ternate sections reserved to the United States along the line of land-grant railroads, the price for which was fixed at $2.50 per acre; that the act of 1891 was interpreted to mean all desert lands, those within as well as those without the granted limits of a railroad, and to authorize their sale at $1.25 per acre; and that cases initiated under the act of 1877 should, in re spect to price per acre of lands, be completed according to the terms prescribed by the act of 1891. If, prior to the passage of the act of 1891, the Interior Department had uniformly interpret ed the act of 1877 as reducing the price of alternate reserved sections of land along the lines of land-grant railroads, being desert lands, from $2.50 to $1.25 per acre, we should ac cept that interpretation as the true one, if, upon examining the statute, we found its meaning to be at all doubtful or obscure. But as the practice of the Department has not been uniform, we deem it our duty to determine the true interpretation of the act of 1877, without reference to the practice in the Department. Did the act of 1877 supersede or modify the 146] proviso of *U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2357, which expressly declared that the price to be paid for alternate reserved lands along the line of railroads, within the limits defined by any act of Congress, should be $2.50 per acre? The principal, if not the only, object of the requirement that the alternate reserved sections along the lines of land-grant railroads should not be sold for less than double the minimum price fixed for other public lands, was to compensate the United States for the loss of the sections given away by the government. along the lines of a railroad *aided by a[147 grant of public lands, being also desert lands, could be obtained, under the act of 1877, at $1.25 an acre, would be to modify the previous law by implication merely. In frost v. Wenie, 157 U. S. 46, 58 [39: 614, 619], we said: "It is well settled that repeals by implication are not to be favored. And where two statutes cover, in whole or in part, the same matter, and are not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty of the court-no purpose to repeal being clearly expressed or indicated-is, if possible, to give effect to both. In other words, it must not be supposed that the legislature intended by a later statute to repeal a prior one on the same subject, unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and therefore to displace the prior statute.' Giving effect to these rules of interpretation, we hold that Secretaries Lamar and Noble properly decided that the act of 1877 did not supersede the proviso of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2357, and therefore did not embrace alternate sections reserved to the United States by a railroad land grant. It results that prior to the passage of the act of 1891, lands such as those here in suit, although within the general description of desert lands, could not properly be disposed of at less than $2.50 per acre. Was a different rule prescribed by that act in relation to entries made previously to its passage? If it be true, as seems to have been held by the Interior Department, that the act of 1877, as amended by that of 1891, embraces alternate reserved sections along the lines of landgrant railroads that require irrigation in order to fit them for agricultural purposes,-upon which question we express no opinion,-it is necessary to determine whether a case begun, as this one was, prior to the passage of the act of 1891, is controlled by the law as it was when the original entry was made. This question is important in view of the fact that the appellee's entry was made under the act of 1877 before it was amended, and his final proof was made after the act of 1891 took effect. *The present Secretary of the Interior,[148 as we have seen, held that entries initiated under the act of 1877 and prior to the act of 1891 could be completed upon the terms fixed by the latter act as to price of desert lands. If that construction be correct, and if the plaintiff is not precluded from recovering money voluntarily paid by him, with full knowledge of all the facts, then the judgment below was right. Otherwise, it must be reversed. The act of 1877 and the proviso of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2357, both relate to public lands; the former, to desert lands, that is, such lands -not timber and mineral lands-as required irrigation in order to produce agricultural crops, and the price for which was $1.25 per acre; the latter, to such lands, along the line of railroads, as were reserved to the United States in any grant made by Congress, and the price for which was $2.50 per acre. As the statute last enacted contains no words of repeal, and as repeals of statutes by implication merely are never favored, our duty is to give effect to both the old and new statute, if that can be done consistently with the words employed by Congress in each. We perceive no difficulty in holding that the desert lands referred to in the act of 1877 are those in the states and territories specified, which