition, showing that, for some cause, he thought it improper to vote for it.

This shows that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, properly forbade Congress to prohibit Slavery in the federal territory; else both their fidelity to correct principle, and their oath to support the Constitution, would have constrained them to oppose the prohibition.

Again, George Washington, another of the "thirtynine," was then President of the United States, and, as such, approved and signed the bill, thus completing its validity as a law, and thus showing that, in his understanding, no line dividing local from federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government, to control as to Slavery in federal territory.

No great while after the adoption of the original Constitution, North Carolina ceded to the Federal Government the country now constituting the State of Tennessee; and a few years later Georgia ceded that which now constitutes the States of Mississippi and Alabama. In both deeds of cession it was made a condition by the ceding States that the Federal Government should not prohibit Slavery in the ceded country. Besides this, Slavery was then actually in the ceded country. Under these circumstances, Congress, on taking charge of these countries, did not absolutely prohibit Slavery within them. But they did interfere with it-take control of it-even there, to a certain extent. In 1798, Congress organized the Territory of Mississippi. In the act of organization they prohibited the bringing of Slaves into the Territory, from any place