required irrigation before they could be used for agricultural purposes, but which were not alternate sections reserved by Congress in a railroad land grant. It is as if the act of 1877, in terms, excepted from its operation such lands as are described in the proviso of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2357. Thus construed, both statutes can be given the fullest effect which the words of each necessarily require. In the absence of some declaration that Congress intended to Although the act of 1891 was, in some parmodify the long-established policy indicated ticulars, clumsily drawn, it is manifest that by the proviso of U. 8. Rev. Stat. § 2357, we the words "this act," in the section added by ought not to suppose that there was any purpose it to the act of 1877 and numbered 6, refer to to except from that proviso any public lands the act of 1891, and that the words "said act" of the kind therein described, even if, without refer to the act of 1877. It is equally clear irrigation, they were unprofitable for agricultu- that the purpose of that section, thus added ral purposes. To hold that alternate sections to the former act, was to preserve the right to We are of opinion that the act of 1891 did not authorize the lands in dispute to be sold at $1.25 per acre, where, as in this case, the proceedings to obtain them were begun before its passage. perfect all bona fide claims "lawfully initiated" under the act of 1877, and " upon the same terms and conditions " as were prescribed in that act. It is true that the claimant, at his option, could perfect his claim, thus initiated, and have the lands patented under the act of 1877, as amended by that of 1891, so far as the latter act was applicable to the case. But this did not mean that land entered under the act of 1877, when the price was $2.50 per acre, could be patented, after the passage of the act of 1891, upon paying only $1.25 per acre. 2. 4. 5. If any doubt could exist as to the object of 8. section 6, added by the act of 1891 to the act of 1877,-to which section the attention of the present Secretary seems not to have been drawn, that doubt must be removed by the explicit language of added section 7. The latter section fixes the price of desert lands at $1.25 per acre, and declares that "this section shall not apply to entries made or initiated prior to the approval of this act"-that is, to entries made prior to the approval of the act of 1891. The Secretary construed the word "section" to mean "provision," and as referring, not to the entire section, but only to the clause or 149]provision relating to the quantity of desert lands that any person or association of persons might appropriate. We cannot assent to this view. The words "section" and "provision" frequently occur in the act of 1891, and there is no reason to suppose that Congress, when using the words, "but this section shall not apply to entries made or initiated prior to the approval of this act," intended that only one provision or clause of that section should apply to such entries. right to prefer a creditor by a real sale of property made in good faith for a fair price, to extinguish the debt, and containing no reservation of benefit to the vendor, although the vendor was insolvent to the knowledge of the vendee, and although the vendor intended thereby to defraud his other creditors, and the necessary effect was to prevent other creditors from obtaining payment of their debts. The decisions of the state supreme court construing a state law as to preferences of creditors, will be followed by this court in cases arising in that state. Where a sale of property by a debtor to a credit or was valid by the law of the state, the making of a general assignment by the former on the same day will not render it illegal. As against creditors of an insolvent debtor, one claiming as a purchaser from the latter must prove that he paid a valuable and adequate consideration, but is not bound to negative the reservation of a benefit to the debtor. Instructions to the jury that if the debtor made a valid sale of his stock of goods to a creditor, the latter had a legal right to employ the former as a clerk to assist in winding up the business, and also the right to give or sell the goods to the debtor's wife, are not erroneous as causing the jury to disregard these facts in passing upon the bona fides of the sale to the creditor, where the question of reservation of a secret benefit to the debtor in the sale was particularly called to the attention of the jury. 6. An indorser of a note has a right to protect his indorsement by a sale of goods by the insolvent maker to himself. 7. A corporation of one state does not carry on business in another state by discounting a note sent to it from the other state. 8. We are of opinion that cases initiated under the original act of 1877, but not completed by final proof until after the passage of the act of 1891, were left by the latter act-at least as to the price to be paid for the lands entered -to be governed by the law in force at the time the entry was made. So far as the price of the public lands was concerned, the act of 1891 did not change, but expressly declined to 9. change, the terms and conditions that were applicable to entries made before its passage. Such terms and conditions were expressly preserved in respect of all entries initiated before the passage of that act. Where a creditor writes a letter to another creditor to give an extension to a debtor, and expresses a willingness to grant the extension if the other creditor will, and the other creditor does not accept the proposition but grants an extension in conflict with the letter, the obtaining of preference by the former in the payment of his debt by a sale to him of the debtor's property is not a fraud upon the other creditor. Where the entire charge is not in the record, re versible error will not be inferred from the part given, where the rest of it, if given, might explain the alleged error. [No. 48.] The judgment of the court of claims is reversed, with directions to dismiss the claimant's Submitted April 11, 1895. Decided December petition. Reversed. 9, 1895. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the BAMBERGER, BLOOM, & COMPANY, IN United States for the Northern District of Plffs. in Err., D. W. H. SCHOOLFIELD and G. H. MILLER, (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 149-169.) 1. Under the law of Alabama a debtor has the NOTE.-A8 to assignments for benefit of creditors, with preferences, when valid, when not,-see note to Marbury v. Brooks, 5.522. As to assignments for benefit of creditors; validity; assignment laws have no extraterritorial efficacy; | Alabama, to review a judgment in favor of W. H. Schoolfield et al., in an intervening suit which grew out of an attachment proceeding instituted by Bamberger, Bloom, & Company against one Henry Warten, in which there was a judgment for the claimants, W. H. Schoolfield et al. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Milton Humes, for plaintiffs in error: To establish fraud, it is not necessary to prove it by direct and positive evidence. Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but preferences in assignments; void assignments,—see note to May v. Tenney, 37: 368. As to assignment void for want of change of possession,-see note to Brooks v. Marbury, 6: 423. In most cases it is the only proof that can be adduced. Rea v. Missouri, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 543 (21: 709); Rochester v. Armour, 92 Ala. 489. In the race of diligence the creditor who seeks to become preferred must do no more than by fair methods obtain payment of his Own claim. knowledge or information become the voluntary beneficiaries of the fraud of the debtor thus committed, this is sufficient in law to viti. ate the transaction. Bank of Montgomery v. Ohio Buggy_Co. 100 Ala. 626; Clements v. Nicholson, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 299 (18: 786); Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249, 1 Am. Rep. 103. Instructions which limit and restrict the in Seaman v. Nolen, 68 Ala. 466; Bank of Montgomery v. Ohio Buggy Co. 100 Ala. 626; Fenquiry of the jury to the investigation of the ner v. Dickey, 1 Flipp. 34; Buswell v. Davis, 10 N. H. 413; Campbell v. Hopkins, 87 Ala. 179; 1 Wade, Attachm. ¶ 221. Fraud may be proved by circumstances. When a creditor shows facts that raise a strong presumption of fraud in a conveyance made by his debtor, the history of which is necessarily known to the debtor only, the burden of proof lies on him to explain it, his estate being involved. Clements v. Nicholson, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 299 (18: 786); Hubbard v. Allen, 59 Ala. 296. Judges are no longer required to submit a case to the jury merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character as would warrant the jury to proceed in finding a verdict in favor of the party introducing such evidence. Marion County Com18. v. Clark, 94 U. S. 284 (24: 61); Foster v. Goodwin, 82 Ala. 384; Moore . Penn, 95 Ala. 203; Hodges v. Coleman, 76 Ala. 105; Seamen v. Nolen, 68 Ala. 466; Levy v. Williams, 79 Ala. 177; Wait, Fraud. Conv. § 390, If by the transaction the failing debtor secured to himself a paying employment which but for the sale he would not have had, this was a benefit reserved, which renders the transaction fraudulent. Lukins v. Aird, 73 U. 8. 6 Wall. 78 (18: 750); Harmon v. McRae, 91 Ala. 411; Page v. Francis, 97 Ala. 382; Stephens v. Regenstein, 89 Ala. 561. The acts, conduct, and declarations of the grantor at or about the time of the making of the transaction assailed is a part of the res gesta, and admissible as evidence, whether made or occurring in the presence of the grantee or not. Masterson v. Phinizy, 56 Ala. 336; Lincoln Claflin, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 132 (19: 106); Rea v. Missouri, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 532 (21: 707); Jones v. Simpson, 116 U. S. 609 (29: 742); Durr v. Jackson, 59 Ala. 203; 2 Rice, Ev. 950, 960. The advantage by one creditor over another which the law condemns is an undue and unfair advantage, an advantage obtained by unfair methods, such as concealment, deceit, etc. The charge makes any advantage, whether fair and open, or unfair and concealed, to be condemned by the law. For the error alone of giving this charge, so radically wrong both in its hypothesis of the facts and its statement of the law, this case should be reversed. Ayers v. Watson, 118 U. S. 594, 608, 609 (28: 1093, 1098); Edwards v. Darby, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 206 (6: 603). If the claimants have knowledge of the fraud, or information in regard to it, and with such | existence of the debt, the value of the goods, and the reservation of a benefit by Warten, and do not embrace the additional proposition as to whether the preference given to the claimants by the transaction was obtained by fair methods, or was undue advantage taken by them of the plaintiffs, are erroneous. City Nat. Bank v. Jeffries, 73 Ala. 183; Campbell v. Hopkins, 87 Ala. 184; Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 47 U. S. 6 How. 212 (12: 409); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 1 (7: 327); Greenleaf v. Birth, 34 U. S. 9 Pet. 292 (9: 132). When, as in this case, strong and undisputed circumstances of suspicion and badges of fraud exist, then, the presumption of fraud arising legally from these circumstances, the law im poses the burden upon the creditor preferred of explaining. Moore v. Penn, 95 Ala. 204; Roswald v. Hobbie, 85 Ala. 73; Pollak v. Searcy, 84 Ala. 259; Smith v. Collins, 94 Ala. 394; Chipman v. Glennon, 98 Ala. 263. Messrs. Lawrence Cooper and F. P. Poston, for defendants in error: Under the laws of Alabama, Warten had the right to prefer Schoolfield, Hanauer, & Company over other creditors. Moog v. Farley, 79 Ala. 246. The evidence is irresistible that Schoolfield, Hanauer, & Company did not participate in any fraudulent intent on the part of Warten, if any such intent he had. The goods were taken in payment of an honest debt, at a fair and adequate price, and no interest was reserved by Warten. These concurrent facts absolutely rebut all inferences that might be drawn from attendant badges of fraud and impart validity to the conveyance as an allowable preference of the particular creditor. Hodges v. Coleman, 76 Ala. 103; Meyer v. Sulzbacher, 76 Ala. 120; Levy v. Williams, 79 Ala. 171; Carter v. Coleman, 82 Ala. 177; Wood v. Moore, 84 Ala. 253; Carter v. Coleman, 84 Ala. 256; Dollins v. Pollock, 89 Ala. 351; Hornthall v. Schonfeld, 79 Ala. 107. A sale of his property by an insolvent debtor at a fair and adequate price in absolute payment of an honest debt, without reserving any benefit whatever to himself, will be sustained by Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61 (29: 329); Tompkins v. Wheeler, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 106 (10: 903); Brooks v. Marbury, 24 U. S. 11 Wheat. 78 (6: 423); and Clarke v. White, 37 U. S. 12 Pet. 178 (9: 1046). An absolute sale in payment of an honest debt is not a part of a general assignment. Heyer v. Bromberg, 74 Ala. 524. An absolute unconditional sale and conveyance of bis property by a debtor, free from all reservation, in payment and satisfaction of antecedent debts, cannot be declared a general | ing to Warten. The defendants in error inassignment. Otis v. Maguire, 76 Ala. 295; Danner v. Brewer, 69 Ala. 191. The sale was not as security for the payment of debts, but was an absolute payment of a debt. The sale, therefore, was not a general assignment, and is not within the purview or purpose of the state. tervened and claimed the things seized, and thereby an issue was formed as to whether they were owned by the defendant in attachment or were the property of the claimants. The undisputed facts are as follows: Henry Warten embarked in trade at Athens, Ala., in 1881; his business consisted of a general country merchandise store, of *advancing to [151 farmers money or provisions wherewith to culti Harkins v. Bailey, 48 Ala. 376; Crawford v. | Kirksey, 55 Ala. 282, 28 Am. Rep. 704; Dan-vate and market a crop of cotton, of buying ner v. Brewer, supra. A failing debtor may prefer one creditor to the exclusion of others, and it is immaterial whether the preference be given by payment, Conveyancing, mortgage, by delivery of goods, by confession of judgment, or by suffering an attachment. Claflin v. Sylvester, 99 Mo. 276; Cason v. Murray, 15 Mo. 378; Gilbert v. McCorkle, 110 Ind. 215; Sweetzer v. Higby, 63 Mich. 13; Ful ler Electrical Co. v. Lewis, 101 N. Y. 674; Richardson v. Marqueze, 59 Miss. 80, 42 Am. Rep. 353. Upon the question of the construction and effect of a statute of a state regulating assignments for the benefit of creditors, the decisions of the highest court of the state are of control ling authority in this court. Union Nat. Bank v. Bank of Kansas City, 136 U. S. 223 (34: 341); Peters v. Bain, 133 Ü. S. 670 (33: 676). As to the employment of Warten as a clerk, we find nothing inconsistent with fair dealing. There was no reservation in the bill of sale looking to his employment; it was not then contemplated. Smith v. Craft, 123 U. S. 436 (31: 267). This employment of Warten was not only not an evidence of a fraudulent intent, but was essential to the vigilant preservation and collection of the property. Tompkins v. Wheeler, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 106 (10: 903); Olney v. Tanner, 10 Fed. Rep. 101; Hitchcock v. St. John, Hoffm. Ch. 511; Wilbur v. Fradenburgh, 52 Barb. 476; Murray v. Mc Nealy, 86 Ala. 234. The acts and declarations of Warten, made out of the presence of the grantee, are not evidence against the latter. Moses v. Dunham, 71 Ala. 173. It was permissible to show the business character of Warten as illustrating the reason of his employment. Smith v. Craft, 123 U. S. 436 (31: 267). The charge of the court was in keeping with the authorities cited. Hodges v. Coleman, 76 Ala. 103; Meyer v. Sulzbacher, 76 Ala. 120; Levy v. Williams, 79 Ala. 171; Hornthall v. Schonfeld, 79 Ala. 107; Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61 (29: 329); Tompkins v. Wheeler, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 106 (10: 903). and selling cotton on his own account and as agent for others. Almost at the opening of his career at Athens, Warten began a course of dealings with the commercial firm of Schoolfield, Hanauer, & Company, of Memphis, Tenn. (whom we designate hereafter as the Memphis firm). They became his general factors, selling him merchandise, loaning him money, cashing his sight drafts given to others in payment of merchandise bought by him or for debts due, he consigning them cotton for sale, the proceeds passing to the credit of his account. This course of dealing continued until April, 1889, when the Memphis firm went into liquidation. There was then formed, under the laws of Tennessee, a corporation styled the Schoolfield-Hanauer Company, designated hereafter as the Memphis company, with whom Warten carried on business of the same general nature as that previously conducted with the firm. The cotton crop of 1889, in the region of country where Warten dealt, was a disastrous failure, and in consequence of this fact, by the month of December of that year Warten had a large amount of outstanding debts due him by unsecured accounts, which were either permanently lost or were unavailable as quick realizable assets. At this time he owed a large amount of money for merchandise and for money borrowed during the course of his business. This coudition of things produced disorder in his affairs and a state of actual, if not ultimate, insolvency. By the 20th of December, 1889, Warten owed the Memphis firm a considerable debt, evidenced by four notes, three of which were dated May 22, 1889, two for $5,000 each were past due, one for $3,794 was to become due on January 1, 1890, the other for $2,500 was dated June 10, 1890, and had also matured. The last-mentioned note (dated June 10, 1890) had been made by Warten to the order of the Memphis house, was by it indorsed, and had been discounted by the Memphis company, who put the proceeds to the credit of Warten, he thereafter drawing against the credit to the full extent thereof. Warten at that time also owed the firm of Bamberger, Bloom, *& Company, of Louisville, hereafter [152 called the Louisville firm, a past-due note amounting to $4,719.36, and an open account, both together making the total of his indebtedness to that firm between $6,500 and $7,000. The embarrassed condition of Warten's afThe controversy below was what is known in fairs was known to the Memphis and the Louisthe jurisprudence of Alabama as a statutory ville firm. Late in December, after conferclaim suit, and grew out of an attachment pro- ring with his creditors in Memphis, Warten ceeding instituted by plaintiffs in error against went to Louisville for the purpose of asking one Henry Warten. Under the writ a levy was an extension from the Louisville firm, and demade on certain merchandise treated as belong-livered to them the following letter: Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court: "Memphis, Tenn., Dec. 27, 1889. "Messrs. Bamberger, Bloom, & Company, "Louisville, Ky. "Dear Sirs: Our mutual friend and customer, Mr. Henry Warten, through, we believe no fault of his own, but owing to disastrous failure of crops in his own section, finds himself forced to ask for extension, of his particular friends, and he recognizes you among that number and from whom he can ask that favor. Having confidence in his honor and integrity and business qualifications, we have agreed to give him extension, provided you will do so. He informs us that one of his creditors has agreed to give him extension, and he will only ask it of three houses,-viz., your selves, ourselves, and the party who has agreed to. Yours very truly, A few days after this sale the Louisville firm attached the stock of goods in the Athens store as being yet the property of Warten. The Memphis firm claimed the property seized and bonded it, thus raising the issue to which we have in the outset referred. After the sale by Warten to the Memphis firm, he acted as an employee in the store generally assisting *in[154 the conduct of the business, continuing to do so until the 10th of June, 1890, when what remained of the stock and some other of the property which had been sold to the Memphis firm was resold to the wife of Warten. Although there is no dispute as to the foregoing facts, on every other question of fact there is conflict. The claimants' evidence tended to show that the sale by Warten to them was real, was made for a just price, and that it absolutely extinguished their debt, and that no benefit or expected benefit was expressly or impliedly reserved to the seller; that actual delivery was made of the property sold, and that they were in possession as owners at the time of the attachment; that the employment of Warten was simply in a clerical capacity and was rendered advisable from his knowledge of the business and consequent ability to assist the vendors in converting the stock and assets into cash. On the other hand, the evidence of the attaching creditor (the Louisville firm) tended to show by a mass of circumstances that the sale was intended to and did reserve a benefit to Warten; that his presence in the store after the sale, while ostensibly in the capacity of an employee, was really in that of an owner or of one having an expectancy of ownership. As to the facts connected with the settlement made by the Memphis firm, there was also much conflict in the evidence, Warton swearing that when he presented the letter from the Louisville firm the extension to the next crop year asked by him was refused, unless he paid $3,000 cash, and that it was in consequence of this demand that he telegraphed the Memphis company that the Louisville firm refused the extension and asked $3,000; that when he could not procure the amount of the cash payment demanded, then the settlement was effected, the short term acceptances for $3,000 having been given by him as an equivalent of the cash demanded; the remainder of the debt, except a small sum, having been extended to the next crop season. On the other hand, the testimony of a member of the Louisville house was that no demand of cash was made and that the extension asked by Warten was granted without objection, and was evidenced by the acceptances. "The Schoolfield-Hanauer Co." After arriving at Louisville, Warten telegraphed the Memphis company that the Louisville firm refused the extension unless he paid $3,000 in cash, and the company replied that they could not give him the money. A settle ment was made on the 30th of December between Warten and the Louisville firm, by which the outstanding past-due note was taken up, and Warten furnished an acceptance due on the 15th of January for $1,000, and four other acceptances of $500 each, maturing on the 1st and 15th of February and 1st and 15th of March following, and the balance of the debt, ex153]cept an item *of about $200, was settled by acceptances maturing the following November and December. At the time of making this settlement or thereafter (up to the 13th of January) the Louisville firm made no reply to the letter from the Memphis firm. From January 1 the embarrassment of Warten became rapidly more flagrant, in consequence of the results of the crop disaster becoming absolutely assured. On the 18th of January, 1890, at about 6 o'clock in the morning, Warten sold to the Memphis firm his stock of goods, safe and store fixtures at Athens, with also a small stock and store fixtures owned by him at Elkmont, and certain accounts, a lot of mules, and an interest in real estate, for the price of $17,032.40, this being the amount of the principal and interest of the notes held by the firm, which have been already mentioned. The sale was accepted in full acquittance and discharge of the debt. A member of the firm, who had come from Memphis, took possession of the property. On the same day Warten sold to the Memphis company certain assets in full payment of an open account due by him, and other transfers of assets in payment of other debts to various creditors were also *There was a verdict for the claimants [155 made at or about that time. On the same day (the Memphis firm), and the seizing creditor (the as the sale to the Memphis firm (13th of Janu- Louisville firm) prosecutes this writ of error, ary, 1890), between 11 and 12 o'clock, Warten on which he assigns thirty-six errors, twelve of made a general assignment of all but his ex- which are predicated on erroneous rulings asempt property in favor of his general credi- serted to have been made in admitting or retors; the assets covered by this assignment be-jecting testimony, and the others are directed ing open accounts due bim, and the remaining to the charge of the court to the jury. Only avails of his business, amounting to the face a fragment of the general charge is in the rec value of about $50,000; the claim of the creditors in whose favor this assignment was made, including that of the Louisville firm, aggregating about $15,000. Of the accounts as signed, about $30,000 were debts due Warten for business of the current crop year. 160 U. S. U. S., Book 40. ord. Each party, however, presented a series of requests stating the propositions of law which they respectively deemed applicable to the facts, and all the errors assigned growing out of the charge of the court involve the correctness of the court's action in having sub24 377 |